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Over the last decade environmental and natural resources governance has received a growing 
share of attention on the international peacebuilding agenda.  Few studies have scrutinized in 
detail the role of international peacebuilders or whether reforms and policies help or hinder 
peacebuilding outcomes.  This dissertation examines international efforts to shape the 
governance of forests in Liberia and diamonds and minerals in Sierra Leone.  I find that 
international peacebuilding organizations frame the challenge in both cases as transforming 
conflict resources into peace resources for the purpose of reducing the propensity for 
violence. To accomplish this transformation, international peacebuilders promote and 
establish governance reforms and policies designed to securitize and marketize the 
environment and natural resources.  I find that, despite producing the potential peace 
enhancing benefits of increased stability and revenue, rapidly pushing such a transformation 
strategy comes with significant linked pathologies that run the risk of recreating pre-war 
political arrangements, provoking societal competition, undermining environmental 
management and sustainable livelihoods, and creating unrealistic expectations.  These effects 
  
can produce contention, foster resistance and increase the likelihood of violence in ways that 
undermine the conditions essential for achieving a long-term peace. An alternative approach 
would be to mitigate the effects of securitization and marketization by first addressing issues 
that have historically led to violence and contention in the environmental and natural 
resources sector, including land ownership and tenure issues, genuine public participation, 
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In October 2008, I made my way to the headquarters of the Forest Development Authority 
(FDA) in the Sinkor area of the Liberian capital Monrovia.  My task was to interview two 
senior officials.  The picture they painted was an optimistic one. While revenues from a 
mismanaged forest sector had helped to fuel the conflict in Liberia, the tidal wave of new 
reforms and policies--helped along in large part by international organizations--were making 
a difference.  Forest areas were now under the control of the government and within the year 
substantial timber would be flowing out of the country.  The take away message: revenue 
from timber exports would rapidly help to rebuild the country, and in particular, benefit forest 
communities through increased employment and development projects.   
 The next day, I attended a meeting the city of Buchanan about 100 km southwest of 
Monrovia.   It was organized by a Liberian NGO to discuss forest issues. It was attended by 
officials from an international organization that was deeply involved in the reform process, a 
member of parliament and about 75 people assembled from surrounding communities.  I was 
anxious to meet people, see the countryside and better understand how and why forest 
reforms in Liberia had been so successful.  Once the meeting got started--it was interrupted 
several times by unruly youths who had to be held back by UN peacekeepers--I was stunned.  
Angry and tense exchanges erupted between the participants throughout.  Rather than a 
extolling the virtues of the new forest reforms and policies, community members protested 





exports. The complaints centered on a lack of participation in decision making and a 
perception that the government was repeating history by consolidating its control over forests.   
 It appeared that efforts to reform Liberia's forests, which have been a central priority 
of international peacebuilding organizations, may be controversial.  The question was why?  
What is it about the reforms and policies that may be generating disagreement and 
contention?   What is being done about it?  Who decides? And most importantly, what does 
this presage for the future of the forest reform process in Liberia and peacebuilding outcomes 
in general?  Should peacebuilders be concerned about what is happening given that war-torn 
states like Liberia are vulnerable to resurgent conflict?  My motivation for writing this 
dissertation is to examine the substantial but often overlooked efforts to govern the 
environment and natural resources in war-torn states like Liberia. The stakes are certainly 
high.           
Peacebuilding and the Evolution of a Concept 
Over 90 percent of all armed conflicts in the 1990s were civil conflicts (Wallensteen and 
Sollenberg 2001).   The conflicts, which occurred mostly in the developing world, posed a 
humanitarian disaster and a threat to regional and international stability and security.  From a 
humanitarian viewpoint, the violence was particularly savage and appeared to be 
disproportionately lethal and cruel to civilians and non-combatants.  Genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, mass rape, child soldiers, executions and other atrocities were commonplace.  Nine 
out of every ten people killed in civil conflicts during the 1990s were civilians, which was a 
complete reversal from the early 20th century (Collier et al. 2003, 17).  Beyond the death and 
destruction caused by the conflict, tens of millions had their lives severely upended and 
livelihoods destroyed.  The conflicts had regional repercussions as well by creating refugee 
crises, sparking arms races and causing collapse and war in neighboring states.  The nature of 





and war-torn states offered safe havens for terrorist organizations and drug producers, and 
could act as a vector for AIDS and other pandemics that could threaten international stability. 
Such situations came to represent the "primary security challenge of the contemporary era" 
(Newman, Paris and Richmond 2009, 4). 
In response to the proliferation of civil conflict and the related humanitarian and 
security impacts, new norms and practices of multilateral intervention emerged to manage 
failed states and civil unrest (Finnemore 2003).  States emerging from conflict, in particular, 
were believed to be inherently incapable of rebuilding themselves leading to increased 
intervention by the United Nations (UN) and other international governmental and non-
governmental organizations.  While a handful of these "peace operations" sought to deliver 
humanitarian assistance and protect civilian populations, a majority were established in the 
immediate aftermath of civil war to prevent conflict from reoccurring.  Such operations came 
to be known as peacebuilding.  Key examples include Namibia, Cambodia, Angola, El 
Salvador, Mozambique, Liberia, Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Guatemala, Timor 
Leste, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire. 
Throughout the 1990s peacebuilding practices and strategies evolved.  Peacebuilding 
became a “growth industry” made up of an array of international peacebuilding organizations 
with a wide variety of responsibilities and tasks (Paris 2004, 13). These included supporting 
ceasefires and peace processes; organizing elections; assisting the demobilization, 
disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants; retraining and redeploying police and 
armed forces; repatriating and resettling refugees and the internally displaced; responding to 
food insecurities and health concerns; strengthening  laws and court system; rebuilding 
infrastructure; promoting human rights and social reconciliation; drafting constitutions; 
rebuilding economic systems; providing employment; and provisioning public services--to 
name just a few.  Underscoring these activities, and the peacebuilding policies more 





promoting liberalization and statebuilding.  Liberalization refers to efforts to the promotion of 
market-based democracies and stresses the peace enhancing traits of the liberal peace (Paris 
2004).  Statebuilding, on the other hand, emphasizes the rebuilding of capable, legitimate and 
autonomous state institutions because weak governance is increasingly recognized as a threat 
to sustained peace (Paris 2004; Fukuyama 2004; Brinkerhoff 2007; Call and Wyeth 2008; 
Paris and Sisk 2009).   
Governing the Environment and Natural Resources for Peace 
An issue that has received a growing share of the international peacebuilding agenda and 
policy in recent years is the environment and natural resources.  This attention has been 
driven by empirical evidence that under certain conditions natural resources can foment, 
exacerbate or prolong civil conflict.  One early strand of research linked environmental 
degradation and resource scarcity to civil conflict suggesting that competition for renewable 
resources (i.e. forests, water, crop land, fish soil) caused by elite capture, population growth 
or a lack of access to livelihoods can spark violence (Homer-Dixon 1991).  Other studies 
concluded that a state's relative abundance of "high-value" natural resources--such as oil, 
timber, minerals and gemstones--can be a "curse". This is because dependence undermines 
governance, intensifies poverty, creates economic distress and increases the likelihood of 
civil conflict (Sachs and Warner 2001; de Soysa 2002; Ross 2003; 2004).  Related 
scholarship also found that once a civil conflict begins, natural resources can be traded 
regionally and globally and provide combatants such as government forces or rebel groups 
with the finances to buy weapons and pursue violence (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 1999).   
 According to Ross (2003), since 1990 at least eighteen different civil conflicts have 
been fuelled by the exploitation and trade of natural resources, including wars in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo.  At the same time, conflicts in 





2009). While preliminary evidence suggests that since 1945 at least 40 percent of all civil 
conflicts have been associated in some way with natural resources, it is by no means believed 
to be a thing of the past (Binningsbo and Rustad 2008).  The United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP 2009, 8) suggests that violent conflict associated with the environment 
and natural resources will only increase in the decades ahead, stating: 
   
 As global population continues to rise, and the demand for resources continues to 
 grow, there is significant potential for conflicts over natural resources to intensity in the 
 coming decades.  In addition, the potential consequences of climate change for water 
 availability, food security, and prevalence of disease,  coastal boundaries and population 
 distribution may aggravate already existing tensions and generate new conflicts. 
  
 Claims connecting the environment and natural resources to civil war remain 
controversial among conflict scholars.  Nevertheless, widespread attention to the linkages 
between the environment, natural resources and civil conflict resulted in a range of policy 
responses by international actors to leverage natural resources as a means of ending and 
mitigating violence.  UN peacekeepers have been deployed to areas affected by violent 
conflict to secure and control natural resources so that armed groups could not exploit them.  
Peace settlements have been brokered with varying degrees of success in Sierra Leone, the 
Sudan, Cambodia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) using the future spoils of 
natural resources as part of a wealth-sharing strategy (Jarstad 2008).  Better known perhaps 
have been the periodic authorization of UN sanctions established to disrupt and curtail the 
trade in so-called "conflict resources" to starve belligerents of the funds that fuel violence 
(Bannon and Collier 2004).  In Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the DRC, UN sanctions 





 At the same time, international peacebuilding organizations began to incorporate 
environmental and natural resource concerns into peace operations, particularly where civil 
conflicts were deemed by analysts to be resource-related.  When "high-value" natural 
resources are involved, competition over future spoils and resource-rich territory may 
increase the likelihood of violent conflict and produce tension that can be detrimental to 
peacebuilding.  This is because violent conflict frequently leads to the collapse of state 
institutions and state authority that undermines governance and allows opportunistic 
entrepreneurs or corrupt officials to extract valuable resources for profit.  For this reason, 
international peacebuilding has become deeply involved in efforts to govern and manage 
natural resources so that war will not reignite and have broader security implications.  As UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon stated in 2008, "natural resources are crucial to 
consolidating peace in and between war-torn societies."   
The international peacebuilding agenda and policy also reflects the understanding 
that the environment and natural resources are not just an important leverage point for ending 
or mitigating violent conflict but significantly influence a war-torn state's ability to 
consolidate a lasting peace.  While governing "conflict resources" is viewed as an 
international priority for provisioning security (domestic and international), peacebuilding 
strategies also emphasize the significant role the environment and natural resources play in 
postconflict economic development (UNEP 2009; Biljsma 2005; Conca and Wallace 2009).  
In the aftermath of conflict, "high-value" natural resources represent a potential windfall that 
can be rapidly used by war-torn states to rebuild the postwar economy and restore 
infrastructure, reconstruct state institutions and administer basic services.  Furthermore, 
natural resources represent an obvious starting point for attracting foreign direct investment, 
gaining export revenue and providing employment opportunities. Exporting valuable natural 





the state with the revenues to fund basic services in ways that spur development and send a 
signal to potential spoilers that the benefits of peace outweigh the costs.   
A lion's share of international attention has focused on "high-value" natural 
resources.  However, there is a growing awareness that peacebuilding should also address 
sustainable livelihoods and environmental management. T his is because war directly and 
indirectly damages the ecosystems and natural assets that are essential for human survival.  In 
the aftermath of conflict, people struggle acquire clean water, sanitation, shelter, food and 
energy supplies on which they depend for their well being and livelihoods (UNEP 2009; 
Biljsma 2005; Conca and Wallace 2009).  A failure to respond to the environmental needs of 
the population can deepen poverty, make development more challenging and exacerbate 
environmental problems.  Even worse, a lack of sustainable livelihoods may leave people (or 
ex-combatants) vulnerable to disease and deprivation that may lead to the grievances and 
resentments that can complicate peacebuilding.   Moreover, civil conflict commonly creates 
land use and ownership issues because the process of displacement and resettlement can lead 
to competing and overlapping claims to property and other assets.  In short, civil conflict 
decimates governance institutions designed to protect the environment, which can result in 
unsustainable and uncontrolled resource use.  Therefore, rebuilding state institutions to 
control or govern land or critical environments is deemed important to ensure the 
environment and natural resources are protected from unregulated extraction and can support 
the sustainable livelihoods of the population.     
The general assumption is that the environment and natural resources can contribute 
to peacebuilding if governed effectively.  War-torn states rarely, if ever, have the capacity or 
authority to adequately govern the environment and natural resources, or are too weak or 
corrupt to do so.  Because of this "governance vacuum", international peacebuilding 
organizations have been quick to intervene in war-torn states in order to design, promote, and 





(Ballentine and Nitzschke 2005).  If done right, analysts suggest that environmental and 
natural resource governance may assist in the extraordinarily difficult task of helping to build 
trust and social cohesion in ways that promote cooperation, reduce tension, overcome 
political cleavages and create new opportunities for peacebuilding  (Conca and Dabelko 
2002; UNEP 2009).   
The Problem and Research Questions 
The peacebuilding literature has expanded considerably in recent years but few studies have 
scrutinized in any detail environmental and natural resource governance.  Although a 
multiple-volume set focusing on natural resources management and peacebuilding is due out 
in 2011, and Global Governance is dedicating an entire issue to the topic, most studies to date 
have been too over generalized and theoretical to be helpful to scholars or policy makers 
(UNEP 2009; Lujala and Rustad 2011).  This lack of detailed scholarship is surprising 
because international peacebuilding operations have integrated environmental and natural 
resource governance reforms into war-torn states for over a decade.  Perhaps the reason is 
that international relations scholars have tended to view the environment and natural 
resources as stuff of "low politics" when  trying to understand the effectiveness or success of 
peacebuilding operations (Paris 2004; Doyle and Sambanis 2006).  Or perhaps, scholars of 
peacebuilding view other facets of peace operations, from security sector reform to elections 
and the rule of law, to be a more significant determinant of peacebuilding success.  Still 
another reason for the lack of empirical investigation may simply be that the international 
peacebuilding agenda and policy targeted at governing the environment and natural resources 
is out in front of the scholarship.  Another possibility, of course, may be a tacit recognition in 
scholarly circles that despite international attention by peacebuilders there is no relationship 





we do not know about the role of environmental and natural resource governance in war-torn 
states.  This research endeavors to fill a significant gap in the literature.  
 My objective, then, is to examine how environmental and natural resource 
governance helps or hinders peacebuilding.  The central research questions are: 
 
• How have international peacebuilding organizations conceptualized the linkages 
between the environment, natural resources and peacebuilding?  
 
• Given that conceptualization, what policies and strategies for governing the 
environment and natural resources have the international peacebuilding organizations 
promoted, designed and established? 
 
• What have been the effects and consequences of those reforms and policies for 
peacebuilding?  
 
 The "independent variable" is the strategies and policies to reform environmental and 
natural resource governance. These are promoted, designed and established by what I term 
international peacebuilding organizations (IPOs).  I use the term international peacebuilding 
organizations throughout to refer to regular peacebuilding agents and actors involved in war-
torn states.  This includes the United Nations and its agencies, international financial 
institutions (i.e. World Bank and International Monetary Fund), national governments and 
their development agencies, intergovernmental organizations, international consultants, 
corporations with international reach, and vast array international non-governmental 
organizations.  I define environmental and natural resource governance as the sets of rules, 
institutions and processes that shape human-environment interactions. These rules, 





practices.  By "environment", I refer to the physical conditions that affect natural resources 
and the ecosystem services that sustain and fulfill life.1  And by "natural resources", I mean 
"actual or potential sources of wealth that occur in the natural state, such as timber, water, 
fertile land, wildlife, minerals, metals, stones and hydrocarbons" (UNEP 2009, 7).2
The" dependent variable" is the extent to which environmental and natural resources 
governance helps or hinders peacebuilding.   I use the term peacebuilding in the way 
articulated by the United Nations and largely accepted as the international norm (Paris 2004).  
  
Governance has been subject to a variety of interpretations but at its most basic "concerns the 
rules, institutions, and processes that form the nexus of state-society relations" (Brinkerhoff 
2007, 2).  This definition is centered on "governments as governance", and prioritizes state 
form and integrity, the exercise of state power and authority, state institutions, and the 
assumption that governments are a neutral arbiter of competing groups in society.  A broader 
vision of governance suggests that state-centered notions of governance have been severely 
diminished in a globalizing world as the authority of states has been undermined by 
international institutions, sub-national groups, the spread of the neo-liberal economic order, 
the emergence of new social movements, novel communication technologies, increasing and 
other networks of global interdependence (Rosenau 1990).  I assume governance to be more 
than government and relating to both state-based rules and institutions that mediate state-
society relations and political, economic and societal institutions as well as informal, non-
governmental rules, processes and institutions located on a continuum through society, the 
state, and the global.  
                                                 
 
1 Ecosystem services include "provisioning services" such as food, water and timber; "regulating 
services" that affect climate, floods, disease, wastes and water quality; and "cultural services" that 
provide recreational aesthetic and spiritual benefits; and "supporting services" such as carbon, nutrient 
and hydrological cycles. 
2 A renewable resource refers to a resource that is replenished naturally at a rate comparable to its rate 
of consumption by humans or other users and a non-renewable resource exists in a fixed amount, or an 





The goals of peacebuilding, according to former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, are to 
"identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace" in the 
aftermath of conflict, with the ultimate objective to prevent conflict relapse (Boutros-Ghali 
1992). Boutros-Ghali (1995) restated the purpose, stating that the essential goal of 
peacebuilding is to "create the structures for the institutionalization of peace".  Boutros-
Ghali's predecessor, Kofi Annan (1998) further echoed the sentiments by concluding that 
peacebuilding is "actions undertaken at the end of conflict to consolidate peace to prevent a 
reoccurrence of armed confrontation."  Finally, the Brahimi Report (2000, 3), which was a 
comprehensive review of UN-led peace operations, defines peacebuilding as "activities 
undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide 
tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war." 
Based on these statements from the UN, the world's most active participant in peacebuilding, 
the fundamental purpose of peacebuilding is to establish the conditions for a sustainable and 
long-term peace in countries emerging from civil conflict (Paris 2004, 56).   
The UN and other international peacebuilders employ the term "conflict" and "civil 
conflict" in relation to peacebuilding.  The term "conflict" can be too ambiguous since it can 
mean anything along a continuum from differing goals or ideas of actors to violent 
engagement between them.  At the same time, "civil conflict" typically denotes large-scale 
violence on the range of at least 1,000 battle-related deaths annually (Wallensteen and 
Sollenberg 2001).  Peace, then, by definition is largely concerned with the absence of full-
scale civil conflict.  In my view, however, this definition unduly renders invisible from any 
analysis numbers of fatalities below this arbitrary benchmark and particular forms of violence 
outside of the civil conflict, insurgency, rebellion typology that is all too common.  
Moreover, if peacebuilders are genuinely concerned with the underlying conditions that may 
engender further civil conflict, we should be concerned with violence broadly understood as 





more precise, then, if environmental and natural resource governance "helps" peacebuilding, 
we should be able to detect a related decrease in the propensity of violence.  At the same 
time, if environmental and natural resource governance "hinders" peacebuilding, we should 
be able to identify a subsequent increase in propensity of violence.    
In this study, I employ two distinct approaches to evaluate the extent to which environmental 
and natural resource governance leads to an increased or decreased propensity for violence.  
First, I use a "conflict mitigation" framework employed by Paris (2004).  This framework 
suggests that at a minimum, environmental and natural resource governance should: (1) not 
recreate or "lock-in" conditions that increase the propensity for violence and; (2) "do not 
harm"--that is not create new conditions that increase the propensity for violence.  Any of 
these outcomes would appear to contradict or at the very least challenge the notion that 
environmental and natural resource governance helps peacebuilding.   I also examine four 
specific outcomes deduced from the vast peacebuilding literature, which are thought by 
international peacebuilding organizations --and largely substantiated in the scholarly 
literature--to decrease the propensity for violence.  These outcomes are: (1) security 
improvements; (2) increased economic development; (3) enhanced social cohesion and trust; 
and (4) strengthen state institutions.  These conditions are important to consider in dealing 
with environmental and natural resource governance because they can potentially provide 
insight into historical conditions responsible for violent conflict but also provide 
peacebuilders--to the extent possible--with levers that can be used to improve outcomes.  
More specifically, by considering the "upstream" factors it may allow IBOs not just to "do 
not harm" but, in fact, improve peacebuilding practices in ways that decrease the propensity 






Between 1989 and 2007 there were 19 UN-led international peacebuilding operations 
deployed in countries just emerging from civil war.  By peacebuilding operations, I refer to 
operations involving at least several hundred peacekeepers and by "international" I mean that 
the deployment had the approval of the UN Security Council.  By "just emerging from civil 
war", I denote states in which armed conflict was principally confined to the borders of a 
single state and where warring parties were more or less inhabitants of that state.  This to 
distinguish international missions launched following political upheaval (e.g., Haiti), 
operations that never ended (e.g, Somalia), or civil conflicts as the result of an invasion (e.g., 
Iraq).3
 Given this universe of cases and my research questions, I chose to employ a case 
study approach. This methodological approach is applicable because the total number of 
representative cases is too small to permit an effective statistical analysis.  More importantly, 
the subject matter requires a detailed or "deep" examination of causal mechanisms.  Case 
studies allow us to look more precisely at environmental and natural resource governance and 
uncover specific mechanisms and processes. With those provisos in mind, I selected two case 
studies--Liberia and Sierra Leone--to test my research questions.  I selected the specific cases 
for several reasons.  First, the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone are overwhelmingly 
recognized (for better or worse!) to be "environment or resource conflicts".  The terms "blood 
diamonds" and "blood timber", in fact, refer to these conflicts.  Because of the perceived 
environmental or natural resource dimensions of each conflict, both have been the target of 
substantial international efforts to reform environment and natural resource governance.  
  Of the 19 international peacebuilding operations, I estimate that at least nine, or 
almost half, have promoted and established environmental and natural resource governance 
reforms designed specifically to help establish a stable and lasting peace.   
                                                 
 





Liberia and Sierra Leone, therefore, represent "most likely" cases since we can strongly 
expect to observe how environmental and natural resources governance affects peacebuilding 
trajectories --either positively or negatively (George and Bennett 2004).  The selection of the 
peace operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone is also appropriate because environmental and 
natural resources governance in both countries has been continuing for almost a decade, long 
enough to judge the effects, allow for longitudinal comparison, and analyze key concepts like 
timing, sequencing and interactive effects.  Another consideration in selecting the cases is 
that both are still considered "fragile" war-torn states and exhibit no guarantee of a stable and 
lasting peace.  In short, neither case is so violent or harmonious that the future outcome of 
peacebuilding is determinative.   
 Both countries also offer the opportunity to examine in detail very different types of 
"environments" and natural resources.   Forests are a renewable resource that has been a 
dominant priority in Liberia's peacebuilding operations while minerals and diamonds are non-
renewable resources that have been dominant in Sierra Leonean peacebuilding policy.  
Finally, there is a more practical reason that I chose to focus on Liberia and Sierra Leone.  I 
have extensive experience living and working in West Africa and spent almost three years in 
the region between1997 and 2000-at the height of both conflicts.  This gave me a 
comparative advantage both in terms of doing fieldwork and being familiar with the region 
and its problems.    
  I employ a strategy of process tracing to observe political engagement around 
environmental and natural resource governance in Liberia and Sierra Leone, particularly with 
regards to forests, mineral and diamonds.  Political engagement refers to complex and 
dynamic political, social and economic processes by which actors, agents and coalitions act, 
interact or are engaged with each other (Migdal 1988).  Although political engagements are 
carried out in a range of formal and informal settings, I examine primarily formal rule making 





resources governance in Liberia and Sierra Leone to generate data and information to tests 
the causal hypothesis.  I chose this research strategy based on the assumption that rules and 
institutions fundamentally pattern what is socially and politically acceptable; what is 
considered "normal" behavior; and even what is deemed possible to discuss (Lipschutz 2004).  
Since rule-making and institution building processes can be sites of conflict and contention or 
conversely cooperation and confidence building, it is important not only to understand the 
character of this political engagement but also how it has changed over time.  
 To gather data and provide "answers" to my research questions, I spent over two 
years in West Africa and conducted over six months of in-depth field work in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone between October 2008 and July 2009.  My data collection consisted of two 
methods. The first was to gather as much data and information as possible from primary 
sources. To accomplish this task, I conducted semi-structured interviews consisting of open-
ended questions with 84 "subjects".4  Eighty of the interviews were conducted in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, with an additional four conducted in person in Washington DC and New York.  
One interview was conducted by phone.  The interview subjects were selected in a deliberate 
and largely non-random manner using snow-ball sampling techniques that targeted those with 
knowledge or familiarity of international peacebuilding efforts to govern environmental and 
natural resources in Liberia and Sierra Leone, respectively.  This included government 
officials, representatives of international organizations, national civil society groups, activists, 
academics, business leaders and residents of several communities.5
                                                 
 
4 This figure refers to discrete subjects. I met multiple times with some interviewees.   
  For reasons of 
confidentially, I refer to conversations throughout the dissertation but do not quote by name.  
Through my interview subjects, I was also able to examine a host of documentation that is not 
publically available including internal memos, files and reports, meeting notes and draft 
policy documents.  I should note that this does not include a two-week visit to Sierra Leone in 





May 2009 as part of a United Nations Environment Programme mission, during which I took 
part in over 30 additional interviews on the subject matter.    
 While these interviews are the heart and soul of the dissertation by providing several 
notebooks full of data and information that guided my research and inquiry, I relied heavily 
on secondary sources as well. The treasure drove of documents, reports, articles and studies 
that are available in the public domain were essential to painting a comprehensive and 
accurate picture of ongoing efforts to govern the environment and natural resources in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone and proved very helpful corroborating or casting doubt on information 
gathered during interviews.      
Research Findings 
In Liberia and Sierra Leone, conflict has not resumed and this is certainly the result of a host 
of factors not least of which is sustained peace operations and intervention by IPOs.  
Although peace remains fragile in both countries, this is an impressive accomplishment given 
the extent of the brutality and violence.  Yet, the questions I pose are not about whether 
conflict resumes or not.  Instead, my objective is to examine how environmental and natural 
resource governance helps or hinders peacebuilding.  To accomplish this, I analyze how 
international peacebuilding organizations define the links between the environment, natural 
resources and peacebuilding, and also examine the policies and reforms that are employed.  
My key findings are discussed below.  
 
1.) With regard to environmental and natural resource governance, international 
peacebuilding organizations have conceptualized the key challenge in both cases as 
transforming "conflict resources" into "peace resources" for the purpose of 
establishing a stable and lasting peace.  There exists a broad consensus among international 





peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone.  Despite ambiguity in the scholarship, international 
peacebuilders emphasize a "causal narrative" in which the problem centers on "conflict 
resources".  The central fear--based on particular constructions of the conflicts--is that high 
value natural resources will fund rebel groups or corrupt governments in ways that fuel civil 
conflict and cause an array of international security problems.  The solution to the problem of 
conflict resources is to transform them into peace resources.  Peace resources are those that 
can exploited quickly for economic growth, poverty alleviation and the provision of state 
revenues that in theory can enhance security and development.    
 
2.) To accomplish this transformation, international peacebuilding organizations 
promote and establish governance reforms and policies aimed at "securitizing" and 
"marketizing" the environment and natural resources.   By securitization, I mean 
establishing and consolidating state control and authority over the environment and natural 
resources.  The emphasis on securitization is the result of international interests in 
maintaining order and putting a lid on conflicts that threaten domestic and international 
security.  By marketization, I mean promoting and establishing the conditions that allow the 
environment and natural resources to generate revenue including foreign investment, 
privatization, deregulation and private property rights.  Marketization privileges free-market 
economic reforms and policies to unlock the benefits of international trade to: support 
economic growth and poverty alleviation, supply the state revenue needed to rebuild 
infrastructure and provide basic services, and contribute to employment.  Given scholarship 
that dependence on high-value natural resources can exacerbate corruption and weaken 
governments in ways that make them more likely to fail, securitization and marketization are 
believed to require "good governance" to ensure governments are accountable, transparent 






3.)  International peacebuilding efforts to transform "conflict resources" into "peace 
resources" through securitization and marketization come with significant pathologies.  
Despite producing the potential peace-enhancing benefits of increased stability and revenue, I 
find that the reforms and policies give rise to significant contention, conflict and resistance--
some of it resulting in violence.  The reason is that the reforms and policies give rise to four 
linked pathologies that have potential negative effects for still vulnerable war-torn states.   
 
• Risk of recreating pre-war political arrangements:  In Liberia and Sierra Leone, I 
find that environment and natural resource governance reforms fundamentally mirror 
the arrangements that historically aggrieved the population and led to conflict.  There 
is a myopic focus on reconsolidating state power, and only tokenistic efforts to 
incorporate genuine inclusiveness and participation of the "people".  The widespread 
perception is that the "old ways of doing business"--which are widely blamed for 
corruption, underdevelopment and deprivation that led to war--are returning.  
Improprieties linked to nefarious business agreements raises related questions about 
whether real transparency and accountability is possible where the political culture is 
defined by patronage. Efforts to "jump-start" free-market reforms may be 
resurrecting the patronage-resource nexus, which has always functioned alongside 
state institutions to the benefit of predatory elites. In both cases, rebuilding rather 
than restructuring traditional political arrangements may generate new grievances and 
produce shadow states.  
 
• Danger of provoking societal competition: Control over the environment and natural 
resources is a high stake game in Liberia and Sierra Leone.  Unfortunately, 
governance reforms designed to "fast-track" natural resource exports shortens the 





because the reform process inherently seeks to impose a governing logic on a 
valuable national and societal asset over a short time horizon. The overarching 
perception is that "who is there first" will determine the future of the environment 
and natural resources.  Despite rhetoric of inclusion, transparency and accountability, 
governance reforms of this kind on exacerbate perceptions that: the government and 
business have too much and that communities have too little.  Under appreciated or 
perhaps ignored is that the environment and natural resource represent very different 
values, interests and ideas and efforts to promote or establish new rules and 
institutions is a competitive process.     
 
• Inattention to the environment and sustainable livelihoods: I find that in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone vital environmental issues related to water, sanitation, shelter, food, 
and energy supplies are by-and-large treated as low stakes issues by international 
peacebuilding organizations.  In addition, sectors outside of the international 
spotlight, most notably forests in Sierra Leone, minerals in Liberia and gold in both 
countries--are neglected.  This focus overlooks factors that have habitually impeded 
the ability of communities to meet their sustainable livelihood needs, such as unjust 
land ownership and tenure rights, environmental degradation, and unfair systems of 
patronage.   
 
• Problem of unrealistic expectations:  Peacebuilding comes with high expectations. I 
find that what gets overlooked is the role environmental and natural resource 
governance plays in forming an "expectation gap" in war-torn states.  For instance, 
Poverty Reduction Strategies, which in war-torn states serve as blueprints for 
peacebuilding, are often based on unrealistic projections of revenue derived from the 





on the level anticipated, or gets wind of "backroom business deals" by government 
officials, increased tension, a lack of confidence, and perhaps social unrest can be the 
result. At the same time, elections are usually organized to provide a venue for public 
discussion that is accompanied by an array of political promises.  In both cases, 
expectations have been created that cannot be met, undermining the legitimacy of the 
state and opening up new opportunities for spoilers.  
  
4.) Given this approach and these pathologies, efforts by international peacebuilders to 
govern the environment and natural resources may be counterproductive for 
peacebuilding.  While fighting has not resumed in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the pathologies 
stress that the reforms and policies are creating new conditions that hinder peacebuilding and 
are recreating the seeds of conflict.  This is not a positive development.  Employing a second 
"peacebuilding" framework, I find more reasons for concern.  First, although order and 
stability have returned to both countries, reforms and policies have failed and may even 
undermine security of specific people and communities.  Second, although Liberia and Sierra 
Leone have seen increases in GDP growth and state revenue, human development indicators 
suggest marginal improvement country-wide.  If we take development to be concerned about 
"enlarging people's choices", in terms of equity, sustainability and livelihoods, reforms and 
policies may be undermining the development potential of some people.  Third, contrary to 
the conventional wisdom that environmental and natural resource governance can deepen 
social cohesion and build trust, at this point in time it appears to be--in large part at least--
fostering tension and mistrust in both Liberia and Sierra Leone.  Finally, although the reforms 
and policies have helped to strengthened state capacity and institutions, unrealistic 
expectations along with a serious lack of attention to inclusiveness and public participation 





 Two final caveats about the scope of this research are essential before moving on.  
First, claims that certain reforms and policies promoted and supported by international 
peacebuilding organizations had "positive" or "negative" outcomes raise the question: 
"compared to what"?  More specifically, due to the absence of adequate "control" cases in 
which the independent variable (e.g., environmental and natural resource governance) is 
absent, how do we know what would have happened in their absence?  This methodological 
challenge should not be dismissed in attempting to establish causal outcomes from the cases 
and the findings should be regarded with some caution.  With that in mind, however, I 
employ two analytic strategies to address this point.  First, I employ process tracing to do the 
hard work of narrowing the list of potential causal pathways and illuminating the conditions 
in which they occur. Given the lack of robust theory when it comes to linkages between the 
environment, natural resources and peace, process tracing is an indispensable tool for 
understanding mechanisms, positing novel hypotheses and building theory.  Second, I 
examine briefly in Chapter 8 the closest thing we have to control cases--Liberia's mineral and 
diamond sector and Sierra Leone's forest sector.  What distinguishes these sectors is that they 
have until very recently been devoid of significant intervention by international peacebuilding 
organizations.  While only preliminary, these observations help us to understand the extent to 
which reforms and policies promoted by peacebuilders were determinative in the outcomes.     
 Second, this dissertation did not intend to measure by some objective criteria the 
effectiveness or success of peacebuilding in relation to environmental and natural resource 
governance.  Even if analysts could agree on a definitive marker of peacebuilding "success", I 
suggest that such a project is difficult at best.6
                                                 
 
6 Peacebuilding success has been the subject of much debate. A common (and measureable) guideline 
for peacebuilding success---whether peace prevails when peacebuilders leave--is flawed for two 
reasons.  First, this is not the professed end point of peacebuilding according to international 
peacebuilding organizations themselves.  Second, there is unlikely to be a point at which all 
peacebuilders leave a war-torn state.  





has resumed after peace operations started it would be a fool's errand to assign a single cause 
to conflict relapse given the range of interrelated and cascading factors involved.  It gets 
trickier in situations where civil conflict has not resumed, like Liberia and Sierra Leone. This 
is because whether a war-torn state sustains peace after civil conflict ends cannot be boiled 
down to one particular factor but depends on a range of variables that make the likelihood of 
a stable and lasting peace more or less likely.  The evidence is therefore prospective, which 
limits my ability to make definitive statements about the role of environmental and natural 
resource governance in securing peace.  In some sense, the extent to which environmental 
and natural resource governance helps or hinders peacebuilding -- or increase the propensity 
for violence--will not be known for decades after a full retrospective analysis can be carried 
out.  I acknowledge these difficulties but it would be wrong to give up on such research in the 
search for empirical parsimony or predictive certainty. In fact, given that environmental and 
natural resources governance reforms designed, promoted and funded by international 
peacebuilding organizations is commonplace and likely to increase, a provisional assessment 
is not only possible but necessary.   
A Way Forward for Environmental and Natural Resource 
Governance 
 
In light of these findings our reaction should not be to abandon efforts to govern the 
environment and natural resources in war-torn states.  In fact, international attention and 
intervention has been critical to securing peace.  Nor do I suggest that marketization of 
natural resources should be abandoned, since there is ample evidence that over the long-term 
such policies may promote peace and stability (Paris 2004).  Indeed, I argue that international 
peacebuilders need to do three things.  First, new strategies and policies need to be devised 
that can foster trust, build confidence and stress cooperation particularly in the decade or so 





resources while speeding up efforts to provide sustainable livelihoods to the population. 
Reorienting such priorities, I believe, would  help ensure that issues related to land ownership 
and tenure get resolved early on, reduce the "expectation gap" and minimize potential 
windows of opportunity in which spoilers can emerge.   At the same time, peacebuilders need 
to make sure that reforms do not simply rebuild or reassemble pre-war arrangements and 
structures that had played a role in the conflict. "Slow-tracking" would allow enough time not 
only to rebuild state institutions in ways that better promote peace but to fully transform 
them.  I certainly envision this "way forward" to be criticized on two grounds.  The first is 
that "slow-tracking" rather than "fast-tracking" environmental and natural resource 
governance will not only increase the cost and duration of international peacebuilding but 
deprive war-torn states of revenue that can fund peacebuilding activities shortly after conflict 
ends.  This may appear to be a solid critique but as the Liberia and Sierra Leone cases 
highlight the promise of such revenue is far from clear.   The second potential critique is that 
a reorienting peacebuilding so that it focuses more on the local livelihoods and ownership 
needs of the population can undermine peace since it would slowdown statebuilding.  
However, what really weakens the war-torn state, and its ability to govern, is a lack of 
legitimacy that could be enhanced by placing an emphasis on local dynamics of 
peacebuilding as well as the national.     
 Second, IPOs need to go beyond new strategies and policies to interrogate 
assumptions and constructs.  To name just one: viewing the environment and natural 
resources almost solely in economic terms can lead to reforms and policies that ignore 
politics and the political-economic linkages inherent in patronage.  And third, IPOs need to 
be attentive to the fact that dealing with the environment and natural resources in war-torn 
states intrinsically comes with embedded tensions and contradictions that can make decisions 
difficult.  Peacebuilders should ask precisely "whose peace" they are trying to secure and 





and Turner 2008).  Should the focus be on assessing the livelihoods needs and development 
priorities of local communities before state priorities for revenue and foreign direct 
investment, particularly in the early stages of peacebuilding?  Should there be more balance 
when so much is at stake?  
Structure of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized into three sections.  Section I examines the evolution of 
peacebuilding as well as the theoretical linkages between the environment, natural resources 
and peace.  Chapter 2 places peacebuilding into context by discussing the circumstances that 
led to its rise as well as the development of the underlying strategies that have informed 
peacebuilding policies and practices over the last two decades.  Chapter 3 highlights an issue 
that has received a growing share of attention from IPOs--the role of the environment and 
natural resources.  The chapter first reviews the substantial literature connecting the 
environment and natural resource to conflict.  It then details the scholarship linking the 
environment, natural resources to peace and describes how this is represented in the policies 
and practices of international peacebuilders.       
 Section II presents in-depth case studies of Liberia and Sierra Leone.  Chapter 4 
details Liberia's 14-year conflict that ended in 2003, and briefly describes how it has been 
understood by international peacebuilders. The chapter then examines the country's forest 
resources, and discusses the role forests played in the Liberian conflict itself.  Chapter 5 
reviews the substantial international efforts to change the rules and institutions that govern 
forests in Liberia.  To do so, it traces the development of specific reforms, policies and 
strategies targeted at the forest sector in the aftermath of the conflict--between 2003 and 
2009.  Chapter 6 provides an overview of the Sierra Leone conflict and international 
understanding of it.  It then looks at the historical trajectory of Sierra Leone's diamond and 





7 turns to a comprehensive examination of IPO efforts to reform diamond and mineral 
governance in Sierra Leone.  In doing so, it traces key postconflict reforms, policies and 
strategies designed to govern the diamond and mineral sector between 2002 and 2009.  
 In Section III, I compare and evaluate efforts to govern Liberia's forest resources and 
Sierra Leone's diamond and mineral resources, respectively.  In doing so, I first explore the 
similarities and differences in how international peacebuilders have gone about the process of 
transforming "conflict resources" into "peace resources".  Second, I compare the dominant 
strategies of "securitization" and "marketization", and analyze the extent to which they vary 
across cases.  I then argue that although these strategies have produced some positive 
benefits, a close examination at the cases reveals a mixed verdict.  Rather than serve as focal 
points for trust, confidence and cooperation, the reforms and policies have been relatively 
divisive and wrought with contention, conflict and resistance--some resulting in violence.  
The reason, I suggest, is that "securitization" and "marketization" a strategic agenda gives rise 
to a number of linked pathologies that include: the danger of inattention to livelihoods and the 
environment, the problem of unrealistic expectations, the risk of recreating pre-war political 
arrangements; and the danger of provoking societal competition.  Given the strategies 
employed by IPOs, and the inherent effects and pathologies, the chapter then considers the 
extent to which environmental and natural resource reforms and policies actually help or 
hinder peacebuilding in Liberia and Sierra Leone.  Based on these conclusions, Chapter 9 
describes the key policy challenges as they relate to the environment, natural resources and 
peacebuilding and charts a "way forward".  It concludes with a call for more research and 








Chapter 2: The Evolution of Peacebuilding 
 
 
Despite enormous international investment in peacebuilding over the last two decades it 
remains very much an experiment in progress (Paris and Sisk 2009, 1).  This is because 
transforming chaotic war-torn states into harmonious peaceful states--to the degree that it can 
be done at all-- is a complex undertaking and does not come with a dependable blueprint.  
There can be nothing more complicated than trying to build peace and engineer social, 
economic and political reform in a diverse set of countries emerging from civil strife---as the 
mixed record of peacebuilding can attest.  A range of factors, including the conditions that led 
to the onset of war, the characteristics of the conflict and the nature of the peace settlement 
can complicate the task of sustaining peace (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Doyle and Sambanis 
2006; Fortna 2003; Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 2001; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; 
Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens 2002; Werner 1999). But peacebuilding also resembles an 
experiment because of its constantly expanding agenda and shifting sets of policies and 
strategies that have developed in response preceding peace operations and scholarship.   
This chapter examines the co-evolution of peacebuilding in theory and practice. The 
first part reviews the origins of peacebuilding and the changing role of the UN and other 
international organizations in addressing civil conflict.  It highlights how the idea of 
peacebuilding emerged as an international response to the "problem" posed by civil conflicts 
and failed states in the developing world.   The second part of the chapter details an 
expanding peacebuilding agenda, which developed over time and in response to the 
shortcomings early peace operations and in the context of growing scholarship on 





has the number of "sectoral" areas identified as significant for peacebuilding success.  This 
includes environment and natural resource governance.  The third part of the chapter focuses 
on shifts in peacebuilding strategy.  What is remarkable is that despite an ever-expanding 
agenda and the emergence of new policies to address civil conflict, the underlying strategies 
employed by IPOs across cases remained relatively consistent.  Despite claims to the 
contrary, "liberalization" is still promoted as a necessary ingredient for a sustainable and 
long-term peace in war-torn states.  Recently, however, liberalization has been supplemented 
by a concerted strategy of "statebuilding" (Paris 2004; Fukuyama 2004; Call and Wyeth 
2008; Paris and Sisk 2009; Chandler 2010).  Statebuilding is premised on the assumption that 
establishing the conditions for peace requires not just elections or "sectoral" reforms but the 
development of "capable, autonomous and legitimate" state institutions (Paris and Sisk 2009, 
2). The purpose: without robust state institutions the ability of governments to govern will be 
limited and this puts war-torn states at risk.    
 Why is this important? First, environmental and natural resource governance reflects 
a merger of the two prominent peacebuilding strategies--liberalization and statebuilding.  As 
we shall see in subsequent chapters, statebuilding is no more benign or neutral in the 
peacebuilding process than policies intended to democratize or establish free-market 
conditionalities in war-torn states (Paris 2004).  The overriding perception is that states 
"freely choose" the rules and institutions that govern society in the aftermath of conflict. In 
reality, however, IPOs distrust--sometimes for good reason--the decisions and policies 
rendered by governments. As a result, IPOs actively promote and support the establishment 
of specific "rules of the game" in order to guarantee certain policies and agendas are in-place 
to protect international security interests.  This becomes abundantly clear in efforts by IPOs 
to govern the environment and natural resources through reforms and policies that stress 





Peacebuilding and the Problem of Failed States and New Wars 
 
While the concept of a "failed state" was almost unthinkable a decade earlier, the concept 
gained widespread currency in the 1990s, and provided the rationale for the concept of 
peacebuilding (Helman and Ratner 1992/1993).  Failed states were those deemed “utterly 
incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community” and typified 
“instances in which central state authority collapses for several years" (Esty et al. 1995, 1).  
Failed states are “paralyzed and inoperative: laws are not made, order is not preserved, and 
societal cohesion is not enhanced"(Zartman 1995, 5).  As a symbol of identity, the failed state 
had lost its power--as a territory it cannot assure security and as an authoritative political 
institution it has lost its legitimacy.  As a system of socioeconomic organization it did not 
"exercise control over its people, and it's no longer even the target of demands, because 
people know that it is incapable of providing supplies" (Zartman 1995, 5).  In short, failed 
were considered states are states in name only--internationally recognized--but lacking the 
capacity, legitimate institutions and the authority required for statebuilding (Fukuyama 2004; 
Carment 2003).  
While failed states pose a range of problems, the most adverse are the conditions it 
creates from armed conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Krasner 2004).  Many failed states 
collapse into violence-prone war-torn states because they lack the ability to prevent or 
overcome rebellion while also exacerbating grievances through ineffective and non-existent 
governance. John Mueller captures the dynamic, suggesting that "the amount of warfare that 
persists in the world--virtually all of it civil war--is a function of the degree to which 
inadequate government exists " (Mueller 2002, 29).  The early 1990s saw an extended period 
of civil conflict, primarily in the developing world.  Research at the time concluded that over 
90 percent of all violent conflict during this period was internal in scope (Wallenstein and 





discontinuity between the “old wars"--in which conventional states or disciplined armies 
faced each other--and new ones that reflected a post-Cold War restructuring of the 
international system.  New wars were thought to be: different in scope (intrastate as opposed 
to interstate); employ new fighting strategies and tactics (brutality and guerilla war to capture 
economically valuable areas as opposed to conventional strategies seeking to take territory 
and political power); utilize new methods of financing (based on global markets and shadow 
economies); use different types of combatants (child soldiers, warlords, private armies instead 
of professional soldiers) (Kaldor 1999; Malesevic 2008).   
The new wars were also viewed by the international community as particularly lethal 
and cruel to civilians and non-combatants.  Genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass rape, child 
soldiers, hacking off limbs, executions and other atrocities were commonplace and became 
frequent news items on CNN (Jakobsen 1996).  Commentators frequently explained new 
wars with reference to "new barbarism" in which irrational and uncivilized combatants were 
motivated by ethnic hatreds or primordial savagery to commit murder and cause mayhem 
(Kaplan 1994; Richards 1996).  According to the UNDP, 90 percent of those killed in the 
civil conflicts of the 1990s were civilians, which was a complete reversal from the early 20th 
century when 90 percent of victims were uniformed combatants (UNDP 2002).  Put another 
way, the ratio of civilian deaths to deaths of direct combatants increased three-fold from the 
1980s to the 1990s (Kaldor 1999, 9).  These civil conflicts certainly imperiled populations 
and created humanitarian emergencies that put pressure on the UN and the international 
community to act.  These civil conflicts also gained international attention because of the 
perceived spillover effects that could endanger international security and stability.  Simply 
put, states in the midst of conflict have collapsed and are unable to govern themselves and 
can provide fertile ground for global threats like terrorism, organized crime, drug, weapons 
and human trafficking, disease, environmental crises, refugee flows and mass migration. The 





notice (USAID 2005, v).  In response to the "problem" of failed states and new wars, 
international actors devised new practices and agendas to manage the problem. For a variety 
of reasons discussed below, this task fell largely at the feet of UN and other international 
peacebuilding organizations, which have periodically launched "peace operations" to prevent 
conflict from reoccurring in the aftermath of civil war.  
The Origins of Peacebuilding 
In the aftermath of World War II, the world was locked in a bi-polar struggle of ideological 
wills backed by nuclear deterrence.  The period was defined by a dramatic reshuffling of 
international system as the process of decolonization led to an abundance of new sovereign 
states.  The UN Charter with 51 signatories in 1945 ballooned to three times that by the early 
1990s.  The idea that all “peoples” were part of sovereign states that should be left to govern 
and administer themselves without the influence of other states or the UN defined the era.  
Consistent meddling in the affairs of other countries was standard practice in the international 
system but the UN went out of its way not to intervene in the domestic jurisdiction.  Weak 
states were subject to periodic disruptions such as coup d’etats and civil war during the 1960s 
and 1970s but the suggestion that states could "fail" or be unable to govern themselves was 
an “anathema to the raison d’etre of decolonization and offensive to the notion of self 
determination" (Helman and Ratner 1992/1993, 4).  
If the UN had sought to intervene in weak or newly independent states, it would have 
been viewed as a sovereign intrusion.  Moreover, the US and Soviet Union, both veto 
members of the UN Security Council, would not have approved such interference in their 
"spheres of influence".  When instability or civil strife did occur, the superpowers competed 
to control the situation in strategically important places.  Even in states that did not pose any 
real strategic problem, the prospect of reaching agreement on the UN overseeing postconflict 





combined with the Cold War and decolonization largely restricted UN activities.  
Periodically, however, the UN did get involved in traditional peacekeeping functions.  These 
operations typically involved the deployment of lightly armed military observers to monitor 
ceasefires or patrolling the buffer zones that kept combatants apart.  In these instances, the 
UN was prohibited from using force and instructed not to interfere in the domestic affairs of 
the target state.  The UN Emergency Force positioned in Egypt along the border with Israel in 
1956, for instance, was deemed successful precisely because it was able to keep its actions 
separate from the internal affairs of the Egyptian state (Paris 2004, 14).   
Furthermore, while newly independent states were relatively weak, unstable and 
impoverished, intervention of any kind was considered unnecessary because the power of 
modernization and development was the recipe for peaceful and prosperous states.  For the 
West in particular, the illustrative model was the Marshall Plan that rebuilt the war-torn states 
of Europe and Japan after World War II by focusing on technical and economic assistance to 
establish stable market democracies.  The superpowers, along with members of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), contributed substantial 
development and humanitarian aid to Third World states for this purpose.  Likewise, the UN, 
through the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and other agencies, contributed 
substantial sums to foster economic development through technical assistance projects.  The 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs), most notably the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), also administered billions of dollars in grants and loans ostensibly to 
assist developing states. 
The situation changed dramatically with the end of the Cold War and the emergence 
of so-called failed states.  In an instant, the UN was presented with the opportunity to become 





international intervention revolutionized peace operations.7  Since the US and Soviet Union 
(and later, Russia) were unwilling to get involved in countries not considered vital to their 
immediate security interests, the demands on the UN to address long-standing conflicts or 
failed states increased dramatically.  In 1989, the UN sent a mission to Namibia to disarm 
combatants, prepare the country for its first democratic elections and draft a new constitution.  
In 1991, new peace operations were launched in Angola, El Salvador, and Cambodia that 
involved organizing for elections and human rights monitoring.8
 In short, the conventional prohibitions on UN "meddling"  in the sovereign affairs of 
states was being superseded by new norms of international intervention institutionalized to 
manage civil conflicts and the problem of failed states (Finnemore 2003).  Traditional 
approaches to addressing failed states and civil conflict were simply inadequate in the milieu 
of the post-Cold War world.  In a broad articulation of the UN’s position, An Agenda for 
Peace was prepared by then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992.  The report 
described the evolving mission of the UN and refined the terminology on peace operations.  
  The following year, the UN 
deployed to Bosnia and Somalia in the midst of civil conflict and to Mozambique to lay the 
groundwork for elections.  In every case since 1989, the UN functioned outside of the 
constraints that had traditionally been imposed.  Peacekeepers in Bosnia and Somalia, for 
example, were authorized by the Security Council to use force for more than self-defense, 
and in Cambodia the UN took over administration of the state for a short time during the 
transition.     
 
                                                 
 
7 This expanded role of the UN also coincided with new list of international security threats including 
disease, environment and poverty had materialized on the global agenda that no one country was 
powerful or willing enough to adequately address.  Such threats, we were told, would require 
international cooperation and coordination from the UN and other international organizations.   





Preventative diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent 
existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they 
occur. Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such 
peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Peacekeeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the 
consent of all parties concerned, normally involving UN military and/or police personnel and 
frequently civilians as well.  Peacebuilding is a technique that expands the possibilities for 
both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.9
 
 
 The Agenda for Peace also established in the UN lexicon the term peacebuilding, 
defined as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify 
peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali 1992, 4).  What was 
particularly notable was that by the UN's own definition the objective of peacebuilding was 
not simply to end conflict but establish the conditions for peace, which is a longer-term 
agenda.  Not surprisingly, then, the objectives of peacebuilding were broadened considerably 
in comparison to the UN’s traditional unwillingness to intervene.  
 
These may include disarming warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and 
possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for 
security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming 
or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of 
political participation (Boutros-Ghali 1992, 13). 
 
It is not a stretch to say that in the early 1990s, postconflict peacebuilding was the 
"UN's principal peace and security activity" (Paris and Sisk 2009, 5).  At least eight "peace 
                                                 
 
9 Peacekeeping operations are distinct from “peace enforcement” (which is the authorization to impose 





operations" were deployed between 1989 and 1993 alone.  The UN arguably achieved some 
early “successes” by helping to bring civil conflicts to tenuous peace.  In Namibia, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, and Cambodia the UN helped to facilitate a peace treaty, 
monitor the demobilization of forces, and organize elections.  But a majority of the civil 
conflicts seemed only to fester under uncertain conditions, and at times without clear victors, 
which caused state institutions to decay, infrastructure to collapse, and economic and social 
development to deteriorate.  Research at the time showed that of states in the midst of 
postconflict “transition”, approximately 44 percent would resume open warfare in the first 
five years after a provisional settlement and nearly 50 percent of states in the midst of civil 
war would revert to violence in the first decade of relative peace (Collier et al. 2003; World 
Bank 2004).  The most accurate predictor of future violent conflict appeared to be the 
occurrence of past violent conflict (Junne and Verkoren 2004).  In addition, when the 
peacebuilding process fails and conflict resumes, more intense violence than in the previous 
war is often the result and any political progress, economic development and social 
rehabilitation achieved in the intervening period is undermined (Collier et al. 2003).   
Rwanda, Bosnia Somalia from 1993-1994 are cases in point.  UN efforts in Somalia to 
support political reconciliation, start economic and social reconstruction, and secure a peace 
was a disappointment and the country remains one of the most problematic failed stated in the 
world (Doyle and Sambanis 2006).  In Bosnia, the UN's Protection Force was unable to 
establish "zones of safety" that could stop war crimes against the population. And in Rwanda, 
failed UN efforts to consolidate peace resulted in renewed conflict, and an estimated 800,000 
additional deaths the following year.  The profound cost of failing to consolidate peace 
became evident.  This soul-searching led not only to a short lull in peace operations but a 













El Salvador 1991 
Mozambique 1992 





Timor Leste 1999 
Kosovo 1999 
Sierra Leone 1999 
Democratic Republic of Congo 2000 
Afghanistan 2002 
Cote d’Ivoire 2004 
Burundi 2004 
Sudan 2005 and 2007 
 
Table 1. UN Peacebuilding Operations 1989-200710
 
 
                                                 
 





Peacebuilding: The Second Generation 
By 1995, the Agenda for Peace had been supplemented in a position paper by Boutros-Ghali.  
The Supplement to an Agenda for Peace recognized the broad international appeal of 
postconflict peacebuilding but acknowledged certain shortcomings.  The paper suggested that 
peacebuilding needed to be more than simply a “postconflict” activity.  Instead, 
peacebuilding was better conceived of as a practice of controlling and resolving conflicts and 
consolidating peace at any stage (Boutros-Ghali 1995). This observation was based on a new 
understanding--exemplified by preceding peacebuilding failures-- that war-torn states go 
through pulses of violent conflict and habitually relapse into full-scale war after peace 
agreements have been signed.  It challenged the conventional notion that states progress from 
war to peace in a linear fashion and according to a predictable set of stages.  The optimistic 
but parsimonious peacebuilding agenda promulgated by the UN was relatively successful at 
negotiating ceasefires and peace settlements but did not "create the structures for the 
institutionalization of peace" (Boutros-Ghali 1995).   
At the same time, complications implementing the Dayton-Peace Accords in 1996 
led the UN to reconsider its timelines and benchmarks for success.  Although peacebuilding 
had been defined years earlier in terms of establishing the conditions for peace, many 
operations--Bosnia included--were scheduled for only one year intervals. This timeframe was 
wholly inadequate for the task of peacebuilding if, indeed, holding elections, resettling 
refugees, reforming economic systems and rebuilding government capacity was truly to be 
achieved.  In Bosnia, for example, the mission was eventually extended for a period of 18 
months, and subsequently extended for an indefinite period. This problem became the crux of 
an influential UN evaluation of its peace operations published in 2000. The report, referred to 
as the Brahimi Report (2000), concluded that UN missions lacked realistic timelines and was 





to focus on the appropriate "exit strategy" rather than a results-based framework for success 
(Brahimi 2000, viii).  Among other things, the report underscored the need for short-term 
projects that "make a real difference in the lives of people" and a long-term strategy to 
achieve national reconciliation and support the governance institutions (Brahimi 2000, ix). 
 This new understanding of peacebuilding, termed by former Secretary-General Kofi-
Annan as a policy of "No Exit without Strategy" emerged in parallel with new scholarship in 
the late 1990s that also had an effect on the practice of peacebuilding.  Research by the World 
Bank concluded that the difficulty in achieving a durable peace in war-torn states in the early 
1990s was a failure to address the root causes of conflict, which in the cases studied were 
widespread poverty and anemic economic growth (World Bank 1997; 2004).  As has been 
pointed out by the World Bank and others, “over one billion of the world’s poor were either 
directly affected or at high risk of being affected by civil war, and 80 percent of the world’s 
20 poorest countries suffered a major war in the past 15 years” (Avalle 2007).   If, indeed, the 
objective of peacebuilding was to "consolidate peace to prevent a reoccurrence of armed 
confrontation", then addressing poverty would be essential (Annan 1998).  The evidence, in 
fact, concluded that poverty produced a "conflict trap"--because impoverished countries were 
not only more vulnerable to conflict but conflict only deepens poverty.  In short, a lack of 
economic development in the aftermath of conflict could quite easily lead to the resumption 
of violence.  Second, the World Bank concluded that a “development gap” existed between 
the time UN peacekeeping and humanitarian relief ended and long-term reconstruction, 
economic development and political stability commenced (Collier et al. 2003).  To address 
this gap, the World Bank advocated a sustained and long-term form of peacebuilding to 
ensure that war-torn states proceed with economic development during the transition from 
war to peace (World Bank 2004).  As Mark Duffield (2001) has noted, peacebuilding 
objectives of security and development became inseparable around this time, and the 





 In parallel with the World Bank findings, scholarship in the late 1990s led to an 
expansion in the number of sub-areas and approaches understood as important for 
peacebuilding.  For instance, emergent literature on the durability of peace after civil war 
stressed the importance of different types of peacebuilding operations and peace settlements 
in ending war and building peace (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2003). Other influential 
work stressed the economic motivations of combatants.  These theories concluded that civil 
conflict was the result of economic opportunities available to rebels and warlords; rather than 
political grievances typically associated with the onset of war.  Specifically, conventional 
insurgencies were motivated by "greed" and characterized by the "self-financing" character of 
new wars (Collier and Hoeffler 1999; Ross 2003).  This perspective, in turn, led to increasing 
attention to the environment and natural resources in peacebuilding circles since abundant or 
"lootable" commodities were believed to fuel civil conflict.11
In the early 1990s, peace operations were monopolized by the UN.  However, 
peacebuilding has developed into what Roland Paris (2004, 13) called a “growth industry”, 
characterized by an extensive array of international peacebuilding organizations or IPOs.  
These IPOs include most prominently the UN and its agencies
 Still other scholarship examined 
the significance of gender, justice or disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) 
programs on peacebuilding outcomes, to name just a few.  In short, peacebuilding policy and 
practice increasingly sought to address an almost inexhaustible list of issues.   
12
                                                 
 
11 See Chapter 3. 
, including UNDP, UN 
Environment Programme (UNEP), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme 
(WFP); the World Bank; IMF; OECD; European Union, national development agencies (e.g. 
US Agency for International Development (USAID), UK Department of International 
Development (DFID); regional organizations; and a broad range of international non-
12 The UN is represented by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Political 
Affairs and Department of Economic and Social Affairs Also UN Peacebuilding Commission and 





governmental organizations (INGOs).  Funding from these international organizations has 
also led to the emergence of numerous domestic non-governmental organizations and civil 
society groups, which largely support the peacebuilding agenda circumscribed by the 
international community. Depending on the situation, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and 
the militaries of western powers have also become involved in peacebuilding activities. A 
growing number of private companies have also become an active part of the peacebuilding 
given the importance of developing the economic sector and attracting foreign direct 
investment.13
 Operations after 1999, including in Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone and Liberia 
reflected the lessons of the pre-1997 era.  The mandates of the missions were considerably 
more expansive than earlier operations and arguably more strategic in terms of achieving 
peacebuilding milestones. UN timelines were not necessarily "open ended" but there was an 
acknowledgement that building peace would require a long-term commitment on the part of 
IPOs.  Elections, humanitarian issues and security were emphasized along with traditional 
development goals of poverty alleviation, economic growth, education, health, gender and 
infrastructure were seen as critical to breaking the “conflict trap” and consolidating peace 
(World Bank 1997; 2004).  In addition, attention began to turn toward to improving 
governance and state institutions.  In Sierra Leone, Liberia and to a lesser extent East Timor, 
the management of the environment and natural resources played a prominent role in 
peacebuilding practices.  The expanding peacebuilding agenda of the post-1999 
peacebuilding is well illustrated by a UN Security Council statement (UNSC 2001a): 
  On the periphery, there are also a group of academics, consultants, media 
groups and charities that influence the character and priorities of peacebuilding.   While the 
exact constellation of peacebuilders does vary from one peace operation to the next there is a 
regular contingent of IPOs that are active in war-torn states.   
                                                 
 







Peacebuilding is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or the continuation of 
armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, development, 
humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms.  This requires short and long-
term actions tailored to address the particular needs of societies sliding into conflict or 
emerging from it.  These actions should focus on fostering sustainable development, the 
eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the 
promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law and the promotion of a 
culture of peace and non-violence. 
 
The ever-evolving and expanding second-generation of peacebuilding appeared to be 
moderately successful. Compared to the mid-1990s, few countries had actually reverted back 
to all-out civil war. This was a good sign but as the Brahimi Report (2000, 3) concluded that 
peacebuilding is "more than just the absence of war".  Recall that the objective instead was to 
"reassemble the foundations of peace" and this seemed to be in doubt (Brahimi 2000, 3; UN 
2004).  In 2005 alone, the seven of the nine conflicts that broke were characterized by 
fighting between previous foes (Call and Cousens 2008, 7).  In addition, according to Charles 
Call and Susan Cook (2003, 240), of the 18 UN led peace operations ongoing between 1998 
and 2002, 13 were considered authoritarian regimes after UN intervention.  Moreover, in a 
large majority of war-torn states poverty and deep socio-economic inequalities, which 
arguably were among the root causes of conflict, still remained intact.  While few would 
argue that operations, on the whole, have done more harm than good, the UN and other IPOs 
have continued to evaluate peacebuilding outcomes (Brahimi 2000; UN 2004).14
                                                 
 
14 Jeffrey Herbst (2003) suggests that IBOs should not intervene in African states but to "let them fail". 
The reason: peacebuilding freezes in-place relations that led to the conflicts in the first place and only 






Some experts conclude the broadened peacebuilding agenda, and revolving 
constellation of IPO, has created a confusing mix of goals, activities, timelines and contexts, 
which are actually slowing the process of peace consolidation (Paris and Sisk 2009; 
Richmond 2004).  As Paris (2004, 19) alludes to, second generation peacebuilding is not 
"run" by the UN or any other IPO.  International peacebuilding organizations have a variety 
of responsibilities, missions, objectives and interventions - humanitarian relief, conflict 
mitigation, peacekeeping, poverty alleviation, institutional building and good governance--all 
carried out in very different temporal dimensions from short, medium and long term.  This 
creates not only a lack of strategic consistency and coherency but also fosters cleavages and 
competition between IPOs that can have negative consequences for peacebuilding.  As 
Michael Doyle and Nicolas Sambanis (2006, 344) suggest there is a “need for better strategy 
coordination when several international agencies intervene in the same conflict." Former 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan referred to this lack of coordination as a “gaping hole” that 
limited the effectiveness of UN peacebuilding operations.  Still others insisted that 
peacebuilding suffers from a continued lack of investment in time and money. A High Level 
UN Panel, for instance, stated that a "failure to invest adequately in peacebuilding increases 
the odds that a country will relapse into conflict" (UN 2004).  And In Larger Freedom 
(UNGA 2005), a report of the UN Secretary-General, noted that:  
 
Deploying...peacekeeping forces may be essential in terminating conflicts but are not 
 sufficient for long-term recovery. Serious attention to the longer-term process of 
 peacebuilding in all its multiple dimensions is critical; failure to invest adequately in 






 To meet the need for more coordination and investment, the UN created The 
Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and Peacebuilding Support Office in 2005 to advise the 
UN General Assembly and Security Council.  The commission acknowledged the need for: 
 
Coordinated, coherent and integrated approach  to postconflict peacebuilding and 
reconciliation with a view to achieving sustainable peace; recognizing that need for a 
dedicated institutional mechanism to address the special needs of countries emerging from 
conflict toward recovery, reintegration and reconstruction; and to assist them in laying the 
foundation for sustainable development (UN 2005).  
 
 The main purpose of the PBC was to: (1) bring together all relevant actors to marshal 
resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for postconflict peacebuilding 
and recovery; (2) focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts 
necessary for recovery from conflict and support the development of integrated strategies in 
order to lay the foundation for sustainable development; (3) and provide recommendations 
and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the 
United Nations (UNGA 2005b).  As of 2007, three focus countries had been selected--
Burundi, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau.  The UN has, more recently, put into place 
"integrated missions" (for example, in Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste) that combine all the 
dimensions of peacebuilding together under a central UN office.  The purpose is to move the 
UN from "coordination to integration" so that political, security and humanitarian responses 
are linked.   
 The concept of peacebuilding has been deeply institutionalized in the international 
system by international actors concerned in large part that war-torn and failed states pose a 
serious problem to global security and stability. It is evident that peacebuilding practices and 





guidance to the practices and policies articulated above?  How have these changed over time?  
And does it matter for peacebuilding?    
Peacebuilding Frameworks 
The evolution of peacebuilding over the course of the last two decades is quite remarkable.  
In light of the challenges posed by war-torn states, and the various pathologies of peace 
operations, peacebuilding has changed.  New policies, agendas, sub-areas, institutions and 
practices have frequently emerged in response to the peacebuilding experiment. In addition, 
the constellation of international peace builders has grown substantially.  But the underlying 
peacebuilding strategies have varied little.  The first decade or so IPOs stressed a typical 
formula of liberalization to end war and build states, which was found to be deeply flawed 
(Paris 2004).  Despite statements to the contrary liberalization still remains central to the 
peacebuilding experiment.  Recently, however, it has been supplemented by a shift toward a 
strategy of statebuilding (Paris 2004; Fukuyama 2004; Call and Wyeth 2008; Paris and Sisk 
2009; Chandler 2010).   
Liberalization: elections and markets 
A majority of peace operations during the 1990s focused on what Roland Paris 
(2004) termed the “elixir of liberalization”.  Peacebuilding, and hence IBOs, pursued a 
strategy to establish a sustainable and lasting peace by reproducing the tenets of the liberal 
peace thesis.  Liberalization assumes the stability-enhancing traits of both democratization 
and market-oriented economic policies.  The strategy was based on the perception--which 
was dominant in the years following the Cold War--that democracy and free-market 
economics had trumped all other ways of organizing society.  It was also based on the 
enduring perception that democracy and international trade had rebuilt a peaceful Europe and 





surrounding democratization and the "Third Wave" of democracy when suggesting the 20th 
century offered a particularly valuable lesson: 
 
Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one 
another.  They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their 
leaders.  Democratic governments do not ethically “cleanse” their own populations, and they 
are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency.  Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against 
one another.  They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one 
another.  Democratic countries from a more reliable, open and enduring trading partnerships.  
In the long run they offer better and more stable climate for investment.  They are more 
environmentally responsible because they answer to their own citizens, who organize to 
protest the destruction of their environments.  They are better bets to honor international 
treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes much more 
difficult to breech agreements in secret. Precisely because within their own borders, they 
respect competition, civil liberties, properties rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the 
only reliable foundation on which to build a new world order of international security and 
prosperity can be built (emphasis added). 
 
 Such pronouncements were routine in the 1990s.  Former UN Secretary-General 
Boutros-Ghali (1996) all but pronounced democracy the cure-all for the planet's and 
humanity’s ills when he stressed that democracy was “essential to progress on a wide range 
of human concerns and to the protection of human rights.” This human concern included not 
only war between states but also conflict within them. Democracy was the anecdote for 
everything: economic development, cultural enrichment, control of crime and corruption, and 
the protection of the environment (Boutros-Ghali 1996).  The optimism with regards to 
democracy as the dominant peacebuilding strategy was supported by scholarship that 





conflict, and the notion that market democracies rarely go to war against one another (Chan 
1997; Ray 1998; Russett and Oneal 2001).  Related studies also concluded that market 
democracies, especially those that are "well established", are less prone to experience civil 
conflict (Hegre 2001).  RJ Rummel (1997, 85), for instance, found democracies to be less 
likely than non-democracies to experience “revolutions, bloody coups d’etat, political 
assassinations, anti-government terrorist bombings, guerrilla warfare, insurgencies, civil 
wars, mutinies and rebellions." 
 Given the evidence that peace could be secured through democracy and free 
markets, it is not surprising that liberalization served as the universal strategy of IBOs 
throughout the 1990s (Paris 2004). In theory, at least, democracy--defined largely by the 
holding of elections--would serve as the mechanism for postconflict reconciliation and 
compromise.  This explains why most of peace operations focused on political reconciliation, 
in particular, and was preoccupied with arranging peace settlements, planning for elections, 
overseeing constitutional reforms, and rebuilding civil society--but little else. Marina 
Ottaway (2003) refers to this as the “democratic reconstruction model” of peacebuilding, 
which provided a rationale for limited peace operations since it entailed short-term efforts to 
maintain security in preparation for elections.  As such, democratization--and more 
specifically the emphasis on holding elections--were convenient endpoints that "provided a 
built-in exit strategy” for the UN and other reluctant peacebuilders (Kumar 1998). 
Democratization was also deemed significant because it was supposed to lay the 
groundwork for neoliberal economic reforms, which were dominant during the 1990s.  These 
were characterized by eliminating barriers to international trade, attracting foreign 
investment, stimulating private enterprise and limiting the government's role in the economy.  
In terms of peacebuilding policy, such reforms might result in: the privatization of state-
owned industries, reductions in government subsidies, the loosening of regulations, and 





would work to revitalize the economy in order to “buy confidence in the peace process...fund 
specific commitments in the peace agreement... and set the foundations necessary to sustain 
peace” (Woodward 2002).  If democratization was thought to set the foundation for peace, it 
was through economic reforms that peace would be cemented.  Efforts by IBOs to promote 
and establish free-market economic reforms was reinforced by evidence that, among other 
things, slow or stagnant economic growth, combined with endemic poverty, correlated to 
incidences of violent conflict (Collier et al. 2003).  It was also reinforced by the realization 
that reconstruction would require substantial state revenue. While experts largely avoided the 
question of what would "jump-start" economic growth or what might mobilize state revenue 
quickly--natural resources being the most obvious-- it was quite reasonable that IBOs should 
promote and rapidly implement reforms and policies to spur economic growth and 
development.    
Despite optimism about the power of liberalization to transform war -torn states into 
peaceful states, the results were somewhat problematic. As noted above, the rate at which 
civil conflict resumed after peace after the arrival of IBOs raised serious questions about 
peacebuilding policies.  Moreover, evidence that authoritarian regimes were more likely to 
govern after intervention by IPOs (in spite of elections and "democratization" efforts) 
suggested that peacebuilding strategies might be defective.   The inability of IPOs to achieve 
a sustainable and lasting peace, particularly in the 1990s, was blamed on a variety of issues, 
which were discussed in the preceding section; others postulated that the underlying strategy 
of liberalization was having a deleterious effect on the ability of war-torn states to establish 
peace (Paris 2004).  Research showed, for instance, that conflict reoccurred more often than 
not in states exposed to UN peace operations (Paris 2004).  An illustrative example is Timor 
Leste, which after a period of intense liberalization (and UN peacekeepers pulled out), 
collapsed into violence in 2006 (Richmond 2009).  Meanwhile, scholarship found that 





promoting democracy involves profound social transformation that is a very bumpy ride.  
Carothers (2002) suggested that most transitioning states are stuck in a “gray zone” that 
resembles democracy in name only.  Similarly, Mansfield and Snyder (1995) argued that 
states undergoing transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule are more likely than 
established democracies or non-democracies to be involved in conflict due to political 
opportunists and resurgent nationalism.  Other scholars have reached comparable 
conclusions, pointing out that states are particularly war-prone in the earliest phases of 
democratic transition (Huntington 1968; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; 
Gleditsch and Ward 2000; Hegre 2001; Snyder 2000).  There is also substantial disagreement 
on the precise relationship between market-oriented economic policies and civil conflict. 
While well-established market economies certainly seem to enjoy peace and stability, market-
based reforms and policies appear to increase not decrease violence and civil unrest in 
developing countries (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Skogly 1993; Stiglitz 2002; Walton and 
Seddon 1994).  
According to Paris (2004, 156), the fatal flaw in the liberalization-peacebuilding 
paradigm was that democracy and market-based economic policies "both encourage conflict 
and competition." Democracy requires competitive elections and a politically active civil 
society that can scrutinize state policy and balance state power (Paris 2004, 156).  In theory, 
this tension can act as a safety-valve that reduces conflict but in war-torn states competition 
for state power or the rules that govern society may lead to renewed instability and violence 
(Dahl 1986). This paradox extends to the self-interested competition that lies at the heart of 
liberal economic theory.  In such a world, competition for profit in the marketplace works to 
allocate resources in such a way as to create greater prosperity and peace for society as a 
whole.  The problem, of course, is that social cohesion is not guaranteed since reforms and 
policies designed to spur economic growth can create disparities in wealth that fosters 





of capitalism creates winners and losers, which can fuel social unrest and undermine the 
process of democratization.  
The apparent pathologies of liberalization resulted very different reactions among 
IBOs and experts (Paris 2009).  While some questioned the merits of the liberalization 
orthodoxy, a majority emphasized the point that before democracy and market-based 
economic policies can be sustained, state institutions must have the capacity and legitimacy 
to govern.   
Statebuilding: authority and institutions 
Liberalization certainly remains a dominant peacebuilding strategy.  However, over 
the last decade there has been a growing recognition among IBOs and experts alike that 
successful war to peace transitions requires a strategy of "statebuilding."  The emphasis on 
statebuilding gained momentum after 9/11when the problem of failed and war-torn states 
garnered increased visibility among scholars and the international security establishment. 
Spillover effects were no longer perceived as just humanitarian concerns but were identified 
as a genuine strategic threat to international security.  In the US, failed states suffering from a 
"sovereignty gap" became the top national security priority (White House 2002).  This new 
security orientation influenced ongoing peace operations by emphasizing almost overnight 
the importance of building states and the legitimate structures of governance to prevent state 
failure and conflict relapse (Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan 2005).  Francis Fukuyama (2004, 
103), citing operations in Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Timor Leste, criticized IBOs for 
not creating "self-sustaining states".  He argued that a lack of state institutions was a critical 
obstacle to achieving political, economic and social development in failed states and a 
continued cause for alarm in other countries.  Similarly, James Fearon and David Laitin 
(2004) argued that UN-led peacebuilding missions had not been effective at statebuilding. 





precondition for political and economic success--would fail to be realized.  Fukuyama and 
Fearon and Laitin recommended a robust form of peacebuilding that in some situation may 
warrant "neo-trusteeship" in which international actors take over the administration of fragile 
and war-torn national governments.  Likewise, Steven Krasner (2004, 90)  argued that 
effective government institutions are required to provide lasting results noting  that “failed, 
inadequate and incompetent or abusive national authority structures has sabotaged the 
economic well-being, violated the basic human rights, and undermined the physical security 
of the their country's populations.” The perception was that IBOs must first build states to 
build peace (Call and Wyeth 2008).   
Statebuilding, then, is the "construction or strengthening of legitimate governmental 
institutions in countries emerging from civil conflict" (Paris and Sisk 2009, 1).15
                                                 
 
15 Chandler (2010, 1) argues that statebuilding goes beyond war-torn states and is "seen as a vital 
package of policy measures designed to prevent states from sliding into political and economic 
collapse." 
  Put another 
way, statebuilding "is the creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of 
existing ones” (Fukuyama 2004, ix).    At its core, statebuilding is a strategy to both 
rehabilitate state institutions and restore the authority of war-torn states (Call and Wyeth 
2008; Paris 2004; Paris and Sisk 2009).  From this perspective, statebuilding draws on Max 
Weber’s concept of the state as a collection of institutions that successfully claim a monopoly 
on the legitimate authority over a given territory.  As Call and Wyeth (2008) suggest, 
statebuilding places a strategic peacebuilding priority on building institutional capacity, 
which emphasizes the functionality of formal state agencies; rather than informal or 
traditional institutions of authority or international authority.  In this Weberian view, 
"stateness" functions in two ways.  First, it furnishes institutions that can guarantee a 
monopoly of the coercive use of force and institutions that can collect revenues and govern 





understanding of the state extends to all state agencies, including those that formulate policy 
in the areas of justice, finance, agriculture and trade, among others.  
Scholars suggest that to establish a sustainable and long-term peace, state institutions 
must be legitimate to the population and the outside world.  Institutions should, in theory, 
provide space for society to express their preferences and resolve conflicts nonviolently.  If 
institutions of the state are weak or societal contestation too strong, competition can lead to 
renewed violence (Paris 2004).   Ineffective institutions can also cause a "security dilemma" 
whereby societal groups that cannot rely on the state for protection may have an incentive to 
mobilize in self-defense (Paris 2004, 173).  In addition, fractured or illegitimate state 
institutions may not be able to (or want to) balance societal demands into authoritative "rules 
of the game" thereby inviting individuals and groups to pursue their own interests outside of 
state  institutions (Paris 2004, 173).  Paris (2004) argued that IBOs need to devote more 
attention to institutional prerequisites of peacebuilding since virtually every peacebuilding 
task--from long-term security, the rule of law, alleviating poverty, managing the environment 
and natural resources, repairing infrastructure and healing society-- inherently takes place 
within the constraints of state institutions that are designed to resolve disputes, translate 
public debate into governmental policy and enforce a system of rules and regulations that 
govern the polity.  
More to the point, statebuilding (and hence state institutions) is perceived as critical 
to the goal of implementing reforms and policies of good governance, which are desired by 
IBOs. As noted by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (1997): 
 
Good governance is also a component of our work for peace. It has a strong preventive aspect. 
 It gives  societies sound structures for economic and social development. In post-conflict 





 peace. Good governance demands the consent and the participation of the governed and the 
 full and lasting involvement of all citizens in the future of their nation.   
 
Recall that at its core failed and war-torn states are states with perceptibly weak, 
corrupt or non-existent governance.  In short, legitimate state institutions are deemed 
essential for transforming bad governance, which causes problems into good governance that 
rights them.  Governance is a process by which rules, institutions and processes through 
which authority and control are established, political decisions made, state and society 
structured and social and economic policies administered.  Good governance, on the other 
hand, is a normative concept that stresses: 
 
 The capacity of the state, the commitment to the public good, the rule of law, the degree of 
 transparency and accountability, the level of popular participation, and the stock of social 
 capital. Without good governance, it is impossible to foster development.  No amount of 
 resources transferred or infrastructure built can compensate for-or survive-bad governance 
 (USAID 2009).    
 
Another overarching premise is also that without a functioning state and good 
governance, democracy and economic reform would be impossible.  In short, analysts 
believed that the problems with the peacebuilding-liberalization nexus alluded to in the 
preceding section could be mitigated through statebuilding (Paris 2004).  For example, 
scholars have long argued that successful democratization requires the existence of a 
functioning state with a functioning bureaucracy (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1990, 23).  
Democracies are more likely to survive if it has an institutional apparatus necessary to 
exercise "a monopoly on the legitimate use of force" and  "command...regulate and extract 





(Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1990, 23).  Moreover, war-torn states that lack institutional 
capacity are less likely to successfully manage economic reforms.  According to Paris (2004) 
legitimate state institutions are required  to oversee and implement economic policies, which 
include enforcing  property rights, managing public finances, granting and enforcing 
contracts and  concessions, collecting taxes, and regulating banks.   
Against this backdrop, IBOs began to adjust peacebuilding strategies toward 
constructing and strengthening state institutions.  This process began post-1999 but 
accelerated after 2002 more or less in response to 9/11, and the conflict in Iraq (World Bank 
2000; OECD 2007; Paris and Sisk 2009).  From Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Timor Leste and 
Burundi--and more recently Afghanistan and Cote d'Ivoire--IBOs have invested in a strategy 
of statebuilding.  This strategy has manifested itself in two-ways in peace operations.  First, 
peacebuilders have invested heavily on improving state capacity and administration in terms 
of training, funding and reorganizing state ministries and agencies. The rationale is that state 
capacity--often in decay after conflict-- is needed if the government is to deliver basic 
services and carry out political, security and economic functions essential for peacebuilding 
(read: liberalization).  Second, peacebuilders "export" the tenets of good governance, 
including inclusiveness, accountability, transparency and the rule of law into war-torn states 
(Chandler 2010).  Not only are these tenets perceived to be important characteristics of the 
liberal state imperative for long-term peace and development but serve as an antidote for bad 
governance (e.g., corruption) that can lead to conflict relapse.     
 Statebuilding is no more benign or neutral in the peacebuilding process than policies 
intended to liberalize war-torn states (Paris 2004).  For this reason, building peace by first 
building states will not be without controversy.  Although systematic attempts to evaluate 
statebuilding as a peacebuilding strategy have only just begun several problems emerge (Paris 
and Sisk 2009; Chandler 2010).  Does the substantial level of intervention statebuilding 





Does enhancing the power and authority of state institutions create insecurity among 
excluded or alienated groups in society that can ignite conflict?  Can statebuilding undermine 
efforts to form participatory state institutions by strengthening abusive regimes or recreating 
pre-war arrangements?  Can state institutions buffer the effects of liberalization?   
Conclusion 
After the review of peacebuilding presented, two things are worth noting. First, peacebuilding 
practices, policies and strategies will continue to evolve along with the "lesson learned" from 
ongoing operations, new scholarship and as yet to be determined global events.  Because the 
stakes are so high, we can expect efforts to improve upon the peacebuilding experiment to 
continue.  Second, peacebuilding and its "successes" are bound to be controversial and 
uncertain.  This is merely the by-product--for better or worse--of trying to transform 
something as complex and multifaceted as war-torn states and societies.   
On the surface, the importance of this chapter to my research is clear.  I am interested 
in examining how environmental and natural resources governance helps or hinders 
peacebuilding so we must first understand the evolution of the concept and the milieu within 
which it materialized.  As noted in the chapter, attention to the environment and natural 
resources by IPOs emerged in the late-1990s, after which it became integrated in 
peacebuilding policy.  This attention was due largely emergent scholarship that linked the 
environment and natural resources to civil conflict, which I discuss at length in Chapter 3. 
This chapter is also important for another reason that will unfold in subsequent 
chapters.  Environmental and natural resource governance in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
reflects a merger between the two prominent peacebuilding strategies--liberalization and 
statebuilding.  Rather than permitting war-torn states to freely choose the rules and 
institutions, I argue that IBOs actively promote and support the establishment of specific 





resources.   For reasons that will become clear, this poses a significant problem for 
peacebuilding and raises questions about the strategies being employed by peacebuilders. 
 





Chapter 3: The Environment and Natural Resources in 




The salience of global environmental issues increased in the early 1990s as it became clearer 
that problems could transcend borders and  it would require international cooperation to solve 
them (UNCED 1992).  Problems in one country--a nuclear meltdown in Chernobyl, for 
example--might swiftly endanger the safety and security of another.  Jessica Matthews (1989) 
linked the environment to security concerns by building on heightened public concern about 
ozone depletion, climate change and rainforest destruction. The result was a period in which 
the environment was “securitized”--that is, linked to Western geopolitical and national 
security threats (Dalby 2002).  Some scholars argued that militarizing the environment and 
equating it with a security imperative was methodology unwarranted and a potentially 
dangerous conflation of issues but it still gained enormous global currency (Deudney and 
Matthew 1999; Diehl and Gleditsch 2001; Khagram and Ali 2006).  At the same time, the 
perceived increase in fragile states and "new wars", discussed in the preceding chapter, had 
also grown to dominate the international security agenda. The result: efforts to redefine 
security after the Cold War did so in combination with the proliferation of "new wars" and 
global environmental issues, which focused international attention on the linkages between 
the environment, natural resources and civil conflict.   
 This chapter starts by examining the extensive scholarship concerning the 
environment, natural resources and civil conflict.  In doing so, I suggest that the idea that the 
environment and natural resources correspond  in some way to civil conflict materialized  





despite the literature, which frames the debate in terms of scarcity or abundance explanations 
of civil conflict, it suffers from significant intellectual challenges, methodological doubts and 
empirical complexities that have result in few, if any, definitive findings.  These ambiguities 
aside, these explanations are the dominant framework from which IBOs perceive the 
environment, natural resource and conflict problematic.  The chapter, then, examines the 
ways in which IBOs have incorporated environmental and natural resources concerns into 
peace operations over the last decade. I suggest that the environment-resource-conflict 
literature has had a profound influence on the way international peacebuilding organizations 
understand how the environment and natural resources relate to peace and has a significant 
bearing on the reforms and policies that peacebuilders promote in war-torn states.  All of this 
raises serious questions about peacebuilding: given how little we know about the linkages 
between the environment, natural resources and conflict, how can we trust that the linkages 
between the environment, natural resources and peacebuilding are correct?    
The Environment, Natural Resources and Conflict 
Resource scarcity 
 The perception that resource scarcity can cause social problems and even violent 
conflict is nothing new.  Thomas Malthus in 1798 posited that growing populations would 
eventually outstrip food supplies and lead to disease, social decay and violent conflict.  
Garrett Hardin (1968) popularized the view that overpopulation would severely tax our 
environmental resources and have serious societal impacts.  A contemporary version of 
Malthusianism was posited by Robert Kaplan, who wrote in an influential Atlantic Monthly 
article that “surging populations, spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water 
depletion, air pollution and possibly rising sea levels… will prompt mass migrations and in 





the scholarship of Thomas Homer-Dixon, which focused on the links between global 
environmental change and civil conflict.   
Homer-Dixon (1991) used case-based evidence to suggest that under certain 
conditions scarcities of renewable resources (i.e., cropland, fish, water, forests) exacerbated 
by environmental degradation and depletion, population growth and inequitable distribution, 
can trigger violent conflict.16
Similar correlations between resource scarcity and violent conflict were also found in 
case study work carried out by the Environmental and Conflicts Project (ENCOP) headed by 
Günther Baechler (Baechler 1998; Baechler and Spillmann1996).  The findings suggested 
that environmental degradation induces conflict when social "fault lines are manipulated in 
struggles over social, ethnic, political and international power" but that conflict is more likely 
with weak states, societies with environmental discrimination and a history of conflict, 
among other factors (Baechler and Spillman n 1996, 24).  Similar to Homer-Dixon, Baechler 
and Spillmann (1996) argued that “environmental conflicts manifest themselves as political, 
social, economic, ethnic, religious or territorial conflicts” and as such resource scarcities, 
  He argued that conflicts often appear to have other causes 
because resource scarcity generates other significant social effects such as poverty, migration, 
economic decline, ethnic tension and weak institutions that are frequently mistaken for a 
conflict's "immediate causes" (Homer Dixon and Blitt 1998, 223).   Homer-Dixon noted that 
resources scarcities motivate political and economic elites to capture resources that end up 
marginalized groups and forcing them to migrate to ecologically vulnerable or unproductive 
areas.  The result: substantial grievances that increase opportunities for "collective 
action...against the state" (Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998, 227).  This can lead not only to 
conflict but undermine the state by increasing demands on institutions, encouraging predation 
by elites and reducing tax revenues (Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998).  
                                                 
 





compounded by environmental exploitation and population growth, aggravate already 
existing social problems that can be traced to a lack of economic development and unequal 
resource distribution (Baechler and Spillmann 1996, 26).  In light of Homer-Dixon’s and 
ENCOP’s work, Hauge and Ellingsen (1998) conducted a quantitative study to test the causal 
link between resource scarcity and violent conflict.  The findings confirmed that 
environmental degradation in the form of deforestation, land degradation and scarce 
freshwater, does increase the risk of “lower level” violent conflict.  However, key economic 
and political factors, such as level of development and political regime, were found to be 
more significant in predicting the likelihood of civil conflict.17
Critical analysts inspired by political ecology widely critiqued the resource scarcity 
findings as a throwback to cultural ecologists who surmised that conflict plays a role in 
maintaining a population and ecological balance (Peluso and Watts 2001, 13-14).   From this 
perspective conflict is a natural phenomenon devoid of both human agency and structural 
conditions.  Like Kaplan's characterization, critics charged Homer-Dixon's and ENCOP's 
depiction as either blaming the poor for environmental mismanagement or suggested that 
such conflicts in the developing world are the result of primitive practices (Hartmann 2001).
   
18
                                                 
 
17 Recent statistical analyses confirm that the links between resource scarcity and conflict are weak 
(Binningsbø et al. 2007). 
   
In addition, the work does not consider that resources are "value mediated", which means that 
the value of any resource "differs from one social group to another" (Yapa 1996, 714).  Put 
another way, land and resources are context dependent (i.e., they have no inherent meaning or 
use) although its value is the product not only of the land's characteristics but other 
circumstances, including land ownership (Yapa 1996, 714).  For example, a forest's "value" 
can be as part of cultural-livelihood systems, international market commodities or as the 
"lungs of the earth" depending on one's vested interests and prevailing ideas (Conca 2006).    
18 Assuming, of course, that the extent of degradation is accurately measured (Leach and Mearns 1996; 





Rather than the cause of violence, Peluso and Watts (2001) suggest that 
environmental degradation and resource scarcity is the result of it. Conflict is rooted in the 
political since webs of economic and social practices shape how the environment is 
controlled, defined and managed and in this way, violence is “site specific…rooted in local 
histories and social relations yet connected to larger processes of material transformation... 
power relations" (Peluso and Watts 2001, 5).  This "political ecology" approach  highlights 
multiple forms of political practice and forms of contention that emerge around environments 
and resource use along a continuum that  include everyday actions of resistance to outright 
violence.  From this view, violence is not caused by environmental change and scarcities but 
as a "last resort" reaction by excluded or aggrieved groups.19 Moreover, civil war is 
connected to “other forms of violence, emerging from racial and ethnic tensions, state forms 
of violence, and other social tensions that either come to the surface during transitional 
periods when social and spatial power relations are rearranged or create those transitional 
periods” (Peluso and Watts 2001, 31).20
In a related critique, Betsey Hartmann (2001, 50) argues that one of the major flaws 
of Homer-Dixon's work is the "neglect of larger economic and political forces that 
profoundly affect local environments and conflicts."  In a period of expanding global 
economic forces, Homer-Dixon's (and Baechler's) posit a closed-system without movement 
of resources between local, regional, national and global actors and not connected to patterns 
of international trade. The activities of extractive industries such as oil, timber, minerals, 
agricultural products and gemstones is largely ignored, even though the natural resources of 
  
                                                 
 
19 What is interesting is that once these groups used violent tactics it virtually ensures (at least for a 
while and if they "lose") exclusion from any political process while justifying harsh state-sanctioned 
violence in response (Richards 2001).    
20 For example, state power in Kenya has used the leverage of natural resources to exploit already 
existing social or ethnic cleavages (Kahl 1998); “international players” such as multinational oil 
conglomerates in Nigeria hide behind the state to gain access to valuable natural resources (Watts 
2001); and political forces in West Kalimantan, Indonesia produced ethnic turmoil and conflict over 





the global South have long been exported to the global North.21
Resource abundance: rebels, greed and looting 
  As James Fairhead (2001) 
states, international demand for strategic or valuable resources by the global marketplace is a 
far larger force for environmental degradation and resources scarcity than either poverty or 
population. The same type of relationship is evident in the state imposition of conservation 
areas or development projects, which create new land arrangements, human displacement and 
environmental scarcity that more often than not harms the poorest and most marginalized 
(Peluso 1992; Neumann 2001).    
Discussions of resource abundance, however, would not have gotten off the ground 
were it not for with the rise of economic-centered explanations of civil conflict briefly 
alluded to in Chapter 2.  In contrast to conflicts of the past, which appeared to be generated 
by political grievances, new wars were apparently fought over the plunder and predations of 
natural resources that sustained violence and enriched combatants (Kaldor 1999, Duffield 
2001, Kalyvas 2001).22
                                                 
 
21In the Philippines "slash and burn" farming  and population growth has largely been seen as the cause 
of deforestation although as James Boyce (1993, 238) notes that during the Marco's reign an estimated 
two-hundred landowners controlled the country's forests and reduced the total by as much as 85 
percent.  The real "agents of deforestation, according to Boyce (1993, 238), were the "the loggers, 
government officials... landlords and international firms and institutions" with the farmers among the 
victims.   
  Keen (1998) suggested that although political motives may trigger 
wars, rebel groups require substantial financing if they are to maintain a fighting force that 
can challenge a standing army.  And Arnson (2005, 3) explained that in the 1990s, the, 
"control of territory and populations was transformed into economic rather than purely 
military or strategic objective, and the pursuit of war into a highly rational enterprise aimed at 
the enrichment of particular elites or factions".  As evidence of such a relationship, Le Billon 
22 It should be noted that according to Ross (2004) no quantitative studies have reported changes the 





(2003, 215) claimed that natural resources provided a bulk of the revenues that financed wars 
in developing countries since the end of the Cold War. 
Certainly, the most influential work on this topic was that of Paul Collier and Anke 
Hoeffler (1998; 1999; 2000; 2004), who used large N-data sets and economic analysis to 
investigate the extent to which civil wars had economic rather than just political causes.  
Collier and Hoeffler (1998) found that several factors were significantly correlated with the 
risk of civil war including per-capita income, natural resource endowments (calculated by 
share of primary commodity exports in GDP), population size and ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization.23
In a follow-up report, Collier and Hoeffler (1999) began to extrapolate the initial 
findings to the motivations of rebels and causes of civil conflicts.
 The study was significant for several reasons.  First, it placed the spotlight 
on natural resources and primary commodities as a potential driver of civil war and  rejected 
the notion that conflict is attributable to fractionalized or homogenous societies, which was 
one of the most "common political explanations for civil war" (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 
571).  Second, it suggested that poverty (as measured by per capita income) was a significant 
determiner of civil war onset.   
24
                                                 
 
23 Importantly, Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 571) found that "increased natural resources" initially leads 
to more conflict although "at a high level" natural resources reduce the risk of war.  
  Collier and Hoeffler 
(1999, 15) found that although conflict can be “a blend of an altruistic desire to rectify the 
grievances of a group", the most significant cause of civil conflict is the "selfish desire to loot 
the resources of others."  A year later, Collier and Hoeffler (2000) published a paper titled 
"Greed and Grievance in Civil War", which would have "a major impact on both public 
24 They grouped causes into two distinct categories: (1) the quest for "justice" in the form of 
grievances, real or perceived or; (2) the quest for "loot" since "many rebellions...appear to be linked to 
the capture of resources: diamonds in Angola and Sierra Leone, drugs in Colombia, and timber in 





debate and social science research on contemporary civil wars" (Fearon 2005, 483).25  The 
key finding: opportunities for rebellion are largely influenced by the "availability of finance" 
and because primary commodities increase the likelihood of conflict, such commodities make 
rebellion possible or even desired (Collier and Hoeffler 2000, 16).26
 Collier and Hoeffler's influential work, however, has been controversial for several 
reasons.  First, the notion that primary commodity exports increase the risk of civil conflict 
has not been sustained empirically, even using the same data set (Fearon 2005; Fearon and 
Laitin 2003).  Fearon and Laitin (2003, 87), state bluntly, "neither the share of primary 
commodity exports in GDP nor its square is remotely significant." Other studies have also 
found arguably mixed results (de Soysa and Neumayer 2007; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; 
Hegre 2004; Ross 2004).  So while the gist of Collier and Hoeffler's argument is plausible--
financial opportunities available to rebels increase the likelihood of civil war --there is no 
  In the end, Collier and 
Hoeffler's research suggested that conflict is linked to predation or “greed” for natural 
resource wealth; rather than the factors long associated with grievances (or justice seeking), 
including political repression and economic inequality.  Collier elaborated on this by 
suggesting that contemporary rebellions resemble a "quasi-criminal activity" that is 
perpetuated by bandits concerned with natural resource predation,--which due to a 
government military response--often resulted in conflict (Collier 2000). Put differently, the 
ability to seize natural resource wealth was the central rationale for rebels to engage in civil 
conflict.  
                                                 
 
25 Collier and Hoeffler's report has been released in several forms between 2000 and 2004, using 
updated datasets. According to James Fearon (2005, 483-484), the reports interpretation became the 
"most widely reported result of any cross-national statistical study of civil war, ever (emphasis in 
original)." 
26 Along with the availability of primary commodities, factors such as male school enrollment, income, 
growth rates (and dispersed populations and population size) also increase the risk of conflict, possibly 
through a grievance mechanism.  While the authors did allow for an association between greed and 
grievance  - that greed produces grievances and narratives of grievances are useful recruiting tool - by 
and large, "proxies for grievance", including inequality, political rights, ethnic polarization, land 





evidence that primary commodities finance this potential (Fearon 2005, 486).  ). In the final 
analysis, "the claim that primary commodity exports are linked to civil war appears fragile 
and should be treated with caution" (Ross 2004, 342).     
Despite the criticism, Collier and Hoeffler's work did spawn extensive efforts to 
understand other aspects relating to natural resource wealth and conflict.  Michael Ross 
(2004, 61), for instance, found strong empirical evidence that “resource wealth...made 
conflict more likely to occur, last longer and produce more casualties when it does occur."   
Ross also concluded that oil, minerals and other lootable commodities (including diamonds, 
gemstones, timber and illicit drugs) are linked to violent conflict in some way, although the 
findings are divergent.  Research on how minerals and other lootables (including gemstones 
like diamonds and timber) are also mixed.  Humphreys (2005) and Lujala, Gleditsch, Gilmore 
(2005) find that the presence of diamonds increase the likelihood of civil conflict while others 
assert that there is no correlation (Regan and Norton 2005).  On the other hand, minerals and 
diamonds do appear to lengthen on-going wars (Fearon 2004; Humphreys 2005, Ross 2004) 
and increase the geographic scope of conflicts (Buhaug and Gates 2002), although this is 
influenced by global trade and consumer demand (Le Billon 2008).   Few studies sustain the 
idea that timber causes conflict even though exports may influence the duration of war (Le 
Billon 2000; Global Witness 2002; de Jong, Donovan, and Ken-Ichi 2007; Rustad et al. 2008; 
Thomson and Kanaan 2005).  
All this debate has also raised the question as to what specific characteristics of 
natural resources and how geographic distribution makes them more or less likely to ignite or 
prolong conflict. Lootable resources tend to be those that "have low economic barriers to 
entry and can be profitably exploited by small scale artisans" while non-lootable resources 
have "high barriers to entry" and require large capital and technological inputs (Ross 2003; 
Snyder and Bhavnani 2005, 568).  Not surprisingly, lootable resources, such as alluvial 





which rebel groups (and other combatants) can extract and trade them for profit. Non-lootable 
resources, on the other hand, are those such as timber, copper, bauxite, iron ore, oil and 
Kimberlitic diamonds extracted and controlled primarily by the state.27
Collier and Hoeffler's rejection of grievances and support for the "greed" hypothesis 
provoked considerable debate (Humphreys 2005).
  Le Billon (2001; 
2005), likewise, makes the distinction between resources that are proximate or distant to 
locations of state power and those that are "point source" or "diffuse" to distinguish different 
types of conflicts and struggles.    
28
Methodological debates aside, probably the most critical outcomes of the greed vs. 
grievance debate is stated simply by James Ron (2005, 443), who noted that "natural 
resources have powerful effects on civil wars...but...in ways that are profoundly political" and 
  While there is some agreement that 
economic factors play a part in civil conflicts there remains "little consensus as to how they 
matter, how much they matter, or in what ways" (Ballentine and Sherman 2003, 4-5). Collier 
and Hoeffler's approach, which relied on single factor explanations derived from econometric 
models, have been criticized for its one-sided economic and materialist explanations 
(Zartman 2005, 258). Some insist that the lack of empirical support for the greed thesis is 
largely technical in nature resulting from problems of data and model specification that can 
be continually tweaked (Humphreys 2005).  However, others assert that the focus on greed is 
based on a methodology that is simply unable to handle important contextual elements with 
no "feel" for the subject or its indicators (Zartman 2005).   Put another way, the complex 
ways in which natural resources relate to violence are all but masked by the coarse-grained 
indicators that Collier and others have utilized in investigating resource abundance.   
                                                 
 
27 Mac Ginty (2004) asserts that looting is not just motivated by economic rationales but can be a non-
material activity, part of a political-military strategy or a very selective endeavor depending on the 
complex conflict dynamics at play.   
28 It is important to note that Ross (2004) finds no evidence to support the contention that rebels loot 
natural resources to provide funding for neither civil war nor that grievances over land expropriation, 





suggests returning to "political opportunity theories" to understand civil conflict and their 
relationship to natural resources.  This means two things.  First, violent conflict has 
overlapping political, social and economic drivers of conflict for both political elites (Reno 
1995) and combatants (Weinstein 2007).  Grievances and identities remain by-and-large the 
roots and objectives of conflict although greed and self-enrichment can be a "product or later 
stage of wars started for other reasons" (Arnson 2005, 11).  Second, the focus on greed and 
natural resources may be too "rebel centric" by ignoring the critical role state's play in setting 
the conditions for conflict (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2005). Humphreys (2005) posits that 
failed states explain the impacts of natural resources better than economic explanations 
because such states cannot meet the demands for basic services of its population or may seek 
to privatize public revenues for personal gain while repressing political opposition or public 
protest (Zartman 1995; 2005).29
Finally, other critiques of Collier and Hoeffler's work suggest that while it has raised 
the profile of natural resource-conflict linkages and the focus on the economic opportunities 
of rebels it has come at an intellectual cost.  First, the focus on civil war, which is defined as 
  Reno (1995, 1998) and others (Boas 2001; Chabal and 
Daloz 1999; Richards 1996) also suggest that state leaders use natural resource revenue in 
order to sustain political power through patronage networks.  Politics is, then, reduced to a 
"kind of business" that channels scarce state resources into informal relationships that 
undermine the provision of state services creating "hollowed out" state institutions.  The 
result is the formation of "shadow states" that can lead to state failure and provide 
opportunities for the emergence of warlords (Reno 1995).  In the end, weak and failed states 
lack not only authority and legitimacy but also the ability to govern, generating grievances 
and contributing to the opportunity structures that make conflict feasible (Fearon and Laitin 
2003).    
                                                 
 
29 Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that state responses in the opening stages of a rebellion actually 





at least 1,000 battle deaths per year,  renders invisible "multiple forms and scales of violence 
enacted through resource exploitation and its regulation",  and in fact, "war is not the only (or 
even primary) type of violence associated with resource-extractive industries"(Le Billon 
2008, 347).  Duffield (2001) also points out that in Collier and Hoeffler's analysis the only 
grievance that appears to have any relevance is related to economic decline and poverty at the 
state level.  But, as Ron (2005, 447) notes, economic malfeasance is a political product and 
poverty is a political outcome. The underlying political dynamics and political practices as 
they relate to natural resources (i.e. property regimes, access issues, and how these may be 
linked to poverty) are by extension important to understand (Peluso and Watts 2001).  
Furthermore, much of the debate has remained focused on rebel and state-level dynamics, 
which overlook regional or international actors that may be culpable in either the social 
relations of production or the weakening state institutions.  For instance, the structural 
adjustment and development policies of international financial institutions like the World 
Bank and IMF have long been implicated in policies that undermine states (Stiglitz 2002; 
Pugh, Cooper and Goodhand 2004).  There has been comparatively little about how global 
competition for strategic or valuable natural resources by powerful states and multinational 
businesses may undermine states or prop up authoritarian rulers, which can lead to both 
weakened governments and conflict (Dalby 2002; Fairhead 2001; Watts 2001).  
Resource abundance: dependence and the state 
A preponderance of attention has focused on the effect natural resource abundance 
has on rebel opportunities for rebellion and the onset and duration of civil conflicts discussed 
in the preceding section.  However, primary commodity exports or natural resource 
abundance may also contribute to the "paradox of plenty", which is the proposition that 
abundant natural resources have significant effects on the political economy and economic 





agricultural products, minerals and gemstones appear to suffer economic decline and political 
dysfunction--particularly in the developing world.30  Of more concern is the evidence that the 
level of economic development corresponds with the potential risk of civil war (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004; de Soysa 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2004; Hegre and Sambanis 2006).31
  A range of studies suggest that resource-dependent economies tend to grow more 
slowly than resource poor countries for several reasons (Ross 1999; Sachs and Warner 2001).  
First, resource exports from developing countries suffer from poor terms of trade that 
exacerbate inequalities between industrialized and developing states (Easterly et al. 1993; 
Ross 1999).  Much of this has also been blamed on a worldwide rise in commodity exports 
(due in part to the fall of Eastern Bloc) and the structural adjustment and debt policies 
peddled by the IFIs (Ross 1999; Stiglitz 2002).  The World Bank (2002), for example, found 
that countries with medium to large mining sectors saw their GDP drop significantly in the 
1990s.  Second, the instability of natural resource markets may harm developing states, since 
"boom and bust" cycles undermine state economies (Ross 1999).
   
32
Evidence also emerged to support the proposition that state's that rely on natural 
resources for primary exports often have high rates of poverty (Ross 2001).  According to 
Ross (2004), this is partly because resource-endowed states often have poor education 
  And finally, economic 
growth stagnates in resources-dependent economies because the rents are captured by foreign 
companies with little revenue actually accruing to state governments.  While the explanations 
remain uncertain (Brunnschweiler 2008), there is evidence that found that countries with 
negative growth rates are more likely to engage in civil war (Collier 2007; Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004; Hegre 2004).   
                                                 
 
30 The poster child for the resource curse is Nigeria where 70% percent of the population lives on less 
than $1 /day while being the 15 largest oil producer in the world.  
31The irony, of course, is that up until the 1990s, development of natural resources exports was 
believed to be the panacea for economic growth, democracy and peace (Rostow 1961).  





systems and underperforming health care for the population, which keeps people in a poverty 
trap.  Moreover, there is evidence to conclude that greater dependence on oil and mineral 
exports, in particular, are linked to high child mortality rates that are often deemed a proxy 
for poverty and relative deprivation (Ross 2003).   Again, while these figures are 
disconcerting, the larger concern is that according to an array of studies, the greater a 
country's poverty rate, the more likely it is to face a civil war (Collier 2007; Elbadawi and 
Sambanis 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003).  In theory at least, this is because people are more 
likely rebel against state interests when the government offers few economic opportunities 
and poverty remains entrenched.  
While resource dependence apparently impacts a country's economic development it 
also may have a perceptible impact on governments and governance, especially in states with 
overwhelmingly poor populations (Le Billon 2008).  Liete and Weidmann (1999), for 
example, suggest that when governments get substantial revenues from oil, minerals and 
timber it is more likely to be corrupt. This problem is due, at least in part, to the perception 
that the sheer volume and value of natural resources encourages rent-seeking behavior; rather 
than entrepreneurism or investment (Ross 2003).  While some country's may not have the 
institutional capacity to manage revenues in a transparent fashion, high rents encourage 
corrupt practices and  lead governments to weaken accountability mechanisms in order to 
garner massive profits--especially during boom times. This dynamic can lead unscrupulous 
leaders, business men or military commanders to seize revenues instead of building 
institutions and implementing policies for economic development, although this dynamic 
depends on a range of factors (Dunning 2008; Jones-Luong and Weinthal 2006).  Political 
leaders can grant resources contracts and concessions to wealthy landowners, political elites 
and foreign investors in exchange for kickbacks, a portion of the revenue, foreign aid or 
political support (Ross 2003, 25-26).  States gain a large percentage of their revenue from 





and Laitin 2003).  In fact, governments that get their income from natural resources often 
become less democratic (Ross 2003).  One reason for this pattern is that when governments 
have an abundance of revenue they tend to use it to quell dissent--both by dispensing 
patronage and by building up their domestic security forces.33
 As Karl (1997, 16) notes, "dependence... produces a distinctive type of institutional 
setting, which encourages the political distribution of rents" and "substitute public spending 
for statecraft, thereby weakening state capacity".   This is because resource-endowed 
governments often do not make the necessary investments in state institutions that can 
effectively intervene in societal conflicts, and thereby are more susceptible to conflict. If a 
country has resources that are particularly valuable and can be mined with little training or 
investment, such as alluvial diamonds and other minerals, it is difficult to govern extraction 
process or provide law and order in the extractive region. This dynamic can provide 
incentives for criminal elements--gangs, warlords, and rogue military leaders--to acquire the 
financial resources to challenge the government directly or establish a shadow state (Reno 
1998). 
   
 To reiterate, the literature concludes that natural resources dependence may not only 
harmful to a country's overall economic development but also make states more susceptible 
to civil conflict.  A host of studies link government accountability and corruption to civil war 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003; Le Billon 2003; Reno 1998; Sachs and Warner 2001).  
Correspondingly, less accountable states are frequently more authoritarian, and thus less able 
to resolve grievances.  As Ross (2003, 26) notes, "a lack of economic growth can destabilize 
governments, which can lead to corruption...because corrupt governments cannot manage 
economies or polities or counteract economic stagnation,  the outcome is a downward spiral 
that may eventually lead to civil war."  But the empirical evidence linking the resource 
                                                 
 






dependence to civil war is relatively weak in other quantitative studies and little consensus on 
the literature's findings has emerged.  Brunnschweiler (2008) and others (Lederman and 
Maloney 2007) find no evidence for resource curse arguing conversely that an abundance of 
natural resources is a boon for economic performance with no deleterious effects on state 
institutions.   
 Lack of agreement on the resource dependence-conflict link may be reducible to 
different models, poor proxy measures or a lack of data.  However, others insist that the 
resource curse is mediated by a host of other  contextual factors including, historical 
extraction conditions (i.e., conditions under colonialism), resource and conflict characteristics 
and other complexities  that may be best formulated using comparative methods, which 
integrate complexity over simple relationships (Basedau 2005, 34).   Michael Watts (2008, 
71), for example, suggests that the "politics of the minorities" long preceded oil in Nigeria 
and that the oil exacerbated related grievances by bringing with it policies of enclosure and 
dispossession that produced new narratives and a struggle for resource control.  Other 
scholars stress the need to understand that resource dependence is not just as a factor of state 
politics but is enmeshed within the context of geopolitical and international forces.  For 
instance, Omeje (2008, 7-8) lists the diverse ways in which external factors undermine state 
institutions, including the propping up of unpopular, repressive and corrupt regimes, 
providing of military aid, and supporting multinational businesses.  
The Environment, Natural Resources and Peace 
The above review, which detailed the current state of the literature linking the environment, 
natural resources and civil conflict, conveys two points.  First, the literature did not emerge in 
a vacuum but in response to the "problem" of failed states and civil conflicts described in 
Chapter 2. The dominant approaches, which largely emerge from the international relations 





Although these approaches are different, both imply that states and societies are confronted 
with a given environment or natural resource endowment (or a lack thereof) that shapes 
economic systems and state institutions in ways that make them more or less susceptible to 
violent conflict.  In short, states and societies have either "too much" or "too little" of a good 
(or bad) thing.  Second, despite the very extensive literature, scarcity and abundance 
explanations of conflict remain tentative and controversial.  I argue, however, that despite 
ambiguous and evolving scholarship on the topic the environment, natural resource conflict 
problematic in terms of resource abundance , and in particular, related to rebels, greed and 
looting had insinuated itself into the reforms and policies of IPOs beginning in the late 1990s.  
This should not be surprising because as such explanations emerged the empirical evidence 
that greedy rebels fought over valuable natural resources appeared robust and widely 
accepted.  However, as the scholarship has become more refined, the reforms and policies 
supported by IPOs have not kept pace.    
International peacebuilding organizations and environmental and 
natural resource governance 
 
 The idea that the environment and natural resources might play a role in helping to 
end conflict and rebuild war-torn states began to get attention from IBOs in the late-1990s.  
This comes as no surprise since it corresponded with the "second generation" of 
peacebuilding described in Chapter 2. Peacebuilding's second generation emphasized the root 
causes of conflict, largely perceived as poverty and a lack of sustained development as well 
as increased attention to sub-areas, including most prominently the environment and natural 
resources.  The Brahimi Report (2000) summed it up well: 
 
[Other] variables that affect the difficulty of peace implementation include, first, sources of 
 the conflict.  These can range from economics (e.g. issues of poverty, distribution, 





 environmental issues (such as competition for scarce water) to issues of ethnicity, religion or 
 gross violations of human rights.  
 
 While work linking resource scarcity to violent conflict was widely discussed in the 
early 199Os, it failed to make its way into peacebuilding practices (Peluso and Watts 2001; 
Dalby 2002).  Even as Homer-Dixon (1991) and Kaplan (1994) described the civil conflicts 
in Sierra Leone, Rwanda and the Sudan as linked to environmental degradation and scarce 
water, land and forest resources, the policies of IBOs did not reflect that concern.  Despite a 
few mostly journalistic accounts documenting the role of diamonds in the Sierra Leone 
conflict, or rubber, minerals and forests in Liberia, it raised few red-flags.  This was largely 
because peacebuilders were preoccupied, particularly on the African continent with 
negotiating ceasefires, fashioning peace settlements and organizing elections.  The notion that 
the environment and natural resources could help mitigate conflict or consolidate peace in 
war-torn states simply did not exist within the international peacebuilding universe (Boutros-
Ghali 1992; 1995).34
 It was not until a convergence of events in the late-1990s that environmental and 
natural resource governance began to increasingly emerge in the policies and practices of 
international peacebuilding organizations.  While international NGOs began to draw public 
attention to the role of the natural resource trade in helping to fuel conflict in Cambodia and 
Angola, the work of Collier and Hoeffler emerged as methodologically robust and largely 
uncontroversial given the divine status given to statistical analysis (as opposed to the case-
based work of Homer-Dixon) and the economic motives of warlords and combatants was an 
intuitive way to understand complex and puzzling "new wars."  In fact, the influential work 
  
                                                 
 
34 The UN did employ commodity sanctions on Iraq, Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Libya and Haiti in the 
early 1990s although the character of these sanctions and their targets differ from those that followed 





of Collier and Hoeffler was probably the biggest single factor placing the environment and 
natural resources onto the peacebuilding agenda.35
 One common approach was to use the future spoils from natural resources as part of a 
wealth-sharing strategy.  Such strategies--floated by peace negotiators during negotiations in 
the late 1990s Angola and Sierra Leone--guaranteed rebel leaders decision-making authority 
over natural resources in a new government or the ability to control particular regions 
endowed with resources in exchange for peace.  While wealth sharing strategies could be 
successful at bringing combatants to the negotiating table, they repeatedly failed to 
consolidate peace.
  The notion that "high-value" natural 
resources--timber, minerals and diamonds--might fuel civil conflict by providing revenues to 
"greedy" rebels directly led IBOs to promote and support policy interventions designed to 
limit revenue from the illicit trade of natural resources.  The rationale among IBOs was that 
by limiting the ability of combatants to acquire natural resource revenue would encourage 
rebels to either give up or bring them to the negotiating table.  Between 1998 and 2000 -- as 
the work of Collier and Hoeffler was at its apex in terms of scholarly acceptance--controlling 
"conflict resources" emerged as a top-level concern of international peacebuilders.  Again, 
this should not be surprising because Collier and Hoeffler's interpretation was the "most 
widely reported result of any cross-national study of civil war, ever" and had a major impact 
on the intellectual and empirical debate (Fearon 2005, 483-484).  This impact was felt not 
only on the social science research community but figured prominently among international 
peacebuilding organizations that began to focus attention on natural resources.  
36
                                                 
 
35 It is important to note that at the time of Collier and Hoeffler's findings both were economists at the 
World Bank, which is a key international peacebuilding organization.  
  The reason: wealth-sharing strategies end up prolonging conflict by 
36 Efforts to negotiate an end to the Sierra Leone conflict in 1999 resulted in the Lomé Agreement that 
installed rebel leader Fonday Sankoh as Head of Mineral Rights Commission, which Gberie (2005, 






exacerbating inequalities, undermining state institutions and neglecting the underlying causes 
of the conflict (Le Billon and Nicholls 2007; Jarstad 2008).  
 When wealth sharing is not feasible, IBOs intervened directly in war-torn states by 
approving policy instruments or "control regimes" on natural resources thought to be fueling 
conflict. The most powerful and most publicized have been international sanctions designed 
and imposed by the UN Security Council.37  While conflicts are never financed by only one 
revenue source, it was believed that after the Cold War the largest sources of funding, 
particularly in the developing world, came from natural resources (Le Billon 2003, 215).  
Sanctions are designed, then, to curtail the trade in "conflict resources" in a bid to starve 
combatants of the funds that fuel conflict (Le Billon 2003).38  Besides UN sanctions imposed 
on Iraqi oil exports after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, UN sanctions have predominantly been 
targeted at natural resources including timber, oil and diamonds.39
 As Crossin, Hayman and Taylor (2003) note, although there has been a historical 
reluctance for the UN or other IBOs to try and control the trade of natural resources globally, 
increased attention to so-called "conflict resources" has changed that.  Investigative research 
 UN sanctions have been 
imposed--in theory at least--in an effort to "maintain or restore international peace and 
security", according to the UN Charter.  Once the decision is made in the Security Council to 
ban the import or export of a conflict resource, all UN member states are obligated to accept 
and carry out the mandate (Le Billon 2003, 230).  But unless UN sanctions (or domestic 
laws) ban it, trading "conflict resources" with rebel groups or corrupt governments is not 
illegal under international law--a fact that has resulted in delays in getting sanctions enacted 
and failures to get the international support necessary.   
                                                 
 
37 These sanctions are often labeled "smart" sanctions because they are intended to not hurt civilians.  
38 Conflict resources have been defined as "natural resources whose control, exploitation, trade, 
taxation or protection contribute to, or benefit from the context of, armed conflict (Le Billon 2003, 
216). 
39 In the case of drugs, most notably heroin, the UN has used sanctions to curtain the trade in chemicals 





carried out by international NGOs has significantly influenced the formation of UN expert 
panels and provided recommendations designed to curtail the trade in conflict resources.40
 UN sanctions have been labeled "robust" policy instruments but reducing access to 
natural resource revenues does not seem to equate with shorter or less intense and deadly civil 
conflicts (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2005, 6).  Evidence is inconclusive but combatants 
lacking access to revenues may in fact intensify attacks on civilians (Le Billon 2003, 218).  
Moreover, an influx of revenues at the right time can allow combatants to win the war 
outright, thus shortening the duration of conflict and making any subsequent peace more 
likely to be sustained (Doyle and Sambanis 2006).   A large stockpile of diamonds, for 
example, was reported to have financed the Angolan government offensive between 1999 and 
2002 that led to a military victory (Le Billon 2003, 218).  In addition, there is ample evidence 
from Cambodia that the internal competition for revenues can actually undermine group 
  
Global Witness, (1998) brought to the world's attention the use of diamonds to fuel war in 
Angola, and Partnership Africa Canada  recommended  the UN take action to halt the illicit 
trade of diamonds from Sierra Leone (Smillie, Gberie and Hazleton 2000).  Such public 
campaigns have been important in "naming and shaming" countries and leveraging pressure 
on international businesses dealing in valuable commodities and countries importing conflict 
resources.  For example, De Beers was the target of a public campaign to stop selling 
diamonds from conflict areas (Le Billon 2006), and there was widespread political pressure 
on France and China, Liberia's two biggest importers of timber, to agree to an embargo.  
Simply put, UN sanctions are not only influenced by member states but also non-
governmental organizations and public sentiment.   
                                                 
 
40 While UN sanctions do not, by and large, involve international policing--monitoring and 
information-gathering is an important component, which is difficult in war-torn states.  To some 
extent, this had been remedied by the creation of UN expert panels that submit periodic reports to the 
Security Council about instances of sanctions busting, the character of war economies or whether 






cohesion that can lead to the fragmentation and a quicker end to conflict (Le Billon 2003, 
218).  There is also debate as to how successful multilateral sanctions are (Cortright and 
Lopez 2000; Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot 1990; Pape 1997).  While an estimated 80 percent of 
the conflicts in which UN sanctions were imposed since 1990 were resolved a majority of 
those were ended by military intervention by UN peacekeepers (Le Billon 2003).  Mack and 
Khan (2000) suggest that while sanctions and embargos largely fail to alter target behavior 
they but should not be discounted because they have the effect of naming, shaming, 
containing and stigmatizing targets.  At the same time, Le Billon and Nicholls (2007) suggest 
that although sanctions have been ineffective at ending conflict and contributing to 
peacebuilding, improvements in terms of monitoring and enforcement have been helpful.     
 A second approach to addressing "conflict resources" and the ability of rebel groups 
(or other combatants) to use the revenue to wage war, are regimes that track and regulate the 
illicit trading of legal commodities such as diamonds and timber. The most advancement in 
this regard has been efforts to regulate the trade in rough diamonds, and specifically the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS).  The Kimberly Process is a voluntary 
system in which countries agree to certify that diamonds originating in their territory are 
conflict free. The KPCS, which came into full effect in 2003, was designed to ensure that the 
production of diamonds can be traced from the "mine to the point of export" (i.e. chain of 
custody) and exports tracked and accompanied by a "certificate of origin" to guarantee that 
diamonds do not originate from a conflict area (KPCS 2010).41
                                                 
 
41 While the KPCS was officially launched in 2003, the first year the scheme was introduced was 2000.  
   The KPCS came to fruition 
after several years of joint meetings between governments, international organizations, 
industry (De Beers being by far the largest) and NGOs (Smillie 2005).  While the KPCS had 
an estimated 49 members, representing 75 states, participating as of 2009, there remains 





ability or willingness of governments to monitor diamond production and provide trading 
statistics (Smillie 2005), others cite high levels of continued smuggling and local grievances 
generated by the formalization of small-scale diamond mining (Cooper 2008; Maconachie 
2008).  Despite these challenges, the seizure of non-certified diamonds or even the process by 
which the Kimberley Agreement came together can be seen as signs of a promising solution 
to the trade in conflict resources (Smillie 2005).  






Natural Resource  
 
1990 Iraq All commodities 
1991 Yugoslavia All commodities 
1992 Cambodia Log exports; embargo on 
minerals and gems 
1993 Libya Oil refining equipment 
1994 Haiti All commodities 
 
1998 
Angola All diamonds outside certificate 
of origin regime and areas 
outside government control 
2000 Sierra Leone All rough diamonds 
2001 Liberia All rough diamonds 
2003 Liberia Logs and rough timber 
2005 Cote d'Ivoire All rough diamonds 
 






 By 2003, the UN and IPOs had already imposed UN sanctions on the global trade in 
oil, gemstones, timber and other resources in an effort to halt conflicts in Angola, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Cambodia, Sierra Leone and Liberia. Moreover, international 
peacebuilding organizations continued to focus their attention on international regimes like 
the Kimberly Process or newer initiatives like the Forests Law Enforcement Governance and 
Trade (FLEGT) regime designed to limit the trade in conflict timber to the European Union.  
Both of these initiatives focused on the trade in conflict resources-- as UN Resolution 60/223 
emphasized the need to:  
 
 Address the negative implications of the illegal exploitation of natural resources in all its 
 aspects on peace,  security and development in Africa" and "preventing the illegal exploitation 
 and trafficking of natural resources and high-value commodities (UNGA 2006).     
 
 At the same time, however, the international peacebuilding agenda reflected the 
understanding that the environment and natural resources are not just an important leverage 
point for ending or mitigating conflict but also significantly influence a war-torn state's 
ability to establish a long-term peace.  As UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon stated in 
2008, "natural resources are crucial to consolidating peace in and between war-torn 
societies."  And Carolyn McAskie, the UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding 
Support stated in 2007: 
 
 War-torn countries rich in natural resources face particular challenges in the stabilization and 
 reconstruction of their societies, despite the apparent promise that natural resource wealth 
 holds for peacebuilding and development.  Where resources exploitation has driven war, or 
 served to impede peace, improving governance capacity to control natural resources is a 






 While governing and managing so-called "conflict resources" vìs-a-vìs sanctions or 
regimes was an international priority and received much of the attention among scholars and 
public, since 1999 IBOs amplified efforts to tie the success of peacebuilding to the 
environment and natural resources governance.  A report from the UN Environment 
Programme titled From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the 
Environment, stated bluntly, "integrating environmental management and natural resources 
into peacebuilding...is no longer an option--it is a security imperative" (UNEP 2009, 6).  The 
report went on to lay out three mechanisms through which the environment and natural 
resource may contribute to peace:  promoting economic recovery, supporting sustainable 
livelihoods and fostering dialogue.  This report was published to highlight that the 
environment and natural resources have a "determining influence" on peace and security, and 
to advocate for international peacebuilders integrate the environment and natural resources 
into peacebuilding (UNEP 2009, 5).  What goes largely unnoticed is that even as UN 
sanctions on "conflict resources" were in force, and work on establishing global commodity 
regimes were ongoing, international peacebuilding organizations have been deeply engaged 
in reforming environmental and natural resource governance in war-torn states--as the case 
studies in subsequent chapters makes clear.  IPOs have assumed that environment and natural 
resource governance--if carried out effectively-- can help peacebuilding by supporting and 
establishing reforms and policies that reduce the propensity for violence.   
 The peacebuilding literature points us to a handful of outcomes perceived by scholars 
and practitioners as essential for achieving a long-term and sustainable peace in war-torn 
states--or to be more precise for reducing the propensity for violence.  These outcomes are: 
(1) security improvements; (2) increased economic development; (3) enhanced social 
cohesion and trust; and (4) strengthen state institutions.  Indeed, if environmental and natural 





extension help peacebuilding--then we need to better understand both how IPOs understand 
this relations relationship and whether it has any basis in the scholarly literature.  This is 
significant because as we move to the case studies that follow, it will help us to evaluate 
whether governance reforms supported and established by peacebuilders do, in fact, help or 
hinder peacebuilding.   
The environment, natural resources and security 
Peacebuilding is concerned with reducing the propensity of violence -- and in 
particular large-scale violence on the order of civil conflict.  From the perspective of IBOs, 
security, then, is perceived as an "absolute prerequisite" of peacebuilding concerned with 
long-term stability and order rather than a more expansive definition like the "freedom from 
violence and coercion" (Salomons 2005, 19).  Given the perceptible fear among IPOs that 
rebel groups or corrupt governments will use the trade in "high-value" natural resources to 
fund civil conflict, governing the environment and natural resources is viewed as vitally 
important.  Specifically, peacebuilders stress the importance of controlling and managing 
natural resource revenue and the trade in "conflict resources" so they are not used to increase 
the likelihood of violence in ways that undermine security.   
As a result, IPOs emphasize "good governance"--and in particular reforms and 
policies designed to improve revenue transparency and tracking commodities that can be used 
by combatants to fund civil conflict (Collier 2004).  Revenue transparency is believed to 
reduce the propensity for violence by ensuring that revenues are not being siphoned off by 
corrupt elites or societal groups in ways that undermine long-term development and security.  
The focus on revenue transparency is also a measure to help guarantee that insurgents or 
potential insurgents are not able to acquire revenue from the sale of natural resources that can 
be used to purchase weapons and resume violent conflict.  In short, revenue transparency in 





potential that rebel movements can development and holding state leaders accountable 
(Collier 2004).  Since state-led development --and peacebuilding--requires significant 
revenue, improved transparency makes it more likely that funds will go toward the 
provisioning of basic services and economic development priorities rather than self-
enrichment or patronage.  This is important because as noted in the preceding section, 
corruption is a factor believed to increase the likelihood of violent conflict particularly if the 
population at-large remains impoverished and excluded hostility (Gurr 1970). According to 
the World Bank (2004), rebuilding war-torn states all but requires revenue transparency, and 
is a conditionality for assistance from international peacebuilding organizations.  As noted by 
the UN Security Council (2004), in reference to the Democratic Republic of Congo: 
  
The link between the illicit exploration and trade of natural resources in certain regions and 
 fuelling  of armed conflict...exhorts international financial institutions to assist the 
 government in establishing efficient and transparent control of natural resources.  
 
IPOs also placed an emphasis on the environmental and natural resource governance 
by way of commodity tracking schemes (UNGA 2007).  Again, the purpose of such schemes 
is to make it more difficult for rebel groups to profit from the looting of valuable natural 
resources by keeping so-called "conflict commodities" off global markets.  As Collier (2004, 
10) notes these schemes are designed specifically to address the problem that natural 
resources have "historically been used to finance rebel movements".   In fact, by 2005, almost 
every country containing rough diamonds are voluntary signatories to the Kimberly Process.  
For commodities where no scheme is in place --for example in tracking timber from the point 
of harvest to export, they are being created as the implementation of FLEGT in the EU can 





Despite ambiguities in the environment, natural resource and conflict literature 
described in this chapter, transparency and commodity-trading schemes may help to reduce 
the likelihood of violent conflict.  However, a broader examination of the linkages between 
the environment, natural resources and security highlight others sets of factors that may also 
be significant.   First, the literature suggests that security can be undermined if certain the 
population or more specifically local communities do not feel as though their claims or 
interests are being represented in the decision making channels and participatory structures 
they relate to the environment and natural resources (Chambers 1994).  Numerous case 
studies show that when societal groups and local communities are excluded from 
participating in decisions, or are subjugated in the participatory process by the government, 
problems in the form of violent conflict or resistance can occur (Peluso and Watts 2001; 
Gardner and Lewis 1996; Peet and Watts 1996).  Conversely, there is substantial evidence 
from the environment and development literature that when decision making and 
participation are relatively decentralized, open and inclusive there is a reduced likelihood of 
societal contestation and violence (Buckles 1999; Ostrom 1990).  While the word 
"participation" is by now an ever-present buzzword, it suggests that security may be 
enhanced and the propensity of violence reduced when environmental and natural resource 
governance comes from the "bottom up" rather than from "top-down" policies that come from 
governments or external authorities.    
The literature also finds that access to natural resources is widely acknowledged as 
vital for security and reducing the propensity of violence.  Access refers primarily to the 
ability of individuals or groups to use or consume productive natural resources, and is often 
determined by inequities of power and authority that can exist at many different levels (i.e. 
community, national and international) and be structured through “ethnicity, caste, social 
status or economic class” (Gardner and Lewis 1996).  While access can be limited between 





government policy can limit the ability of local communities to procure resources need for 
their well-being (Peluso and Watts 2001).  In particular, state policies that limit land 
ownership or undermine traditional land tenure such as privatization, conservation areas or 
other exclusionary practices in favor of powerful groups can set the state for violence (Peluso 
and Watts 2001; Peluso 1992).   While Hardin (1968) suggested that private property regimes 
and coercive state policies should be imposed on traditional common-property systems to 
avoid conflict and environmental degradation, recent work has suggested that restricting or 
blocking access to resources is more predictive of violent conflict (Peluso and Watts 2001; 
Ostrom 1990).  In short, if access to natural resources is relatively equitable, and people are 
adequately meeting their livelihood needs, states and societies are more secure (Gardner and 
Lewis 1996).   
The literature also posits that the provision of benefits--how different actors perceive 
the provision of future benefits--can have an impact on security.  Benefits are most 
predominantly conceived of as monetary or material in nature--for example having to do with 
the provision of profits, rents or royalty payments.  The acquisition of rents--or more 
specifically competition for revenues derived from natural resources is what most concerns 
the international peacebuilders.  For instance, work of Collier and Hoeffler strongly suggests 
that the struggle for revenue by rebel groups and rents by corrupt government officials is the 
greatest threat to war-torn states.  Conversely, there is also substantial evidence derived from 
case study work that in places where the economic benefits from the extraction and 
production processes are equitably shared and distributed among the population or local 
communities security is more likely to persist since perception of equality and relative 
deprivation are reduced (Peluso and Watts 2001).  The literature, however, also points out 
that benefits are not just material.  Local communities benefit from equitable access to the 
environmental assets such as water, land and forest resources that contribute to physical and 





due to embedded social, political and economic relations and imbalances of power and 
authority, violent conflict can result (Peet and Watts 1996).  Of course, despite the fact that 
benefits derived from the environment and natural resources are almost universally mal-
distributed and deprivation is widespread violent conflict can be rare in such situations.  As 
such, the literature suggests that where benefits are disproportionately controlled or accrued 
by a small group of actors--be it political elites, state authorities, foreign companies or local 
groups-- or where actors intentionally or unintentionally encumber the benefits owed to 
others, conflict, the propensity of violence increases (Peluso and Watts 2001).  
 Finally, literature points out that cost correspond to negative externalities that result 
from extraction, consumption or production of natural resources.  These costs can be both 
social and environmental, and are often disproportionately borne by those who do not 
actually benefit (or benefit little) from the processes or activities that cause the harmful 
effects and impacts.  More explicitly, the costs associated with negative externalities are 
deeply embedded in relations of power and authority.    Environmental costs frequently refer 
to environmental change and degradation from the overuse of renewable resources, abundant 
wastes or industrial activities (pollution), resource extraction of non-renewable (e.g., mining 
and timber) or large-scale development projects (e.g., dam construction or oil pipelines) 
(Peluso and Watts 2001).  Environmental costs can also be related to the enclosure of “living 
space and territory” as well as various forms of resource conservation (Peluso and Watts 
2001).  On the other hand, the social costs can be the alteration of social institutions (such as 
the organization of households, land tenure arrangements or local knowledge systems), 
changes in cultural traditions, and the transformation of embedded power and hierarchical 
relations (Peet and Watts 1996).  Environmental and social costs are usually connected.  For 
instance, the pollution of freshwater, mining activity or the establishment of nature preserves 
can all create genuine resource scarcities that modify traditional property arrangements, 





While some negative externalities are inevitable in the consumption or production of 
natural resources- -what is of most concern is the extent of its effects on the environment and 
people.  While commodification of the environment has always occurred at some level, the 
trading of "global commodities", from oil and shrimp to forest and diamonds, has 
transformed and intensified links between human relations and the environment.  This is 
particularly important because if the environmental and social costs are particularly 
destructive, disruptive, widespread--or unduly endured by certain groups or local 
communities--it may lead to a higher propensity of violence (Peluso and Watts 2001; Homer-
Dixon 1991).  Watts (2001), for instance, documents how the extensive environmental and 
social costs of the petroleum industry in Nigeria have exacerbated violent conflict. While 
Hardin (1968) has suggested that state authority is vital for mitigating such environmental 
costs, in many cases the state has been implicated in the destruction or, indeed, has little 
desire or capacity to mitigate or stop the deleterious impacts of negative externalities.    
The environment, natural resources and economic development 
 Recall that IPOs assume that the environment and natural resources will reduce the 
propensity of violence through increased transparency and the implementation of commodity-
tracking schemes.  However, where peacebuilding overlaps with the presence of quick-
yielding, "high-value" natural resources, IPOs emphasize the importance of" kick-starting" 
the extraction and export so as to foster economic recovery.  From the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone to Timor Leste, Cote d'Ivoire and Angola, reforming 
environmental and natural resources governance for the purpose of economic development 
has been an international priority (Bannon and Collier 2003)..  This is because a major legacy 
of civil conflict is damage to the economy, which reduces a country's GDP by about 15 
percent and shifts revenue streams away from basic services (Collier 2007, 104).  Conflict 





For countries that have them, valuable natural resources represent a potential windfall that 
can be used to rebuild the postwar economy and restore infrastructure, reconstruct state 
institutions and administer basic services.   
 Peacebuilding aside, natural resource exploitation has been long-associated with 
economic growth, democracy and peace (Rostow 1961).  As a result, natural resources are an 
obvious starting point for attracting foreign direct investment, gaining export revenue and 
providing employment opportunities that form the basis of economic development.  
Exporting natural resources can, in theory at least, can help to "jump-start" economic growth, 
alleviate poverty and provide the state with the revenues to fund basic services in ways that 
spur development and send a signal to potential spoilers that the benefits of peace outweigh 
the costs. In the aftermath of conflict, one of the first tasks of international peacebuilders--
particularly the World Bank and IMF--is to identify quick-yielding revenue measures that can 
support economic recovery, and supply state revenue (World Bank 1997; 2004).  Since the 
extraction of natural resources has often been a part of the pre-war economy, especially 
compared to other potential exports (agriculture or manufactured goods), it is believed that 
extractive industries can be up and running swiftly with only minimal investment.42
The convention wisdom is that economic growth is fundamental for peacebuilding.  
First, as Susan Woodward (2002, 183) states, "no international or local action in support of 
peace can occur without a budget or donor to tap".  Peacebuilding requires revenue to "buy 
confidence in the peace process" and begin provisioning basic services, fixing infrastructure, 
paying government officials and rebuilding state institutions (Woodward 2002, 
185).International aid can provide fiscal resources in near term but eventually states must be 
able to sustain themselves after external aid diminishes.  Second, as noted in the above 
   
                                                 
 
42 In some cases, the infrastructure for extractive operations is destroyed during war.  However, in 
some instances, companies continue to function in a conflict setting. For example, the Firestone 
Rubber Company in Liberia continued to operate for a time at a much reduced level by negotiating 





section, despite ambiguities in the research, economic growth believed to be vital for 
sustaining a long-term peace because negative growth and poverty are risk factors for 
conflict. As Bannon and Collier (2003, 8) argue, economic growth is the "best protection 
against civil war" since it provides state revenue that can be used to provide basic services 
while also raising income levels.  With incomes rising, so it goes, the population will be less 
inclined to rebel against the state or be recruited by rebel groups.   
 The irony, of course, is that countries with an abundance of natural resources, in 
particular fragile and war-torn states, may be susceptible to violent conflict.  While the 
scholarship is far from conclusive, revenue may fall into the hands of rebel groups and 
corrupt government officials or dependence on natural resource wealth may weaken 
governments, intensify poverty and cause economic distress.  The predominant cause for such 
failures is overwhelmingly perceived by scholars to be corruption and bad governance 
(Collier 2007).  For these reasons, the literature suggests that leveraging the environment and 
natural resources for economic development needs to be accompanied by "good governance" 
(Bannon and Collier 2003).   This includes most prominently revenue transparency to provide 
improved government accountability and scrutiny into how revenues are being allocated. The 
rationale is that transparency will change the" rules of the game" by allowing civil society 
and international peacebuilders to observe what revenues are collected and to some degree 
how it is spent.  In theory, such measures are intended to increase trust and legitimacy in the 
government by helping to ensure that revenue is used for economic development and the 
provision of basic services for the population.  Disclosure by government and business 
entities can also remove the legitimacy of potential spoilers by giving state leaders the ability 
to demonstrate that agreements, contracts and concessions in the natural resource sectors are 
lawful and equitable.  
Paris (2004) has argued forcefully that rapid efforts at economic reform can be 





grievances.  Accordingly, before economic competition in the form of international markets 
and foreign direct investment are unleashed, states must first have functioning state 
institutions to manage the inevitable "conflicts of interest" that will arise.  Evidence from the 
literature also suggests that market-based policies have increased not decreased, violence and 
unrest in developing countries (Skogly 1993; Stiglitz 2002; Walton and Seddon 1994). In 
addition, some research has concluded that economic adjustments of the kind promoted by 
the World Bank and IMF can have destabilizing effects in developing countries by reducing 
employment opportunities, increasing food prices and fostering inequalities, among other 
things (Paris 2002; 2004; Woodward 1995; Woodroffe and Ellis-Jones 2001).  Similar 
arguments have been made with reference to the environmental and natural resource sectors 
in particular.  As suggested, a wealth of cases document the impact of resource extraction, 
and the direct role of state policy, that results in increased poverty, a lack of benefits and  
considerable social and environment costs that not only create tensions but also increase the 
propensity for violence (Peluso and Watts 2001; Gardner and Lewis 1996).  In addition, 
rather than impact the human development of the population or local communities, capitalist 
development is unequal and benefits the privileged few.  The overarching point, then, is that 
government policies in the quest for economic development--propelled by international 
norms of economic globalization--can actually undermine security and social cohesion.  
A lion's share of international attention by peacebuilders is focused on "high-value" 
natural resources and economic development.   However, there is a growing awareness that 
peacebuilding should also address environmental management for the purpose of supporting 
sustainable livelihoods (UNEP 2009).  Put another way, peacebuilding seeks to secure 
people's livelihoods by promoting environmentally sustainable resource use and development 
(Conca and Wallace 2009, 497).  For example, the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel 






 Threats to security are interconnected... poverty, infectious disease, environmental 
 degradation and war feed one another in a deadly cycle ...environmental stress, caused by 
 large populations and shortages of land and other natural resources, can contribute to civil 
 violence...Yet rarely are environmental concerns factored into security, development or 
 humanitarian strategies...More legal mechanisms are necessary in the area of natural 
 resources, fights over which have often been an obstacle to peace....A new challenge for  the 
 United Nations is to provide support for weak states - especially, but not limited to those 
 recovering from war - in the management of their natural resources to avoid future 
 conflicts (UN 2004). 
 
 The fact is civil conflict directly and indirectly damages the ecosystems and natural 
assets that are essential for human survival.  Military campaigns have historically targeted 
forest areas and water sources and damage results from the movement of combatants and war 
machinery, human displacement and unexploded ordinance.43  The consequences are often 
short and long-term impacts on health and local living conditions as well as patterns of 
resource degradation that can have social and economic repercussions.44
                                                 
 
43 As Conca and Wallace (2009, 490) note, such direct effects vary from case to case and are 
dependent on both the scope and extent of the conflict and also the depth of environmental assessment.  
 Conflict disrupts 
pre-conflict social and economic practices that can damage ecological systems, diminish 
natural resources and harm wildlife.  For instance, conflict disturbs patterns of land 
ownership and displaces people that drift around in search of livelihoods and incomes--often 
to the detriment of the environment and ecological resources (UNEP 2009).  The literature 
tells us that people who struggle acquire clean water, sanitation, shelter, food and energy 
supplies on which they depend for their well being and livelihoods can trigger violence 
among groups (Peluso and Watts 2001; Gardner an Lewis 1996; Gurr 1970).  A failure to 
44 Compounding the direct effects of conflict on the environment and ecological systems only 
aggravate pre-conflict challenges of "pollution, resources degradation and poor environmental 





respond to the environmental needs of the population can deepen poverty, make development 
more challenging and exacerbate environmental problems (Chambers and Leach 1989).  Even 
worse, a lack of sustainable livelihoods may leave people (or ex-combatants) vulnerable to 
disease and deprivation that may lead to the grievances and resentments that can complicate 
peacebuilding.   
The environment, natural resources and state institutions/authority 
As noted in Chapter 2, statebuilding has emerged as a dominant strategy from which 
to think about building peace in war-torn states.  This preoccupation with statebuilding by 
international peacebuilders is based on the perception that state authority and state institutions 
are not only necessary for conflict management but indeed promote political, economic and 
social stability.  First, a lack of state authority and power over environments and natural 
resources by weak or corrupt governments are deemed to be a contributing factor in the 
emergence of civil conflict.  As such, IPOs stress the importance of reestablishing state 
authority over natural resources and the environment. The rationale is that the state is the 
most effective manager of the environment due to its sovereign claim on the monopoly over a 
given territory (including natural resources) and its ability to formulate and enforce policies. 
Compared the any local or international entity, the state is the institution constructed to 
equitably and effectively establish the "rules of the game" that govern society and provide the 
incentives by which individuals and groups pursue interests.  There is certainly the perception 
that a powerful state is important because the inability to coerce and enforce certain behaviors 
can undermine the provisioning of service and reduce the state's legitimacy in the eyes of the 
population.  A lack of state authority may also provides insurgents the opportunity to rebel--
which is under most circumstances an obstacle in achieving social, political and economic 





However, scholars suggest that authority, although related to power, is different in 
that it denotes an “institutionalized or formal power” (Biersteker 2002, 168). Moreover, 
authority, in contrast to power, denotes some appearance of legitimacy.  That is, a “form of 
consent or recognition of authority on the part of the regulated or governed” (Biersteker 2002, 
168).  As Biersteker (2002, 168) notes, this “legitimacy may be earned or generated” by 
political leaders and “consent is the product of persuasion and trust rather than coercion”.  As 
such one way to think about state authority is as the marriage of material power with 
legitimacy.  Another way to think about state authority is through the language of “social 
control." As Migdal (1988, 32) writes, the strength of the state is dependent on the level of 
social control since it enables the state to achieve its goals. Increasing levels of social control 
are the function of three indicators – compliance, participation and legitimacy – and the more 
these three are available as “currency” to the state and its organizations, the more authority 
and control the state is believed to have.  Compliance refers to the ability of the state to 
compel the population to conform to its demands, which at the most basic level relates to 
power and the use of force but can also refer to other sanctions.  Participation denotes another 
way in which the state can gain “strength” and authority since it permits the state to “organize 
the population for specialized tasks in the institutional components of state organizations.” 
According to Migdal (1988), participation “denotes repeated voluntary use of, and action in, 
state-run or state authorized institutions.”  The most important indicator of state control is 
legitimacy.  Legitimacy “is an acceptance, even approbation” that the state’s rules and social 
order is “true and right.” Whereas both compliance and participation may result from rational 
“calculations of the rewards or sanctions” - legitimacy includes the “acceptance of the state’s 
symbolic configuration within which the rewards and sanctions are packaged.” Simply put, 
legitimacy indicates a population’s consent to state’s desired social order.   Therefore, state 





There is also the broad perception among IBOs that state institutions must be rebuilt 
and resurrected in order for democracy to flourish, the justice system to be effectual, 
economic recovery to be effective and social rehabilitation to be successful.  For this reason, 
peacebuilders have placed an emphasis on rebuilding states institutions responsible for 
environmental and natural resource management (UNEP 2009).  Conflict can have dramatic 
effects on state institutions responsible for environmental management.  Environmental 
ministries, agricultural research centers, and electricity and water distribution points, for 
example, are frequently singled out for destruction and looting.  This leaves the government 
with little institutional capacity to deal with land, water, sanitation issues.  Conflict weakens 
environmental governance that can "lead to a culture of impunity and corruption as public 
officials... ignore norms and structures" intended to manage resources sustainably (UNEP 
2009, 17).45
At the same time, there is view that state authority will facilitate the rebuilding of 
state institutions (environmental and natural resource agencies) and thereby foster 
opportunities for peace and stability.  Hardin (1968), for example, suggest the state 
management -- is the best way to reduce conflict resulting from overuse of resources and 
protect the environment.  In short, local communities are deemed not only incapable of 
  The lack of legitimate governance, then, may lead opportunistic conflict 
entrepreneurs--be they rebels or corrupt government officials--to establish informal 
commercial networks with which to exploit natural resources outside the institutions of the 
state. In short, conflict decimates governance institutions designed to protect the 
environment, which can result in unsustainable and uncontrolled resource use.  Therefore, 
rebuilding state institutions to control or govern land or critical environments is deemed 
important to ensure the environment and natural resources are protected from unregulated 
extraction and can support the sustainable livelihoods of the population.     
                                                 
 
45 Of course, this assumes that "governance, institutions, authority, accountability and transparency" 





sustainably management resource use but may in fact lead to violent conflict as self-interested 
individuals consume the commons.  As such state environmental agencies are deemed 
important to administering use and access to environment and resources have the knowledge 
and capacity to do so. In war-torn states in particular, there is a pronounced impact on 
environmental and natural resources institutions - from the inability to control 
overexploitation of resources use and or address environmental issues such as the provision 
of clean water.  For this reason, state institutions have been viewed as particularly important.  
The problem is, however, that the state and its leaders often use natural resources to sustain 
political power through patronage networks.  States use their authority as a "kind of business" 
that channels natural resource revenues into informal relationships that undermine the 
provision of state services creating "hollowed out" state institutions.  The result is the 
formation of "shadow states" that can lead to state failure and provide opportunities for the 
emergence of warlords (Reno 1995).  In the end, weak and failed states lack not only 
authority and legitimacy but also the ability to govern, generating grievances and contributing 
to the opportunity structures that make conflict feasible (Fearon and Laitin 2003).  
It should be noted however, that work by Ostrom (1990) and others (Dietz et al. 
2002) that local institutions are better equipped to govern the environment and natural 
resources.  While not perfect, evidence suggests that effective institutions--as measured by 
efficiency, sustainability and equity--may best be left to communities.  More specifically, 
community-owned and managed resources through local institutions may be better suited 
than state institutions that in many cases made things worse for the resources as well as the 
users" (Dietz et al. 2002. 13). Therefore, increased levels of participation over time by local 
communities will increase the perceived degree of authority state organizations have over 
natural resources.  In addition, decreased levels of access and benefits, as well as greater 
social and environmental costs will decrease the perceived degree of authority state 





The environment, natural resources and social cohesion/trust 
 Violent conflict tears societies apart and undermines ability of states to provide 
services and protect the population.  If societal dynamics remain contentious and divisive, it 
can perpetuate negative attitudes and fears about other groups -- based on class, ethnicity, 
tribal affiliation or political party - that can leave people vulnerable and disenchanted, and 
potentially increase the likelihood of violence (Colletta, Kim, and Kelles-Viitanen 2002).  At 
the same time, if people lack trust and confidence in the state and its institutions -- for 
example, because of patronage, nepotism or corruption -- it can contribute to the exacerbation 
of societal grievances and even the emergence of spoilers.  Both outcomes, in turn, can lead 
to the return of violent conflict.  Peacebuilding, then, requires efforts to understand and make 
sense of how societal conflict leads to violence as well the consequences of violent behavior.  
To this end, establishing social cohesion and trust ranks as one of the key pillars of 
peacebuilding as is evidenced by the proliferation of truth and reconciliation commissions 
and other strategies designed by IPOs.   
 Environmental and natural resource governance is assumed to be particularly helpful 
in efforts to deepen social cohesion and build trust in order to transform divided societies and 
state institutions so as to help people -- and in fact the country -- heal.  If done right, 
environmental and natural resource governance may assist in the extraordinarily difficult task 
of helping to build trust and social cohesion in ways that promote cooperation, reduce 
tension, overcome political cleavages and reduce the propensity of violence (Conca and 
Dabelko 2002; UNEP 2009).  UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon (2008) has openly stated 
the UN position by suggesting that that environment and natural resource governance is 
important for "promoting dialogue around shared resources and enabling opposing groups to 





 Despite these pronouncements, however, there appears to be two central ways in 
which IBOs assume social cohesion and trust can be facilitated.  First, there is the assumption 
that the best recipe for collective action --and hence social cohesion with regards to the 
environment and resources -- is via a strong state authority that organizes incentives, provides 
inducements and enforces punishment to those that did not follow the "rules of the game" 
(Olsen 1965).  Hardin (1968, 1244), for example, has suggested that individuals with too 
much "freedom" brings ruin to all because self-interested behavior results in the destruction 
of the environment and overuse of resources.  In this sense, self-interest subsumes any "social 
mechanism to control self-interest, such as communication, trust and... agreements" (Dietz et 
al. 2002, 5).   This suggests that coercion to control human behavior is a necessary and 
effective strategy, and that "rules of the game" for environmental and natural resource 
governance are best achieved through the state.  Second, there is the assumption that free 
market-oriented policies enhance societal cooperation.  This is deeply embedded in the 
principles of modern capitalism, which suggests that competition between profit-seekers--be 
they firms or individuals--result in greater prosperity for all.  Moreover, markets are believed 
to temper social conflict by providing a mechanism through with self-interested behavior is 
manifest and the "natural harmony of interests" can emerge Smith1976 [1776]).   Pioneering 
work alluded to above by Elinor Ostrom (1990), however, has suggested that people and local 
communities do transcend self-interest by devising and adjusting rules and institutions that 
define user groups, determine who has access and how resources can be used and establish 
who participates in decision making and how rights and duties to land are transferred.  Such 
local institutions, according to Dietz et al (2002), foster social cohesion and trust that have 
endured for generations.  Research has also showed that where state authority and policy have 
actually transformed traditional land tenure and ownerships arrangement in ways that 
accommodate state authority structures and creates divisions among groups, reducing access 





While the "top-down" approaches and private property have conventionally enjoy significant 
hegemony, the "bottom-up" approaches to environmental and natural resource governance 
described by Ostrom are gaining traction through decentralization and community 
management, which allows for significant amount of participation and inclusion in decision 
making that improves social cohesion and trust. 
  Second, although identities do not inevitably lead to conflict, the literature suggests 
that identities (personal or social) are often in tension.  Precisely how identity is related to 
violent conflict is uncertain but how people identify themselves  - ethnicity, social strategy, 
tribal or racial, nationalism --often intensify during g periods of social, political and economic 
crisis.  The literature suggests that as uncertainty grows and state authority declines practices 
in-place to protect one group from another loses their credibility. State authority declines due 
to crises, fears of insecurity can grow as certain groups invest in measures to protect 
themselves making violence more likely.  From this perspective, state weakness is often 
perceived as the "incapacity to protect one group from another" (Stein 2002, 299).   
 In terms of the environment and natural resources, then, the consolidation of state 
authority is perceived as an be important way to protect society's most vulnerable groups but 
also to balance demands for resources, resolve disputes and translate public debate into 
government policy.  In short, state authority, is thought to be above the fray and able to 
effectively and equitable mediate societal conflict and ensure that no one group dominates 
environmental and natural resources governance in ways that may increase the propensity of 
violence. T he problem is, of course, that states are not always the neutral arbiter of society 
and state authorities have often used identity to induce conflict over competition for, and the 
control of,  natural resources (Peluso and Watts 2001).  Just as spoilers expropriate identities 
to gain control of natural resources, and exclude people from resources on the basis of 





 According to the literature, it is here that environmental and natural resources may be 
particularly helpful.  Competing material interests are vital but they may not be sufficient to 
change the underlying conditions that result in propensity of violence.  In short, interests are 
shaped by images and beliefs - that are part of identity (Stein 2002).  Therefore, interactions 
and communication around the environment and natural resources may be able to "trigger 
broader forms of peace" (Conca and Dabelko 2002).  Specifically, efforts to govern the 
environment and natural resources can work to emphasize "political or economic 
interdependencies" that can promote communication and interaction between adversaries or 
potential adversaries thereby establishing trust and confidence.  Second, the environment may 
be able to foster interdependencies that can strengthen intergroup or societal trust, and create 
openings for peace. Cooperation at the local level may foster the formation of shared 
collective identities within societies and between potential adversarial groups that are not 
based on national, ethnic, class, religious, kinship or other cleavages.  In both cases, 
environmental issues may rejuvenate civil society and facilitate dialogue and confidence 
building among civil society and between civil society and the state.  This can help transform 
state and political institutions as well as alter societal relations in the direction of peace by 
focusing on the mutual benefits of the environment and natural resource challenges.  The 
point is, of course, that inclusion and participation need are vitally important in making sure 
that identity does not exclude certain groups, and that interaction and communication can be a 
part of the process.   
 The preceding section has detailed, at least preliminarily, the ways in which 
international peacebuilding organizations understand the linkages between the environment, 
natural resources and peace, and how these ideas have been translated into specific 
peacebuilding practices.  The picture that emerges-- prospectively--is that IPOs since the late 
1990s been preoccupied with specific explanations about how the environment and natural 





will fund rebel groups and corrupt governments.  The result has been a range of policies and 
practices by IBOs to mitigate "conflict resources" and also transform them into "peace 
resources".  For example, peacebuilders have imposed sanctions and implemented 
commodity certification schemes designed to curtail the trade in diamonds, timber and other 
commodities.  At the same time, however, IBOs have increasingly supported and established 
reforms and policies in war-torn states designed to reduce the propensity for violence.  In 
short, IBOs assume that environmental and natural resource governance impacts four key 
peacebuilding pillars--security, economic development, social cohesion and state 
institutions.46
 
  Specific outcomes on these pillars are desired because they are perceived to 
reduce the propensity for a return to large-scale violence.   Table 3 summarizes the key ways 
in which environment, natural resources and peace believed to be linked to the peacebuilding 
pillars.  Several things are worth noting.  First, participation/inclusion, access (e.g., land 
ownership and tenure) and costs and benefits appear to be significant factors in reducing the 
propensity of violence.  Second, there are important contradictions or embedded tensions in 
the literature with regards to state authority, institutions and the role of economic growth.    
 
Peacebuilding Pillars 
How does the environment and natural 




Social Cohesion and Trust 
• Participation and inclusion 
• Land ownership and tenure (access to 
resources) 
• Equitable benefits from  resource 
                                                 
 
46 It is important to note that the ways in which environmental and natural resource governance may 
impact the four peacebuilding pillars are not mutually exclusive.  The literature points out, for 
example, that issues of identity or access can undermine security while simultaneously effecting social 







• Economic growth  
• Strong state authority 




State Institutions and Authority 
• Participation and inclusion in decision 
making process 
• Legitimacy of the state 
• Land ownership and tenure 
• Equitably distributed benefits 
• Strong state authority  





• Increasing state revenue 
• Decreasing rates of poverty  
• Increasing GDP 
• Access to natural resources for adequately 
meeting livelihood needs 
• Social and environmental costs 
• Equitably distributed benefits (material 
and cultural) 
Security • Revenue transparency and commodity 
tracking schemes 
• Participation and inclusion in decision 
making process 
• Access to natural resources for adequately 
meeting livelihood needs 






• Social and environmental costs  
 
Table 3. Linkages between the Environment, Natural Resources and Peace 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued two points.  First, the idea that the environment and natural resources 
corresponds in some way to civil conflict materialized as the problem of fragile states and 
"new wars" discussed in Chapter 2 surfaced as an international security threat.  What 
developed was a significant body of research that linked either resource scarcity or resource 
abundance to civil conflict.  However, despite the extensive literature, scarcity and abundance 
explanations suffer from significant intellectual contradictions, methodological doubts and 
empirical complexities that have result in few, if any, definitive findings.  These ambiguities 
notwithstanding, it is the dominant framework from which IBOs perceive the environment, 
natural resource and conflict problematic.  Second, this has had a profound influence in the 
way international peacebuilding organizations understand how the environment and natural 
resources relate to peacebuilding and has a significant bearing on the reforms and policies 
they promote and establish. This, or course, raises a serious question: given how little we 
know about the linkages between the environment, natural resources and conflict, how can 
we trust that the linkages between the environment, natural resources and peacebuilding are 
correct?    
 IBOs have incorporated and integrated environmental and natural resources concerns 
into peace operations for almost a decade.  While sanctions and regimes get the most 
attention, IBOs have been deeply engaged in efforts to govern and manage the environment 
and natural resources--particularly high-value ones-- so that conflict will not reignite and 
peace can be sustained.  But few studies have scrutinized in any detail the impacts of 





surprising because the peacebuilding literature has expanded considerably in recent years 
(Call and Wyeth 2008; Caplan 2005; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Jeong 2005; Kumar 1997; 
Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens 2002).  While there are exceptions--a multiple-volume set 
focusing on natural resources management and peacebuilding is due out in 2011--most 
studies have been too over generalized and theoretical to be helpful to scholars or policy 
makers (UNEP 2009; Lujala and Rustad 2011).  Regardless as to why such research has not 
been forthcoming, it appears that international peacebuilding agenda and policy targeted at 
governing the environment and natural resources is out in front of the empirical investigation.   
 This chapter is important in understanding what is to come.  In following chapters, I 
argue that environment and natural resource govern reforms and policies in Liberia (e.g., 
forests) and Sierra Leone (e.g., minerals and diamonds) are profoundly influenced and shaped 
by the conflict literature, which help frame how the respective conflicts are understood by 
IBOs.  The dominant construction of both conflicts, for example, center on the problem of 
"conflict resources" even though both conflicts and their underlying causes go much deeper.  
The result, however, is that the solution to the problem of "conflict resources"--transforming 















The Liberian conflict has been the subject of numerous books, articles and monographs 
written by a broad array of scholars (Ellis 1999; Kieh 2008; Levitt 2005; Mgbeoji 2003; 
Omeje 2009; Reno 1998; Sawyer 1992; 2005; TRC 2009).  Taken together this collection has 
improved our understanding of a complex, puzzling, and horrific civil war.  Despite this 
growing body of literature, however, there has been a general inability of analysts to fully 
understand the conflict, and instead focus on aspects that are easier for academics to study or 
(Western) audiences and policy makers to digest.  Early explanations of the conflict, for 
example, focused on the region's Hobbesian "state of nature", characterized by "new 
barbarism" in which irrational and uncivilized warlords--motivated by ethnic hatreds or 
primordial savagery--committed murder for no reason (Kaplan 1994; Richards 1996).  Other 
explanations blamed globalization and the end of the Cold War for the collapse of the 
country's institutions and governance for the conflict (Kaldor 1999).   
 This chapter argues that the dominate explanation for the Liberian conflict--
particularly among international peacebuilding organizations--centers on the economic 
motives of combatants, and the responsibility valuable natural resources played in starting 
and fueling the 14-year civil war. This emphasis is attributable to the influential scholarship 
connecting the environment and natural resources to civil conflict, discussed at length in the 
previous chapter.   Such narratives emphasize the role of "greedy" warlords and corrupt 
government officials, who traded in "blood timber"--among other resources--to amass wealth, 





greed-driven, natural resource conflict, and the prime example of a "new war" fought over 
forests and their revenues (de Jong, Donovan, and Ken-Ichi 2007).  I argue that these 
explanations have not clarified our understanding but have obscured the conflict's nuanced 
origins and dynamics, and at the same time misrepresented the deep-seated links between 
Liberia's forests and conflict.  Rather than a novel feature of conventional civil conflicts, 
Liberia's forests have historically been at the center of political and societal grievances and 
struggles. If the objective of peacebuilding is genuinely to establish the conditions for a 
sustainable and long-term peace, then, it seems imperative that IBOs understand these 
underlying problems. A failure to do so, may lead to new reforms, practices and policies that 
do not attend to the root causes of the conflict or make things worse off.       
 This chapter begins with a brief overview of Liberian history from 1822-1989 paying 
particular attention to the changing social, political and economic dynamics of state 
formation.  I then describe, in detail, Liberia's "Great War", which was fought between 1989 
and 2003.  A central theme is that the Liberian conflict is best understood as a continuation 
and manifestation of historical social grievances, political conflict and competition for power 
and not simply the symptom of a post-Cold War world.  I then examine Liberia's forests from 
a historical perspective to better understand the role of forests in the political, economic and 
social fabric of the country.  In the last part of the chapter, I then examine the links between 
forests and the conflict, how this relationship has been framed by IBOs, and subsequent 
efforts to address "blood timber."   
Liberia: The Making and Remaking of the State (1822-1989) 
From settlement to sovereign 
 Before the first "settlers" arrived on the "Grain Coast" in 1822, it was inhabited by 





17; Liebenow 1969).47  According to Levitt (2005, 19-20), these groups, while indigenous to 
the region, were largely "post-traditional"  in the sense that their patterns of thought, belief, 
and custom had been altered by the trans-Atlantic slave trade and century's worth of  trade 
with Europe.48  Settlers arrived at what is now Liberia as part of an experiment by the 
American Colonization Society (ACS) to resettle freed American slaves to Africa.49  The 
ACS was established in 1816 by aristocratic slave owners to decrease the number of former 
slaves, who were considered not only inferior but also "vicious and mischievous"-- leading to 
an organized movement to remove them from the country (Levitt 2005, 32-33).  From the 
beginning it was clear "the ACS intended to establish a paternalistic and authoritarian socio-
political order in Liberia" (Levitt 2005, 39).50
 To secure territory, the ACS (with the help of the US Navy) coerced the native king 
to sell land by holding a gun to his head (Levitt 2005, 40).
  The ACS drew up the rules governing the 
distribution, procurement and ownership of land, the character of interactions with indigenous 
peoples, and the extent of political rights. The ACS also adopted a constitution, which 
endowed itself with all authority over the settlement and denied the settlers it was resettling 
the right to establish a government and elect its own leadership.  
51
                                                 
 
47 These groups are as follows: Kpelle, Bassa, Gio, Kru, Grebo, Mano, Loma, Krahn, Gola, Kissi, 
Mandingo, Vai, Gbandi, Belle, Dei, and Mende.  
  Between 1822 and 1847, the 
settlement endured frequent confrontation with the indigenous population that resisted the 
48 Much of this early trade was in what can be termed "forest products" such as ivory, kola, rubber, 
wood and gold that was traded for manufactured goods and salt.  Slaves were considered forest 
products.    
49 The ACS also was tasked with resettling recaptured slaves or those found to be abroad slave ships 
that were seized by the US Navy.   
50 Although not officially sanctioned by the US government, the ACS did receive substantial political 
and financial support, including the use of navy ships to transport the settlers and payment for the ACS 
agent. This support coincided with the passing of the "Act of Addition to the Acts of Prohibiting the 
Slave Trade" in March 1819" which was a companion Act to the "Act of Congress Prohibiting the 
Slave Trade" which was passed in 1808.   The objectives of the Act were not to end slavery but to 
address the problem of more and freer Blacks living in the US.   
51 The land was eventually bought in exchange for a few dozen items (TRC 2009, 75).  What the ACS 
failed to understand was that the concept of land ownership was unknown and even taboo to 





establishment and rapid expansion of the colony.52  A quarter of a century after the settlers 
arrived, delegates adopted a Liberian Declaration of Independence and established the first 
Liberian Republic. The independence movement was shaped by the authoritarian rule of the 
ACS, which created deep resentments among the settlers or "Americo-Liberians", as they 
came to be known.  By 1848, the Liberian Constitution had been adopted and Great Britain 
became the first country to recognize Liberia as an independent state.  Nevertheless, the 
transition from settlement to republic was beset by continuous conflict (Levitt 2005, 99-123).  
This was partially the result of an indigenous population rebelling against the new state.53  
But the persistence of conflict also helped to shape what Levitt terms the "rise of the settler 
oligarchic state", characterized by subjugation of the indigenous population by a small 
oligarchy of settlers that sought to impose religion, culture and political and economic 
arrangements that denied the indigenous people political rights and land ownership (Sawyer 
1992; TRC 2009, 71).54
 The second half of the 19th century and into the early decades of the 20th century can 
best be characterized by Liberian by attempts to formally extend the Liberian state from the 
capital Monrovia to the periphery or "hinterland".
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52  Indigenous groups that controlled lucrative trade routes viewed the settlers with caution and actively 
attempted to undermine the settlement in order to continue to profit from slavery and other 
"commodities" (Levitt 2005).  Moreover, the decision of the ACS to carry out a "civilizing" and 
"Christianizing" program created resentment and triggered conflict (Levitt 2005, 46; TRC 2009, 78-
79).  Despite almost constant conflict the reluctance of the settlers--who were effectively "stateless" to 
flee--along with the continued arrival of more settlers, and the formation of military units, gave 
increased strength to the settlement. 
  This policy of "expansionism" was 
influenced by British and French encroachment as both powers claimed the need to bring 
"order" to the "ungoverned" hinterland areas of Liberia that was threatening its colonial 
53 The indigenous population enjoyed several military victories against the settlers but still 
accommodated setter demands based on the perception that the US Navy would come to the support 
the Republic (Levitt 2005).    
54 The TRC highlights how even things as seemingly benign as creating the Liberian flag, which 
portrayed a ship over the motto "The Love of Liberty Brought Us Here", were embedded with the 
division between settlers and indigenous population.  





territory--Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast.56 The policy was also justified by the increasing 
demand for Liberian commodities, such as palm oil, coffee, camwood, ivory, hides and rice 
in Europe and the US, as well as the growing need for state revenue (Sawyer 1992, 156-
160).57  The result was an increasingly repressive policy toward the indigenous population, 
which included use of the government's new Frontier Force.58 The Liberian government 
sought to strengthen its relationship with traditional rulers, however, who controlled access to 
the hinterland's agricultural land and natural resources (Sawyer 1992).  This led to a policy of 
"indirect rule", the central purpose of which was dividing up rural areas into districts and 
using civilian administrators to buy, co-opt and coerce traditional rulers into supporting 
government policies, paying taxes, supplying labor and maintaining law and order.59
State development and centralization 
  As a 
result, Liberia began to develop increasing economic and trade relations with the US and 
Europe, which is exemplified by Liberia's granting of a 99-year lease (on four percent of the 
country's land area) to US-based Firestone Rubber Company.   
 By the late 1920s, Liberia took its current territorial form.  Between 1931 and 1979, 
Liberia had three presidents (e.g., Barclay, Tubman and Tolbert Jr.) and was essentially a 
                                                 
 
56 Britain and France were emboldened by the Berlin Africa Congress (1884-1885), which mandated 
that states needed to establish "effective control" over its African lands.   
57 This also began a pattern of foreign lending for Liberia brought on by the sovereign state's 
international obligation to maintain order and build the institutions of a state.  Because of Liberia's 
difficulty of administering taxes, Liberia looked to foreign powers as a source of revenue and a 
continued quest to be able to pay it back.   
58 The Frontier Force was established between 1904 and 1908 and was responsible for its summary 
killings, rape and violence (Levitt, 2005, 179).  
59 Indirect rule not only created new relations between the national government and local chiefs that 
helped to maintain informal government control of the hinterland but also increased the power and 
influence of traditional chiefs at local and national levels.  Ellis (1999, 210) points out that the practice 
of indirect rule assumed the existence of political authority at the local level, which often did not exist.  
As such, district commissioners and other government administrators often searched out potential 
allies to carry out government directives.  This not only had the effect of facilitating the emergence of 
new strong men at the local level but also influenced how traditional government is carried out and 
perceived historically.  It is also important to point out as well that indirect rule also had the effect of 





one-party state.60  During this time, Liberia's development was characterized by increasing 
investment by foreign business interests and the centralization of political and military 
authority (Sawyer 1992).  William Tubman was the president of Liberia for almost 30 years 
(1944-1971), and his tenure is distinguished by the widespread penetration of state 
government control and the consolidation of settler oligarchic power.  This chain of events 
developed as a result of Liberia's "Open Door" economic policy, which increased state 
revenues and facilitated the emergence of more expansive networks of patronage (Ellis 1999; 
Levitt 2005; Sawyer 1992).61  The 'Open Door Policy' was essentially a modernization 
program, which for a time was believed to have fueled one of the "world's fastest growing 
economies" in the 1960s (Ellis 1999, xxv; Marinelli 1964). Laws and regulations were 
adopted that "gave foreign investors full freedom of entry and repatriation of capital and 
profits" and imposed few if any restrictions on international business behavior or regulations 
regarding labor or communities (Sawyer 1992, Marinelli 1964).62
 As Tubman saw it, the Open Door Policy helped to secure "citizens against the curse 
of ignorance, poverty and disease" and provided "profitable investments" for the country 
(Marinelli 1964, 72).  However, Sawyer (1992) has argued that the policy brought about 
foreign domination of the Liberian economy that granted of property rights and 
concessionary agreements to foreign investors and transformed traditional land ownership 
and tenure arrangements (Sawyer 1992).
   
63
                                                 
 
60 The True Whig Party ruled for over a century.  
  The longer term consequence being the contested 
notion that the Liberian state--opposed to traditional rulers or communities--were indeed the 
61 It was also enabled by the support of the US who considered Liberia a Cold War client and received 
US aid.   
62 Those that complained of such poor trade agreements were routinely sanctioned or jailed (Alao, 
Mackinlay, and Olonisaki 1999, 17).  
63 For example, Tubman's administration negotiated the so-called "Christie concession", which handed 
an 80-year concession to the Liberia Mining Company in 1945 but at low rate of about five cents per 





authority or "master of the land" (Sawyer 1992, 242).64  It also allowed those in government 
to acquire wealth and power through business relationships and then distribute that wealth 
through patronage networks.  But for the first time Liberia had the resources to build roads, 
schools and hospitals, and employment opportunities increased as foreign companies and 
other development brought many Liberians a higher standard of living and greater access to 
other parts of the country (Marinelli 1964).  According to Marinelli (1964, 93-143), by 1948 
Liberia's revenue had grown from $1.5 million to $12.5 million, and by 1964 Liberia's 
national budget had increased 50-fold from less than $1 million to $50 million. Despite the 
promise of a "New Liberia" described by Marinelli (1964) others suggested that Liberia had 
undergone "growth without development" (Clower et al. 1966).  Clower et al. (1966, 5) 
suggested that "because the traditional policies and ruling group remains unchanged in the 
new economic environment of massive iron ore mines and rubber plantations...Liberia is 
growing but not developing."65
 Successful efforts to amend the Constitution to permit unlimited 4-year terms and 
excessive authoritarianism made Tubman many enemies and caused both settler and 
indigenous elites to conspire against him.
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64 Sawyer (1992, 244) notes that a strategy of economic development through concessionary 
agreements to foreign interests has always been contested in Liberia.   
 This led to the use ever more harsh measures to 
secure power and crush any opposition.  As Levitt (2005) notes, although violence was long 
endemic in Liberia, this was the first time violence was used as an instrument of political 
competition.  By the 1960s, Tubman had establish civilian and military security agencies and 
created a network of civilian "spies". The growing international demand for rubber, iron ore 
and timber provided him with the resources to finance his new security apparatus and expand 
his personal patronage network.   
65 This economic "backwardness", according to Clower et al. (1966, 4) cannot be attributed to a "lack 
of resources nor domination by foreign financial and political interests" but instead to the "leaders of 
Liberia [who] have not permitted... changes necessary to develop the society and its economy."  





 Tubman's died in 1971 led to the appointment of his successor William Tolbert Jr.  
Tolbert continued Tubman's "Open Door" policy, further integrating Liberia’s economy into 
international markets and exporting raw materials.  By the mid-1970s, an estimated 20 timber 
concessions encompassed almost one-fifth the land area of Liberia, 3,000 private rubber 
estates had been created and over 50 percent of Liberia’s government revenues came from 
Firestone and the Liberian Iron Mining Company (Dunn and Tarr 1988; Reno 1998, 81-86; 
Sawyer 1992, 252).  However, the 1970s also saw international demand for commodities 
contract with a global recession.  Despite massive foreign aid from the US, a reduction in 
taxes and royalties negatively affected most Liberians, with the "rich and influential losing 
wealth and access; and the poor becoming poorer" and angrier (Levitt 2005, 191).  Despite 
the rising resentment two events in 1979 helped to bring down the Tolbert regime.  First, 
Tolbert and his administration proposed increasing the price of rice (the staple food of the 
population), reportedly to assist farmers although the price hike was reportedly to help the 
government write off its substantial foreign debt and reward political allies who stood to 
profit from higher prices (Levitt 2005, 195).  Response to the price hikes led to "rice riots" 
that turned violent resulting fatalities and an estimated $40 million in damage to Monrovia 
(Liebenow 1987, 172).67
 Before these events could bring down the Tolbert government, in April 1980, 17 non-
commissioned officers of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), and of indigenous origins, led 
by Sergeant Thomas Quiwonkpa attacked the Executive Mansion killing Tolbert and 
  Second, a considerable lack of trust in the government led to the 
formation of rival political parties and activist student groups that contested to the one-party 
state by calling for strikes and protests--all of which were met harshly by security forces.  
                                                 
 
67 Despite calls for national reconciliation, the government's reaction to the so-called "rice riots" was to 
seek presidential powers to quell the violence, which resulted was not only the jailing of protesters and 






The Doe decade 
 In a matter of hours, the hundred plus years one-party rule was 
brought down by a "people's revolution."   
 Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, the highest ranking of the coup plotters was installed 
as the head of state, and the People's Redemption Council (PRC) took power in Liberia.69  
Doe and the PRC came to power with extensive public support and the perception that they 
had liberated the country (Boley 1983; Liebenow 1980; 1987).70  While the PRC and Doe 
sought revenge on members of the Tolbert regime71, they also tried to satisfy all previously 
excluded Liberians--principally the indigenous population--who were expecting to be flooded 
with "money, jobs and other resources" (Ellis 1999, 56).72 Doe presumed that he could build 
political power by appealing to the public and using the levers of the state, including the 
military. However, the accumulation of power necessitated economic control, and therefore 
reliance on the same network of elites that Tolbert and Tubman had relied on.  Rather than 
revolutionary change to the status quo, then, the power of Doe and the PRC's required not 
only the coercive potential of the military but support of the same patronage networks.  The 
ability to pay off not only government bureaucrats, potential opposition, the military 
establishment and the powerful traditional rulers in the hinterland was dependent on Doe's 
ability to control resource revenues and dispense patronage.73
                                                 
 
68 Reports of American involvement in the coup have been widely circulated (TRC 2009, 113).  There 
is a  debate as to who actually led the coup with some stating the leader was Samuel Doe and others 
suggesting it was Thomas Quiwonkpa 
 These arrangements went 
"beyond corruption", diverting massive state revenues from development priorities to 
69 Doe and Quiwonkpa were not yet 30 years old.  
70 The public executions of members of the Tolbert administration also sent many into exile.  
71 This included a very public execution on a beach in Monrovia in front of television cameras.  
72 The PRC was quick to respond to the public sentiment by abolishing the unpopular "hut tax" and 
raising government wages (soldiers and bureaucrats) by as much as 300 percent (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 
5; Ellis 1999, 54).   
73 Doe ran the Forest Development Authority to divert timber concession fees and used the Liberian 





priorities of patronage (Liebenow 1987; Reno 1998, 86).  Between 1980 and 1983, despite 
growing exports, state revenue from rubber, iron ore, and timber fell by about $125 million 
(Reno 1998, 86).  The resulting weakening of state institutions, capacity and services was 
both blamed on and justified by the structural adjustment policies of the World Bank and IMF 
that demanded reduced state spending, privatization and the use of international business 
(Reno 1998).    
 Following the coup, competition for political power, infighting among the PRC, and 
ethnic favoritism in government positions combined with limited resources to leave Doe in a 
precarious position.  Rumors of counter-coups and a basic insecurity led Doe to disarm the 
military, increase the power of his personal security services and consolidate state power.  
This led to the imprisoning, coercing and outlawing of opposition groups.74  However, 
responding to public demands--fueled by his increasingly unpopular authoritarian regime--
Doe moved forward with elections in 1985 and presented himself as a viable leader.75  Doe 
responded to demands for civilian rule by replacing the PRC with an interim assembly and 
lifting a ban on political activities.  This allowed Doe to garner enough legitimacy, winning 
the election by a majority of votes (50.9 percent) (Liebenow 1987).76
 Doe's electoral victory was followed by an abortive coup by exiled Quiwonkpa 
causing the government to become increasingly suspicious.
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74 It also led Doe to accuse army commander and fellow coup plotter Quiwonkpa of plotting a coup, 
forcing him into exile. 
  From 1986 onward, violence 
and coercion grew worse and atrocities were carried out against Gio and Mano groups in 
75 Doe employed as advisors once members of the Tubman and Tolbert administrations to "groom" 
him to be president (Levitt 2005, 200).  Doe began to see himself more as a civilian leader having 
made himself not only a general (from a master sergeant) but eventually the "Chairman of the PRC" 
and once the PRC was dissolved, the President. 
76 Certainly, few, except Liberia's ally the US government, believed the election verdict (Liebenow 
1987, 297).  





Nimba County, which had rumor had it supported the rebellion.78 Doe manipulated ethnic 
tensions, which had been long dormant, to prevent the emergence of a united front against 
him.79  The coup also caused Doe to adopt an aggressive attitude toward all opposition (or 
potential opposition) figures mirroring the detentions, arrests, torture and murder under the 
Tolbert regime. Every segment of Liberian society was affected by the repression with "the 
only consistency" being "military rule [and] the looting of society" (Sawyer 1992, 294)  Like 
those before him, Doe concentrated on maintaining his patronage system by granting 
concessions to foreign companies "beholden to him for commercial opportunities" and using 
the revenues to buy local support (Ellis 1999, 64).  One estimate suggests that in the decade 
of Doe's rule $300 million were siphoned off by Doe for patronage and profit (Reno 1998, 
85).80
The Liberian Civil War (1989-2003) 
  By 1989, however, his ouster was imminent.  
 
The Liberian conflict began on Christmas Eve 1989 when Charles Taylor led a violent 
rebellion against the government of Samuel Doe.81
                                                 
 
78 Quiwonkpa was ethnic Mano. 
  The rebel assault by Taylor’s force of 100 
poorly armed fighters--a multi-ethnic coalition of Liberians and foreign insurgents fighting 
79 Doe's inner circle and patronage network openly favored the Krahn, who made up an estimated 4-5 
percent of the population, resulting in further "ethnicization" of Liberian society with political enemies 
and allies aligned along ethnic lines. 
80 To reiterate, this reduction in state services, institutions and capacity was enabled by structural 
adjustment policies by that advocating privatization and a reduction in the state.   
81 Taylor was a former confidant of President Samuel Doe. He had once been the secretary-general of 
President Samuel Doe's Government Services Administration, a high ranking cabinet post.  But 
Taylor--a protégé of Quiwonkpa --fled Liberia to the US as Doe cracked down on Quiwonkpa 
supporters.  Taylor's flight to the US was followed by allegations by the Doe regime that Taylor had 
embezzled nearly a million dollars.  At Doe's request, Taylor was arrested in the US and placed in jail 
for 18 months while awaiting extradition. However, under mysterious circumstances, Taylor escaped 
and made his way back to West Africa, meeting up with a small contingent of other revolutionaries 
with a dislike of Doe.  Taylor was able to open a line of communication with Libya and most 
importantly, its leader Muammar Gaddafi, who had an interest in riding the continent of imperial 
powers. It was through these connections that Taylor was able to garnered support from Libya, 
Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire and training in revolutionary camps.  As noted by Ellis (1999), it was 





under the name of the National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL).82  Taylor claimed the 
objective of the NPFL--which was a "network of armed dissidents" rather than a well-trained 
guerilla force or political party--was to get President Doe "off the backs of the Liberian 
people." He urged the population to take up arms against the government (Ellis 1999, 74).  
The main contingent of NPFL fighters was located in the northeast (Nimba County) but 
rumors circulated that teams of rebels were stationed around the country.83  This began a 
spasm of killings by President Doe--and his Krahn-dominated Armed Forces of Liberia 
(AFL)--who singled out and brutalized potential collaborators.   Counter-insurgency tactics 
by Doe, however, had the effect of increasing rebel recruitment as thousands of civilians took 
up arms against the Doe regime fearing he wanted to "wipe out the Gio and Mano people" 
(Alao, Mackinlay, and Olonisaki 1999, 20).84
 By July 1990, the NPFL was five miles outside Monrovia, controlled 90 percent of 
the country and had cut water, electricity and phone service to the capital.  A generally 
popular Taylor seemed poised to take power as the NPFL entered Monrovia--committing 
atrocities against civilians and displacing an estimated 700,000 people along the way.
   The NPFL offensive quickly diminished the 
moral of AFL troops--who largely resorted to looting emptied villages) while as the same 
time intensifying ethnically-driven animosities as Krahn and Mandingo groups that had  
nothing to do with Doe's excesses were unjustly targeted by rebels.  
85
                                                 
 
82 Reports on the numbers of insurgents vary. The NPFL was initially formed much earlier by Thomas 
Quiwonkpa.  Taylor was married to a close relative. The assault originated in Cote d'Ivoire and Nimba 
County, which was where reprisals against the Gio and Mano groups occurred during and after the 
Quiwonkpa  rebellion in 1985.    
   But 
83 Whether this was true or not is debatable.  Taylor was a master of over exaggerating threats and 
instilling fear. 
84 During this time, the first child soldiers took up arms with the NPFL as children lost families, were 
displaced by AFL atrocities or were guaranteed access to food.  Child soldiers reportedly as young as 
six or seven were forced to join the NPFL and forced to ingest drugs and taught to kill (TRC 2009, 
224).  





two factors conspired to deny Taylor a military victory.86   First, although framed as an effort 
to bring peace to Liberia, Nigerian concerns that Taylor might take power led to an 
intervention by ECOWAS, West Africa's primary economic organization. With the tacit 
support of the United States and under considerable Nigerian pressure ECOWAS voted for 
intervention and an ECOMOG "peacekeeping" force made up of mostly Nigerian troops was 
sent to Monrovia (Alao, Mackinlay, and Olonisaki 1999, 28-38).87  Second, shortly after 
ECOMOG troops arrived, Prince Johnson--who had split from the NPFL and formed a rival 
group-- captured, tortured and assassinated President Doe ending his ten-year rule.88 The end 
result of was a stalemate. The hinterland was controlled by Taylor and the NPFL and 
Monrovia was controlled by an interim Liberian government that relied on ECOMOG 
peacekeepers for security.89 While these were viewed as positive developments 
internationally, and encouraged international organizations to return, the Nigerian military 
increasing had vested interest in staying in Liberia.90
 Taylor adapted to his denial of military victory and political aspirations by setting up 
a parallel government referred to as "Greater Liberia". Whereas the interim government 
lacked power and was saddled with billions in foreign debt, Taylor consolidated economic 
control over the country's resources and amassed a "personal fief" (Ellis 1999, 89).  Taylor 




                                                 
 
86 It is likely that Nigeria provided weapons to Doe.  During this time, virtually all Anglo-phone actors 
would have supported US intervention, although the 2,000 US marines stationed off-shore only 
evacuated US citizens and foreign nationals without intervening. As Ellis (1999) notes, other world 
events such as the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait began to receive most US attention. 
  For those with established interests in Liberia, including Firestone and the 
87 The US was particularly concerned about Taylor's relationship to Libya. 
88 For a vivid description of Doe's murder (Ellis 1999).  DVD's of Doe's murder still circulate on the 
streets of Monrovia (and other West African capitals).   
89 The Interim Government of National Unity was set up literally by committee under the chairmanship 
of Amos Sawyer.  
90 ECOMOG commanders openly traded in commodities (Ellis 1999, 88).  





Liberian Minerals Company, it was imperative to restart operations. After the NPFL took 
control of the Firestone plantation in 1990, Taylor used the buildings as administration 
offices and the company reportedly provided Taylor with a radio communications center that 
was converted into a radio station (KISS-FM).  Firestone also signed a memorandum of 
understanding with the NPFL that allowed them to export about 12,000 tons of rubber in 
1993 alone (Ellis 1999, 167).92
 The control of Greater Liberia opened up new opportunities for Taylor to extend 
influence outside the borders of Liberia. Taylor provided support for the invasion of Sierra 
Leone in 1991 by the Revolutionary United Front largely driven by a deep animosity toward 
the Sierra Leonean government.
  Newer arrivals, particularly the timber industry also 
discovered the necessity and attraction of dealing with Taylor who would grant licenses in 
return for personal payment in US dollars. Ivorian, French, Italian Israeli, Dutch and Thai 
logging companies gained access to forests.  From late 1991-1993, Taylor had reportedly 
made at least $75-$100 million annually (Ellis 1999. 90) from the trade in diamonds, rubber, 
gold, iron ore and timber.  
93 The spread of the war to Sierra Leone, along with a host of 
other factors, fostered the emergence of new factions inclined to fight the NPFL, including 
United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) (Ellis 1999, 94-104).94  
Feeling threatened, Taylor led a second NPFL assault on Monrovia in October 1992 that 
resulted in the systematic looting, widespread killing and rape.  ECOMOG responded by 
using air strikes and artillery against NPFL positions, which resulted in extensive civilian 
casualties.95
                                                 
 
92 This was only of fraction of the over 100,000 tons exported before the war began. 
  The end result, however, was a decisive victory for ECOMOG and ULIMO with 
93 Contrary to the conventional wisdom, Taylor's motives for supporting the insurgency in Sierra 
Leone were largely political (Keen 2005). For example, Taylor harbored deep animosity toward the 
government in Sierra Leone that had supported ECOMOG and funded ULIMO elements.  
94 ULIMO was made up of Doe loyalists as well as ethnic Krahn and Mandingo fighters. ULIMO had 
the support of Sierra Leone and Guinea.  





Taylor losing substantial parts of Greater Liberia, including the port at Buchanan.96
 Realizing that Nigeria and the ECOMOG force stood in the way of what he wanted 
most--the presidency of Liberia--Taylor met with the Nigerian President in August 1995to 
hammer the Abuja Accords.
  The 
military pressure on Taylor raised the prospects of a political settlement as the three central 
players of the conflict, ECOMOG, NPFL and ULIMO signed the Cotonou Accord in 1993.  
Although the accords collapsed within a few months, they led to the establishment of a 
United Nations Observer Force in Liberia (UNOMIL), and for the first time, brought the 
NPFL to the negotiation table.  
97 The accords called for the formation of an interim "collective 
presidency" composed of the warring factions and disarmament while making preparations 
for national elections.98  Taylor was dependent on ECOMOG for protection but he made a 
triumphant return to Monrovia where he enjoyed enormous advantages over his political 
opponents.99  Taylor had amassed considerable monetary resources--he was able to pay 
ECOMOG officers and disperse patronage to political allies--and was an effective public 
communicator.  In July 1997, over three-fourths of the population went to the polls, and an 
estimated 75 percent voted for Taylor.  The election was deemed "the fairest in the country's 
history" although the conventional wisdom was that the vote was influenced by a perception 
that the conflict would restart if he did not win (Ellis 1999, 109).100
                                                 
 
96 It should be noted that Taylor was not the only faction to use natural resources as ULIMO used 
diamonds to fund its operations.  
  
97 This was by one count, the fourteenth  peace accord of the Liberian civil war  (Alao, Mackinlay and 
Olonisaki 1999; TRC 2009) 
98 According to Ellis (1999, 105-106), the Abuja Accords fundamentally changed the "political and 
military mechanisms for securing the control of resources, which was the key to peace and war".  This 
was because Taylor's control of Greater Liberia was not enough to attain the presidency and 
ECOMOG's control of Monrovia was insufficient to end the war. 
99 Even as the Abuja Accords were being implemented, NPFL fighters engaged in substantial fighting 
and looting in an effort to take what they could before elections were held. In fact, during this time 
Taylor and the NPFL reacquired Liberia's western diamond fields and timber areas.    
100 A famous chant about Taylor's election goes something like this: "He killed my pa, He killed my 





 Despite initial accommodation with Taylor, regional tensions soon increased.  
ECOMOG accused Taylor of disregarding the Abuja Accords by rearming supporters.101
Everything changed in April 1999 when conflict erupted on the border of Liberia and 
Guinea. Although Taylor accused Guinea of destabilizing the region, the region as a whole 
had still not accepted Taylor's presidency, especially given the NPFL's role in the conflict.  
The new attacks, which began "the second Liberian civil war", were carried out by new rebel 
groups, including Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) composed of 
former members of the ULIMO.  The conflict escalated substantially in late-1999, and 
continued throughout 2001 and 2002.
  The 
UN, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Ghana all accused Taylor's government of backing the RUF in 
Sierra Leone.  Within Liberia hostility and dissatisfaction also began to build as Taylor came 
under increasing scrutiny for human rights abuses as his government settled old scores and 
eliminated and intimidated political opponents.  Taylor was the target of several coup 
attempts and consequently tightened his grip on security and cleansed state institutions of any 
political opponents that might challenge his authority.  But by-and-large, the international 
community seemed relatively unconcerned or unaware with Taylor's consolidation of state 
power, the looting of natural resources or his continued support for the ongoing war in Sierra 
Leone. From 1997-1999, violence in Liberia was at a relatively low level, providing Taylor 
with a modicum of support at home and abroad.  The United States generally supported 
Taylor as well based on his ability establish order, and the perception that he could be 
transformed into a respectable leader (Ellis 1999).  
102
                                                 
 
101 For example, Taylor did not keep the commitment to demobilize 40,000 former combatants.  
  For the first time, the international community 
became visibly concerned with the scale of the violence, bloodshed and displacement, which 
was featured prominently on CNN (Jakobsen 1996).   Meanwhile, accusations began to 
surface that Taylor was using diamonds from Sierra Leone to arm his personal security force 





and the RUF.  This led to UN sanctions against all diamond sales from Liberia (Smillie, 
Gberie, and Hazelton 2000; UNSC 2001b).  Adding to Taylor's problems was a growing lack 
of resources and an inability to procure weapons and dispense patronage. The diamond 
sanctions began to dry up Taylor's revenue stream--turning his attention to timber exports 
(Global Witness 2001a).  Libya's Gaddafi and Burkina Faso, Taylor's traditional allies, were 
distancing themselves from him as international scrutiny of the conflict increased.    
In early 2003, a new rebel group, composed of former Doe supporters calling 
themselves the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) also joined the fighting. The 
worsening situation in Liberia again caught the attention of the international community and 
the UN-Secretary General warned of the humanitarian crisis.  Responding to reports that the 
trade in Liberian timber was now helping to fuel the conflict, the UN passed sanctions on 
Liberian timber in mid-2003.  Taylor was subsequently indictment for war crimes by the UN-
backed Special Court on Sierra Leone in early June 2003.103 The charges alleged that Taylor 
backed the RUF during the Sierra Leone civil war and received diamonds in exchange for his 
support.   In June 2003, Taylor signed the Accra Accords with LURD and MODEL under 
pressure from IBOs, civil society and religious groups that called for an immediate ceasefire--
even as fighting continued.  Despite Taylor's insistence that a majority of the Liberian people 
supported him, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CAP) called for a new transitional 
government (not to include Taylor) and an ECOWAS-led verification team to oversee the 
implementation.  However, Taylor's intransigence, LURD and MODEL's reluctance to 
negotiate any further with Taylor, and ECOWAS's weakness led to increasing pressure on the 
United States to intervene.104
                                                 
 
103 At the requests of the Special Court, Switzerland froze the assets of Taylor, his relatives and 
members of his government.  
  US President George W. Bush urged Taylor to step down but 
104 Many argued at the time that the UK role in sending in troops to end the Sierra Leone conflict (and 






stopped short of direct intervention.105  Negotiations in Accra shifted toward the conditions of 
any cease fire and how to put together a transitional government. With ECOWAS set to send 
in thousands of soldiers, fighting intensified with LURD advancing into Monrovia and calling 
for Taylor to depart the country.106 With the violence spiraling out of control and the situation 
in Liberia deteriorating quickly, the UN approved a resolution to send a large UN-backed 
peacekeeping force to Liberia.107
On August 11, 2003 Charles Taylor resigned as the President of Liberia and left for 
exile in Nigeria.
  
108 The peace agreement called for the permanent end hostilities, the 
establishment of a National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL). The NTGL, in 
which LURD and MODEL were guaranteed 12 seats each in the transitional assembly, had a 
mandate to enforce the peace agreement, promote reconciliation and prepare for national 
elections to be held in October 2005. The agreement also called for the establishment of a 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission to uncover the root causes of the crises and deal with 
human rights abuses (TRC 2009).  In October 2003, Charles Gyude Bryant, a businessman 
and leader to the Liberia Action Party, was selected as the chairman of the NTGL.109
                                                 
 
105 Ellis (1999) argues that, in a sense, the decision to "intervene" had already been decided based on 
growing international concern about the conditions in Monrovia, which was getting unprecedented 
media attention.  In addition, in the context of 9/11, the instability in Liberia and West Africa was 
deemed a potential threat to the US, especially since failed states such as Liberia were increasingly 
viewed potential safe havens or funding opportunities for terrorists (Farah 2004).    
 Shortly 
afterward, the UN Security Council approved the formation of the 15,000 member 
peacekeeping force known as United Nations Mission in Liberia.    
106 Reports of at least 600 dead were reported.  
107 The agreement provisionally stated that only those that had not fought in the war could serve in top 
government positions.  However, representatives of LURD and MODEL argued that only leaders of 
the rebel groups could disarm fighters (Levitt, 2009, 233).  
108 In a moment of theatrics, it has been reported that just after Taylor's "sacrificial lamb" resignation 
speech; three US navy ships appeared off the coast.    





Liberia's Forests in Historical Perspective 
Liberia's forests have always supplied the resources needed for survival and the sustainable 
livelihoods of forest communities.  They provide wood for construction, energy and trade and 
supply fruits, medicines, bush meat and other food stuffs (Lomax 2008; Lebbie et al. 2009).  
Forest areas are important for indigenous agricultural systems since they are cleared for the 
cultivation of rice and the production of other food staples.  Forests are also of great cultural 
meaning to Liberians.  For example, Sande and Poro secret societies ritualize and conduct 
rites of passage in particular forest groves. Liberia lies within in the Upper Guinea Forest 
Ecosystem, which sits in parts of seven West African countries.  It contains by far the largest 
contiguous blocks of the Upper Guinea rainforest belt representing between 40 and 50 
percent of the remaining forest cover (Blundell 2003; UNEP 2004).  An estimated 80 percent 
of the country is forested, with about 35 percent "undisturbed" rainforest (UNEP 2004, 44-
45).  The remainder of the country's forests is regenerating wooded areas or land used in 
shifting agricultural cultivation.110
 Liberia is located in the proximity of early trading routes that helped to shape the 
relationship between society and forests (Richards 1996).  First, the area was heavily 
influenced by the regional and European trade in forest products including wood, gold, ivory, 
spices, dyes, nuts and beeswax.  The slave trade also had a tremendous impact on the region.  
Second, the relationship between the people, land and forests changed forever with the arrival 
  At least 55 percent of the population resides in forested 
areas and nearly all of the people depend on charcoal and firewood for energy (UNEP 2004).  
Liberia's forests are fundamental to local livelihoods and cultural systems as well as an 
important global commodity.  More recently, Liberia's forests have emerged as globally 
significant for biodiversity and climate change.   
                                                 
 
110 Shifting cultivation is a farming system in which land is cultivated rotationally to maintain 
productivity. In Liberia, patches of forests or wooded areas are cleared every few seasons to plant rice 





of the first settlers from the United States.  The ACS attempted to purchase land from the 
indigenous population-- which was unknown and taboo--and brought with them a set of rules 
that included rights of individuals to own land.  Traditionally, forests were managed by 
"customary land tenure", which is an indigenous system for "acquiring, holding and 
regulating land" (Wily 2007, 104).  Such tenure arrangements are generally governed 
collectively by communities or in some instances by ruling lineages. According to Wily 
(2007, 104), customary tenure  is generally an agrarian and community-based  practice--
although contrary to the conventional wisdom--it is not static but shifts along with 
communities and changing environment and land pressures.   
 Wily (2007, 73) notes that by the 1850s the foundation of Liberia's land laws were in 
place and  the institutionalization of new ownership regimes fundamentally made the 
indigenous people "tenets of the state on government land".  In the early 20th century, state 
policy toward land and the indigenous population began to shift as a result of indirect rule 
and the growing interests in "developing" and "governing" the hinterland.  For instance, in 
1904-1905, changes to land policy mandated that allotments of public land could be owned 
by indigenous people as long as they become "civilized" (Wily 2007, 110).   The "civilized" 
among the population, of course, were generally indigenous elites or traditional leaders 
courted by the government through indirect rule. Despite slight alterations in law over time, 
however, almost every conflict in Liberia has deep roots in competition over land and 
resources fundamentally because the rules that govern them have always been "diametrically 
opposed" (Levitt 2005, 86).  The rules in question conferred on a certain group--primarily 
"Americo-Liberians"--the right to individual land ownership while forcing a vast majority of 
the population to remain under unfair land arrangements dominated by customary authorities 
or government officials.  In short, oligarchic and oppressive state--using a policy of coercion 
and cooptation of traditional rulers to maintain order--established unfair land ownership and 





 Between the 1920s and the 1950s, the government proclaimed--via the Hinterland 
Laws---that property in the periphery belongs to the "respective tribes, irrespective of 
whether or not they acquire and hold official deeds describing those areas"--the authority 
resting with the traditional chiefs and transferable to collective holdings with the permission 
of the state (Wily 2007, 114). These laws provided for "collective legal ownership" to 
indigenous peoples--laws that have not been found before or since anywhere on the continent 
(Wily 2007).  These laws endowed the state with "territorial title" but allowed for Liberian 
citizens to purchase land from the indigenous groups so long as it was done with the consent 
of traditional chief--who is the custodian of the land (Wily 2007).  These laws were 
progressive but did little to alter the underlying structure of land ownership.  Regardless, 
changes to the laws in 1956 led to all but locked-in the power of the oligarchy through a 
"silent land theft at a considerable scale" (Wily 2007, 121).  By changing a few words--from 
"right and title to land" to "right of use and possession of the land"--the Liberian state 
rendered the indigenous population "occupants and users" of land and forests and endowed 
the state with sole ownership (Wily 2007, 121).  The new laws considered for the first time 
"property"--defined as lands that were "owned individually and registered with the state--
produced a market by which those with money could buy land from the poor (Wily 2007, 
123).  The result was the further consolidation and control of the land by political elites.   
 While Firestone's extensive rubber concession's initiated the "Concession Era" in 
Liberia, changes to land laws and regulations corresponded to Tubman's "Open Door Policy", 
which sought to open up the country to international business interests for the production of 
agricultural products, iron ore, gold and timber.  Although foreign entities cannot own land, 
the granting of rights to public and private land is permitted and the state has the authority to 
"lease any portion...of public lands...to any foreign individual,  corporation or company for 
engaging in agricultural, mercantile, or mining operations" (Sawyer 1992, 244). While 





economic domination of the Liberian economy (Sawyer 1992).  The policy worked to wean 
Liberia from a reliance on Firestone by attracting numerous business investments in iron ore, 
agriculture and timber.  International companies could now more easily lease land by 
obtaining long-term concessionary rights, contracts and agreements but generally at less than 
optimal terms for the state.  The "Christie concession" handed an 80-year concession to the 
Liberia Mining Company in 1945 but at the extremely low rate of five cents per ton of ore 
(Alao, Mackinlay and Olonisaki 1999, 17).  Such arrangements failed to spur economic 
development (although those in power got rich) and increased competition for land.  As 
Sawyer (1992, 244) notes since the 1950s, "the strategy of undertaking economic 
development through concessionary agreements to foreign entities has...been contested in 
Liberian society".  
 Liberia's forests have undergone a gradual process of forest conversion, in contrast to 
neighboring countries--like Sierra Leone-- where the timber sector has been active for a 
century (Richards 1996).111   However, beginning in the early 1960s, commercial timber 
operations began in many parts of the hinterland (Clower et al. 1966).112  A survey of forests 
in 1951 showed that almost 60 percent of Liberia as covered in closed-canopy rainforest, of 
which an estimated 40 percent was unlogged.  But by 1968 undisturbed areas of the forest 
had been reduced to about 25 percent (Parren and de Graaf 1995).  While not as profitable or 
labor intensive as iron ore or rubber industries timber emerged as a vital part of Liberia's 
economy and generated thousands of jobs (Clower et al. 1966).113
                                                 
 
111 Sierra Leone's timber was reduced significantly in the early 20th century (Richards 1996).  
  Throughout the 1970s, 
there was a "timber boom" as production increased as a percentage of GDP and rose five-fold 
as a percent of Liberia's exports (Dunn and Tarr 1988, 132-142).  In addition, the value of 
timber rose from an estimated $32 million in 1976 to $72 million in 1980 (even as volumes 
112 The Forest Act creates Bureau of Forest Conservation to manage forest areas.  





declined) making up about 10 percent of foreign exchange (FAO 1984, 3-6).  By 1980 
official figures estimated that the largest 20 forest concessions encompassed nearly 20 
percent of Liberia's land area (Reno 1998, 83).  The government and international actors 
largely viewed the 1960s-1970s as a time of "social stability and economic progress" (NTGL 
2005, 24).  The only problem, of course, was that the benefits accumulated to a small group 
of landowners, foreign investors and elites that left most of the country underdeveloped and a 
large segment of the population disenchanted.  As Clower et al. (1966) suggested such 
outcomes can be attributed to an importunate system in-place to benefit the leaders of the 
state while incentivizing even further the consolidation of state power.  The long-term 
consequence of such resentment and resistance being the contested notion that the Liberian 
state--as opposed to traditional rulers or rural communities--are actually the "authority" or 
"master of the land" (Sawyer 1992, 242).   
 Concerns about the pace of "rational forestry" led to greater attention to conservation 
during the 1960s-1980s.114
                                                 
 
114 Perhaps foreseeing a general trend toward an industrial forest sector, Forest Laws were passed in 
1953. The objectives of the laws were to: "establish a permanent forest estate, made of reserved areas, 
upon which scientific forestry will be practiced" and "stop needless waste and destruction...bring about 
the profitable harvesting of all forest products while assuring...products are perpetual" (GoL 1953, 3).  
The law was the first in Liberia's history to address conservation values and established the Bureau of 
Forest Conservation to undertake forest inventories.  The law also granted the Liberian President the 
authority to establish forest reserves, national parks and communal forests (GoL 1953).  The law was 
supplemented in 1957 to provide guidance on the issuing of forest permits and concessions, the 
collection of revenues and receipts, and management of wildlife resources (GoL 1957).  In spite of the 
emphasis on conservation, the priority was on developing the forestry sector for the "permanent good 
of the whole people"(GoL 1953). 
  Ten national forests were established during the 1960s to "protect 
both forests and wildlife"--although they may have been "protected in name only" as 
agriculture and forest concessions reduced forest areas and hunting decimated wildlife 
(Verschuren 1983).  During the 1970s, the effects of "slash and burn" agriculture and the 
protection of large mammals were the central concerns over time there was a "mounting 
awareness of the negative effects of the international timber trade" (Kolk 1996, 245). The 





blocks of forests as nature reserves, parks and wildlife areas. In 1980, the World 
Conservation Strategy  labeled Liberia's forests as "essential" for worldwide conservation 
goals and it was listed as a priority country under the Worldwide Fund for Wildlife's (WWF) 
tropical rainforest campaign (IUCN 1980).115  Despite, or perhaps because of the "timber 
boom" of the 1970s-1980s, conservation gained momentum even as the political situation 
under Tolbert and Doe deteriorated.  A report by the International Union for the Conservation 
of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) and the WWF titled the "Conservation of Tropical 
Rainforest in Liberia" was hopeful that the "great interest in conservation shown by the 
highest authorities of Liberia will allow for the forest ecosystem in Liberia to be saved before 
it is too late" (Verschuren 1983, 6).116
 By the time Samuel Doe took power, the global economy was contracting, which led 
to decreasing timber production.  Despite economic decline, the forest sector remained an 
important part of the economy contributing about 5 percent to GDP and exports totaling $36 
million in 1981-1982 (FAO 1984).  The Doe regime, like Tubman and Tolbert 
administrations, continued to grant large concessions to timber companies.  Verschuren 
(1983, 7) noted that by 1983 all primary and (old) secondary growth forests--or 
approximately 50 percent of the country--was part of a concession.  What went unnoticed was 
the extent to which the timber sector, and other natural resources sectors, had been captured 
by the state (e.g., Tubman, Tolbert and Doe), and foreign investors (Reno 1998).  Beginning 
in the 1960s, foreign domination of the Liberian economy, which greatly expanded the 
provision of property rights and concessionary agreements allowed local leaders and political 
elites to acquire wealth through business relationships, and then to distribute that wealth 
   
                                                 
 
115 Liberian forestry was perceived to have strong forest management, which was strengthened by the 
creation of the Forest Development Authority (FDA) in 1976. 
116 In closing, the report stressed the need to establish national parks, and responding to such call, Sapo 






through patronage networks to gain and maintain support.    Not only is patronage essential 
for political power--and financially dependent on natural resource revenues--but patronage 
thrives where agreements and concessions can arranged without any transparency or 
accountability.       
 To help maintain power Doe set out separate forest resources--and their substantial 
revenues--from formal state institutions and the national economy.  Doe promoted 
commercial alliances with timber companies, granted concessions to friends and channeled 
the rents into networks of patronage that bought political support. For example, Doe granted 
the largest timber contract in West Africa to an Israeli firm--and to make this happen 
appointed himself the managing director of Liberia's Forest Development Authority.  
Liberian presidents, and political and business elites, have long consolidated state power over 
natural resources to manipulate contracts and expropriate rents for political purposes.  
However, Doe shifted away from a policy based on access to state power and toward contacts 
with more fragmented and informal networks of power (Reno 1998). The result was a decline 
in state expenditures and the weakening of state institutions, public resentment, and the 
emergence of new opponents that could challenge Doe for power.117
International Peacebuilders and the Emergence of "Conflict 
Forests" 
  Another dimension that 
was not a matter of concern until much later was the willingness of timber companies to trade 
weapons and military assistance in exchange for agreements and concessions (Reno 1998).  
What is significant about these developments is that after the Liberian conflict began Charles 
Taylor "found that he could tap...timber operations to fund military operations" in exchange 
for the protection of timber companies themselves (Reno 1998, 95).  
 
                                                 
 
117 To reiterate an important point, structural adjustment policies of the IFIs also weakened the state by 





As ECOMOG and interim government established order in Monrovia, Taylor and the NPFL 
maintained control of "Greater Liberia" that includes vast stretches of tropical forest.  These 
forests--along with other natural resources--not only provided rebel groups with a safe haven 
but provided Taylor with economic control of Liberia's natural resources.118
 Foreign companies knowingly contributed to Liberia's "war economy" but the 
international consensus was that commercial activities were on balance beneficial--or at the 
very least tolerable--because free trade was not to be regulated.  As Crossin, Hayman and 
Taylor (2003) note, there has always been a historical reluctance among consuming countries 
to control the trade in legal commodities such as timber.  To reiterate: foreign businesses had 
long made deals with nefarious political elites in Liberia with varying degrees of authority 
and legitimacy over natural resource concessions and contracts.  The difference in the early 
part of the Liberian conflict was that Taylor was not the leader of a sovereign state but an" 
 Scores of 
industries fled the country after fighting started but "not all investors shunned Liberia" 
(Johnston 2004, 443).  With command over major ports and roads, Greater Liberia was stable 
enough for many foreign business interests that took advantage of the "stateless" situation. 
Taylor granted numerous and extensive timber concessions.  Ivorian timber companies--who 
logged out domestic supplies--gained access to the vast forests of Nimba County.  European 
logging firms from France, Italy, Israel, Netherlands and Thailand also established 
themselves in Greater Liberia. Between 1991 and 1992, Taylor exported about 343,000 
hectares of timber to Europe alone.  In fact, France's second biggest supplier of timber and 
wood products in 1991--estimated at $19 million--was Liberia (read: Greater Liberia) (Ellis 
1999, 165; Global Witness 2002, 12).   
                                                 
 
118 As mentioned in the previous section, the realization that natural resource operations could 
operation outside of the formal state institutions and fund military operations probably started under 





un-sovereign"--albeit in control of vast resources.  As Reno (1998, 107) noted perceptively, 
"the sovereign state was challenged as the primary reservoir of rewards".   
 The fact that timber activities carried out by Taylor in Greater Liberia were conduits 
for criminal activity, human abuses, environmental destruction and weapons trafficking was 
widely acknowledged by the population.119  Even though Taylor formed a "shadow FDA", a 
lack of sustainable management led to the destruction of as much as 2.5 million hectares of 
forest in Greater Liberia between 1990 and 1995 (UNEP 2004).120  Fighting also occurred in 
and around forest areas leading to the displacement of tens of thousands and the forcing the 
conscription of people in forest communities, including children. The fighting also placed 
large areas of forests off limits, which drastically reduced the amount of land under 
cultivation and undermined the ability of forests to support livelihoods.  Parren and de Graaf 
(1995) suggested that the commercial timber operations were fuelling the war and destroying 
forest reserves. The issue, however, got little, if any, attention from international 
peacebuilders, and was tolerated and accepted by Western governments. 121
 Following the elections, Taylor was emboldened as the president of a sovereign 
country to consolidate state control and authority over the formal economy, including 
Liberia's natural resources.   The Strategic Commodities Act of 1999 gave the president the 
sole authority to "execute, negotiate and conclude all commercial contracts or agreements 
with any foreign or domestic investor" (GoL 1999).
   
122
                                                 
 
119 Taylor exerted his influence in other ways as well decreeing a minimum wage of two dollars a day 
for those working in the timber industry--a substantial increase from before the conflict (Ellis1999, 
92).   
  Greenpeace (2001, 5) stated that the 
Act made Taylor "the sole beneficiary of all revenue obtained, with a total contempt for 
economic and social well-being of his country."  Activists and civil society actors in Liberia 
120 Key scientific data and reports were destroyed as buildings were looted and destroyed. 
121 In addition, a French journalist accused the French government of contributing to the war (see Reno 
1998). 
122 Strategic commodities were defined as all mineral resources, all natural forest resources, all unique 





argued that the law was unconstitutional even as Liberian officials "defended the law on the 
basis that the economy had always been controlled this way", and was a matter of national 
security (Liberian Post 2002).  A new National Forestry Law similarly "declared that all 
forest resources are the property of the government except for communal and privately 
owned" plantations and empowered the FDA to collect fees and manage logging concessions 
(GoL 2000).123  This more prominent role for the FDA was suspect given that Charles 
Taylor's brother was its executive director and another close associates sat on its board of 
directors (Global Witness 2001a).124
 After Taylor became president--during a brief period of relative stability--activists 
and journalists began t investigate reports that the "looting spree", which characterized the 
first seven years of the conflict, was continuing under Taylor's Presidency (Perspective 
2000).  What they found was that timber companies-- under the supervision of the Taylor 
government--had destroyed homes, constructed roads through communities and sacred areas, 
harassed women and arrested and beat villagers. The abuses were carried out by private 
militias and government security forces working on behalf of timber companies.  They also 
accused timber companies of logging illegally and in an environmentally unsustainable 
manner without any benefits accruing to communities.  There was also evidence that the 
profits from the timber industry were paying for weapons shipments that were contributing to 
the conflict in Sierra Leone and activists procured documents to link specific timber 
companies to arms smuggling in defiance of UN sanctions (on arms shipments).  IBOs, 
however, were relatively indifferent with Taylor's consolidation of power over natural 
 
                                                 
 
123 This law remains controversial since the final printed version was reportedly altered at the last 
minute from the version debated and agreed to by the Liberian legislature (see Laws and Regulations 
related to forestry in Liberia).   
124 Two on the FDA's board of directors were known to be involved in the diamond trade in Sierra 





resources or the exploitation of Liberian timber--so long as full-scale conflict did not resume 
in Liberia.  
 With regards to Liberia, IBOs remained overwhelmingly concerned with the role of 
diamonds--not timber--in fueling the conflict in neighboring Sierra Leone.  Charles Taylor 
was accused of organizing rebels in Sierra Leone and directly controlling that country's 
plentiful rough diamonds to traffic weapons and launder money (Smillie, Gberie, and 
Hazelton 2000).  A  UN Panel of Experts (2000) found that Sierra Leonean diamonds were 
smuggled through Liberia with the involvement of Liberian officials, and that the diamonds 
revenues were actively fueling the violence. Based on the "unequivocal and overwhelming 
evidence" that the Government of Liberia was actively supporting RUF rebels in Sierra 
Leone, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1343, which reiterated demands  that 
Taylor cease supporting armed groups in Sierra Leone (UNSC 2001b).  The resolution 
mandated that "all States shall take the necessary steps to prevent the direct or indirect import 
of all rough diamonds from Liberia, whether or not such diamonds originated in Liberia." 
Despite significant attention to "conflict diamonds", the same panel reported on the linkages 
between Liberia's forests and the conflict in Sierra Leone. 
 
 The principals in Liberia’s timber industry are involved in a variety of illicit activities, and 
 large amounts of the proceeds are used to pay for extra-budgetary activities, including the 
 acquisition of weapons. Consideration should be given to placing a temporary embargo on 
 Liberian timber  exports, until Liberia demonstrates convincingly that it is no longer 
 involved in the trafficking of arms to, or diamonds from, Sierra Leone" (UN Panel of 
 Experts 2000, 12). 
  
 Global Witness and other international NGOs used the focus on "conflict diamonds" 





diamonds exposed as fueling conflict in Angola and Sierra Leone but Global Witness made 
their name by drawing attention to the links between the timber trade and the Khmer Rouge 
in Cambodia in 1995.  In January 2001, Global Witness presented evidence before the UN 
Security Council that Liberian President Charles Taylor was now using timber revenue to 
fund the conflict in Sierra Leone (Global Witness 2001b).  Global Witness (2001b, 2) 
suggested that the timber trade had become "more financially valuable" to Charles Taylor 
than the trade in diamonds and " a significant portion of...revenue is used... to train, arm and 
supply the RUF." In fact, Global Witness suggested that because of the sanctions on 
diamonds, Taylor was forced to shift his attention to forests to fund the conflict in Sierra 
Leone and support his own security forces.   Precise figures are uncertain but figures showed 
that the export value of timber in 1999 had increased substantially from the previous year to 
approximately $21 million, with a majority being exported to Europe (Global Witness 2001b, 
5-6).125   Global Witness (2001b) calculated that over 100,000 m² of forests were logged in 
the first three months of 1999 alone with profits between $50 and $70 million.126
  Global Witness pointed the finger at one company in particular--Oriental Timber 
Company (OTC)--which was accused of monopolizing the Liberian timber industry, 
harvesting in an unsustainable manner, and  leaving forests in "crisis" (Global Witness 
2001a).  The UN Panel of Experts (2000, 36) reported that "roads built and maintained for 
   For 
example, timber production in 2000 was estimated to be 934,000 m³, worth a minimum of 
$187 million on international markets, with exports worth about $130 million (Global 
Witness 2001a, 3).  Taking into account production costs, Global Witness calculated that at 
least $100 million was available to split between logging companies, Taylor and other 
patrons.   
                                                 
 
125 The import value was estimated to be much more, approximately $29 million. 
126 Five biggest importers of Liberian timber in 1999 were (Global Witness 2001; Greenpeace 2001): 





timber extraction are conveniently used for weapons movement within Liberia and for the 
onward shipment...to Sierra Leone."  The same report (2000, 36) declared that the chairman 
of the OTC had organized weapon's deals and transferred arms from Monrovia to Sierra 
Leone.127  The OTC was working with Charles Taylor to procure vast amounts of timber and 
operate illegally under Liberian law. A deal between OTC and Taylor was alleged to provide 
the company with the freedom to conduct timber activities, control the Port of Buchanan and 
construct all necessary roads (Global Witness 2001a).128
 Based on this evidence, Global Witness (2001a, 1) recommended that the UN 
Security Council "impose a total embargo on the exportation and transport of Liberian timber, 
and its importation into other countries", which should remain into effect until the trade does 
not contribute to the RUF in Sierra Leone and is carried out in a transparent manner as 
required by UN Security Council Resolution 1306 (UNSC 2000).  Global Witness further 
recommended a detailed investigation into the Liberian timber industry, particularly the 
actions of the Oriental Timber Company to enable the UN and the international community to 
gain a comprehensive understanding of the role of the industry in Liberia and the conflict in 
Sierra Leone (Global Witness 2001a).  The US and Britain also supported sanctions on 
Liberian timber based on growing concern--in the context of 9/11 --that the instability in 
Liberia and West Africa was a threat to developed countries (White House 2002; Duffield 
2001).   
  Accordingly, the OTC paid Taylor 
$5 million in exchange for tax-except status and exclusion from all regulations.    
 But support for sanctions on Liberian timber was not universal. Taylor's government 
argued that it had the sovereign right to exploit its own natural resources without external 
                                                 
 
127 The chairman of the OTC was Gus van Kouwenhoven, 
128 OTC was found by Global Witness (2001) to be clear cutting much more than the 4 percent 
allowable per annum for concessions and without the required reforestation.  OTC, which was also 
required to build roads that would "benefit the people of Liberia" instead, built substandard roads 






intervention, and in any case needed the revenues to defend the country from rebel attacks.129  
The timber industry suggested that sanctions would reduce employment opportunities that 
accrue mostly to the rural population.130 France and China --with the largest financial stake in 
the timber sector--led international efforts to undermine any sanctions regime. China, the 
largest importer of Liberian timber in 2000, hinted at the potential humanitarian costs of such 
an intervention, and France, the second largest importer, argued that such a punitive approach 
is unwarranted given there is no proof of a link between timber and weapons smuggling 
(Global Witness 2001a, 17; Perspective 2001). Global Witness (2001a, 11), argued that while 
the sovereignty argument is the standard in such circumstances, in Liberia "where resources 
are being exploited contrary to Liberian law for the benefit of the elite, not the state or the 
population" such an argument falls flat.  Moreover, those that wish to cite loss of employment 
or humanitarian concerns put off more long-term setbacks for the population.  Given the 
importance of Liberian timber to France and China, the rationale for being against sanctions 
must be weighed against pure self-interest. As one activist stated, "the UNSC must consider 
our call for a moratorium on Liberian timber and respond positively to send a clear signal to 
Taylor that his military adventurism will no longer be tolerated...temporary job losses and 
economic hardship is a small price to pay for sub-regional peace and security" (Global 
Witness 2001a, 4).  Despite support by the US and Britain, the objections from China and 
France the sanctions on timber were tabled by the Security Council.131
 An influential UN Panel of Experts report published pursuant to UN Resolution 1343 
also emphasized the need for sanctions (UN Panel of Experts 2001).   The panel stated that 
 
                                                 
 
129 Reports of demonstrations against UN sanctions went international (see: 
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/africa/12/20/liberia.un.protest.reut/) 
130 For example, the Danish company DLH Nordisk suggested that sanctions would cost Liberia 
100,000 timber related jobs (Global Witness 2001a, 11).  
131 Although a reestablishment of an arms embargo and an embargo on Liberian diamonds and travel 





the United Nations should "impose a ban on all round log exports from Liberia."132 While 
timber production is a source of employment for Liberia and a prime source of revenue for 
the government, it is also a source of "sanctions-busting" (UN Panel of Experts 2001, 15).133 
But another way, revenue from timber concessions was found to be procuring weapons and 
ammunition that perpetuated the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone (UN Panel of Experts 
2001, 13).134
 The Liberian conflict intensified and spread throughout 2002 even as the war in 
neighboring Sierra Leone had been declared over.  Containing the conflict in Liberia was now 
deemed critical to consolidating peace in Sierra Leone.  Even as the UN Security Council was 
reluctant to seriously address a ban on timber exports from Liberia, Global Witness continued 
to press for sanctions.  A report concluded that the Liberian timber industry was both "a 
major driving force behind the threat" to Sierra Leone, and the "lynchpin of the current 
violence and destabilization" in Liberia (Global Witness 2002).  With diamonds exports 
substantially reduced due to the diamond sanctions, the "importance of the timber industry to 
Liberian government's war machine...increased" as did timber exports and revenue--even 
though fighting had hampered the timber industry in certain regions (Global Witness 2002, 6; 
UN Panel of Experts 2002, 33).  While the revenue could have been used to rebuild the 
   
                                                 
 
132 The report, also recommended that the government should reach an agreement with the IMF to 
commission an independent and detailed report on revenues from timber concessions from January 
2001-July 2002.   
133 The report estimates calculate total round log production in 2000 rose to over 900,000 m³, with a 
value of over $60 million.  Log production is believed to be nearly 679,000 m³ for the first half of 2001 
alone (valued at almost $50 million).  However, these figures may be underestimates of real exports by 
as much as 50-200 percent.  Importantly, these figures do not include exports to Cote d'Ivoire.  Total 
revenue for the government in 2000, based on official figures, was somewhere between $6.7 - 13.3 
million although the UN panel suggests it is probably $25 million (UN Panel of Experts 2001, 70-71).  
134 While NGO accounts had focused largely on the nefarious dealings of OTC, who have concessions 
on an estimated 42 percent of Liberia's productive forests and are linked to weapons shipments to 
Sierra Leone (Global Witness 2001a; 2001b; 2001c), the UN Panel of Experts (2001; 2002) focused its 
attention on the company ETTE. The company was run by Leonid Minin who was arrested in Italy in 
2000 on charges of weapons smuggling into Liberia.  According to the panel, Minin had in his 
possession a significant number of documents "showing his involvement in timber but also in the arms 





country, it appears as though much of it went to buy arms.  The OTC was more deeply 
implicated in vast illegal weapons shipments throughout 2002 some of which were likely 
channeled to Sierra Leone and the others were used to arm logging company militias and 
government forces (Global Witness 2002).  Global Witness (2002, 21) continued to press for 
UN sanctions, stating "sanctions on the timber industry are integral to any plan to stop the 
current, unrestrained violence in Liberia, and to prepare the country and West Africa for a 
sustainable future." 
 While Global Witness and other INGOs played a key role in magnifying the 
importance of "conflict timber"135 throughout 2000-2002 by the links between revenue and 
conflict, local organizations such as Save My Future Foundation's (SAMFU), Green 
Advocates and Grand Gedeh Community Servants Association (GECOMSA) were also 
essential conduits of information.136 These organizations detailed the practices of a timber 
industry that were leading to "plunder, deprivation, conflict, discontentment and 
environmental degradation as never before seen in Liberia" (SAMFU 2002, 2).137
                                                 
 
135 Global Witness defined "conflict timber" as timber that is traded at some point in the chain of 
custody by armed groups, be they rebel factions or regular soldiers or by civilian administration 
involved in armed conflict - either to perpetuate conflict or take advantage of conflict situations for 
personal gain (Global Witness 2002, 3).  
  SAMFU's 
Liberian Forest and Human Rights Campaign documented the ways in which timber 
companies destroyed forest areas without any benefit for the Liberian people, undermined 
cultural practices and traditional institutions, and ruined livelihoods of rural people--the 
overwhelming percentage of which "depend on the land and forests for food, clean water, 
medicine and other forest products for survival"  (SAMFU 2002, 7). The deforestation and 
road construction not only has environmental repercussions but also intensified competition 
among the population for dwindling agricultural lands that caused conflict and fueled the 
136 This also included exile political groups such as MDCL who called for timber sanctions in 2002.  
137 Many activists risked life and limp to report information.  At one point, Taylor himself threatened 
with death the authors of a report by SAMFU about the timber sector and Senators were reported to 





bush meat trade by opening up new areas to commercial hunters.138 In addition, to the long-
term consequences of timber operations, SAMFU discussed the social and health impacts of 
makeshift  logging camps on local communities, including a lack of sanitation and clean 
drinking water and the introduction of prostitution, drugs and crime to remote regions 
(SAMFU 2002).139
 Along with International NGOs, these Liberian-based NGOs and activists 
recommended--among other things--a ban on all round log exports, more transparency and 
less corruption in the sector, an end to forest crimes and human rights abuses perpetrated by 
the timber industry against communities and more protection for protected forests and 
biodiversity.  Since 2000, the profile of conflict timber and its role in the Liberian conflict 
had grown exponentially.  This was partially because images of the Liberian conflict were 
being transmitted around the world, the war in Sierra Leone was fragile but holding, and 
Global Witness and other international NGOs has been successful at publicizing the issues of 
conflict resources. UN lobbying efforts starting to have an effect as the UN Security Council 
passed Resolution 1408 calling for the government "take urgent steps, including the 
establishment of a transparent and internationally verifiable audit regimes, to ensure that 
derived...from the Liberian timber industry is used for legitimate social, humanitarian and 
development purposes" (UNSC 2002).   
  Finally, SAMFU argued that while foreign businessmen and government 
officials got rich, local people got deceived, harassed and further impoverished.  As one 
person put it in 2002, "OTC is extracting natural resources leaving behind nothing but 
sickness, hunger, poverty and poor welfare" (SAMFU 2002, 7). 
  By late 2002 and early 2003, shipping information was linking countries to Liberian 
timber-- making things uncomfortable in European capitals.  British Waterways, for example, 
                                                 
 
138 The report notes that while local people have had to rely more on protein from bush meat, to a large 
extent the market is dominated by foreign hunters with international markets.   
139 The reports tells of unsanitary bush camps set up next to creeks and streams  from which rural 





a government agency tasked with restoring the Avon Canal, was accused of purchasing 
"conflict timber" from Liberia and the Dutch firm DLH was accused of illegal activities 
(Global Witness 2002, 14).  Moreover, Global Witness continued to provide evidence of 
illegal arms shipments linked to Liberian timber against UN Security Council resolutions that 
had the potential to destabilize Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire.  These claims were 
substantiated by UN Panel of Experts (2003a), which documented shipments of arms into 
Liberia from OTC or other timber companies.  The panel reported that while the government 
had begun an auditing of the forestry sector for transparency and accountability, which was 
required by resolution 1408, the integrity of the process was suspect.  Based on these 
findings, and a history of non-compliance, the Security Council passed Resolution 1478 in 
May 2003.  This resolution, for the first time, placed timber sanction on a country.  The 
sanctions demanded that "all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, for a period 
of 10 months, the import into their territories of all round logs and timber products 
originating in Liberia" (UNSC 2003a).   In a nod to countries that disagreed with the need for 
sanctions, the UN decided that the sanctions would come into force on July 7, 2003, "unless 
the Council decides otherwise" (UNSC 2003a, 4).   
 Sanctions entered into force in July 2003 but the conflict had intensified to the point 
that most timber companies had ceased operations.  While the warring parties in Liberia, 
including the government, MODEL and LURD, all requested that timber operations be able 
to continue, sanctions remained in force. While the effects of the timber industry were well 
known, a UN Panel of Experts (2003b) offered recommendations for the sector's future.  It 
found that the sanctions most obvious benefit would be that armed State and non-state actors 
would be deprived of revenue and violations of human rights would decrease as would the 
overharvesting of forests (UN Panel of Experts 2003b, 7).  Even though the sanctions may be 
related to a "reduction in export income and employment" that may have "consequences for 





be...overshadowed by the negative effects of the civil war" (UN Panel of Experts 2003b, 7).  
The panel declared that a ban on all commercial activities in the extractive sector should 
remain in place until "peace and stability are restored and good governance in established" 
(UN Panel of Experts 2003b, 7 and 31-34).  The panel also recommended significant reform 
of forest governance to ensure that the sector is "participatory, transparent, accountable, 
effective and equitable and that promote the rule of law" (UN Panel of Experts 2003b, 26-
30).  In other words, any forestry sector reform must involve a broad segment of the 
population and benefit all of Liberian society; require opening the sector to public scrutiny 
and monitoring; and improve oversight and enforcement of the sector in concert with 
Liberian law and regulation.  And finally, the panel stressed the importance of "getting the 
conditions right" to resume logging. Given the failure of the sector, "the Security Council 
should maintain the timber ban until governance in Liberia is improved... [and] these 
conditions will not be met under the current regime" (UN Panel of Experts 2003b, 26).      
Conclusion 
As mentioned at the outset, the dominant explanation for the Liberian conflict--particularly 
among IBOs--still centers on economic motives of combatants and the role valuable natural 
resources--including "blood forests"--played in fueling the 14-year civil war.  Liberia is still 
the prime example of a "new war" fought over forests and their revenues (de Jong, Donovan 
and Ken-Ichi 2007).  This is the case despite considerable evidence that the conflict 
represents continuation and manifestation of historical grievances linked to an oppressive 
government, unfair land practices and underdevelopment; political conflict and competition 
for power.  Forests and the control of forests and land in particular, have always been a 
source of grievance and resistance among the population and is not purely a feature of 
contemporary civil conflicts.  To focus exclusively on economic motives of Taylor or the 





and economic dimensions to achieving power are linked via systems of patronage. Taylor's 
motives were in essence political and involved the looting the country's resources, including 
forests--in much the same way as Doe and those before him.    
 This is important for several reasons that will be discussed in Chapter 5. The point is 
that despite ambiguity in the literature linking the environment and natural resources to civil 
conflict and the nuanced relationship between Liberia's forests and conflict discussed in this 
chapter, international peacebuilding organizations have framed the issue in terms of "blood 
timber".  This stems from the accounts of Charles Taylor awarding concessions and trading 
timber in exchange for weapons that destabilized the region and threatened international 
security.  The overarching perception, then, among IBOs has been that because of a lack of 
control and inadequate governance over Liberia's forests, the revenue went into the hands of 
rebels and a corrupt government in ways that fueled civil war rather than toward the 
economic development of the country.  This may be an overly one-dimensional analysis but 
the solution is simple: transform Liberia's "conflict resources" (e.g. conflict timber) into 
"peace resources" (e.g., peace timber) so as to help mitigate conflict and consolidate peace. I 
show in the next chapter that IBOs attempt to do just that by promoting and establishing 
reforms and policies aimed at what I call "securitizing" and "marketizing" Liberia's forests. 
But questions remain: What are the effects of these reforms and policies? To what degree do 














Following the Accra Accords and the subsequent Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), 
conditions began to improve for a majority of the Liberian population as a result of the 
deployment of 15,000 international peacekeepers that opened up areas for humanitarian 
assistance, enabled the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of 
combatants to commence and allowed people to return to their homes and communities.  But 
considerable challenges remained.  The conflict that killed between 50,000 and 200,000 
people vastly disrupted the lives and livelihoods of the population with 90 percent having 
been displaced (Ellis 1999, 312-316).  A country that before the war had high rates of poverty 
and difficulty meeting the basic needs was made significantly worse, particularly in rural 
areas.  The conflict destroyed infrastructure, including bridges, roads, government buildings, 
hospitals, schools, universities and electric and water facilities.140
                                                 
 
140 An estimated 70 percent of all school buildings were destroyed with most youth spending little or 
no time at school over the course of the conflict. 
 The destruction was 
accompanied by the exodus of skilled workers and resulted in the collapse of "social, 
political, economic and traditional governances systems" (IMF 2008).  The formal economy 
was literally destroyed.  Between 1987 and 1995, Liberia's GDP fell by 90 percent 
precipitating one of the largest economic collapses ever (IMF 2008, 15).  By the time the 





among the poorest in the world with over three quarters of the population living in absolute 
poverty (IMF 2008).141
  Despite these challenges, however, there was optimism that the transitional 
government with the support, assistance and oversight of international peacebuilding 
organizations would help move the country from "conflict to development".  A framework 
was devised to advance "Liberia's transition from conflict to peace and stability, and from 
relief...to development" that included reforms in the clusters of security; good governance 
and democratic development; elections; basic services, restoration of productive capacity; 
infrastructure; economic policy and development  (NTGL 2005, 25).  At the same time, 
addressing the issue of "conflict forests" was peacebuilding priority.  As the preceding 
chapter highlighted, international peacebuilding organizations came to understand the 
problem in terms of timber and timber concessions being traded in exchange for weapons, 
which destabilized the region and threatened international security.  To reiterate, the 
predominant peacebuilding challenge for IBOs was to establish robust state control over 
forests, and improve governance so as to reduce the prospect for conflict relapse and support 
economic recovery.  In short, IBOs endeavor to transform "conflict resources" into "peace 
resources" for the purpose of establishing a stable and lasting peace. 
   
 This chapter details the step-by-step efforts by international peacebuilding 
organizations to alter the "rules of the game" that govern Liberia's forests between 2003 and 
2009.  In the first part of the chapter, trace the reform process, which is manifest in new 
policies, laws, regulations, and practices but culminates in the passing of the National 
Forestry Reform Law (NFRL).  I suggest that IBOs by-and-large promote and help establish 
reforms and policies aimed at "securitizing" and "marketizing" Liberia's forests for the 
purpose of transforming "conflict timber" into "peace timber".  In the second part of the 
                                                 
 
141 Absolute poverty is living on less than $1 per day; extreme poverty living on less than $.50 per day 





chapter, I examine the effects and consequences of the forest reform process, and argue that, 
if anything, they have engendered an unexpected period of contention and resistance.   
Forest Reform: From Security to Global Markets 
 
As just noted, this section charts in some detail the extensive efforts by IBOs to transform 
Liberia's "conflict forests" into "peace forests".  In doing so, I trace the reform process--
including new policies, laws, regulations and practices--which in some sense culminates with 
the passing of a comprehensive forest reform law.  I argue that the reforms and policies aimed 
to "securitize" and "marketize" Liberia's forests.  By "securitization", I mean establishing and 
consolidating state control and authority over forests and instituting good governance 
measures.  By "marketization", I mean promoting the conditions that allow forests to generate 
revenue to support economic growth, alleviate poverty and supply state revenue.   
IBOs and the argument for forest reform 
 Discussions about the future of Liberia's forest sector began almost immediately after 
the end of hostilities.  Since UN sanctions were to be reviewed and a donor's conference held, 
the US government insisted that the transitional government create a committee to oversee 
forest reform.  The 'Committee to Review Sanctions on Logs and Timber Trade' was formed 
in December 2003 with the objective of developing actions and recommendations to get the 
sanctions lifted "in a timely manner so that sector operations can begin" (NTGL 2003, 2).  
The committee stated that new forest reform should ensure "the full benefits of the logging 
and timber sector accrue to the Liberian people and ...undertaken in a manner consistent with 
internationally-accepted environmental standards" (NTGL 2003, 2).   
 Shortly thereafter, the committee, with considerable assistance from the US, 
produced a "roadmap" for reforming the forest sector (NTGL 2003). The roadmap recognized 





acknowledged the role of the timber in supporting armed groups and destabilizing the region, 
and the impact conflict took on environmental management.  A majority of the roadmap was 
focused on getting the sanctions lifted.  It stressed the effects of sanctions on the economy 
and local employment pointing out that the forest sector contributed more than half of foreign 
exchange, earned the government $20 million in taxes and employed 6,000-7,000 people with 
an average salary between $800 and $1,000 per year during the late 1990s (NTGL 2003, 3).  
The roadmap argued that UN sanctions might keep intact forest cover and protect the 
environment--which was important to conservationists and environmentalists--but the 
prohibition on timber exports would have a prolonged negative impact on Liberia's the 
economy.   
 Without providing details, the roadmap called for transparent and accountable 
systems of managing, maintaining and disbursing forest revenues and carrying out 
conservation activities when timber operations begin (NTGL 2003).  Echoing Global Witness 
and the UN Expert Panel, the roadmap also sought to review all timber concessions and 
agreements to determine their legitimacy and verify whether logging was occurring legally in 
concession areas.  All in all, however, the roadmap suggested that forest policy--and a large 
majority of the staff working for the Forest Development Authority (FDA)--was "solid" 
(NTGL 2003).  While the roadmap suggested that "broader reform efforts of governance, 
financial management and equitable use of natural resources", the solution to restoring state 
authority and legitimacy to the forest sector, and regulating and managing forests more 
broadly, was to rapidly rebuild the capacity of the FDA through better staff compensation, 
training, transportation and facilities (NTGL 2003).  The US largely agreed with the 
assessment, concluding that "problems with the forest sector were due more to Liberia's 
inability to enforce existing rules and regulations due to a lack of will and capacity; rather 
than from fundamental problems with the rules and regulations themselves" (McAlpine, O' 





 Despite the roadmap, the UN Security Council expressed serious concerns about 
"illegal exploitation of natural resources such as diamonds and timber...and trafficking in 
illegal arms" documented by the Panel of Experts (UN Panel of Experts 2003b).  
Consequently, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1521; confirming the ban on 
Liberian timber and requiring further conditionalities.  The transitional government was 
required to "establish its full authority and control over timber producing areas, and to take all 
necessary steps to ensure that government revenues from the Liberian timber industry are not 
used to fuel conflict or otherwise in violation of the Council's resolutions but are used for the 
legitimate purposes for the benefit of the Liberian people, including development" (UNSC 
2003b, 4).142
 Using the Liberian committee report as a basis for discussion, a "stakeholder 
roundtable" composed of   international peacebuilding organizations, was assembled by the 
US. The reason was first, and foremost, to arrive at a general consensus among peacebuilders 
about the need for reform.  Despite UN sanctions on Liberian timber exports, the forestry 
issue was only added to the donor's conference agenda after US persistence.  The World Bank 
had to be convinced that forest governance was a serious peacebuilding priority and the 
European Union suggested that large-scale reforms might be premature without first 
undertaking robust inventories and assessments.  The US, on the other hand, argued 
forcefully that despite the peace agreement and sanctions, forests posed a continued threat to 
  The resolution demanded that forest reforms should include "oversight 
mechanisms for the timber industry that will promote responsible business practices and 
...establish transparent accounting and auditing mechanisms to ensure that all government 
revenues ...are not used to fuel conflict (UNSC 2003b, 4). Citing the threat of Liberia's forests 
to international and regional security, the resolution determined that only if the conditions in 
Resolution 1521 were met could the sanctions be lifted.   
                                                 
 
142 Realizing the lack of NTGL authority the resolution urged all parties to the CPA not to "hinder the 





both Liberian peace and international security.  First, the government lacked control of forest 
areas, leaving them open to continued mismanagement and the misappropriation of revenue 
that could reignite conflict.  Second, the conflict destroyed any genuine forest governance 
structures that existed before the conflict, opening up the possibility that local, national or 
international actors would try to seize forest assets. Third, Liberia's forests were essential for 
peacebuilding since the demand for state revenue to fund reconstruction and basic services 
was only going to increase.  In short, the US argued that Liberia's long-term prospects for 
peace depended on its forest resources since they could act as an engine for economic 
recovery, poverty alleviation and employment.   
 A consensus did emerge among key international peacebuilding organizations under 
the leadership of the US government--not coincidently the largest unilateral donor to Liberia 
and after 9/11 the country most concerned with the problem of failed states--that deep and 
significant reforms needed to be undertaken before sanctions could be lifted.  As a member of 
an international organization stated, "international [peacebuilders] played an expansive role 
in constructing reforms, policies and values of forests" (Interview 1).  Peacebuilders came to 
realize that UN sanctions provided a "window of opportunity" for forest reform that would be 
short-lived since pressure would rapidly mount to reopen the timber industry to generate 
revenue for the country's peacebuilding priorities (Blundell 2003, 4). Timely reforms were 
desirable to ensure  the Liberian government established "immediate control of the forests"  
because "a majority of countries recovering from war return to war when revenue from 
natural resources is  misappropriated by combatants to resume fighting" (Blundell 2003, 4).  
The reforms also protected the international community's peacebuilding investment by 
ensuring against the return of "conflict timber" (Blundell 2003).   
 The roundtable also served generate a shared understanding on the types of reforms 
and policies that would meet UN obligations under Resolution 1521, and assist in 





transitional government's roadmap provided only broad recommendations so the roundtable 
served to provide forest reform specifics.  Five critical domains were identified: regulatory 
reform; revenue reform; concession review; inventory and parks (see Table 4).     
 




Establishment a centralized collection agency to ensure 
transparency of timber revenue; a review and 
publication of all fees and taxation schedules; a full 




Appointing a new FDA Board of Directors; empowering 
Liberia's Environmental Protection Agency143
 
; 
supporting independent monitoring of the FDA by 
Liberian civil society and NGOs; rearranging the FDA's 
management structure; building capacity of FDA staff 
 
Concession 
Identify legal and illegal concessionaires through a 
process that would require timber companies to produce 
evidence of ownership; incorporate a review of forest 
contracts; harmonize concession and contracts with 
international agreements and practices 
Inventory Inventory all of country's forest areas144
Parks 
   
Review and develop management plans 
 
 
Table 4: Liberia Stakeholder Roundtable Forest Reforms (Adapted from Blundell 2003). 
                                                 
 
143 Liberia's EPA was created in 2002 by the Taylor government although it was not functional per se 
until 2004.   





An increased role for IBOs in the forest reform process 
 Despite consensus among international peacebuilders, the US government took a lead 
role. The US designated $4 million toward reform from a package of nearly $500 million 
allocated for humanitarian efforts, governance reforms and support of the UNMIL 
peacekeeping force. This did not include $1 million given by the US State Department to the 
US Forest Service (USFS) to lead the rebuilding of the commercial sector, $1 million 
awarded to the INGO Conservation International for leading protected areas and conservation 
activities, or funds given to the Centre for International Forestry Research and the World 
Agroforestry Centre to adopt community forestry initiatives (McAlpine, O' Donohue and 
Pierson 2006, 84).  Beyond the financial support, the US Department of State145
 The stated objectives of LFI, characterized as a partnership between the Government 
of Liberia was to "support the rehabilitation and reform of Liberia's forest sector" and 
"enhance cooperation and coordination of activities in Liberia" for the promotion of 
sustainable forest management (LFI 2004).   LFI's role was to "promote and assist reforms 
that will allow for transparent management of forest resources and ... ensure that these 
resources are used for the benefit of the Liberian people" (LFI 2004).  While LFI did 
recognized the multiple uses of Liberia's forests, there was an emphasis placed on reforms 
 --with the 
help of US Agency for International Development (USAID) and USFS--created a "cross-
cutting" initiative referred to as the Liberia Forest Initiative (LFI) to lead the forest reform 
process.  US agencies and Conservation International were joined in LFI by an array of 
international peacebuilders, including the World Bank, IUCN, European Community, FAO, 
IMF, Flora and Fauna International, UN Environment Programme, Environmental Law 
Institute, and CIFOR.    
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and policies that would meet the conditions of UN sanctions, and lead to the return of large-
scale timber activities (McAlpine, O' Donohue and Pierson 2006).  In short, LFI intervened to 
help reduce the threat of forest conflict, and rebuild a sustainable timber sector that could 
provide "a revenue stream and jobs" (Interview 1).  A key task of LFI was to assist the 
government in establishing authority and control over forests resources by rebuilding the 
capacity of the FDA and improving revenue management and accountability (McAlpine, O' 
Donohue and Pierson 2006).   
 Although the FDA was non-functional and no substantive changes were made in 
forest sector governance, the transitional government continued to lobby the UN to have 
sanctions lifted. Based on an IMF analysis indicating poor to stagnant economic prospects for 
Liberia, the government emphasized the need to generate income for the economy, create 
employment and encourage foreign direct investment (IMF 2004; 2007).  This position was 
supported by the UNMIL peacekeeping force, which argued for a lifting of sanctions because 
security of forest areas had improved, revenue was needed for reconstruction and rural 
employment--especially among ex-combatants--was necessary (Mitchell 2004).  In Liberia 
itself, the sanctions were also beginning to create tensions as the UN was accused of 
infringing on the country's sovereignty and retarding economic development (UN Panel of 
Experts 2004).  To avert any popular resentment, the UN's Liberia Sanctions Review 
Committee, sent out a press release stating that the sanctions were not punitive but instead 
intended to help consolidate peace (UN Press Release 2004) 
 A UN Panel of Experts report, however, recommended that sanctions remain in place 
"until the forest is both secure and well managed" (UN Panel of Experts 2004, 37).  The 
report concluded that although the sanctions "appear to have halted both commercial logging 
and exports of timber" several factors make ending sanctions unwise.  First, because UN 
peacekeepers were not deployed to all of Liberia's forest areas, security remained precarious.  





still had little oversight over the sector and failed in its ability to manage revenues in a 
transparent and accountable manner. The UN Expert Panel reported, for instance, that 
revenue from the small domestic sale of salvage timber by the FDA could not be accounted 
for.  Finally, the transitional government had failed to carry outs its obligation to reform the 
forest sector.  No concession review had been started and no system for improving 
transparency and accountability had been development despite the support of LFI (UN Panel 
of Experts 2004).   
Forest concession review and state resistance to reform 
 Despite the continuation of UN sanctions and the involvement of LFI, the transitional 
government did not move forward with reform. The LFI inspired "Critical Path Timeline", a 
comprehensive plan to begin instituting policies to improve transparency and accountability 
met with "resistance" (McAlpine, O' Donohue and Pierson 2006, 87).  The conventional 
wisdom was that the transitional government was "motivated more by a desire to see 
sanctions lifted so they could get back to business as usual than by a deep-seated desire for 
reform" (Liberia Update 2004).  In fact, ex-generals were found to be hiring ex-combatants to 
meet a small but growing domestic market for timber and forest products (UN Panel of 
Experts 2004).146
                                                 
 
146 While the Security Council placed most of the blame on the NTGL for its lack of progress, it also 
noted that only half of the pledges made at the Reconstruction Conference had been redeemed.   
  Concerned that the security situation was worsening, the Security Council 
demanded the government intensify efforts to meet the conditions set in Resolution 1521 and 
implement LFI's forest reform agenda.  Under tremendous pressure, the transitional 
government gave in to international demands by establishing a Forest Concession Review 
Committee (FCRC). The FCRC was to develop an objective methodology for reviewing each 
timber concession and company and assess each of 70 plus holders to judge compliance in 





laws and labor regulations; if they had authentic contracts, if they were involved in the 
conflict and if they met financial obligations (FCRC 2005).  The establishment of the review 
committee amounted to a "key reform goal" for IBOs because the common perception was 
that little could be done in the forest sector until an investigation of timber companies and 
contracts was complete (Interview 8).  
 The concession review was completed in May 2005, against what the NGO Coalition 
of Liberia called "formidable odds" (NGO Coalition of Liberia 2005).  The FCRC uncovered 
widespread mismanagement of timber concession areas that included massive road building 
and overharvesting (FCRC 2005).  Between 1985 and 2004 at least 26 million acres of timber 
concessions had been allocated by the government even though only 10 million acres exist in 
Liberia (FCRC 2005, 34-35).  The review discovered that only about 14 percent of all taxes 
were ever collected on concessions leaving the government in arrears of more than $64 
million (FCRC 2005, 36).  The committee also documented serious abuses by timber 
companies including "damage to crops, militia threats and unpaid salaries" that severely 
damaged the livelihoods of forest communities (FCRC 2005, 37).  The FCRC concluded that 
no timber company could demonstrate that they had acquired their contract in a legal manner.  
Put another way, it appeared the government and timber industry had over the years 
conspired to loot and plunder the country's forests, damage the environment and abuse forest 
communities.   
 Based on the findings, the committee--with the assistance of LFI--advocated a series 
of forest reforms and policies to "place the commercial forestry sector in the context of the 
"three C's"--commercial, conservation and community-- in order to manage Liberia's forest 
sustainably and achieve ...accountability and  transparency" (FCRC 2005).   The committee 
encouraged the transitional government to "act immediately to cancel all existing forest 





Forest Reform Monitoring Committee to establish necessary reforms and policies.147
Corruption, insecurity and increased intervention 
 Despite 
the FCRC's work, the transitional government (and FDA) was unresponsive.  Although LFI 
had largely "prepared the groundwork" for the kinds of reforms and policies necessary to lift 
UN sanctions, the government "declined to seize the opportunity" (McAlpine, O' Donohue 
and Pierson 2006, 88).  Moreover, in spite of considerable international pressure to revoke all 
past timber concessions, they failed to do so.  Interviews with former government officials 
indicated there was a deep distrust of the FCRC and the process that recommended all 
concessions be cancelled (Interview 21; Interview 2).  Two high-ranking officials in the FDA, 
for example, stated that the process was "fixed" from the beginning and the criteria were so 
stringent that no timber company could have possibly complied (Interview 21; Interview 2).  
 International peacebuilders believed that forest reforms would be legitimate, and 
socially and politically acceptable, only if the government were viewed as partners in the 
reform process. But the peacebuilders apparently forgot that the transitional government was 
composed primarily of former warlords and "criminal elements" with an interest in 
perpetuating the status-quo and lacking the desire to set aside private interests for the good of 
the country (McGovern 2008).   Given the government's intransigence--despite several 
million dollars invested by international peacebuilding organizations--increased intervention 
of the sector was understood as the only way to establish genuine reform.  International 
peacebuilding organizations came to regard the UN sanctions as a necessary but insufficient 
requirement to compel changes to how Liberia's forests were governed.  
                                                 
 
147 Reforms were to integrate: land use planning technologies for future concessions, establish a chain 
of custody system to track logging operations, develop an appropriate system of taxation and benefit 
sharing, revise the legal requirements for contracts, develop a competitive bidding system for future 
concessions, and increase ways to institutionalize public and community participation in forest 





 In fact, international peacebuilders apparently underestimated the degree to which 
corruption and profligacy of the transitional government could hamper the reform process.  
Large-scale improprieties were found in "import-export transactions, government contracts 
and budgeting, and the issuance of commodity marketing or land, natural resource, and 
associated concession rights" (Cook 2009, 23).  The UN's Special Representative to Liberia 
noted that corruption and a lack of transparency "appear to be very much alive", and the UN 
Secretary-General decried the transitional government's "lack of transparency in the 
collection and use of revenues and the resistance of some government officials...to reforms" 
(UN 2005).  An audit by the European Commission revealed that the granting of natural 
resources concessions in the rubber, iron and diamond sectors occurred under  mysterious 
circumstances, and an appraisal of Monrovia's ports and petroleum refining company showed 
that managers were unable to account for large sums of money (EC 2005).148
  Along with the corruption and delaying tactics were growing concerns about small-
scale illegal logging and security in forest areas.
  Peacebuilders 
were worried that the lack of transparency and accountability could reignite conflict or even 
provoke a violent reaction when the extent of government corruption became public.   
149
                                                 
 
148 The Chairman of the NTGL was charged with "economic sabotage" for embezzling over $1 million 
in 2007 and a former finance minister had been charged with corruption. 
  Although small-scale "pit-sawing" 
operations provided much needed livelihoods for forest communities, the UN was concerned 
about the revenue accruing to the ex-combatants that controlled the operations (NGO 
Coalition of Liberia 2005; UN Panel of Experts 2005).  In addition, there were increasing 
reports of illegal logging operations that operated late at night and with the tacit support of 
UN peacekeepers (Global Witness 2004; UN Panel of Experts 2004).   Moreover, a rubber 
149 Small-scale operations also increased as a result of UN sanctions, which ended large-scale timber 
harvests and provided incentives to engage in smaller and smaller operations that would not be 
identified by peacebuilders.  The benefits of these operations did provide important livelihoods for 
forest communities and ex-combatants although a majority of the revenue probably went to local 





plantation in Guthrie operated by ex-combatants, as well as reports of 4,000 illegal loggers, 
gold miners and bush meat hunters in Sapo National Park, raised concerns among 
international peacebuilders about the transitional government ability or willingness to control 
the security situation, especially in remote forest areas.  
 Accusations of corruption, along with new security concerns, led international 
peacebuilders to threaten to withhold international aid or mandate conditionality for 
continued support.  Because cutting off aid would be counterproductive, international 
peacebuilders pressed for increased intervention and additional control measures for the 
natural resources sector. The International Crisis Group (2004), for example, called on the 
international community to assume direct responsibility for the management of Liberia's 
revenue.150
 After almost two years, international peacebuilders were frustrated with the pace of 
forest reforms.  Commercial timber exports had stopped due to UN sanctions and a review of 
 The World Bank, IMF, European Commission and USAID, also proposed a new 
mechanism for governing Liberia's economic affairs (Dwan and Bailey 2006).  The result was 
the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP), which mandated 
an independent expert to oversee financial management and accountability to "protect 
revenue streams of key revenue generating agencies and institutions", improve budgeting and 
expenditure management and procurement practices and granting of concessions (GEMAP 
2006).   Despite concerns it would undermine Liberia's sovereignty, under intensive pressure 
from peacebuilders GEMAP was approved by the government.  The role of GEMAP, then, 
was to assist in the management of timber revenue, oversee a chain of custody system to track 
logs from harvest to export, and support the FDA in the issuing of forest concessions, 
contracts and permits.   
                                                 
 
150 The transitional government passed the Public Procurement and Concessions Act, which was to 
designed to improve accountability in managing state expenditures and revenue; and open competition 





past concessions had been completed but the establishment of more comprehensive reforms 
and policies to govern the forest sector had stalled.  Moreover, evidence of government 
corruption and reports of illegal small-scale timber operations managed by ex-combatants 
suggested that the security situation was still fragile. While peacebuilders intervened and had 
improved international oversight through LFI and GEMAP, long-term changes would require 
government action. Liberia's elections had the potential to create forward momentum and 
only one presidential candidate--Ellen Johnson Sirleaf--pledged to cancel all timber 
concessions and establish the forest reforms.  Suffice to say, she had the support of 
international peacebuilders.   
A period of reform and the lifting of UN sanctions 
 The relatively peaceful election of Johnson Sirleaf in November 2005--and her public 
support for the forest reform process--renewed calls to lift, or at least relax, UN sanctions. 
Throughout 2006, in fact, efforts to establish reforms and meet the conditions laid out in UN 
Resolution 1521 progressed rapidly. This stemmed in-part from Johnson Sirleaf's awareness 
that without forward progress on forest reforms momentum on her political agenda--which 
focused on "revitalizing economic activity"--would be impossible (GoL 2006a).  In a 
symbolic first act, Johnson Sirleaf issued Executive Order #1, which adopted all the 
recommendations of the FCRC by cancelling all 72 existing timber concessions.  The 
executive order also placed a moratorium on future commercial timber harvests stating "the 
Forest Development Authority is hereby mandated to grant or allocated future forest 
concessions only after it determines in writing that the measures for forest management 
reform ...are fully instituted and implemented and the necessary legislation enacted and 
regulations passed" (GOL 2006b).  Despite resistance from timber companies that had 
benefited from the vague timber concessions in the past, and some Liberian lawmakers 





peacebuilders as a huge step forward (LFI 2006b).   The Executive Order further mandated 
the establishment of a Forestry Reform Monitoring Committee (FRMC), to be  headed by the 
FDA with the "participation and assistance of the LFI, composed of Liberian and 
international representatives including international and local civil society", to oversee forest 
reform (GOL 2006b).  The committee was to be responsible for "overseeing, monitoring, and 
verifying the formulation, development and implementation of the measures prescribed as a 
condition precedent to the resumption of concession grants and allocations, which would 
allow the resumption of timber harvesting in Liberia consistent with international standards 
and basic principles of accountability, transparency and sustainability" (GOL 2006b).   
 With the election of Johnson Sirleaf, international peacebuilders began to emphasize 
the significance of forest reforms and policies in helping to revive the timber sector and 
promote economic recovery rather than solely on controlling conflict timber. A report by the 
IMF (2004) stated that the dormancy of the timber sector was largely responsible for Liberia's 
stagnate economic growth (compared to other "postconflict" countries) and argued that 
increasing state revenues was not only needed to provide basic services and rebuild 
infrastructure but also to reconstruct the institutions required to revive the forest sector. The 
IMF (2004) also pointed to the employment potential and the projected economic benefits 
such as poverty reduction that could be realized from reviving the timber industry.  A UN 
Panel of Experts (2005) report similarly praised the new government's "dramatic" 
improvements while for the first time underscoring the importance of forest reform to 
Liberia's future in economic and not just security terms.  Referencing the IMF document, the 
panel noted that at full capacity the timber industry could produce $80 million in exports 
annually with approximately $15 million going directly to the government in taxes, fees and 
royalties. In addition, in just three years government revenue could increase four-fold from 





Johnson Sirleaf, which signaled an improvement security situation and resulted in forward 
momentum on forest reform, was a turning point.    
The Johnson Sirleaf government strongly advocated for an end to sanctions based on 
its achievements, and IPOs acknowledged that far more was accomplished in the first five 
months of the Sirleaf administration than entire transitional government had done in two 
years.  According to Sirleaf (2006), "our...pitch for the lifting of sanctions is that there is no 
more conflict...if there is no conflict and we now have peace and we have a new government 
that is doing the right things, then we want to see a change."  Johnson Sirleaf (2006) argued 
that even if sanctions were lifted, her executive order placing a moratorium on future 
concessions was a safeguard that ensured no industrial timber operations would begin until 
the reforms and policies were implemented.   
Liberian civil society was adamant in support of continuing the UN sanctions.  The 
Sustainable Development Institute (SDI), an organization actively involved in the 
concessions review and assisting with the FRMC, stressed that without sanctions there would 
be no incentive to establish new reforms and ensure against illegal timber extraction (SDI 
2006).  SDI argued that the timber industry was still a threat because "without a reform 
process or making meaningful progress ...including chain of custody management 
arrangements, new allocation procedures and processes, new tax regimes and tax collection 
system there is a real possibility of going back to business as usual" (SDI 2006, 3 italics in 
original). As evidence, SDI documented the lack of government control over forest areas by 
suggesting that although the executive order had cancelled all concessions, several timber 
companies were still harvesting logs and operating sawmills. SDI reminded the UN Sanctions 
Committee that "increasing timber production and export after elections in 1997 (when 
Taylor was elected President) did nothing to contribute to Liberia's postconflict recovery 
then, and without reform, it will not contribute to postconflict development today" (SDI 2006, 





cited by international peacebuilders as evidence that the forest sector can contribute to 
peacebuilding, was accomplished in a failed state devoid of forest governance, and did 
nothing to benefit local populations who were subjected to human rights abuses.  SDI argued 
that international peacebuilders had an obligation to not let this happen again. 
International peacebuilding organizations were split on the question of sanction.  
Global Witness--who was instrumental in publicizing the issue of "conflict timber"-- was 
optimistic about the direction of the reforms but ardently supported the continuation of 
sanctions for several reasons (Global Witness 2006).  First, Liberia had not met the 
conditions in the UN Sanctions and technically the laws, regulations and policies in-place 
were analogous to those that existed during the conflict.  Second, while the government 
demonstrated "a willingness to break from the past...benchmarks imposed by the sanctions 
should not be sacrificed for short-term political gains or gestures."  Prematurely lifting 
sanctions would undermine future sanctions regimes, and expose Liberia's natural resource 
sector to abuse before the government retained full control.  Third, due to institutional 
constraints, the government did not have the full authority and control over timber producing 
areas, and in fact, had little control at all.  Global Witness highlighted the inability of the 
government to control widespread and illegal "pit-sawing" and "large swathes of 
territory....controlled by ex-combatants" (Global Witness 2006, 15).  Without government 
control, forests remained open to illicit exploitation that could be used by spoilers to reignite 
conflict.  Fourth, while the forestry reform committee and GEMAP were on the way to 
establishing financial oversight, including measures to ensure revenue transparency, "untried 
and incomplete systems...do not equate to a working system", and commencing timber 
operations before systems are in place is "likely to result in both revenue and resource loss 
and undermine the effectiveness of reforms" (Global Witness 2006, 14). 
Reports also indicated that the UN Security Council was divided over whether to lift 





divisions surfaced over whether Liberia had met all the conditions and whether lifting the 
sanctions would simply encourage spoilers and discourage continued government reform.  
Debate among the Security Council continued over whether the sanctions were having a more 
deleterious impact on Liberian society as a whole by limiting the country from developing 
one of its most valuable commodities, an argument that China was sympathetic too.  
Ultimately, acknowledging Liberia’s progress, and in particular singling out the efforts of the 
new president, the UN Security Council lifted sanctions on the import of all round logs and 
timber products from Liberia with UN Resolution 1689 in June 2006 (UNSC 2006).151
Forest reforms culminate: security and commercialization 
  The 
lifting of the sanctions was conditional, however, stipulating that the legislation proposed by 
the FRMC must be passed by the Government of Liberia in 90-days.  The rationale for the 
timeline was that Liberia's progress so far had been held back by the lack of new reforms and 
policies, and urged the "speedy adoption of...necessary laws" (UNSC 2006).    
The FRMC drafted new forestry laws in July 2006 but the 90-day window mandated 
by the UN intensified debate over the details of the reforms and the extent to which the work 
of the FRMC should be confidential or public (LFI 2006a).  The FRMC worked closely with 
LFI, international consultants, Liberian civil society groups, the FDA and government 
ministries, and international and Liberian business groups to develop the reforms and policies 
but failed to go through a period of public consultation.  The prevailing view was that 
although Liberian law required 60-days of public vetting, given the time constraints imposed 
by the UN, extensive consultations would need to wait until after the law was passed.  
Regardless, the National Forestry Reform Law (NFRL) was passed in September 2006, just 
meeting the deadline imposed by the UN Security Council (GoL 2006c).  Those involved 
                                                 
 





testified that passing the NFRL was not without discord.  According to Alfred Brownell of 
Green Advocates, a Liberian civil society organization:  
 
It was a difficult and enduring fight ensuring that the bill passed unadultered.  I mince no 
words  when I say it was tough.  The timber lobbyists fought to the dying minutes...we were no 
 match for their money... they became desperate, issuing threats.  The head of the timber 
 conglomerate called me...and rained insults  and threats.  Even the government crumbled 
 under pressure from the timber lobby and wanted to water down the law. We resisted that 
 attempt (Brownell 2006). 
 
The NFRL characterized the reforms and policies that IBOs had been promoting for 
almost three years.  As one high ranking official put it, Liberia's government was under a 
"massive microscope" and had to act (Interview 14).  For the UN Security Council, the 
reforms fulfilled the criteria for permanently lifting the ban on Liberian timber exports.  More 
broadly, the forest reforms and policies were significant to IBOs because they seemingly 
"maximized the benefits from the forest sector to the Liberian people...put an end to the use 
of forest resources to fund conflict", and put the government in a "position to regain authority 
and control over forest resources" (UN News Centre 2006).   According to the IMF (2008, 
64), the reforms laid to groundwork for "sustainable forest management", and signaled the 
"economic revival of the sector" by opening up the possibility of new timber concessions.152
Given the range of interests on the reform committee, and diverse sets of values 
placed on forest resources, the NFRL stressed a balance between the “three C’s”--
commercial, community and conservation--as originally articulated by the concessions 
review committee.  The reforms provided the basic qualifications for persons / companies 
   
                                                 
 
152 Although concessionaires that owned the government money could do so until paid back taxes.  
Moreover, there remained a vigorous debate as to whether past concessionaires should be legally able 





wanting to conduct logging operations, established two types of contracts (e.g., forest 
management and timber sale) depending on the size of the concession, and articulated 
regulations for private and forest use permits.  Consistent with the wishes of international 
peacebuilders, the law mandated that the government establish and maintain a chain of 
custody system consistent with international standards and publish payments received by 
companies to ensure revenue transparency.  The law also mandated that 30 percent of land 
rental fees be given to forest communities who, by law, were entitled to equitable benefit 
sharing.153
Although rights to land and forests have shifted over the course of Liberia's history, 
as discussed briefly in Chapter 4, the reforms stated that all forest resources in Liberia--
except those defined as communal forests or developed on private or deeded land-- are held 
in trust by the Republic for the benefit of the people (GoL 2006c; Wily 2007).  This provision 
provided the government with the authority to oversee all matters on such land and 
establishes the state as the sole authority to divide forests into lands open to commercial 
  The reforms also provided regulations for environmental protection, forest areas 
networks and wildlife conservation.  The law emphasized the importance of "ensuring that 
local communities are fully engaged in the sustainable management of the forests" and 
mandated  at some point in the future regulations that "specify the rights and responsibilities 
of communities...establish mechanisms to promote informed community participation in 
forest-related decisions...create a framework that allows communities fair access to forest 
resources [and] establish social, economic and technical procedures for capacity  building to 
ensure communities can equitably participate in and equitably benefit from sustainable 
management of forests" (GOL 2006c, 35).   The law directed the government develop and 
pass a comprehensive law governing community rights to forest lands within one-year.   
                                                 
 






forestry, lands defined as communal forests, and lands that are determined to be protected for 
the purpose of wildlife or biodiversity conservation.  
 The Liberian Forest Policy and Implementation Strategy stated that "historically the 
main focus of the forestry sector...has been the commercial harvesting of forest products" 
(GoL 2006d).  While the NFRL stressed a balance between the commercial, community and 
conservation values, interviews with a wide-spectrum of international peacebuilders and 
government officials suggested  that reforms and policies were bound to be “commercial 
centric” (Interview 1; Interview 7).  Certainly, the Public Procurement and Concessions Act 
and NFRL--both key reforms of the forest sector--feature new "rules of the game" for 
commercial forestry: qualifications for timber companies; concession area bidding criteria; 
granting of concessions and contracts; harvest management; and the taxes, fees and royalty 
payments. In short, restarting the commercial timber operations dominated and took 
precedence over virtually all aspects forest governance.   
 This commercial “first” agenda developed from a variety of interconnected factors.  
First, forestry has a long history in Liberia and narratives of a once booming timber export 
operation remains deeply embedded in the government.  Before the days of Charles Taylor 
and the concept of “conflict timber”, many in the FDA remember the “better days” when 
timber exports contributed to "economic development" (NTGL 2005; Interview 2). This is 
despite evidence to the contrary, covered in the preceding chapter, that noted the strategy of 
development by way of concessionary agreements has always been contested and despite 
increasing revenue and GDP the country had experienced "growth without development".  
Second, the World Bank and IMF pointed to a pre-war forest sector that brought stability and 
progress.  These international financial organizations point to the period between 1997 and 
2002, when Charles Taylor was president and "conflict timber" became a household word, to 
highlight the significant contribution timber exports can make to the Liberian economy.  For 





meters valued at over $100 million dollars and contributing as much as 7,000 jobs, 50 percent 
of export earnings and 20 percent of GDP in the late 1990s. What gets lost in translation is 
that the 1,300 percent increase in production from 1997 to 2002 was accomplished in a war-
torn state, with no forest governance, corrupt timber companies, substantial human rights 
abuses and environmental destruction.   
Developing commercial timber industry is also a key pillar of Liberia's “conflict to 
development” strategy, which emphasized the importance of resuscitating the economy, 
creating employment opportunities, rebuilding infrastructure and supplying basic services by 
"jump-starting" productive economic sectors.  The country's poverty reduction strategy 
(PRSP), which effectively represents the country's "roadmap for the future" stresses the 
importance of reviving "traditional sectors of economic growth", which included opening up 
of the timber sector in order to alleviate poverty, and provide employment and state revenue 
(IMF 2008, 7-36).  Increasing IBOs stressed the importance of economic growth to 
consolidating peace in Liberia since it can provide the required revenue to provide basic 
services, rebuild institutions, pay government officials and fix infrastructure.   As the same 
time, there is the view that economic growth is vital for peace because negative growth and 
poverty supposed to be triggers of conflict (Bannon and Collier 2004).   
As such, commercial timber operations appear to represent an enormous opportunity 
for economic recovery and employment, especially in a cash-strapped country with 
"unemployment" hovering at over 80 percent.  As an international donor mentioned, forests 
are "one of only a few options for national revenue and development funds" (Interview 1).  
According to from the IMF (2008), timber production was projected to grow from 
30,000cubic meters to over 1.3 million cubic meters between 2008 and 2011, with roughly 
2.9 million hectares of forests allocated for timber extraction.  This was estimated to provide 





produce 5,000 jobs and "higher incomes for the rural population" (IMF 2008, 64).154
 With the reforms and policies now codified into Liberian law, international 
peacebuilders agreed that the future direction of the forest sector looked positive.  Although 
negotiating the NFRL was far from easy and many outstanding issues were left to be 
addressed, the establishment of the NFRL appeared to be the "end game" since they basically 
laid out forest policy priorities and implementation strategy (GOL 2006c; 2006d).   
According the World Bank (2008, 173-174) "laws can create institutions and define 
institutional power and responsibilities... [and] set the bounds of acceptable behavior", and 
therefore start the "healing process in postconflict countries”.   In short, IBOs viewed the 
reforms and policies as a road map that the government needed to implement.   However, 
NGOs and numerous community groups believed that while the reforms and policies had 
been passed by the government they were largely illegitimate because the process was not 
transparent and the decisions did not incorporate the input of forest communities (Interview 
29).    
  The 
PRSP stressed reforms and policies that promote an open economy linked to international 
trade and amenable to foreign direct investment.  The private sector was viewed as the "main 
driver of growth" (IMF 2008, 21).  
Taking stock of the forest reforms 
 The previous section has detailed an extensive forest reform process that to IPOs 
largely culminated with the National Forestry Reform Law.  The reforms and policies were at 
the outset concerned with "securitizing" Liberia's forests by promoting and supporting the 
establishment of reforms and policies that helped to "firm-up" or consolidate state control and 
                                                 
 
154 The UN Panel of Experts (2006) had a less optimistic projection for commercial forestry stating "it 
is highly unlikely any new concessions will begin operating before 2007 and even then 3-5 years 





authority over forests. These reforms and policies stressed the importance of "good 
governance", which included measures to improve revenue transparency, government 
accountability and public participation.  In short, international peacebuilding organizations 
wanted to guard against the possibility that timber and timber concessions could be traded in 
exchange for weapons, which could reignite conflict and threaten regional and international 
security once again.  Over time, however, international peacebuilders turned their attention to 
"marketization", as the overwhelming emphasis on the commercialization of Liberia's forests 
in the forestry reform law shows.  This signifies a not so subtle shift in thinking because the 
biggest threat to Liberia was no longer the ability to control forests but stagnant economic 
growth, endemic poverty and a lack of state revenue to pay for basic services and other 
improvements.  Although IBOs remain worried about corruption (i.e. bad governance) in the 
forest sector--particularly given that the Taylor and those before him had largely 
monopolized forests for personal gain and political power--the overwhelming assumption 
was that good governance measures would reduce corruption, or at the very least bring it out 
into the open (IMF 2008, 22).    
Liberia's Forest Reforms: Corruption, Contention and Resistance 
 
Given that nearly a decade has passed since the end of the conflict, and almost five-years 
have elapsed since the forest reform law was passed a simple question remains: what have 
been the effects?  I argue below that there is at present significant contention and resistance 
over the new "rules of the game" promoted by IPOs to govern Liberia's forests.  I suggest that 
efforts to rapidly "securitize" and "marketize" has, in fact, exacerbated  a "struggle for 
control" that at the moment is taking place in the rule making process.  However, there 
remains a possibility that these struggles over forest reforms--some of them deep-seated--may 





Disagreements over the forestry reforms law emerge 
The passing of the National Forestry Reforms Laws registered as a success and was 
hailed by international peacebuilding organizations as a significant step forward for forest 
governance in Liberia. The reforms were recognized as being comprehensive and "cutting 
edge" (Interview 2).  However, within weeks international and Liberian NGOs were pushing 
back against the reforms in ways that would come to define a struggle over the future of 
Liberia's forests.  A coalition of 14 Liberian and seven international NGOs labeled the 
passing of the law a "missed opportunity".  In a letter to the government, the coalition asked 
"what is left for communities?"   More specifically, the reforms failed to address community 
land tenure, access and user rights or meaningful public participation (NGO Open Letter 
2006).  The NGOs argued that the law "prioritizes commercial exploitation of Liberia's 
forests by industrial loggers" with tenure, access and user rights alluded to briefly with 
"statements of intent" (NGO Open Letter 2006).  Commercial timber contracts and permits, 
according to the NGO letter, require no legal obligation that communal tenure be addressed 
before timber harvesting begins, and social agreements between communities and timber 
companies do little to protect communities from unwanted encroachment.155
Shortly thereafter, a report by the Forest People's Programme, a UK-based NGO, 
argued that the law received no pubic vetting or debate because government officials and 
  The NGOs 
insisted that it would be more "effective and cost efficient to get the policies right now, rather 
than lock-in the expensive, damaging and long-term social, economic and ecological 
consequences" of the current reforms (NGO Open Letter 2006).  The NGOs recommended 
that the NFRL place an emphasis on the rights of communities rather than the rights of timber 
companies.  
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communities no legislation had actually been passed mandated this while at the same time, laws 





international peacebuilders had a "fixed agenda" that emphasized commercial timber 
operations as the most efficient way to manage forests sustainably and alleviate poverty.  
According to the report, studies from around the world indicated that industrial timber 
operations have had negative impacts on local communities, including but not limited to 
increases in mortality, health problems, wildlife and habitat disturbance, discriminatory 
working conditions, breakdown of traditional social structures, denial of rights to land, forced 
resettlement and limitations on access, creation of dependency and community conflict 
(Forest People's Programme 2006).  Rather than perpetuate a failed development model that 
equates timber operations with poverty alleviation the NFRL should empower communities 
to save and manage forests themselves.  A member of an international NGO that assisted in 
the drafting of the report argued that communities "have always protected" Liberia's forests 
sustainably and it was the introduction of the "industrial model" that put new pressures on the 
land, forests and people and, "manufactured new threats" (Interview 25).    
The report criticized the new reforms and policies for lacking a provision on how 
much forest lands would be classified by the government for communal forests or under what 
conditions the policies will genuinely uphold the rights of communities to control forest use 
and demand a fair share of benefits from the state and timber companies (Forest People's 
Programme 2006, 7-8).  As someone familiar with the report suggested, the reforms prioritize 
timber extraction and "communities have no right to say no" (Interview 17).  While the 
reform law does require social agreements between timber companies and communities it 
does not recognize community land tenure and access rights in commercial contracts.  It also 
fails to recognize the perpetually poor negotiating position of forest communities, which lack 
the information to make decisions and are "manipulated by powerful elites" (Interviews 29).  
A member of a community NGO echoed this assessment,  stating that even though the 
reforms are supposed to involve the community, the community believes that "whatever 





ambiguous in terms of community benefit sharing and public consultation. The report stated 
that despite "a number of progressive references to transparency, the NFRL relies too heavily 
on the assumption that putting information in the public domain would in itself lead to greater 
accountability and participation...without mechanisms by which communities can influence 
decision making and [hold] authorities to account" (Forest People's Programme 2006, 10).  
The report stressed the importance of establishing the proper structures and safeguards up-
front, despite domestic and international pressure to begin timber harvesting. Almost from the 
beginning, then, NGOs began to question the extent to which communities would be part of 
the forests reform process and whether there was going to be real deliberation over the future 
direction of Liberia's forests. 
Efforts to kick-start commercial forestry begin 
In the shadow of the NFRL, efforts continued to get the commercial timber sector up-
and-running.  The Forest Development Authority conducted socio-economic surveys and 
inventories for six timber sale contracts and three forest management contracts and had 
approved 38 companies (out of 86) through a pre-qualification  process that made these 
companies eligible to engage in future forestry or logging activities (FDA 2007).156
Despite these enthusiastic pronouncements, however, progress was slow and 
increasingly beset by challenges.  The FDA's forest management strategy, which was 
   
According to the FDA Managing Director John Woods, "Liberia is now ready to commence 
commercial logging" and estimated  that "depending on the companies' ability to mobilize 
funds and equipment after winning bids for contracts, logging could begin as early as March 
2008, directly employing 1,800 persons...and generating $1.7 million" (FDA 2007, 10).   
                                                 
 
156 Timber sale contracts are characterized as smaller parcels of forest land no more than 5,000 
hectares. Forest Management Contracts are larger tracts of forest no smaller than 50,000 hectares and 
no larger than 400,000 hectares.  Each type of contract has different provisions and regulations 





supposed to classify Liberian forest land into commercial, conservation and community 
categories, was widely criticized by Liberian civil society groups because the legal status of 
land, particularly customary rights of communities, had not yet been defined.  As noted by a 
prominent Liberian activist, "where [timber] concessions, conservation and community 
forestry take place was made before any real deliberation...and by what criteria...who yields 
the power at this stage" (Interviews 29).  The central grievance was that although the reforms 
place an emphasis on the "three C's", decisions on what forest lands were to be characterized 
as commercial, conservation  and community had been identified by the government without 
any objective data or community consultation, which undermined the spirit of the law 
(Interview 29).  Liberian activists and NGOs argued that the government made the 
determination of how land should be categorized without the know-how to do so and without 
any socio-economic studies (Interview 29).  While government officials wanted to address 
the "immediate problem" of no timber revenue, civil society groups questioned why no 
information was done before the status of land was defined (Interview 1).  Lomax (2008, 19) 
estimated that approximately 75 percent of forest land was set aside for timber production, 24 
percent for conservation and only one percent for communal land.    
The FDA had projected in early2007 that ten short-term timber sales would be 
awarded, which would lead to increased production, rural employment and provide the 
government with revenue of between $1.7and $16 million.  However, delays in the bidding 
process resulted in an initial sale of six contracts and zero revenue from the legal export of 
logs and timber products.  A year later, the IMF (2008) predicted revenue as high as $24 
million but still commercial timber exports amounted to nothing.  Part of the problem 
stemmed from setbacks in economic governance and financial management, and the apparent 
inability or unwillingness of the FDA to follow through with the good governance 
requirements of the reforms.  In particular, there were problems in allocating and planning 





there were other problems as well. The UN Panel of Experts reported a container of wood 
planks had left Liberia in a freighter that was said to contain sheet metal, raising concerns 
about illegal exports and government corruption.157
Evidence of improprieties in the commercial sector 
 In addition, despite joint patrols between 
FDA and UNMIL, reports of FDA rangers coming under attack in Sapo National Park, 
presumably by ex-combatants illegally mining and hunting, led to questions about the 
government's ability to control forest areas.  
The FDA had a problem awarding concessionary agreements to reputable companies 
and certain improprieties in the awarding of concessions raised questions as to the capacity, 
transparency and accountability of the government (UN Panel of Experts 2008). 158
Initial pre-qualification processes began in late 2007 and early 2008 and out of 86 
companies that applied, the review panel approved 37 of them with 15 becoming pre--
 In order 
to bid on timber sales and forest management contracts, timber companies must be pre-
approved using as set of standards to screen out unqualified companies and ensure companies 
were not involved in the trade of illegal timber or in arrears to the government for back taxes 
(Interview 7).  The preamble to FDA regulation 103-07, for example, states "to achieve 
sustainable commercial development of the forest the nation must ensure that forest users 
possess integrity of character and respect for the law, as well as financial and technical 
capacity" (FDA 2006).  In fact, NGOs complained that the FDA had failed to establish a 
debarment list, which opens the door to the Oriental Timber Company and other logging 
companies that played a role in the conflict to reenter the sector at a later date (NGO 
Coalition of Liberia 2008).   
                                                 
 
157 Exports of sheet metal were also illegal.   
158 There were also allegations of the FDA selling abandoned logs at the Port of Buchanan for a low 





qualified and eight becoming provisionally accepted.  However, many issues arose with the 
pre-qualification process.  First, the Sustainable Development Institute suggested that the 
letters of "non-involvement" in past illegal forestry were not authentic or issued without 
permission (UN Panel of Experts 2008).  Moreover, the UN Panel of Experts, in conjunction 
with Liberian NGOs accused the government of failing to set proper standards that could 
result in manipulation, an unfair process and the qualification of unqualified companies.  
Documents suggested, in fact, that of timber companies labeled as "qualified" by the FDA not 
one had any experience in the timber industry and none had any appreciable equity or access 
to credit (Interview 7).  An analysis by the UN Panel of Experts also found that bidders 
routinely failed to disclose the true ownership of the bidding timber company  A large 
majority of the bidding companies actually appeared to be "shell companies" that were 
without substance and that were bound to fail (Interview 7).  Finally, international advisors to 
the FDA expressed concern that the bids were unrealistically high, which would likely result 
in pressure to overharvest in order to pay for land rental prices and lead to a "cut and run" 
mentally before the 25 year contract is up (Interview 18).    
At the same time the above irregularities were cropping up, other improprieties began 
emerged.  Forest management contracts totaling approximately one-third of all forest 
concessions were mysteriously altered in the FDA, and only discovered by GEMAP.159
                                                 
 
159 The forest management contracts were also not advertised internationally as required by law.   
  
Documents specify that a land rental should be paid every year for the 25-year life of the 
timber contract.  However, the contract signed by the FDA (and the Ministries of Justice and 
Finance), and submitted to the President for signature, provided only for a one-time payment 
for the same amount that the company would have had to pay annually.  As the UN Panel of 
Experts (2008, 23) noted, "payments in years 2 through 25 were eliminated without any 





revenue of over $50 million over a 25-year period to the Liberian people while benefiting the 
timber company (Interview 7; Interview 18). This change in the contract would have also 
affected communities and counties, who each would have been entitled to 30 percent of the 
land rental fees, or about $14 million. This episode raised serious questions about how the 
contract was altered and by whom.160
 Throughout 2009 efforts to jump-start commercial forestry continued apace. Liberia 
signed the Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which was aimed at 
managing revenues and bringing transparency to the natural resource sector including the 
forestry (EITI 2010). But implementing the forest reforms and granting timber concessions 
remained contentions and fraught with controversy.  The government asserted that such 
controversies are caused not by it actions, which it insists under the circumstances are quite 
positive, but due to the legal complexities of the forest reforms that were written 
predominantly by IBOs.  The government also blamed the delays on by IB Os, Liberian 
NGOs and even the reports of the UN Panel of Experts.  Liberian NGOs placed the blame 
squarely on the government, stressing that "two years since the...reform agenda...all 
implications are that the...process is failing [and] the forest sector is gradually slipping back 
  Evidence also surfaced that bids for timber contracts 
were not advertised internationally as required by law.  NGOs suggested this "oversight" was 
to reduce competition and favor certain companies.  In addition, a panel that evaluates timber 
concession bids made was accused of not using the established system to choose the highest 
bidder but instead devising a "new system" on the spot.  The result was that the lowest bidder 
(and one that should not have been pre-qualified in the first place) received the concessions.  
The transgressions--some might call it evidence of corruption --did shine an unflattering light 
on the government, and put an effective “hold” on fast-tracking commercial timber 
operations.   
                                                 
 





into the old ways of doing business." The UN Panel of Experts, which had largely been 
supportive of the government's efforts, suggested that high levels of discretion being used by 
the government officials in the implementation of the reforms and policies is a concern" (UN 
Panel of Experts 2008, 51).   
 Much contention has arisen over the granting of concessions. The reforms provided a 
process by which timber permits and contracts are to be issued, including a handful of 
rigorous steps to pre-qualify companies that are then entitled to bid on timber concessions.  
These requirements were intended to ensure that the allocation of commercial timber 
concessions occurred in a transparent, fair and competitive manner, which would increase 
revenues for the state and communities.  As of late 2009, the government had overseen the 
allocation of six timber sales and seven forest management contracts in a combined area in 
excess of 800,000 hectares.  But growing controversy emerged about the pre-qualification 
process, bid evaluations and due diligence, the awarding of contracts, transparency and public 
participation have led the UN Panel of Experts, peacebuilders to question  to question the 
credibility of reforms.  According to the NGO Coalition of Liberia (2008), unless the 
government takes action by reversing controversial contracts and vetting companies, reforms 
are in jeopardy and the country may be headed for a "another cycle of widespread illegal 
logging", unsustainable forest management and conflicts with aggrieved communities.  
 One of the central criticisms was that almost, if not all, of the extensive timber 
contracts signed into law in 2009 were done too quickly, without due diligence and in 
violation of the law and regulations established in  forest reforms.  Global Witness and a 
group of Liberian NGOs161
                                                 
 
161 The four NGOs are: Sustainable Development Institute, Liberia Democratic Institute, Foundation 
for Community Initiative and Children Development Program.   
 argued that several forest contracts were simply too risky given 
serious flaws in the FDA allocation process (Global Witness 2009). Global Witness and the 





sufficient funds.  In fact, the groups found that at least three of the companies may have 
colluded during the bidding process because for some reason the Atlantic Resources proposal 
was in the Southeast Resources' envelope.  These same companies owed almost $3 million to 
government and had not yet commenced operations because of a lack of financial resources.  
This raised serious questions as to whether they would be able to create jobs or generate 
revenue.   
 Three firms considered for major logging contracts--Alpha Logging, Atlantic 
Resources and Southeast Resources-- were linked financially to Samling, a large Malaysian  
timber company known for "destroying tropical forests and abusing local communities" 
(Global Witness 2009). Briefing documents by Global Witness, for example, suggested that 
due to serious flaws in the bid evaluation process and despite concerns expressed by the 
comptroller of GEMAP, Liberia's forests were about to be handed off to "timber pirates" that 
had a documented track record of illegal and unsustainable logging practices and human 
rights abuses.  Global Witness argued that "given the timber industry's previous role in 
fuelling conflict in Liberia, letting in firms controlled by some of the world's most predatory 
loggers would be disastrous [and] one could hardly think of a worse choice" (Global Witness 
2009). According to Global Witness, "there is precious little evidence that industrial logging 
in the tropics is ever sustainable or reduces poverty...if the Liberian government insists on 
once again turning its forests over to the global timber industry, it should, at a minimum, 
exclude firms that have a documented history of destruction and abuse (Global Witness 
2009).  Indeed, if the three companies keep their contracts it would indirectly give Samling a 
stake an estimated 760,000 hectares of commercial forest equivalent to 58 percent of the total 
forests allocated for commercial timber operations, and amounting to almost 8 percent of 
Liberia's total surface area (Global Witness 2009).  Global Witness (2009) argued that letting 
the contracts move forward without properly examining the history of the three companies 





 Despite extensive background investigations into the companies in question, Alpha, 
Atlantic and Southeast all rejected the Global Witness claims that Samling was involved in 
any way.  According to the companies in a joint statement, they are all separate and distinct 
companies, with none being a subsidiary of either with each bidding separately and distinctly 
and won the bid fairly and within the law (The Analyst 2009).  The companies suggested that 
Global Witness was either waging a "proxy war" on behalf of the losing companies or 
conducting a smear campaign against the companies with the  a hidden agenda of not wanting 
to see  timber harvests started  in Liberia.  While the UN Panel of Experts (2009) did not 
address the Samling allegations directly, it did find that a number of fundamental steps in the 
forest reforms and policies had been overlooked and many important criteria were ignored by 
the government in the awarding of contracts. During the process of allocating four large 
forest management contracts, for example, the bid evaluation panel recommended Euro-
Liberia Logging over a more highly ranked bidder even though Euro-Liberia had not met the 
reserve bid-- the basic criteria for assessing bids.  Moreover, contrary to the law, the 
government recommended that the Euro-Liberia negotiate a different bid after its initial one 
making the process not only uncompetitive but tilting the playing field in favor of a particular 
company.  The UN panel report (2009) also stated that much of the required documentation 
needed to assess a company's ability to meet minimum standards, including knowledge in 
forestry and financial resources, were non-existent.  
Tension over community rights and land ownership 
 A report by European NGO, FERN, stated that  the forest reforms and policies 
maintain "a concentration of power over forest resources in the hands of the 
government...forest-dependent communities without deeded entitlement...have no recourse to 
compensation when forest resources are removed" (Lomax 2008, 18).  The reforms provided 





community rights and participation were ignored with few provisions to ensure that forests 
comes into community control (Lomax 2008).  People and communities have largely been 
excluded from the consultative process and have not received a "welcome response" from the 
government (Lomax 2008, 19).  Although there are benefit sharing provisions in the reforms 
and policies--which amount to 30 percent of the land rental fee--these are small relative to the 
importance the forests play in the day-to-day life of forest communities (Lomax 2008, 20).  
Social agreements between the company and community, as mandated by the reforms also 
did not provide bargaining power over timber contracts on customary land or give 
communities a direct role in negotiating timber contracts.    In fact, two-thirds of all timber 
contracts that were approved in 2008 were stopped by community opposition and a refusal to 
sign a social agreement (Interview 7).  
 Experience with the reforms and policies makes clear that the government and 
commercial interests are the "principal actors" and communities the "beneficiaries with a 
minimal financial stake, which does little to change the structure of forest governance over 
the last century" (Lomax 2008, 20).   This status quo relationship highlights the 
incomprehension by the government and IBOs of the overlapping land claims, and the 
significance of determining who owns what before outlining the use of the forest land.  It is 
estimated that over 90 percent of all cases in the Liberian courts are related to land disputes 
and this would only increase once commercial forestry begin (Interview 17).  Liberia's 
Governance Reform Commission argued that the conflict had exacerbated an already 
"complicated and volatile situation" and a rapid and unlawful privatization of forests for 
commercial exploitation may lead to future conflict.  Skirmishes and protests have occurred 
in several areas that the government has issued prospective timber contracts.  In these cases, 
the government has been accused of ignoring local structures and "monopolizing the process" 
in a rush to begin timber harvests (Interview 1).  In Bokumu District, for example, a local 





(Interview 30).   As a member of an International NGOs stated, the local community viewed 
it as "my Father's land", and "not the government's to give away" (Interview 8).  An incident 
in 2008, in which 15 people were killed in land dispute provides ample evidence that violence 
is likely as communities compete for land with the government and timber companies.  The 
worry is, according to an influential international peacebuilder, that "bad forestry will only 
exacerbate conflict" (Interview 7).   
 Efforts to tackle the problem of land ownership and tenure has so far been 
ineffective.  When the FDA requested that all forest deed holders present documentation for 
verification over 8 million acres of deeds were presented, which amounted to almost 70 
percent of all lands available for commercial forestry (Interview 18).  The Governance 
Reform Commission suggests that people state that if we fight again, we will fight about 
land".  Over 60 percent of Liberians reported that land ownership and distribution is the 
leading cause of violent conflict in areas where they live (Topka, Saryee and Asunka 2009).  
This has been echoed by the NGO Coalition of Liberia (2008), which states that the "fast 
tracking" of the commercial timber sector will not only undermine reform efforts but also 
“plunge some communities into conflict when timber harvests do start.” As one interviewee 
stated, it is pertinent to "bring clarity to the confliction that exists since it will help resolve 
disagreements over the foundations of ownership".   
 The UN Panel of Experts (2009) reported a number of pre-felling operations that 
were deemed to be illegal and infringing on communities.162   In one case, a company began 
felling trees without paying the government and failing to meet various conditions.163
                                                 
 
162 These are activities by concessionaires done before full scale timber harvests begin.  
  In 
another instance, Tarpeh Timber cut down trees outside of its concession area and sawing 





logs without a permit.164
 Another serious point of contention emerged over the Community Rights Law 
(CRL), which the forest reform law mandated be enacted within one year. Although the 
government did not meet the deadline, it submitted a 9-page version of the bill to the 
  The panel, as well as Liberian and international NGOs also 
identified serious problems associated with pre-felling including the completion of social 
agreements, environmental impact assessments, and management plans.  The Sustainable 
Development Institute (2009) documented complaints by communities that social agreements 
are not in any way participatory and often are negotiated by those that live outside the 
community.  In addition, social agreements in many communities appeared to have identical 
provisions and in the same handwriting leading NGOs to believe social agreements were 
being written up without any community involvement (UN Panel of Experts 2009). In 
another case, a community complained that a logging company had breached the social 
agreement even before harvesting began.  In another case, several communities presented a 
land deed to the FDA to challenge the granting of two timber contracts and one forest 
management contract on communal land.  However, the FDA noted that it could neither 
confirm nor deny the ownership of land, and therefore did not have the power to nullify the 
commercial contracts (NGO Coalition of Liberia 2008). This, according to the NGO 
Coalition of Liberia (2008), not only violates the law but "poses threats to the peace and 
security of the country as this has the potential to create conflicts between the state and the 
people on the one hand and people and logging companies on the other".  In fact, these 
communities have said that they will "resist any attempt to log their forest" (NGO Coalition 
of Liberia 2008, 6).     
                                                 
 
164 The FDA fined the company $2,000 for the infraction (even though the estimated value of the 
illegally cut logs was more than $100,000 on the international market and also provided a sawing 





president in July 2008.165  However, the bill passed by the Legislature was a longer 32-page 
bill not the bill signed by Johnson Sirleaf.  Nobody seemed to know how the longer version 
ended up in the Legislature and substantial questions remained on what the motives were for 
switching out the bills at the last moment. Suffice to say, that the mystery is significant 
because both are very bills were different in how they defined communal forests and 
community rights. In essence, the passing of one or the other would have had deep 
ramifications for Liberia's forests.  The short bill, supported by the government and vetted by 
the LFI and a broad range of international experts and local actors166, laid out the rights and 
responsibilities for community forest management and recognized tenure rights as that 
described in the Liberian Constitution.  More specifically, endowed the Government of 
Liberia with the authority to manage and govern Liberia’s forest lands on behalf of the 
Republic.  By contrast, the longer version placed the ownership of Liberia’s forests directly 
into the hands of rural communities, and sought to make communal forests the central 
construct of forest management (Wily 2007).  This would have, in effect, recognized that 
forest owners have jurisdictional rights and established community tenure into the forestry 
law.  Supporters of this version, including Sustainable Development Institute, members of the 
House Community Rights Law Caucus, and various communities167
                                                 
 
165 Submission to the Legislature meets the minimum requirement of the NFRL.  
, claimed it would, after 
decades of war and corruption, begin to genuinely empower communities and give them a 
direct voice in how Liberia’s land is used.  It would have also placed communities in control 
of all commercial forestry operations and protected areas.  In effect, timber companies--rather 
than working through the government--would have had to deal directly with communities to 
arrange timber concessions or establish national parks or protected areas.  Basically, it would 
have signaled a seismic shift in the governance of forest lands from a "state asset to a private 
166 A meeting was held in Monrovia in 2008 with many international experts to discuss the community 
rights law.   





resource of ordinary citizens (Wily 2007, 265).  Not only would this empower rural 
communities but, for the first time,  would help guarantee revenues and other benefits go 
directly to communities rather than government officials, timber companies and international 
conservation organizations.    
 The government and a large majority of international actors, including the UN Panel 
of Experts, suggested that handing over all of Liberia’s land to communities would amount to 
a “land grab” and take away a large projected revenue stream that could benefit the entire 
country.  Many have also been questions as to whether communities have the human 
resources or institutional capacity to negotiate with powerful timber companies and 
community “elites” who may want to co-opt the process (Interview 3).  Conservation groups 
also worried that if communities own all land, it puts into question the existence of protected 
areas and national parks.  For conservationists, the state appears much more equipped to 
protect biodiversity and endangered species than communities who it is believed are the 
major driver of deforestation.   
 The switching of the Community Rights Law caused considerable contention.  
Protesters in Monrovia asserted that the longer version had been signed by the president but 
that it disappeared "under dubious circumstances" only to resurface again without her 
signature at a later date (Binda 2010).  According to news reports, some representatives in the 
Legislature took the news of the passing of the 32-page Community Rights Law to their 
constituencies, and told them that the law had returned their land to them, and made them the 
legitimate owners of the forests and its resources (Binda 2010).  The government, however, 
stressing the mysterious switching of documents, called for a new law to be drafted, which 
reconciled the two-versions.  What emerged was a 17-page Community Rights with Respect 
to Forest Lands Act, passed in October 2009.  The Act defined community forestry lands and 
guaranteed communities a 55 percent share of revenues derived from timber ventures on 





remains over the new Community Rights Law, particularly in various communities.168
Diminishing confidence and growing hostility to forest reforms 
  The 
anger stems from accusations that in creating the new law, "provisions calling for social 
benefits for various communities... [were] consciously removed by unknown persons."  
Other's called it an "attack since local communities...had suffered from historical injustices as 
a result of disenfranchisement of their lands...preventing them from their rights to 
development in accordance with their own needs and interests"(Binda 2010).  Rather than 
celebrating a Community Rights Law, the result has been largely anger and disagreement 
about the rights of local communities.   
 Stemming from the problems, disagreements and contention outlined above the forest 
reform process has come under mounting criticism not only for its" lack of progress"  but also 
because the future of the reforms appear more uncertain.  The optimism that existed after 
Johnson Sirleaf took office, the UN sanctions got lifted and the forest reforms laws passed 
have been replaced with a lack of confidence and growing hostility.  This has been 
accompanied by an ongoing process of trying to cast blame.  Much of the criticism concerns 
the delays in meeting the revenue projections of the commercial timber sector. It has been 
estimated that timber companies paid the government approximately $8.63 million in 2010 
(UN Panel of Experts 2010).169
                                                 
 
168 The author attended a community meeting in 2008 concerning the Community Rights Law and 
local representatives appeared to be stoking dissent.    
  While these revenues represent a significant improvement 
over the previous years, it failed to meet the projections in the country's PRSP, which sets out 
a road map for how to attain economic growth, poverty alleviation and state revenue (IMF 
2008).  The period 2001-2011, for example, was projected to total $107 million with the 





expected revenue of $24 million for 2008-2009 and $36 million for 2009-2010. Although the 
government modified its projections slightly, by all measures it will fall far short of estimates.   
 Part of the problem is that the government continues to provide optimistic revenue 
projections based on unrealistic scenarios, which raise expectations that cannot possibly be 
met (UN Panel of Experts 2009, 17).  A report commissioned by the Liberian NGO Green 
Advocates found that the FDA routinely overestimates timber volumes due to a combination 
of poor baseline data and a lack of capacity (Shearman 2009).  The overestimates provide for 
inflated revenue projections and may lead to unsustainable forest management practices both 
of which have a direct bearing on economic development and community relations.  The 
report described more accurate projections that are likely to be less than half as much as 
estimates furnished by the government and international peacebuilders (Shearman 2009).  
The reduction in expected revenues can  inhibit the forest reform  process as well since vital 
functions such as the chain of custody contractor is paid using revenue from the sector it is 
reporting on.170
                                                 
 
170 As of 2010, the $1 million to cover the expenses of the chain of custody had been secured as the 
government committed $500,000 and the World Bank and DFID each contributing $400,000.  
  The implications of inflated projections effect community revenues, county 
development funds and the management of protected areas since each is entitled to some 
percentage of revenues from the sector (UN Panel of Experts 2009, 27).  The Sustainable 
Development Institute (2010, 35) claims that the projections are "largely responsible for the 
government's relentless effort to restart the failed industrial logging... model."  At the same 
time, communities were told that they would share in the immense financial benefits of the 
commercial sector but so far this has not been the case.  The consequences of not meeting 
these expectations is unclear but "there are likely to be tensions when timber companies start 
harvesting without meeting their social obligations and the government is unable to release 





 As a ranking official in an international financial institution admitted, the government 
is under intense pressure to meet the expectations of the commercial timber sector (Interview 
41).  According to the government representatives, the problem in the complex and time 
consuming legal requirements of the forest reforms (Interview 2).  For example, the UN has 
identified 32 different steps in the allocation process (UN Panel of Experts 2009).  This has 
raised discussions, particularly in the government about modifying the law in such a way as 
to cut delays.  While interviews confirm the perception that the reforms and policies may be 
"too legalistic" or the "too complicated" for an FDA that lacks technical know-how and 
capacity, IPOs suggest that delays occurred because of other factors (Interview 7).  Several 
timber contracts were delayed because the bidding companies failed to meet a financial 
obligation of $250,000 and other sales were deferred due to questions of land ownership (UN 
Panel of Experts 2009, 18).  Moreover, some contracts were postponed due to an apparent 
lack of motivation in attending to details or, in fact, corruption by government officials that 
manipulate outcomes.  For international peacebuilders that have invested at least $20 million 
in the reforms, remedying the problem will take time as anti-corruption measures are 
undertaken and norms of good governance become institutionalized (Interview 39).  
However, one high ranking official in the FDA mentioned that from the perspective of the 
government, any so-called improprieties or corruption identified by IPOs actually represent 
"efficiencies" designed to get timber activities moving forward rapidly so as to keep promises 
to political constituents (Interview 42).  
 Government officials also suggest that the problems and delays in the commercial 
timber sector stem from interlocutors that want to put an end to industrial forestry in Liberia 
and obstruct progress (Interview 2; Interview 42).  These interlocutors include both 
international peacebuilders and international and Liberian NGOs.  People inside the FDA, for 
instance, have accused international peacebuilders, including employees of the World Bank 





that it will halt the timber industry.  An internal memo described GEMAP as engaging in a 
deliberate attempt to"...retard our progress" and vilified technical advisors for acts of 
"economic sabotage" and subverting the national interest--both of which are crimes 
punishable by imprisonment under Liberian law. Intimidation of IPOs by the government 
over the forestry reforms may be working because as recently as 2009 the World Bank 
advised its forestry advisor to "draw back from involvement of such contentious issues in the 
forestry sector, particularly commercial forestry" (UN Panel of Experts 2009, 19; Interview 
15).   The UN Panel of Experts, has also come under criticism from the government for 
undermining economic development and providing NGOs with the information intended to 
"stop commercial logging" (UN Panel of Experts 2009, 19; Interview 38).  Government 
officials involved in the management of the natural resource sector have even gone so far as 
to accuse IBOs of intruding into the sovereign administration of the country (Interview 1; 
Interview 38). 
 International and Liberia NGOs have consistently been accused of undermining the 
forestry reforms.  News reports--likely written by those close to government officials--have 
been highly critical of Global Witness, describing the organization as "paralyzing" the timber 
sector, and  stating that "many  Liberians especially rural Liberians ...will remain jobless as 
long as Global Witness and it collaborators continue ...to hold hostage the forest sector" (The 
Analyst 2009).   At the same time, Liberian NGOs are accused of opposing all commercial 
timber activities and even the government's control of forests.  As a member of a 
conservation organization put it, many local NGOs are attempting to pit communities against 
the government in order to halt industrial logging (Interview 4).  Recently, the government 
has "issued press statements, and at least one member of its staff has written an article, 
"questioning the motives" of NGOs (UN Panel of Experts 2009, 19). To this effect, the FDA 
published a public notice in the country's newspapers stating that it was no longer necessary 





discussions related to forest reforms and policies.  The notice noted that Liberian NGOs had 
an obligation to acknowledge state authority on forest matters, and a failure to do so could 
result in "actions compatible with the rule of law" (UN Panel of Experts 2009, 19-20).     
 International and Liberian NGOs equate the delays to which the government and 
international peacebuilders are concerned represents a much deeper problem related to the 
"fast-tracking" of commercial timber operations.  While some organizations believe that more 
public pressure needs to be applied to the Liberian government (Interview 8), others 
suggested that a flaw in the development model that commercial forestry represents is to 
blame (Interview 9; Interview 29). Global Witness has stressed that the in the rush to 
resurrect the forest sector has resulted in the "same mistakes that in the past have resulted in 
natural resource-fuelled instability, corruption and poverty" and that peacebuilders "overlook 
legal breaches, irregularities, evidence of corruption and poor governance" (Global Witness 
2010).  The Sustainable Development Institute (2010), suggests the government has betrayed 
its promise of fully implementing forest reforms, which not only puts "the livelihoods of 
communities at risk [but] undermines the implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy".  
SDI reported that in almost every aspect the government has failed to meet its legal 
obligations and there is no "political will in the government to reign in timber companies or 
to insist on transparency, accountability and the rule of law".  In short, pressures to fast-track 
the timber industry has led politicians to crumble and without concerted efforts to get forest 
reforms back on track, "logging will not be properly regulated, sustainability requirements 
will be discarded and community rights will be violated with impunity...and all of this will be 
for nothing because the expected revenue and jobs might not materialize (Global Witness 
2010; SDI 2010).  This view suggests that there is still a window of opportunity for the 
government to get things back on track but it will take a commitment by President Sirleaf to 





 The Sustainable Development Institute, and other Liberian NGOs, argues that 
without meaningful dialogue with communities on key matters such as land tenure, 
community rights and land ownership and without public access to forest-related information 
that can be used by communities for decision making, commercial forestry should not be 
allowed to move ahead. The groups question how the timber sector can support Liberian 
peace if contentious and occasionally violent episodes over land ownership and tenure still 
exist. These groups have also labeled forestry reforms as "fundamentally flawed" because 
they have "fast tracked" the commercial sector without meaningful dialogue or participation 
with affected communities. Since communities have not historically benefited from the 
timber industry, and have absorbed all the social and environmental costs, there is a 
widespread perception that if communities do not derive the benefits they feel entitled too; it 
may result in a serious disruption of peacebuilding and possibly conflict (Interview 28; 
Interview 20).  Given the deficiency of trust between communities and the government in 
Liberia, a more deliberate set of activities need to be discussed including one that puts 
communities--and not commercial forestry at the center of the paradigm; rather than the 
periphery (Interviews 28).  
 Finally, NGOs largely agree that despite several years and tens of millions of dollars, 
and despite the passing of cutting edge forest reforms, at this point the structure of the forest 
industry remains very similar to the past and "nothing has changed the character of key 
industry actors" (SDI 2010, 44).  This is evident not only in the issues described above, but in 
what NGOs describe as the gradual "attacks on civil society and the spread of misinformation 
about critics" (SDI 2010, 41; UN Panel of Experts 2009).  Guidelines circulated in early2009 
that suggested that all forestry matters must be approved by the government was viewed as an 
attempt to silence" NGOs (Interviews 28).  A common refrain among international and 
Liberian NGOs is that the government is attempting to turn people against these organizations 





instance, the government now routinely labels NGOs as "anti-development" or "anti-logging" 
when all they are doing is holding state institutions to the rule of law (Interview 28). 
According to a member of a Liberian NGO, one of the biggest changes from the past has 
been the "changing dynamics of power", in which the government has to listen to NGOs and 
civil society (Interview 28).  Senior officials in international peacebuilding organizations are 
also beginning view international and Liberian NGOs as hostile or "distrustful" which is a 
new trend that did not exist when forest reforms began (Interview 25). A senior World Bank 
official dealing with forest issues remarked that  a vocal NGO was undermining peace and 
security by "insisting on the full implementation of the law...which stalls... logging... and 
undermines the Poverty Reduction Strategy" (SDI 2010, 88; Interview 15).   
 A growing number of people are also beginning to present the case that large-scale 
industrial timber operations, contrary to the conventional wisdom does not alleviate poverty 
or  provide good employment opportunities for forest communities (World Bank 2008a). 
Instead, commercial forestry promotes conflict since it fosters a culture of patronage, 
"consolidates old rivalries over resources and agitates grievances among the population" 
(Interview 28).  Interviews suggest that the rush to return to an industrial timber industry 
ignores Liberia’s long history of exploitation, in which communities and the population at-
large did not benefit but became poorer, and fails to consider the cultural and livelihood 
values of forests (Interview 28; Interview 9).  One critic could not understand why "Liberia 
would export all its timber only to import toothpicks" if not for a system in which places an 
incentive on "rent-seeking behavior" (Interview 9).  As suggested by SDI (2009, 1), the fact 
that the forests reforms and policies have been so contentious should not be surprising since 
experiences from across Africa show that "progressive laws and equitable laws on paper are 







International peacebuilding organizations have come to understand the link between forests 
and the Liberian conflict as characterized by so-called "conflict timber".  Specifically, the 
problem was that timber and timber concessions were traded by the corrupt Taylor 
government in exchange for weapons, which destabilized the region and threatened 
international security.  The predominant peacebuilding challenge, then, was for IBOs was to 
help establish state control over forests, and improve governance to mitigate conflict and 
support economic recovery.  In essence, IBOs endeavor to transform "conflict resources" into 
"peace resources" for the purpose of establishing a stable and lasting peace.  
 This chapter has traced the forest reform process--including new policies, laws, 
regulations and practices--which culminated with the passing of a comprehensive forest 
reform law.  In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, IPOs were concerned with 
"securitizing" Liberia's forests by promoting and supporting the establishment of reforms and 
policies to "firm-up" or consolidate state control and authority over forests.  These reforms 
and policies stressed the importance of "good governance", including measures to improve 
revenue transparency, government accountability and public participation.  The purpose was 
to ensure the dynamics of "conflict timber" did not resurface.  Over time, international 
peacebuilders turned their attention to promoting reforms and policies that stressed 
"marketization", as exemplified by the emphasis on the commercialization of Liberia's forests 
in the NFRL. This signified a changing perception that the biggest threat to Liberia--and by 
extension international security--was no longer a lack of control over forest revenue but 
stagnant economic growth, poverty and a lack of state revenue.  
Given that nearly a decade has passed since the end of the conflict, and almost five-
years have elapsed since major forest reform what has been the effects?  While it appears that 





the government has made little progress in granting timber concessions and collecting the 
projected timber revenue. The reason, I suggest, is that we are also witnessing a period of 
contention and resistance over the "rules" for governing forests, which by-product of a 
struggle for control that is slowing down the process.   Since the rules, once established 
persist and often determine who has access to forests and who feels the effects of the 
environmental and social costs and benefits, it is not surprising that struggles persist, 
especially in societies where forest lands are fundamental to all aspects of political, economic 
and social life. The main points of contention and resistance appear to catalyze around issues 
of corruption, land ownership and tenure, a lack of genuine participation, and the 
consolidation of state authority over forests.  This contention and resistance has resulted in a 
few episodes of protest and opposition although the current trend is toward less trust and 
more hostility.  There is a growing perception, in fact, that the forestry sector is resuming the 
"old ways of doing things" (Interview 29).  The larger concern, which I turn to in Chapter 8, 
is to understand the source of the resistance and contention and determine what the 













Like the Liberian conflict, the brutal and protracted nature of the Sierra Leonean conflict has 
produced a diverse and expanding literature that has vastly enhanced our comprehension of a 
long and violent civil war (Reno 1995; Abdullah 2004; Gberie 2005; Keen 2005; Pugh, 
Cooper and Goodhand 2004).  Despite this literature however, a persistent set of 
explanations, many of which were put forth in the early years of the conflict, have floated to 
the surface and stuck.  For example, the conflict was blamed initially on a resurgence of 
Sierra Leone's "primordial" nature, which was triggered by over population and 
environmental decay, or even modernity (Kaplan 1994).  Still other explanations focused on 
post-Cold War dynamics that led to the collapse of governance and state institutions, 
lawlessness, and the emergence of a new breed of warlord with little interest in stability 
(Kaldor 1999; Richards 1996).    
 This chapter suggests that the prevailing explanation of the Sierra Leonean conflict, 
especially among international peacebuilders focuses on the economic agendas of the 
combatants and the role of valuable natural resources and their revenues played in the 
conflict's conflagration. Much like the conflict in Liberia, the prominence of literature 
discussed in Chapter 3, which employed an economic logic to link the environment and 
natural resources to conflict was influential. Such explanations highlighted the role of "loot-
seeking" rebels and "greedy" warlords--most prominently Liberia's Charles Taylor--that 
plundered Sierra Leone's vast diamond deposits to buy arms, get rich and sustain conflict. In 





be perceived in perpetuity as a novel species of civil war driven by the globalization or 
"warlordization" of the diamond trade (Campbell 2004).   I argue that these explanations, 
however parsimonious and intuitive, have done little to better our understanding and have 
largely misrepresented the conflict's complex dynamics especially with reference to conflict 
and Sierra Leone's diamonds.  The conflict does not resemble a "new war" but represents a 
continuation of political conflict, social grievances and competition for power in which 
diamonds have played a central role.  This is significant, I assert, because IBOs have been 
active in promoting and establishing reforms and policies in Sierra Leone to address the issue 
of "conflict diamonds", and therefore need understand the political, economic and social 
dynamics of the diamond trade.        
 This chapter begins with an overview of Sierra Leone's historical trajectory from 
British rule in the early 1800s until the eve of the civil war in 1990.  In this section, I 
highlight the impact of colonialism on the economic, political and social landscape that has 
influenced the formation of a sovereign Sierra Leone. I, then, detail Sierra Leone's civil war, 
which raged between 1991 and 2002, and in doing so emphasize the long history of patronage 
and grievance that made the rebellion possible.  I then provide historical background on 
Sierra Leone's diamonds and minerals to better understand the ways in which these resources 
have played a pivotal role the country's development. The final section of the chapter, then, 
describes the links between the diamonds, minerals and the conflict, how this relationship has 







The Long Road to Conflict in Sierra Leone 
The British Colony: Oppression and indirect rule 
 Sierra Leone was founded by British abolitionists as a free settlement for former 
slaves in 1787.  After a period of conflict and collapse, the British took full control of the 
settlement--renamed Freetown--and the surrounding peninsula in 1808, declaring it officially 
a "Crown Colony".  British authorities rapidly exploited the areas vast natural resources 
throughout the 1800s.  In the valley's near Freetown tropical timber was extracted in for the 
construction of British Navy ships and the export of Mahogany (Richards 1996).  The British 
intensified trade with the interior, with colonial trading companies purchasing agricultural 
and forest products destined for Europe and the US (Zach-Williams 1995).  This substantial 
trade activity led to the use of slave labor by indigenous chiefs that took advantage of their 
position as the "custodians of the land" to garner substantial profits and prestige.171
 In 1896, all of Sierra Leone became a British Protectorate and instituted colonial rule 
throughout the hinterland.  By bringing colonial administration to the indigenous peoples--
that now became "protected" peoples--the British believed it could more easily control trade 
and guarantee stability.  Colonial officials quickly recognized, however, that the colonial 
bureaucracy could not carry out the central tasks of managing trade and collecting revenues 
given the costs in money and legitimacy direct domination (Reno 1995).
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171 It also fostered violent competition between chiefs that led to sporadic uprisings and power 
struggles and led Colonial authorities also established the Frontier Force in 1890 to maintain law and 
order (Keen 2005). 
  Therefore, the 
British had to rely on the traditional authority of indigenous chiefs to extend influence and 
172 As Reno (1995, 30)  suggests, the dilemma of direct rule was that continued coercion by British 
forces to force compliance with administrative demands would cause local chiefs to form a 
counterweight to British "abuses" and local "collaborators" and become more involved in trade and 





carry out tasks in the interior.173
 The introduction of cash crops such as coffee and cocoa and the completion of the 
Sierra Leone railway continued to enrich chiefs but also began to "drag" Sierra Leone into an 
expanding "taxable cash economy" (Reno 1995, 38).  Estimates suggested that the value of 
exports reached between £1.6 and £2.2 million between 1920 and 1930 despite the Great 
Depression (Zach-Williams 1995, 44).  This was a welcome development since the business 
of colonial administration and the increasing demands to build infrastructure required 
revenue.  The desire to control trade led to the gradual domination of export markets by 
European trading companies and Lebanese traders, which had the effect of crowding out 
traditional Creole middlemen. This had the effect of pitting the interests of the Protectorate 
against the interests of the elites in Freetown (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999). The 
development of the "dependent" economy also was marked by continued tension and 
violence characterized by struggles over working conditions and wages as laborers realized 
they were "being denied their fair share of the proceeds" (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 
1999, 46-48; Zach-Williams 1995, 44).  
 As a colonial policy, "indirect rule" was employed in ways 
that rewarded indigenous chiefs that carried out the wishes of the colonial government.  The 
idea was to allow chiefs to employ their traditional authority and legitimacy to maintain 
stability, guarantee a plentiful supply of labor, demand tax payments and provide access to 
land and natural resources desired by the British and various trading companies.  
A changing economy and the consolidation of colonial authority 
 By the 1930s, Sierra Leone was transformed by the emergence of a mining sector and 
the economic, political and social changes that followed it.  The discovery of alluvial gold, 
                                                 
 
173 There was a discrepancy between those in Britain who wanted to rule Sierra Leone's interior with an 
iron fist and those colonial administrators who realized that because the British could not dominate the 





diamonds, iron ore platinum and chrome motivated colonial rulers to establish control of all 
aspects of mining in an attempt to monopolize the revenues.174  Between 1929 and 1932 
mining licenses were granted to European companies.  Whereas the "dependent" economy--
based on agricultural and forest products--required the co-option of indigenous chiefs to 
supply labor and maintain law and order, the mining sector and particularly the alluvial 
diamond sector sought to preclude any involvement of chiefs or indigenous labor.  This was 
because the government worried about competing "illicit "operations that would capture state 
revenues and company profits.175
 The exclusion of chiefs from diamond mining was seen as an "unwarranted extension 
of state power", and an infringement on their customary rights to be involved in the 
Protectorate's economic development (Reno 1995, 46-49).  As Reno (1995, 46) notes, 
decades of collaboration with the British "taught chiefs to expect direct economic gain" in 
exchange for "political loyalty." The arrival of armed mercenaries to guard alluvial diamond 
mining areas was not welcome. Tensions between the colonial administration and chiefs also 
stemmed from the increasing involvement of "strangers"--wealthy African and Lebanese 
elites from Freetown-- accused by the government of illicitly mining diamonds and paying 
chiefs that were excluding from formal mining operations, for "rent" and protection (Reno 
1995, 49).
 To protect these interests, the diamond company was 
authorized to provide its own armed security force.  
176  The chiefs then began playing an intermediary role where they would intervene 
in the diamond business on behalf of all concerned-"strangers".177
                                                 
 
174 Part of this was experience of the British in Ghana or the Gold Coast where it was believed that 
involving African's in mining would lead to exploitation, smuggling and a lack of revenues for the 
colonial administration.   
  Native Authority Scheme 
175 Alluvial diamond mining was dominated by SLST, which operated a 99-year lease. 
176 These strangers had been increasingly squeezed out of legitimate trade given the preference for 
European companies.   
177 This was heightened with the Native Authority Scheme, which provided chiefs with lavish salaries 
to cut back on illicit mining.  For example, the colonial administration believed that only through 





was approved to provide chiefs with lavish salaries as an incentive to cut back on illicit 
mining. The presumption of the colonial administration was that only through wealth-seeking 
behavior would chiefs begin to crack down on illegal mining activities. However, despite the 
new payments to keep diamond mining in the formal sector, chiefs remained deeply involved 
in illicit diamond mining playing off the dividing interests of the different actors.  Put simply, 
chiefs did not respond to reforms if that "undercut their own political power through the 
control of markets" (Reno 1995, 55). This exemplifies how political authority came to be 
divided in terms of the formal and informal sectors that distinguish a parallel "shadow state" 
to the institutional state (Reno 1995).   
 Despite efforts to crack down on illicit diamond mining by using indirect rule, during 
the "diamond rush" of the 1950s as many as 70,000 people were involved in illicit operations, 
mostly as diggers.  This rush paralleled post-World War II movements for increased political 
representation, a demand for more services like education from colonial authorities and 
increasing disturbances targeted at popular resentment over chief's privileges and taxes.  
Much of the resentment, in Kono District at least, was over the perception that the 
government controlled the best diamonds fields and held a monopoly over diamonds in which 
the benefits accrued to European companies, British officials and local chiefs while the 
population remained poor and marginalized (Reno 1995; Zach-Williams 1995).  Another 
issue was that the intensification of alluvial diamond mining led to a reduction in lands 
dedicated to subsistence agriculture, and this was done with the permission of chiefs who 
benefited from the illicit mining operations.  In 1955 local miners attacked SLST mercenaries 
and local police forces in response to these grievances.  Understanding that unrest threatened 
law and order-and colonial rule directly--the government moved to reform local government 
and end the SLST's monopoly on diamond mining.  The colonial authorities also legalized 
some illicit mining--even though only the wealthy and well connected could acquire a 





diamond wealth was leaking from the country making investments by the colonial 
government nearly impossible, and leaving the population in a persistent state of 
underdevelopment (Keen 2005; Zach-Williams 1995).    
One-party rule, patronage and rural exclusion 
 The developments in Sierra Leone's alluvial diamond areas intersected with post-
World War II political events that would lead to independence and the consolidation of party 
politics in post-colonial Sierra Leone.  While decolonization is a long process, British 
attitudes towards its colonies in the aftermath of the Second World War led to political and 
constitutional reforms. These reforms were intended to increase African representation. Such 
overtures were not without controversy as they exacerbated rivalries between the peoples of 
the Protectorate, including powerful chiefs and an educated class in Freetown (Cartwright 
1970).  Out of these developments emerged political parties that promoted the causes of 
certain constituencies and regions.  For example, uniting people of the Protectorate was the 
Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) led by Dr. Milton Margai.178  The SLPP enjoyed much 
economic and political authority in the waning years of British rule, which was a sign that the 
colonial rulers were grooming them take control after independence. However, the SLPP 
divided along regional and ethnic lines and came to be seen as hegemony of elites-doing little 
to change colonial dynamics (Cartwright 1970). The result was the formation of a new party, 
the All People's Congress (APC), which emerged under the leadership of Siaka Stevens just 
as independence from the British was made official in April 1961.179
 Steven's APC garnered its support from "wage workers, the rural poor, the lumpen 
proletariat, and those peasants who were chafing under the oppressive yoke of the chiefs" 
   
                                                 
 
178 Margai was the Protectorate's first medical doctor.   
179 Stevens and Albert Margai (Milton's brother and the first Protectorate Western-educated lawyer) 
initially launched the People's National Party (PNP) in September 1958.  However, a break in the 





along with the "mostly educated" --making it a party that would enjoy mass popular support 
(Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999, 70-71).  Post-independence elections in 1962 saw 
Margai elected as Sierra Leone's first head of state, largely due to the unconditional support 
of the SLPP by the Paramount Chiefs (Cartwright 1970).  Margai's government was 
legitimized by a post-independence nationalist fervor and a form of "tolerated pluralism" that 
came to resemble a messy but democratic form of politics.  However, the SLPP exercised 
patronage and coercion to consolidate power.  For example, Margai and the SLPP leadership 
continued to dispense development revenue to chiefs in the north in return for support while 
also allowing chiefs to put down any APC opposition violently (Reno 1995).180
 With Margai's death in 1964, Albert Margai took office but understood that the APC 
was emerging as an opposition party, and that state power needed to be consolidated.  The 
legitimacy of Margai and the SLPP continued to decline as suspicions of corruption, coercion 
and other authoritarian tactics increased.  Feeling threatened, Margai increased the number of 
Mende officers in the army and looked to Guinea for military support.
   
181  Margai's rule not 
only introduced the military into Sierra Leonean politics but began to use ethnicity as a 
political tool. Despite the ethnic and regional cleavages however, the population was united 
against the SLPP--with the APC winning elections in 1967 and bringing Siaka Stevens to 
power.182
 Seeking to build a "state hegemonic project", Steven's worked to diminish and divide 
any political rivals by employing intimidation and violence (Keen 2005; Reno 1995; Zach-
Williams 1999).   Steven's Special Security Division, which was virtually a private security 
        
                                                 
 
180 As Keen (2005, 14) suggests, this policy did not "endear the SLPP to the people of the north" and 
was not going to unite the country.   
181 Margai was reportedly the target of a coup in 1967 in which mostly northerners and Creole in the 
army were punished. 
182 The election results threatened Mende elements in the army, which joined with a handful of SLPP 
politicians to stage a coup against the APC.   However, the military regime was unpopular and quickly 





force, suppressed interlocutors and terrorized political dissidents.  Elections in 1973 and 1977 
suffered from intimidation and violence. Moreover, mass student protests against the 
deteriorating educational facilities in urban areas were routinely suppressed using harsh 
tactics. His grasp on power was increased when Stevens established a one-party state in 
1978.183
 Like the British, Stevens needed access to the natural resources that lie at the heart of 
political authority in Sierra Leone, and therefore needed the collaborate with or co-opt 
Paramount Chiefs.  Revenue was dependent on diamonds, minerals and other primary 
resources, which meant that Steven's needed to buy-off chiefs or appoint "intermediaries" to 
establish control.
  Although Steven's use of violence and repression of opponents was critical to 
consolidating political power, it was not sufficient.  
184
 Understanding that political threats were likely to emerge from informal markets, 
Stevens saw to it that plots were handed out to APC supporters such as government officials 
 Stevens formally attempted to control of the diamond sector through 
state-owned diamond mining companies. As Reno (1995, 95) suggests, these state-owned 
companies gave many chiefs a "powerful incentive to cooperate with government efforts to 
regulate the organization of mining, both illicit and legal, in order to increase the volume of 
resources available for distribution". The state, wanting to cement its relationship with 
friendly chiefs and ensure stability in diamond areas, provided security forces to suppress 
illicit mining operations and helped to protect chiefs from their own people.  Most of the 
revenues from the state-run operations failed to increase government revenue and substantial 
illicit mining continued.  Between 1968 and 1973 diamond production decreased by at least 
25 percent in official channels (Reno 1995).   
                                                 
 
183 Stevens famously stated that "An opposition party can...be destructive and useless force for a party 
committed to the good of the country-and the interests of my country must always come first with me".   






 The system that Stevens had imposed was not solely about personal enrichment 
(although this was certainly part of it) but also about maintaining a grip on power.  Revenues 
from diamonds and other resources were used to sustain a system of patronage in which 
revenues are distributed by patrons (Stevens and his cronies) to clients in return for loyalty 
and support.  Revenues from natural resources played a large part (Richards 1996).
  In essence, alluvial diamond plots were given in exchange for loyalty (Reno 
1995, 106).  The new policy also had the impact of shifting production away from the mining 
company and toward private production in the range of $60-70 million per year by 1980 
(Reno 1995).  Movement toward private production was in concert with a crack-down on 
small-scale miners and depriving the local population of the benefits. In 1974, the 
government also ended De Beers monopoly, awarding export licenses to several private 
dealers connected with Stevens.  This arrangement gave Steven's direct access to the foreign 
exchange that had largely been unavailable to the state and a stake in diamond sales 
themselves (Reno 1995).  In short, Steven's gained access to substantial private revenues 
blurring the lines between the state and the "shadow state".    
186  In the 
production of minerals such as rutile and bauxite government officials colluded with mining 
companies to evade taxes and manipulate contracts that kept state revenues minimal while 
allowing profits to accrue to companies and politicians.187
                                                 
 
185 Stevens allowed this through the Cooperative Contract Mining (CCM) company.  
 In this way, the natural resource 
sector strengthened patrimonial relations while depriving the state of taxes that could be used 
for the development of the state.  
186 An identical dynamic was at play during the 1980s fascination with "privatization".  In fact, 
privatization only enriched prominent politicians and businessman who colluded to avoid taxes. 
Chabal and Daloz (1999, 122) referred to this as the hijacking of privatization.  
187 This same dynamic was evident in the agricultural sector as government marketing boards set low 
prices on cash crops that deprived the state of revenue while importing more white rice for the 





 While patronage leads naturally to opportunity and even enrichment for some 
supporters and associates, it also requires the marginalization and repression of societal 
groups that resist domination or pose a threat to the status quo.  As Reno (1995, 126) argues, 
Steven's patronage monopolized opportunities and created resentment and popular unrest 
from those outside the "in" patronage networks.  In Sierra Leone, products and income that 
largely originated in rural areas--diamonds, agricultural and forest products--ended up 
benefiting urban groups, government officials and foreign investors.  In fact, in rural areas the 
Sierra Leone government was a remote entity that provided very little in the way of basic 
services while using repression to control the extractive economy.  But Steven's system began 
to erode in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a global recession undermined the national 
economy, which was based on primary commodity exports.  This was exacerbated by falling 
levels of domestic food production caused by an increasingly urban population, a rise in 
diamond mining (and cash crop cultivation) that ate up arable land.188  Between 1980 and 
1985 per capita income fell by an average of six percent annually and inflation was high 
(Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999, 116).189
 In a country where many people relied on a systems of entrenched patronage and 
financial favors, the sudden the lack of revenue raised questions about how to secure loyalty 
and support from powerful benefactors  like army commanders, Paramount Chiefs, senior 
government officials and intellectuals. Often using money provided by international financial 
  Needing an influx of revenue the 
government agreed to a structural adjustment package by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), which mandated reductions in government spending and privatization of state-run 
enterprises all of which placed hardships on Sierra Leonean society and further eroded state 
institutions (Reno 1995).  
                                                 
 
188 This led to a dependence on rice imports.   
189 Against the backdrop of drastic drops in state revenue, budget deficits and rising debt payments was 
the 1980 Organizations of African Unity Conference that burdened Sierra Leone's people with a $200 





institutions or foreign aid Steven's continued to leverage the "shadow state".190 Fearing a 
threat to his rule, Stevens withdrew state support from the rural areas to consolidate power in 
urban centers (Keen 2005).  This further disenfranchised rural communities (in the south and 
east of the country) and produced disaffected urban elite outside of Steven's patronage 
system.  Riots were common but were put down by security forces.  By 1985, Siaka Stevens 
was an unpopular dictator in his eighties.  Faced with economic and political turmoil Stevens 
retired, and appointed Joseph Momoh, a loyal "protector" and head of the military, as 
president.191
 Momoh's political survival was premised on his ability to regain control of diamond 
producing areas in order to rebuild patronage networks (and meet IMF demands) (IMF 1990).  
Momoh used foreign companies as a counterweight against the entrenched groups by 
granting a monopoly concession over a wide area.
  
192
                                                 
 
190 Due to economic hardship, Stevens paid off his soldiers with rice and other commodities, which 
only raise the prices for ordinary citizens.  As noted in Keen (2005, 27) the average bag of rice equaled 
a month's wages.    
  Momoh also cracked down on the 
informal trade in diamonds through an emergency act and two military campaigns (which the 
IMF supported as a policy of "regularization") to "force accumulation back under [state] 
control and to undercut ...the informal economy" (Reno 1995, 159). However, as Reno (1998, 
121) argues, "this assertive strategy, which seemed appropriate to centralize state control over 
resources, instead widened the gap between the state's authority in the capital and its capacity 
to control the minefields" in rural areas.  Up to 25,000 miners--mostly young men whose 
livelihoods were based on illicit mining--were forcibly removed from mining areas provoking 
considerable anger (Reno 1998, 121).   
191 Momoh had the support of the APC and was the only candidate in the presidential election. 
192 The company involved was LIAT Construction and Finance, an Israeli company.  LIAT had been 
implicated in funneling supplies and possibly armaments to apartheid South Africa.  






 Despite attempts to increase state control over diamond mining areas, however, 
economic decline continued.  Momoh vigorously pushed a "reform" agenda to secure IMF  
loans to pay the military and civil servants, maintain electricity in the capital and provide 
even basic health and education services.  But such "reforms" proved to be destabilizing.  In 
1989, inflation was at 100 percent and austerity measures increased the price of petrol as 
much as 300 percent, and rice to nearly 180 percent (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999, 
126).  As Reno (1995, 170) notes, "Sierra Leone's citizens saw a presidential network that 
existed only to extract resources."  In addition, the "middle strata"--those that were supposed 
to benefit most from reforms in exchange for political support--found life even more 
unbearable.  Protests and agitation by teachers, lawyers and students for fixing the economic 
situation and demanding a return to a multi-party system continued.     
War in Sierra Leone (1991-2002) 
In March 1991, a small group of rebels crossed into Sierra Leone from Liberian territory 
controlled by Charles Taylor's NPFL.  The rebels, who called themselves the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF), were commanded by Taylor confidante Foday Sankoh and supported by 
members of the NPFL and "mercenaries" from other parts of West Africa.193
                                                 
 
193 Sankoh was a former corporal in the Sierra Leonean army who under the Stevens regime spent 
seven years in jail for taking part in a coup attempt.193 After being released, Sankoh found his way to 
Libya where he trained with Taylor and other "revolutionaries" and later fought with Taylor's NPFL in 
Liberia. 
  The RUF 
leadership was motivated by political albeit not necessarily ideological goals (Keen 2005).  
Sankoh and his fighters declared themselves "freedom fighters" battling to free Sierra Leone's 
people from the corrupt one-party rule of the APC.  In the RUF's manifesto, the rebellion was 





elite and their masters abroad" (RUF 1995, 14-15).194  Taylor also harbored strategic reasons 
for sponsoring the rebellion, including anger over Sierra Leone's support of ECOMOG forces 
in Liberia.195 Taylor openly threatened President Momoh with invasion unless he withdrew 
his support.196
To combat the RUF, Momoh expanded the Sierra Leonean army that was largely 
unprofessional and ill-equipped.
    
197 The increase in troop numbers, however, did little to push 
back the rebels.  In fact, there is little evidence that the army, which was neglected and left on 
its own, confronted rebel elements directly.  Instead it pursued a policy of looting property 
and harassing civilians it believed to be supporting the insurgency.  This resulted in the 
rounding up of civilians and episodes of brutality and destruction that rivaled those carried 
out by the rebels.  Although rebel recruitment was linked to grievances spurred by 
disaffection over a lack of viable livelihood opportunities (no land and disruption of diamond 
mining) and chronic underdevelopment, widespread violence by the Sierra Leonean army 
against civilians drove young men to join the rebels.198
                                                 
 
194 Much has been written about the motives of the RUF cadre with Richards (1996) arguing that the 
underlying motives were inspired by Gaddafi's revolutionary-inspired "Third Way".  This explanation 
has been refuted by Bangura (2004).     
 Civilians found themselves with little 
protection from the violence, and while most preferred to flee, young men who were the 
targets of government atrocities were often recruited or forced into the RUF ranks.  This 
realization among the population that they would have to fend for themselves started the 
195 There have also been arguments that Libya had a strategic reason to stoke the rebellion in Sierra 
Leone (Keen 2005).   
196 Taylor may have also wanted to create a "buffer zone" between his forces and those of the anti-
Taylor ULIMO forces that were increasingly harassing NPFL forces.   
197 Stevens purposefully kept the army dysfunctional and ceremonial because it was seen as a threat to 
his power.    
198 It is also well documented that throughout the conflict recruitment to the RUF and Sierra Leonean 





"civil defense movement" or "Kamajors", which would eventually spread throughout the 
country.199
In April 1992 a group of disgruntled junior soldiers led a coup against President 
Momoh.
 
200 While the coup ended the APC's nearly a quarter of a century of one-party rule, it 
did not lead to the rebuilding of a multi-party state but started four years of military rule.  The 
APC ruling elites were replaced by a young cadre of army officers--led by Captain Valentine 
Strasser--with little education and no governing experience.201
A period of quiet in late 1993 started the flow of humanitarian assistance and 
renewed calls for the provisional military government to hold elections but this was disturbed 
by significant rebel advances.  The RUF--armed with new weapons and uniforms--increased 
 The new regime, calling itself 
the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) promised to end the war, democratize the 
country, and pursue an anti-corruption agenda.  However, this populist message was short-
lived.  The NPRC was preoccupied with threats to its rule, which led to political repression 
and summary executions.  In addition, rather than trying to end the conflict, Strasser and the 
NPRC escalated it by expanding the army. The financial weight of the war, and a lack of state 
revenue, also led the regime to increase control over the mining sector as the government 
granted concessions to mining companies and cracked down on diamond smuggling--which 
was made permissible by a series battles that returned the most productive diamond fields to 
government control.  However, these victories created new motives for the continuation of 
the conflict as army forces took control of the lucrative diamonds fields.  For the first time, 
the Sierra Leone's army had access to significant economic resources and "many officers 
were now keen to volunteer for duty in Kono District" (Keen 2005, 117).   
                                                 
 
199 The term "Kamajor" refers to traditional Mende hunters that were traditional hunters believed to be 
endowed with special or supernatural powers.   
200 It appears as though the RUF supported the coup leaders by promising to hold off on any attacks in 
the immediate aftermath of the coup (Keen 2005, 94).   





attacks on civilian targets, retook areas rich in diamonds and carried out attacks on the 
outskirts of Freetown202 Rather than traditional battle lines, however, what emerge was what 
Keen (2005) has termed a "strangely cooperative conflict" in which government soldiers and 
rebels colluded with each other to continue the conflict.  Reports of collusion were 
widespread with government forces normally fleeing rather than engaging the RUF in battle. 
The strategy, if there was one, was for the army and rebels to engage in small-scale 
skirmishes and brutality to depopulate rural areas prolong the war and continue to loot 
diamonds (Keen 2005).  During this time the term "so-bels" came to signify those with dual 
loyalties--"soldiers by day and rebels by night".203 The NPRC's vested interest in keeping the 
conflict alive by colluding with RUF and it leaders was seriously challenged by rebel attacks 
on key mining operations, including the Sieromco bauxite mines and Sierra Rutile, in 1995.  
The destruction and looting of these areas, largely with the complicity of "so-bels", greatly 
reduced the government's export earnings and ability to fund the army, which was now eating 
up three-quarters of the state's official budget (Reno 1998, 126).  While the Sierra Leonean 
army was in corrupt and weak, the Kamajor's had become an effective counter-insurgency 
force.204
A rebel offensive on Freetown in early 1995 severely constrained government 
ambitions to regulate mining or gain control of the country, and signaled the growing power 
of the RUF.  For Strasser and the NPRC, the threat was heightened by collusion between the 
rebels and the armed forces.  To ensure the regimes protection, Strasser began to enlist 
private mercenaries.
   
205
                                                 
 
202 The RUF has established several extensive camps in forest areas.   
  With the RUF moving closer to Freetown, Strasser reached out to a 
203 Strasser was reported to have quipped that 20 percent of the army was disloyal (Gberie 2005).   
204 The Kamajors were also implicated in human rights abuses (Keen 2005).   
205 The first of such relationships was with Gurkha Security Guards (GSG) that were paid tens of 
millions of dollars and diamond concessions and openly engaged in battle with the RUF (Reno 1998).  
While the Gurkha's repulsed rebel attacks, an ambush that killed GSG's commanding officer led to 





mercenary firm based in South Africa called Executive Outcomes (EO).206  EO's mission was 
to engage and destroy the RUF, help restore internal security, and by extension help attract 
new economic investment (Gberie 2005).  EO had business ties with the Branch-Heritage 
Group, which owned another security company (Sandline International), and mining (Branch 
Energy and DiamondWorks) and oil (Heritage Oil and Gas) companies. Strasser agreed to 
pay EO $15 million and a share of several diamond concessions in Kono, which were granted 
to Branch Energy three months after EO started operations in Sierra Leone.207 Despite the 
fact that the money paid to EO could have been spent on government troops or addressing the 
needs of the country, by late 1995 EO operations had brought relative stability to the 
country.208  EO effectively pushed the rebels out of Freetown and successfully returned 
diamond-mining areas.209
The relative calm, which emerged as a result of the EO offensive, provided an 
opening for the NPRC to hold elections in early 1996.  Strasser's transformation from a 
soldier to a civilian politician backfired when his second in command Brigadier General 
Julius Maada Bio staged a peaceful and internal coup. With Bio in control as the new NPRC 
chairman, efforts to hold an election and initiate peace talks continued. In March 1996, an 
election was held and Ahmed Tejan Kabbah became Sierra Leone's new president despite the 
lack of RUF participation and a brutal effort by rebels to undermine the vote.
  
210
                                                 
 
206 The use of mercenaries, and EO in particular, was not universally accepted by Sierra Leonean civil 
society - although groups that protested  were targeted by the military regime and punished harshly 
(see Gberie 2005).  However, in Kono District, the people were largely supportive of EO since it led to 
drastic reduction in fighting and brought a relative moment of peace. 
 Kabbah, a 
member of the SLPP party, was peacefully handed power by Bio for the first time in the 
country's history.  After the election, international aid increased dramatically although the 
207 Branch Energy also obtained shares of Sierra Rutile and Sieromco.  
208 Bangura (2004) suggested that the millions spend on EO by Strasser and the NPRC could have 
increased the salaries of the Sierra Leonean army by 8-fold.   
209 EO's success has been attributed to the deployment of attack helicopters, the inclusion of Kamajor 
units in EO operations, and the assistance of foreign troops.    
210 According to reports, the RUF amputated the hands of thousands of civilians in a bid to stop the 





government continued to rely on small-scale mining concessions for revenue and EO for 
security. While many heralded the democratic elections, relative stability and security 
throughout 1996, Reno (1998) highlighted how EO and other foreign private security forces 
pushed out local strongmen from diamond mining areas so as to increase Kabbah's political 
network.  In short, even though the power of the rebels and government soldiers had been 
reduced, these network relations "kept economic opportunity in privileged hands" (Gberie 
2005, 95; Reno 1998, 137).       
The election occurred just as peace talks between the NPRC and RUF were getting 
started in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire. Bio initiated the talks but Kabbah made them central to his 
presidency, even meeting with RUF leader Sankoh on several occasions and agreeing to a 
truce.211 The RUF was reluctant to sign a peace treaty with EO and other foreign troops still 
in the country and Sankoh wanted to be assigned, along with ranking members of the RUF, 
high-level posts in the government as any condition for laying down their weapons (Abraham 
2004).  Offensive operations by the Kamajors and EO, which included decisive military 
defeats of the RUF, led Sankoh to give in to demands and sign the Abidjan Peace Accord in 
November 1996.212
                                                 
 
211 Kabbah originally refused to meet directly with Sankoh or the top RUF commanders deeming it 
"unconstitutional and unethical".   
 With a peace agreement in place, pressures from the International 
Monetary Fund, public dissatisfaction (at least in part of the country) with foreign 
mercenaries and as part of the Accords demands, EO's contract was terminated and departed 
the country.   But the gap left by the departure of EO cannot be overstated. First, it had the 
effect of placing corrupt government forces in control of the country, and leaving diamond 
areas unprotected from large-scale exploitation, collusion and competition between RUF 
rebels, government forces, Kamajors and business interests (Keen 2005; Reno 1998). Second, 
212 It has been reported that Sankoh dropped his objectives and supported the peace plan because he 
was positioning himself for a power-sharing position in a post-coup NPRC administration (Abraham 





the RUF without fear of EO reprisal became less reluctant to abide by the peace settlement, 
and saw a new opportunity to gain political and economic advantage.213  Reports that the 
RUF was planning to continue the conflict and purchase weapons led Kabbah's government 
and Sankoh break off relations--only to have Sankoh held on weapons smuggling charges in 
Nigeria for 18 months.214
 Despite Kabbah's election and the peace agreement, fighting between the armed 
forces, Kamajors and rebels continued.  A military coup against President Kabbah in May 
1997, by members of the Sierra Leonean army forced him to flee to Guinea.  The coup, which 
started when soldiers released and armed some 600 prisoners onto the streets of Freetown, 
was apparently done in concert with the RUF leadership and "was the culmination of long 
period of collusion" between the army and rebels.
   
215  Johnny Paul Koroma, a "so-bel" of the 
highest order, was installed as the leader of the new Armed Forces Ruling Council 
(AFRC).216  According to Koroma, one reason for the coup was Kabbah's inability to foster a 
lasting peace with the RUF, and invited all rebel elements to come to Freetown to be part of a 
"People's Army" and join in a new coalition government that would lead to peace (Gberie 
2005).217
                                                 
 
213 Keen (2005, 203-207) describes how the international community failed to maintain a commitment 
to the Abidjan Peace Accord, which may have been a factor in  reigniting the conflict   
 Koroma, proclaiming the war over, banned the Kamajors, suspended the 
Constitution and installed Foday Sankoh as the country's second in-command. The 
proclamation of a joint government led the RUF to enter Freetown in droves. The capital was 
looted and the population brutalized by elements of the AFRC and RUF.  In a matter of 
214 This sparked an internal feud within the RUF in which Sam Bockarie, a former diamond miner and 
confidant of Sankoh took control (Hirsh 2001).      
215 Although Sankoh was under house arrest in Cote d'Ivoire, he was reported to be in constant contact 
with the RUF leadership.   
216 Koroma was freed from Pademba Prison and had been accused of a former coup plot a year earlier.  
217 Koroma also listed Kabbah's ethnically charged politics and closeness with the Kamajors as 
rationale for the coup (Gberie 2005).  However, the coup may have also been sparked by Kabbah's 
efforts to demobilize parts of the army.   The AFRC enjoyed support from anti-SLPP elements 





months, actions of the new junta triggered chaos, massive displacement and a refugee crisis 
on a level unknown since the conflict began.218
 In January 1999, ECOMOG, with between 10,000-14,000 troops along with Sierra 
Leonean Civil Defense Forces (CDF) , began a intensive effort to retake Freetown.
     
219  Within 
days, remnants of the AFRC and RUF junta were fleeing upcountry leaving a vast swath of 
looting, rape and killing in their path.  In March, Kabbah was restored to power and large 
majorities of the country, including the diamond producing areas, were under the control of 
ECOMOG and CDF control.220 With AFRC junta and RUF on the run and Sankoh guilty of 
treason and in a Freetown prison, it appeared the country could begin to rebuild.  However, 
once Kabbah returned as president, the security situation declined throughout 1998. For the 
first time, the Sierra Leone conflict began to get increased media attention, which arguably 
compelled the international community to get more involved.  Although calls for an UN-led 
peacekeeping force were disregarded, pressure mounted for a peace settlement.  In particular, 
Nigeria, the US and Britain advocated dialogue between the warring parties, which began in 
Lomé, Togo in May 1999.221  To Sierra Leonean civil society and many Sierra Leoneans in 
general, further negotiations with the RUF seemed pointless. The government's position was 
that they would not agree to any power-sharing agreement or national unity government 
(Gberie 2005; Hirsh 2001).  The RUF, on the other hand, demanded cabinet-level positions, 
particularly for Sankoh who was sentenced to hang.222
                                                 
 
218 An estimated 400,000 fled Freetown.  
 Despite a deep reluctance to deal with 
Sankoh, who he despised as a "treacherous and evil man" who could not be trusted, Kabbah 
219 These Civilian Defense Forces were made up of Kamajors and other anti-AFRC elements.  They 
began an assault in eastern diamond mining areas in January 1998.  
220 As Keen (2005) notes, ECOMOG commanders and Kamajors were engaging in illicit diamond 
mining.   
221 The week previous, Kabbah flew to Lomé to agree to a ceasefire.  Many believed, at first, that he 
was forced to sign it by US envoy Jesse Jackson.   
222 Interviews with Kabbah in Gberie (2005) suggest he did not want to negotiate with Sankoh but did 





believed the only way the UN would intervene in Sierra Leone was if a peace agreement was 
reached  (Gberie 2005, 157).  In July 1999 the Lomé Peace Agreement was signed by the 
government and RUF.223 The agreement gave the RUF at least seven ministerial positions, 
enabled the RUF to assemble itself into a political party and placed Sankoh in charge of the 
mineral rights commission and Vice Presidency.224
With the Lomé Agreement the UN role in Sierra Leone grew substantially from it 
almost non-involvement in the years before.
  
225  The UN Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL) was authorized by the Security Council via UN Resolution 1270 to oversee 
disarmament and demobilization activities and provide up to 6,000 peacekeepers (UNSC 
1999).226 Although the Lomé Accord signaled peace between the warring factions it did not 
guarantee it since many factions, including Sam Bockarie's RUF contingent, was against any 
agreement or UN involvement (Keen 2005, 254-256).227 This resulted in almost constant 
harassment of the UN contingent culminating in the RUF taking over 500 peacekeepers 
hostage in the city of Makeni and an RUF offensive aimed at Freetown in May 2000.228
                                                 
 
223 Among the many provisions, Lomé did provide for a Truth and Reconciliation and Human Rights 
Commission but granted amnesty to all parties to the conflict. According to Gberie (2005), this 
"scandalized Sierra Leoneans and the human rights community around the world".  According to Coll 
(2000), despite the documented atrocities carried out by the RUF, they were being treated as victors.  
Reacting to the agreement, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights announced that the amnesty 
provisions left open the possibility of prosecuting those responsible for the atrocities and war crimes 
(Gberie 2005).     
 In 
protest, as many as 30,000 demonstrators marched to the home of Sankoh demanding the 
peacekeepers be released and the war ended.  Sankoh was captured and placed into 
224 Gberie (2005) called the head of the mineral rights commission the "diamond czar".  Ironically, he 
was charged with responsibly for controlling the exploitation of gold, diamonds and other resources of 
strategic importance to Sierra Leone.  
225 In some respects, the UN became the "guarantor" of peace in Sierra Leone.  
226This was in addition to the nearly 12,000 Nigerian soldiers already deployed.  The Nigerian troops 
were withdrawn over time.     
227 A related problem was that combatants failed to see that peace was a desirable outcome because 
DDR efforts excluded many armed groups (AFRC, CDF and Sierra Leone army) and were largely 
unsuccessful at providing alterative livelihoods or counseling to those that were included (Keen 2005). 
In addition, as Keen (2005) suggests, many combatants were still manipulated by their leaders and 
therefore were reluctant to put down their arms.    





government custody. As evidence surfaced that Sankoh had been involved in diamond 
smuggling, Kabbah requested that the UN establish a special court to prosecute those in the 
RUF most responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity (Hirsch 2001).229
These events, coupled with accusations that Nigerian officers had been deeply 
involved in diamond smuggling, led to the virtual collapse of the UN peacekeeping endeavor 
and the Lomé Agreement (Olonisakin 2008; UN Panel of Experts 2000, 30).  Making light of 
UNAMSIL's constraints, the mandate was broadened to allow a vigorous response to hostile 
attack and a mission to extend state authority and establish law and order (Olonisakin 
2008).
          
230
The kidnapping of the UN peacekeepers and the advance toward Freetown in May 
2000, proved to be beginning of the RUF's steady decline. Part of this can be attributed to 
UNAMSIL's gradual strengthening both as a military and political force (Olonisakin 2008).   
However, RUF incursions into Guinean territory, ostensibly to gain access to an area rich in 
diamonds, resulted in a massive response from the Guinean army.
  While the weak UN peacekeeping efforts were certainly to blame for the back 
slide, other factors were equally important.  For one, Liberian President Charles Taylor 
continued to support it by supplying weapons and buying diamonds.  A report published and 
widely disseminated in early 2000 by the NGO Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) found that 
Sierra Leone's diamonds had been plundered by Taylor to support his political and economic 
ambitions and were equally indispensible to the RUF (Smillie, Gberie, and Hazelton 2000).   
In response, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1306 in July 2000, which prohibited 
the import of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone.  
231
                                                 
 
229 According to Olonisakin (2008, 119), the idea of a special court was the brainchild of the US, The 
Special Court for Sierra Leone was established by the government and UN in January 2002.   
  More importantly, the 
230 According to Olonisakin (2008) there was a belief that the failure of UNAMSIL would create a 
Somalia-like situation from which the UN may never recover.   
231 Guinea was supported by French, US and British intelligence as well as Civil Defense Forces 





British introduced a military force into Sierra Leone that was able to dismantle and intimidate 
the RUF at will and convince them it was in their best interest to honor the peace agreement. 
In fact, by the end of 2000, over 1,000 British troops were on the ground to provide security 
(Gberie 2005, 175).232 The RUF's decline is also related to international attention to "conflict 
diamonds" (Le Billon 2008).  The UN Panel of Expert report, for example, confirmed that 
diamonds were an important resource for the RUF and Liberian official involvement (UN 
Panel of Experts 2000). By mid-2001, the RUF was also disarming and demobilizing in 
conjunction with the 1999 agreement.233 Although an isolated Taylor was still in power in 
Liberia, the UN’s disarmament, demobilization and reintegration policy continued to gain 
momentum. This went more smoothly than expected for two reasons.  First, the RUF's new 
leader was motivated by a "war-weariness" within the ranks and determined to clamp down 
on human rights abuses and keep the peace in order to form a viable political party (Keen 
2005).Throughout 2001, the Sierra Leone conflict was ultimately coming to an end as 
representatives from the warring parties came together to hammer out another ceasefire in 
May 2001234
Sierra Leone's Diamond and Minerals in Historical Context 
  
Sierra Leone is endowed with substantial mineral resources.  While a geological survey failed 
to locate minerals in a1918-1921 expedition, a subsequent survey in 1926 turned up minerals 
and diamonds that changed Sierra Leone forever (Zack-Williams 1995, 45).235
                                                                                                                                           
 
been "deployed" to Liberia to defend Charles Taylor, few reinforcements were available (Gberie 
2005).  
 Alluvial gold 
232 Of course, Britain's military assistance was only one component.  Britain was the largest donor, 
provided considerable financial support to the government and was the main sponsors of UN 
Resolution 1270 and 1306.  
233 Until the early part of 2001, RUF fighters were still engaged in sporadic gun battles with Guinean 
troops and Civil Defense Forces and therefore were reluctant to disarm without a guarantee for 
protection from UNAMSIL.    
234  





deposits were discovered in Tonkolili District, and diamonds in Kono in 1926-1927, along 
with iron ore in Marampa (Port Loko District in the north), platinum on the Freetown 
peninsula and chromites in Kenema District.236  In 1927, colonial authorities assumed all 
mineral rights to gain control of the future revenues (Reno 1995, 46).237   Soon afterwards, a 
mining license was given to the European firm, African and Eastern Trading Company. 
Platinum and gold exports began in1930 (Zack-Williams 1995).238
 The first alluvial diamonds were discovered in the Nimi Koro Chiefdom in Kono 
District.  Prospecting started soon after the deposits were found to be "probably the richest 
alluvial diamonds in the world" (Hall 1970).   Mining began in earnest when colonial 
administrators signed a concessionary agreement with Consolidated African Selection Trust 
(CAST), a corporation controlled by a London company--Selection Trust Group--that had 
shares held by the South African De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited.
  In 1933, iron ore was 
exported for the first time, again by the African and Eastern Trading Company, who began 
construction on a railway from the deposits in the north of the country to the port.  The 
company secured a 99-year lease on about five square miles with an estimated annual 
payment of £250 going to the tribal authorities.  The Colonial Development Act was passed 
in 1929, which led to a new company--the Sierra Leone Development Company (DELCO)--
which would be active in the export of iron ore for the next 40 years with very generous 
terms of trade (Zack-Williams 1995, 49).       
239
                                                 
 
236 There is some confusion and uncertainty as to when certain minerals were discovered. 
  In 1932, CAST 
formed a new company, the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST), which was awarded a 99-
year concession.  Two years later, SLST's diamond mining lease would cover all the land 
outside of the Freetown peninsula. The alluvial diamond mining, the colonial government and 
237 Part of this was experience of the British in Ghana or the Gold Coast where it was believed that 
involving African's in mining would lead to exploitation, smuggling and a lack of revenues for the 
colonial administration.   
238 An addition, eleven exclusive prospecting licenses were awarded solely to European firms.    





the SLST attempted to prevent the involvement of chiefs or indigenous labor, because the 
government worried about competing illicit operations.240 However, the exclusion of chiefs 
and local peoples from alluvial diamond mining was seen as an "unwarranted extension of 
state power" and an infringement on their customary rights (Reno 1995, 46-49).  As a result, 
chiefs began playing an intermediary role in the diamond business by mediating access on 
behalf of Lebanese businessman, the government and their people-all the while being 
rewarded with greater prestige, power and resources.241
 By the 1950s, the economy was largely dependent on mineral exports although the 
most important sector remained agriculture.  According to Zack-Williams (1995, 54), total 
mineral exports rose from less than one percent in 1929 to 73 percent in 1940 and almost 88 
percent in 1960.  Whereas in 1953, iron ore accounted for 74 percent of total value of 
minerals, less than a decade later diamonds had taken the place of iron ore amounting to 
almost 80 percent of the total (Zack-Williams 1995, 56).  This growth of mining operations 
changing the composition of labor, employing  thousands of workers and led to a growing 




                                                 
 
240 SLST also employed an armed security force to control its operations.   
  The number of illicit miners increased from 5,000 to as many as 70,000 in the mid-
1950s. This "diamond rush" was propelled by a series of crop failures in which many farmers 
turned to mining to meet their livelihood needs.  The diamond rush also had other 
consequences.  For instance, diamond pits spread across the landscape it destroyed land 
suitable for agriculture, had an impact on food availability, water drainage and the 
environment, more broadly.  
241 This was heightened with the Native Authority Scheme, which provided chiefs with lavish salaries 
to cut back on illicit mining.  For example, the colonial administration believed that only through 
wealth-seeking behavior would chiefs begin to crack down on the "strangers'" activities.  
242 The direction of the migration was mostly from the north to the south where opportunities in illicit 





 Regular attempts by colonial authorities to crack down on illicit mining led to 
popular resentment, in Kono District and other diamond-rich areas over the perception that 
SLST held a monopoly over diamonds that disproportionately benefited European companies, 
British officials and local chiefs while the population remained poor and marginalized (Zack-
Williams 1995; Reno 1995).  Unrest led colonial administrators to create the Mining Area 
Development Administration (MADA), which was to manage rural development projects 
derived from diamond revenue.243 In addition, colonial authorities ended SLST's monopoly 
on diamond mining by surrendering some of its diamond concessions and legalizing some 
illicit mining through the Alluvial Diamond Mining Scheme (ADMS).244  These reforms, 
however, had the effect of opening up diamond mining only to the wealthy and well-
connected since most Sierra Leoneans lacked the resources to enter the diamond mining 
business.245
 To combat smuggling, the Gold and Diamond Office (GDO) was set up to buy and 
sell exportable diamonds.
  This, in part, led to increased levels of smuggling, which accounted for roughly 
two-thirds of the total value of diamonds produced (Hall 1970).  
246 The GDO was to pay higher prices than could be obtained 
through the "black market" and reduce smuggling that weakened De Beers' market position.   
Smuggling was also to be curtailed by deploying security forces-augmented by De Beers' 
mercenaries- to crack down on illicit mining operations.247
                                                 
 
243 As Reno (1995, 65-68) notes, side payments to chiefs under the auspices of the MADA since they 
central to maintaining stability and implementing policy in the hinterland.  This effort at development 
largely strengthened the "shadow state".   
  Reports from the period suggest 
that the GDO and increased security had the effect of reducing smuggling and increasing 
legal diamond exports although substantial revenues for the government remained out of 
244 The SLST still held on to the most productive areas around Tongo in return for increased protection 
from colonial authorities.  
245 Paramount Chiefs and the ruling families, in particular, benefited from their ability to grant licenses 
and reserved the best deposits for themselves by taking advantage of their role as the custodian of all 
lands in the Protectorate (Zack-Williams 1995).  
246 The GDO was run by Diamond Corporation, a part of the De Beers cartel. 





reach while profits for De Beers increased dramatically.248
 Throughout the developments of the 1960s, most notably Sierra Leonean 
independence and the emergence of party politics, minerals and diamonds remained front and 
center in Sierra Leone politically, economically and socially.  Although Margai's SLPP party 
united the people of the protectorate in the waning years of British rule, over time his rule 
came was linked to the colonial system based on corruption and coercion to control access to 
diamonds. Even so, Margai's rule was viewed as a time of "stability and predominantly 
legitimate operations...alluvial diamond mining has become an established and accepted 
feature of the economy of the country and provides a living for about 25,000 
miners...smuggling is no longer a serious problem, and miners now receive a reasonable 
proportion of the export value of their diamonds" (Hall 1970).
 In short, Sierra Leone's diamond 
wealth was leaving the country and leaving the population in a persistent state of 
underdevelopment (Keen 2005; Zack-Williams 1995).    
249
 Given challenges to Steven's rule by chiefs and other political rivals, natural 
resources played a large part in the Stevens' objective to build a "state hegemonic project" 
and consolidate state power in the 1970s.  In 1971, Stevens formally attempted to gain control 
of the diamond sector by forming a state-owned diamond mining company (NDMC or 
  Certainly, official diamond 
exports reached their apex in the mid-1960s with average production estimated at $250 
million and contributed to 60 percent of foreign exchange earnings. However, the APC and 
Siaka Stevens, who garnered most of his support from the rural poor in Kono, used diamonds 
to oppose the SLPP and bring Stevens to power in 1968.  Stevens argued that diamonds 
represented "the little man's only hope for wealth" (Smillie, Gberie, and Hazelton 2000, 41) 
as a way to oppose Margai's policies.   
                                                 
 
248 According to Van der Laan (1965), diamonds produced under the ADMS was one-thirtieth of the 
value on the world market.  This provided De Beers with a substantial profit while reducing the 
amount the government could tax.  





DIMINCO) to increase diamond production in order to increase sources of foreign exchange 
and state revenues.  However, the operation failed to increase government revenue.  As a 
result, Steven's set about to privatize mining by rezoning mining areas as cooperatives that 
were given largely to APC supporters.  The new policy shifted production away from the 
mining companies and local chiefs and toward private production in the range of $60-70 
million per year by 1980 (Reno 1995).  Movement toward private production was in concert 
with a crack-down on small-scale miners and a policy of repression to control the extractive 
economy. When the government ended De Beers' monopoly Stevens gained direct access to 
the foreign exchange that had largely been unavailable to the state and a stake in diamond 
sales themselves (Reno 1995).  Revenues from diamonds and other resources were used to 
sustain a system of patronage by which revenues are distributed to patrons in return for 
loyalty and support rather than supporting economic and social development.  Ultimately, this 
led to the decay of state institutions and growing resentment from young men outside the 
circles of patronage and with few livelihood options outside of alluvial diamond mining.   
 The same dynamic of patronage continued well after Stevens handed power to 
Momoh in 1985.  To illustrate the pattern, which started under Stevens, official diamond 
exports in 1970 were about two million carats but by 1980 had dropped to 595,000 carats and 
48,000 in 1988 (Smillie, Gberie, and Hazelton 2000, 5).  In 1988 diamond exports flowing 
through official government channels reached only $22,000 while the informal sector 
exported an estimated $250 million.  Momoh's political survival was premised on controlling 
diamond producing areas since it provided his government foreign currency and was a way to 
control local strongmen and illicit miners.  Momoh's "assertive strategy", which used military 
forces to control minefields, pushed 25,000  miners,  mostly young "diggers" whose 
livelihoods were based on illicit mining and who started mining diamonds due to a lack of 
land and other opportunities for making a living were forcibly removed from  mining areas 





illicit mining for decades and resented APC control.  Finally, moving the army, which was 
poorly paid and equipped, created an incentive for soldiers to get involved in illicit diamond 
mining.   
 While diamonds have garnered the lion's share of attention, the mining of gold and 
iron ore continued since the 1930s, the production of minerals such as rutile and bauxite 
began in the 1960s.250  Rutile, produced by Sierra Rutile Limited, which changed ownership 
several times, increased production during the 1980s and early 1990s, amounting to about 
one-third of world output (World Bank 2005).  In 1991, just before the war started, 
production of rutile and another titanium mineral, ilmenite, totaled over 200,000 tons, which 
was valued at $86 million (World Bank 2005). The rutile mines provided employment for 
about 2,250 workers, making it the largest private employer in Sierra Leone.  Plans to expand 
the operation were put on hold due to risks associated with the war (World Bank 2005, 5).   
At the same time, Sierra Leone's bauxite, which was mined by Sierra Leone Ore and Metal 
Company (SIEROMCO), was a relatively small player in global markets.251
                                                 
 
250 Iron ore mining, which was started by DELCO in the 1930s, was discontinued in the early 1980s 
due to depletion of the iron reserves.  Production resumed in 1982-1984 from tailings but was 
unsuccessful (World Bank 2005).  Gold mining is of the artisanal variety and was estimated to be 
about 50,000 ounces or $15 million annually (World Bank 2005, 6).   
  Just before the 
conflict, Sierra Leone produced about 1.2 million tones of bauxite valued at $25 million 
(World Bank 2005).  Faced with decaying infrastructure, low international prices and the 
risks associated with the civil conflict, SIEROMCO ended operations and withdrew from the 
country.  As with the diamond sector, it was common knowledge that government officials 
colluded with mining companies to evade taxes and manipulate contracts that kept state 
revenues from the sector minimal while allowing profits to accrue to companies and 
politicians. In this way, the natural resource sector strengthened patrimonial relations by 





providing "big men" and their followers to benefit from private accumulation while depriving 
the state of taxes that could be used for the development of the state.   
 If anything the availability diamonds and minerals, and the corresponding 
accumulation of wealth by elites, enabled  such political, social and economic developments 
by strengthening the power of the traditional chiefs and ruling classes, destabilizing and 
marginalizing rural communities and rationalizing the use of state-sponsored violence 
(Abdullah 2004).252
International peacebuilders and the emergence of "conflict 
diamonds" 
  These factors, taken together, had the effect of weakening state 
institutions, undermining the legitimacy of the state as a governing force and fostering 
patterns of resentment and alienation that made the recruitment of rebel leaders and fighters 
possible.   
 
The economic, social and political trajectory of Sierra Leone being deeply linked to the 
mineral and diamond mining, it is surprising that these factors did not emerge as an 
explanation of the conflict until at least seven years after it began.  Among Sierra Leoneans 
diamond mining, and to a lesser extent, industrial mining operations, had been a locus of 
conflict and violence almost since they were discovered. This was particularly the case in 
Kono District where the RUF emerged and gained a foothold.  In addition, the rebels and 
government soldiers took turns controlling the country's most lucrative diamond fields 
throughout the conflict, apparently even colluding to avoid peace. A handful of scholars did 
point out the role diamonds and minerals played in constructing the "shadow state" and 
exercising political power (Reno 1998, 113).  William Reno (1995; 1998), for instance, 
acknowledged the role diamond and mineral revenue--and the control of mineral resources 
                                                 
 
252 Sierra Leone's dependence on international financial institutions also helped to fund such governing 





more broadly--played as a key component of the conflict since it functioned as a means to 
pay soldiers, mercenaries and keep a hold on power for warlords and government leaders.  
Likewise, Ian Douglas (1999) touched on how political and economic actors in Sierra Leone 
had always used the control and exploitation of mineral resources as a means to political 
power.  But international actors by-and-large did not appear concerned with the diamond 
trade as long as it was fueling an internal conflict (Pugh, Cooper and Goodhand 2004).  The 
RUF established an office in Brussels--close to Antwerp's diamond markets--with little 
fanfare.  Moreover, it was no secret that the substantial amounts of diamonds flooding into 
Tel Aviv and Antwerp from Liberia and Guinea had originated in war ravaged Sierra Leone.       
 As discussed in Chapter 3, scholarship in the late 1990s turn to economic motives 
and rebel greed to explain the emergence and growth of civil wars in the developing world 
(Collier and Hoeffler 1998; 1999; Keen 1998).  As Keen (1998) noted at the time, "conflict 
can create war economies, often in regions controlled by rebels or warlords and linked to 
international trading networks; members of armed gangs can benefit from looting...winning 
may not be desirable."  The work of Keen and others appeared to reflect the ongoing situation 
in many war-torn states, particularly in Africa.  A focus on diamonds, in particular, emerged 
when Global Witness reported on the role of diamonds in fueling the Angolan conflict 
(Global Witness 1998).  This led almost immediately to UN Security Council Resolution 
1173 enacted in June 1998 that instructed all member states to "take the necessary 
measures...to prohibit the direct or indirect import from Angola to their territory of all 
diamonds that are not controlled by  the certificate of origin regime" managed by the 





 The discourse of African conflicts began to shift away from the discourse of new 
barbarism" and toward economic explanations that focused predominantly on diamonds.253  
As an editorial in the New York Times in August 1999 stated: "loot not better government has 
motivated...the brutal guerillas of Sierra Leone... [who] trade diamonds they control for arms 
through neighboring Liberia, under the sponsorship of President Charles Taylor, their 
longtime patron."  The editorial underscored the prevailing discourse and emphasized the 
importance of an international embargo on so-called "conflict diamonds" until there are 
international controls in place, and US consumers are shamed into ending their role in 
Africa's misery (New York Times 1999).  Global Witness soon initiated a global campaign 
with four other European NGOs to educate the global public about the consequences of 
conflict diamonds.254  The campaign, called 'Fatal Transactions', began with a press release 
with the heading: "Campaign launched to stop billion dollar diamond trade from funding 
conflict in Africa". The campaign targeted select journalists, newspapers and jewelry retailers 
in the US and Europe.255
 By late 1999, the significance of "conflict diamonds" to the RUF was beginning to 
get the attention of IBOs.  The US Agency for International Development (USAID) and 
Britain's Department of International Development (DFID) developed diamond industry 
reforms and policies designed to address the link between diamonds and conflict 
  An article in the Washington Post appeared the same month noting 
how "diamond hunters" were fuelling Africa's brutal civil wars and Charles Taylor was using 
diamonds to fund the war in Sierra Leone (Rupert 1999).   
                                                 
 
253 International attention turned to Sierra Leone in 1998 and 1999 stemming in part from failure of 
elections to being an end to the conflict, the brutal assault on Freetown and emerging reports of 
amputations, child soldiers and civilian casualties. It should be noted that this was not always the case.  
For example, an expose of the Sierra Leonean conflict by Washington Post reporter Steve Coll in early 
2000 only made two brief mentions of diamonds.   
254 Fatal Transactions was led by Global Witness (UK), Medico International (Germany), Netherlands 
Institute for Southern Africa and Novib (Oxfam Netherlands).      
255 Part of the campaign entailed sending fake diamond rings to journalists and retailers with messages 





(USAID/OTI 2001, 2).   In the US Congress, trade legislation reflected the emerging 
prominence of conflict diamonds on the international agenda.  Congressman Tony Hall 
advocated for a disclosure clause in which the source of diamonds imported into the United 
States would identified.  Hall (1999) noted that since Americans bought a majority of 
diamonds sold globally, such a provision could change the market and send a message to the 
diamond industry that diamonds fuel wars.  
 By 2000, the blame for the Sierra Leone conflict had been placed squarely on 
"conflict diamonds."256
 
  An influential and widely read report by international NGO 
Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) gave a detailed depiction of Sierra Leone's diamond 
industry and its corruptive and violent impact. The report, which was published in January 
2000, detailed how "diamonds--small pieces of carbon with no great intrinsic value--have 
been the cause of widespread death, destruction and misery for almost a decade" (Smillie, 
Gberie, and Hazelton 2000, 1).  While the report suggested that the genesis of the conflict 
goes back to the privatized violence of the 1950s and the emergence of Steven's "shadow 
state" in the 1970s,  it argued that the conflict was not caused by political grievance so much 
as  by "economic opportunity presented by a breakdown in law and order" (Smillie, Gberie, 
and Hazelton 2000, 2).  The conflict was not being fought for a "better government" but as a 
means to looting diamonds and engaging in "profitable crime under the cover of warfare" 
(Smillie, Gberie, and Hazelton 2000, 11). The informal diamond mining sector that had long  
existed in Sierra Leone, according to the report, had became globalized and influenced by 
transnational smuggling networks in which "violence was central to the advancement of 
vested interests" (Smillie, Gberie, and Hazelton 2000, 3).   
                                                 
 
256 The PAC report received widespread publicity around the world and was covered in most major 





 The report exposed inner workings of the international diamond trade and 
documented the "secretive, iconoclastic and exploitative" industry, which sells 67.1 million 
pieces of jewelry valued at $50 billion annually.  PAC provided an overview of the major 
commercial and corporate interests, including De Beers that controlled 70-80 percent of the 
market supply of rough diamonds, and Belgium and the Diamond High Council.257  The 
report stressed that De Beers was not actively involved in mining activities in Sierra Leone 
but that trading companies in neighboring countries, particularly Liberia, were buying 
diamonds that originated in Sierra Leone. PAC noted that the Government of Sierra Leone 
recorded exports in 1998 totally 8,500 carats although numbers registered in Belgium pointed 
to exports in the range of 770,000 carats. In addition, although Liberian diamond mining 
capacity was estimated to be between 100,000 and 150,000 carats records in Belgium 
indicated Liberian imports at over 31 million carats between 1997 and 1998 (Smillie, Gberie, 
and Hazelton 2000, 5).258
 The PAC report also found that as the conflict spiraled out of control, the RUF's 
diamond mining activities became more extensive and coordinated by Charles Taylor.  PAC 
maintained that the RUF managed special armed mining camps that used captives and 
"freelance" miners--mostly young men with no other options--to mine diamonds.
    
259
                                                 
 
257 Antwerp, according to Smillie, Gberie, and Hazelton 2000, is "undeniably the world centre for 
rough diamonds" and the Diamond High Council is an organization tasked with promoting the Belgian 
diamond industry.  
  The 
258  Without international companies actively involved in diamond mining during the conflict, the 
industry was largely left to small companies referred to "juniors", which took an industry that had 
largely operated on the margins as "disorganized crime" began to transform the industry into 
"organized crime" bent on the smuggling of not just rough diamonds but guns, drugs and money 
(Smillie, Gberie, and Hazelton 2000, 14).  These "juniors", which were primarily Canadian were 
willing to take risks that international companies were not, were linked to fraudulent diamond 
concessions, private security firms and violence. DiamondWorks, which later acquired Branch Energy, 
was linked to Executive Outcomes and Sandline International, two security companies hired by the 
Government of Sierra Leone to provide security and protect mining areas.  
259 One thing the PAC report underemphasized was the level to which all combatants-the RUF, NPRC, 
ECOMOG, Kamajors and the Sierra Leone Armed Forces colluded to destabilize the country in order 
to maintain access and control of diamond resources.  As Keen (2005) notes, peace was a threat to the 





report concluded that Charles Taylor was the principle beneficiary of the RUF activities, 
given his primary role in training, arming and mentoring the rebels for the purpose of 
"plunder" rather than any strategic or political calculations (Gberie 2005, 184; Smillie, 
Gberie, and Hazelton 2000, 46).  The report concluded by stating: "no peace would be 
sustainable until problems related to mining and selling diamonds had been addressed, both 
inside Sierra Leone and internationally" (Smillie, Gberie, and Hazelton 2000, 1).  PAC's 
recommended international oversight over the global trade in rough diamonds and advocated 
that the UN take action to ban diamonds that originate not only in Sierra Leone but also 
Liberia. The PAC report also tried to apply pressure to De Beers and Belgian diamond 
industry. For example, De Beers was urged to increase oversight to reign in smuggling and to 
close its Liberian purchasing offices.  At the same time, the PAC put pressure Belgium and 
European Union to establish oversight measures of the diamond industry to take seriously the 
origins of diamonds.   
 The reaction was swift among government leaders, including Britain, Sierra Leone's 
largest donor of international aid. British Foreign Minister urged Western governments and 
the UN to consider "ways to stamp out the theft of Sierra Leone's diamonds" which "fund 
conflict" while depriving the government of revenues in needed to develop the country.  
Efforts to address the issue of diamonds in conflict zones also began to bring together the 
international diamond industry, non-governmental organizations and delegates from 
producing and importing countries, predominantly due to increasing public pressure (Bieri 
2010).  A meeting was held in Kimberley, South Africa that began discussions on an 
international scheme to certify rough diamonds and make sure they do not originate or transit 
war zones.  These initial discussions would serve as the origins of the "Kimberley Process".  
 
                                                                                                                                           
 
author on the PAC report, those caught stealing diamonds in the RUF camps were shot by the RUF 





 Expressing its concern to end the conflict, the UN Security Council passed 
Resolution 1306 in July 2000 at the urging of the British government.  The resolution 
expressed "concern at the role played by the illicit trade in diamonds in fuelling the conflict in 
Sierra Leone, and at reports that such diamonds transit neighboring countries....including 
Liberia" (UNSC 2000).  The resolution requested that all states "take the necessary measures 
to prohibit the direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Sierra Leone to their 
territory" for a period of 18 months.  It also directed the Government of Sierra Leone, under 
the guidance of IPOs, to ensure that "an effective certificate of origin regime for trade in 
diamonds is in operation in Sierra Leone."  Once a certificate of origin regime is put into 
place by the government, certified diamonds will be exempt from import restrictions.    
 At the same time, the US, Britain and Belgium were forging a "trilateral approach" to 
assist the Government of Sierra Leone with export policies intended to control "conflict 
diamonds", primarily within the context of a "guideline" document written by USAID.  For 
instance, USAID submitted a summary of outputs for assistance in the diamond sector that 
concentrated on putting in place a set of reforms and policies to improve transparency and 
accountability while stemming corruption (USAID/OTI 2001, 4).  Part of the process, which 
began as discussions between the USAID and Diamond High Council of Belgium, was to 
develop a certificate of origin regime for Sierra Leone--modeled after the Angolan certificate-
-that would qualify Sierra Leone for exemption under Resolution 1306.   Sure enough, in 
mid-October, after several meetings at the UN stressing key elements of the new mining and 
export regime, the Security Council granted an exemption and allowed the government to 
permit exports so long as the framework was adequately implemented.260
                                                 
 
260 One complication, of course, was that much of Sierra Leone's productive diamond fields were under 






 In December 2000 hearings on conflict diamonds had intensified at the UN.261
 Based on these hearings, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted Resolution 
55/56: "The role of diamonds in fueling conflict: breaking the link between the illicit 
transaction of rough diamonds and armed conflict as a contribution to prevention and 
settlement of conflicts." The resolution "expressed concern" over the problem of "conflict 
diamonds", which the document defined as "rough diamonds which are used by rebel 
movements to finance their military activities, including attempts to undermine or overthrow 
legitimate governments" (UNGA 2001, 1).
 Three 
consecutive hearings convened as part of Resolution 1306 by the UN Security Council 
focused on (1) the country's diamond industry--including the nature of the diamonds, export 
patterns and current regulation; (2) links between illicit diamond revenue and the trade in 
arms and other materiel and; (3) avenues for developing a sustainable and well-regulated 
diamond industry (UNSC 2000).  The key finding: The "smuggling of diamonds through 
neighboring countries has funded the Revolutionary United Front" and that Charles Taylor 
regularly supplied the RUF with arms funded by Sierra Leone diamond production (UNSC 
2000).   
262  The resolution noted that the problem is an 
international one and endorsed the Kimberley Process.263
 A UN Panel of Experts Report was also mandated by UN Resolution 1306 minced no 
words when it announced: 
    
 
                                                 
 
261 It's also safe to say that RUF diamond mining was intensive during this period as reported by 
USAID (2001).  The intensity of mining was likely caused by the RUF realizing that due to 
international attention the window of opportunity for mining was closing (and this coincided with the 
dry season).   
262 The resolution singled out Sierra Leone and Angola.   
263 The first time the term "Kimberley Process" was officially used was during a meeting of 38 





 Diamonds have become an important resource for Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front 
 (RUF) in sustaining and advancing its military ambitions. Estimates of the volume of 
 RUF diamonds vary widely, from as little as $25 million per annum to as much as 
 $125 million. Whatever the total, it represents a major and primary source of income for the 
 RUF, and is more than enough to sustain its military  activities (UNSC 2000, 8). 
 
 The report found substantial evidence for what was  what was largely known, that 
most of the RUF diamonds are smuggled through Liberia with the involvement of "Liberian 
government officials at the highest level" (UNSC 2000, 8).  The report uncovered 
"unequivocal and overwhelming evidence that Liberia has been actively supporting the RUF 
at all levels, in providing training, weapons, and related materiel, logistical support, a staging 
ground for attacks and a safe haven for retreat and recuperation, and for public relations 
activities" (UNSC 2000, 10).  The panel found that President Charles Taylor was "actively 
involved in fueling the violence in Sierra Leone and many businessmen close to his inner 
circle operate on an international scale, sourcing weaponry" (UNSC 2000, 10).264
                                                 
 
264 Not surprisingly, the report found that the Lomé Agreement, which placed Foday Sankoh in the 
Chairmanship for the Management of Strategic Mineral Resources was a failure that largely resulted in 
nefarious agreements with international business firms and the enrichment of Sankoh and his 
associates.  
  In March 
2001, in response both to the Panel of Experts Report and General Assembly Resolution 
55/56, the Security Council passed Resolution 1343 that demanded that Liberia cease its 
support of the RUF, expel RUF members from the country and end the direct or indirect 
importation of Sierra Leone rough diamonds not controlled by the government's Certificate of 
Origin regime (UNSC 2001b).   In affirming the evidence that large quantities of Sierra 
Leonean diamonds were transiting through Liberia, the resolution placed a ban on the "direct 





Liberia" (UNSC 2001b, 3).265
 By mid-2001, IBOs acknowledged that progress was being made in terms of the 
reforming the Sierra Leonean diamond sector, specifically to address "conflict diamonds" by 
ensuring that increasing numbers of them flow through official state channels (USAID/OTI  
2001).  These reforms and policies were concerned mostly the certificate of origin regime, 
which entailed two interlinked approaches. First, it monitored diamonds to identify "clean" 
stones that did not originate in rebel-held areas, and second, it established a chain of custody 
system to track from the mining field to export to identify smuggling.  While a USAID report 
documented a range of challenges, a review of Sierra Leone's certification of origin regime in 
August 2001 found it to be a "major success" since it resulted in over $30 million in exports 
since it was put into place (UNSC 2001c, 5).  Export figures showed substantial increases as 
rough diamonds valued at almost $13 million was exported compared to $6 million the 
previous year.
  This was the first time the UN had imposed sanctions on a 
country for its refusal to comply with sanctions in another (Olonisakin 2008, 78).   
266
 Despite progress in the form of state revenue, however, an article published in the 
Washington Post in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks dramatically increased the 
urgency of tackling Sierra Leone's "conflict diamonds".   The article, by Douglas Farah 
(2001), titled "Al Qaeda cash tied to diamond trade" quoted US and European intelligence 
officials as saying that the terrorist network had acquired millions of dollars from the illicit 
sale of Sierra Leonean diamonds.
   
267
                                                 
 
265 As mentioned in Chapter 5, feeling international pressure to curb the trade in diamonds, Taylor had 
begun shifting his attention to the timber exports so as to fund weapons shipments to the RUF.  
  According to reports, Al Qaeda operatives bought the 
diamonds a bargain basement prices beginning in 1998 and sold them in Europe for large 
profits that helped fund international terrorist activities.  While the diamond s originated in 
266 This is from areas not under RUF control.  
267 The reports suggested that diamond revenue may have helped to support terrorist activities in 
Lebanon during the 1980s with the help of Sierra Leone's vast Lebanese Diaspora and fund and the 





Sierra Leone Liberia was the transit point and the Liberian government acted as a liaison. A 
European investigator quoted in the article, suggested that in order to "cut off Al Qaeda funds 
and laundering activities you have to cut off the diamond pipeline" (Farah 2001).  The article 
received enormous attention and increased the international pressure on the UN to establish 
control of diamond mining areas and enforce the ban on diamond exports from Sierra Leone 
and Liberia (Pugh, Cooper and Goodhand 2004, 98).  
 IPOs remained focused of the role of "conflict diamonds" and by the end of 2001 the 
situation in Sierra Leone had improved. The RUF was weakened by a host of factors, and 
Charles Taylor was increasingly isolated in Liberia.  The security situation had stabilized as 
the parties to the conflict began to disarm and demobilize in accordance with the Lomé 
Agreement and UN peacekeepers and small British contingent were deployed with a vigorous 
mandate to extend state authority and establish law and order.   By mid-July 2001, UN 
peacekeepers had established control of Kono and Tongo diamond fields.268
Conclusion 
  In addition, 
world-wide attention to role of diamonds in African conflicts as the result of NGO activity 
combined with international efforts by international organizations, states, businesses and 
NGOs to regulate the trade in conflict diamonds vis-a-vis a certificate of origin regime had 
arguably led to progress in terms of removing diamonds revenues from the hands combatants 
and channeling diamonds into official government channels. This is despite the fact that as 
much as 60 percent of Sierra Leone's diamonds were still smuggled out of the country. 
As alluded to at the beginning of the chapter, the most prevalent explanation for the Sierra 
Leonean conflict, especially among international peacebuilding organizations, focuses on the 
economic agendas of combatants and the role valuable natural resources and their revenues 
                                                 
 





played in fueling the conflict.  Sierra Leone has certainly become synonymous with the 
phrase "blood diamonds", and the war will undoubtedly be perceived for the foreseeable 
future as "new" type of civil war driven by the globalization and the "warlordization" of the 
diamond trade (Campbell 2004).  This is in spite of extensive evidence discussed in this 
chapter that the conflict represents a continuation, or perhaps a manifestation, of political 
conflict, societal grievances and competition for power that has a long historical trajectory.   
There can be no doubt that alluvial diamonds--and to a lesser extent the mineral trade--have 
always been a source of grievances and resentment linked to a widespread underdevelopment 
and a lack of available land linked to unjust and corrupt political system.  At the same time, 
the control of natural resources--and their revenues--has always been central to acquiring 
political power and dispensing patronage that not only creates resentment but undermines 
state institutions.  Put bluntly, focusing almost exclusively on economic drivers of conflict or 
characterizing it simply as a "new war" distracts us from the more nuanced ways in which 
diamonds and minerals may be linked to conflict.   
 This is important for several reasons.  First, despite considerable uncertainly in the 
literature linking the environment and natural resources to conflict and the broader dynamics 
of the Sierra Leonean  conflict discussed in this chapter, international peacebuilding 
organizations have come to understand the issue in terms of "blood diamonds".  This stems 
from the evidence that Charles Taylor and the RUF were trading diamonds in exchange for 
weapons and other implements of destruction the destabilized West Africa and threatened 
international security.  The perception, then, is that a lack of state control and authority over 
diamond mining areas undermined the project of economic development by allowing rebels 
(and other combatants) to buy weapons and fuel conflict. Framing the conflict in this way 
suggests that what are needed are reforms and policies to transform "conflict resources" (e.g. 
diamonds and minerals) into "peace resources" to end conflict and build long-term peace and 





policies aimed at "securitizing" and "marketizing" the diamond and mineral sectors.  The 
larger question --which I will address in Chapter 8--is whether efforts to control "conflict 

















Chapter 7: Securitizing and Marketizing Diamonds 





Despite weaknesses in the Lomé Peace Agreement, the deployment of 17,000 UN 
peacekeepers, the presence of a small contingent of British troops, and a concerted effort to 
disarm, demobilize and reintegrate combatants led to substantial security improvements.  
Even so the scale of the human tragedy was vast.  Estimates suggest that between 20,000 and 
200,000 people were killed and hundreds of thousands wounded or maimed (IMF 2005, 
Gberie 2005). Most of the population had their lives and livelihoods severely disturbed with 
nearly half of the country's 5 million people reporting to have been displaced or made 
refugees (IMF 2005).  The war plunged at least 80 percent of the population into extreme 
poverty (GoSL 2001, 8).  While informal diamond mining continued, and end to industrial 
mineral operations and the demise of agriculture undermined livelihoods and created an 
unemployed rural population. The highest percentage of the unemployed was youths that 
without agricultural opportunities were forced to become combatants or join the ranks of the 
displaced or urban poor (IMF 2005).269
                                                 
 
269 During the conflict, combatants used coercion and the treat of execution to recruit young men to 
fight or work diamond mines (Keen 2005; SLTRC 2004).   
  The economy was devastated as the GDP fell by 50 
percent amounting to a dismal $142 per capita by 2000 (IMF 2005, 1).  By war's end, the 
country ranked at the bottom of the world's Human Development Index with indicators such 
as illiteracy, primary school enrollment, life expectancy, maternal death, malnutrition, and 





institutions severely hampered the government's ability to provide of basic services and the 
conflict damaged much of Sierra Leone's physical and economic infrastructure.   
  By the time the conflict was officially declared over in January 2002 hopes and 
expectations were high.  There was an optimistic feeling that with proper planning, political 
will and commitment by IBOs, the country could recover.  The government's National 
Recovery Strategy (NRS) laid out benchmarks for "consolidating peace" and making the 
"transition towards sustainable development" that included restoring state authority; 
rebuilding communities; addressing human rights; and the restoration of the economy (GoSL 
2003).  At the same time, addressing the issue of "blood diamonds" was a top peacebuilding 
priority.  As the preceding chapter highlighted, international peacebuilding organizations 
came to understand the problem as related to rough diamonds, which were traded by rebels 
and other non-state combatants in exchange for armaments that destabilized the region and 
threatened international security.   Recall that in 2001, evidence linked the "War on 
Terrorism" to Sierra Leone's illicit diamond trade.   Again, the principal peacebuilding 
challenges for IBOs was to consolidated state authority and control over diamonds and 
diamond producing areas, and improve governance so as to ensure diamond revenue funds 
economic recovery rather than conflict.  Due to an inherent distrust that diamonds could be 
readily controlled, IBOs also stressed the importance of rebuilding Sierra Leone's mineral 
sector. The objective of IBOs was to transform problematic "conflict resources" into "peace 
resources" for the purpose of establishing a stable and lasting peace. 
 This chapter examines in-depth efforts by international peacebuilding organizations 
to alter the "rules" that govern Sierra Leone's diamonds and minerals between 2002 and 2009.  
The beginning of the chapter, details the reform process, including ongoing initiatives to put 
into practice new policies, laws, regulations, and practices.  Much like Liberia's forests, I 
suggest that IBOs by-and-large promote and help establish reforms and policies aimed at 





transforming "conflict diamonds" into "peace resources".  In the second part of the chapter, I 
examine the effects and consequences of the diamond and mineral reform process, and argue 
that they have resulted in conflict and even episodes of violence.   
Diamond and Mineral Reform: Control and Trade 
As noted above, this section charts in detail the extensive efforts by IBOs to transform Sierra 
Leone's "conflict diamonds" into "peace resources".  In doing so, I track the reform process--
including new policies, laws, regulations and practices.  Similar to the Liberian forest case in 
Chapter 5, I argue that the reforms and policies are designed to "securitize" and "marketize" 
diamonds and minerals.  By "securitization", I mean establishing and consolidating state 
control and authority and instituting good governance measures.  By "marketization", I mean 
promoting the conditions that allow diamonds and minerals to generate revenue that supports 
economic growth, alleviate poverty and supply state revenue.    
 President Kabbah declared the conflict over in January 2002 and set up a timeline for 
elections. The focus on the securitizing mining areas and governing the trade in "conflict 
diamonds" would remain at the forefront of peacebuilding.   While efforts to curtail conflict 
diamonds had improved, the UN unanimously renewed sanctions on the import of rough 
diamonds from Sierra Leone for another 12 months, except those controlled by the 
government under its certificate of origin regime.  In doing so, the UN Security Council 
acknowledged the fragility of the peace and determined that the country "continues to 
constitute a threat to international peace and security" (UNSC 2001b, 2).  In response, a host 
of reports were published by IBOs consider the necessary steps to reform the diamond sector 
in line with the country's larger peacebuilding strategy. The Sierra Leone Diamond Policy 
Study (2002) called for "new start" aimed at differentiating in the public's mind from an "old 
system" to a "new system" that emphasized a "diamond policy for a new Sierra Leone" 





legislation in other African countries, it argued for new legislation and regulations to augment 
the Mines and Minerals Act of 1996, including amendments to reduce the friction between 
mine operators in the formal and informal sectors, transparency and accountability in 
diamond dealing and exporting, and attention to the environmental impacts and social aspects 
of the industry.  
 But efforts in the diamond sector were soon accompanied by IBO initiatives to revive 
the mineral sector's "socially responsible and economically important" role as an engine of 
growth and poverty reduction (World Bank 2005, vi).  Numbers vary widely but report 
stressed the importance of exploiting Kimberlite diamonds as well as alluvial deposits 
projecting that by 2006, somewhere between 750,000 and 1 million carats could be produced 
at a value of $180 million.270
 
   Direct employment was projected to be upwards of 15,000 
people with an additional 140,000 people dependent on the diamond sector for their 
livelihoods.  The report's principal problem with the diamond industry was that policies had 
historically reinforced a "whole industry for the advantage of a few."  The report goes on to 
say:  
 Whatever options are chosen ...they will not be effective unless the Government also takes 
 steps to rid the country, and particularly, the diamond industry, of its greatest threat - 
 corruption.  Changing or improving the structure of the industry will not, of itself, prevent 
 corruption, and without addressing the scourge of corruption even the best policy 
 decisions will not bring to Sierra Leone the benefit of the industry and the stability 
 which it needs (World Bank 2005).  
 
 The World Bank (2002b), in a report titled "A Mining Strategy for Sierra Leone's 
Post-War Recovery Efforts" produced an early but comprehensive attempt to assist the 
                                                 
 





government by proposing reform of the mining and diamond sector.  The World Bank noted 
that reforms are "crucial because of their [diamonds and minerals] long-established 
importance to the economy and their current potential for income and employment 
generation, especially in the rural areas where the mining activities take place, as well as for 
generating fiscal revenues for the government from large-scale mining activities" (World 
Bank 2002a, 2).   The report stressed the historically under-utilized potential of minerals as a 
"pro-poor growth and rural development" engine, and reflected on the sectors "relatively low 
share of fiscal revenues as well as significant trade through unofficial channels... [that] can be 
largely attributed to inadequate policies and governance as well as traditionally weak 
administration of the mining sector and a lack of an enabling environment attractive to 
investors" (World Bank 2002b, 2).   The role of the government, according to the World 
Bank, is to ensure clear, non-discretionary and consistent policies and promote reforms that 
stress foreign investment and ensure social and environmental responsible development while 
leaving exportation and exploitation to the private sector (World Bank 2002b, 6). The report 
suggested that the size of the mining sector is modest by international standards but that 
Sierra Leone is largely dependent on it due to its high contribution to GDP and exports 
throughout the 1990s.271
 Given the importance of industrial minerals to the country's economy before the war, 
attention also turned to reviving and reactivating the large-scale industrial mining sector, 
including the rutile and bauxite mines and the exploitation of Kimberlite diamond pipes.
  In addition, approximately 14 percent of the country's workforce 
was at one point directly or indirectly tied to the mining sector in some way.   
272
                                                 
 
271 Approximately 20 percent of GDP and 90 percent of registered exports.   
  
These industrial minerals, when compared to alluvial and small-scale diamond mining were 
viewed as a particularly important by IBOs because they are perceived to come with fewer 
272 As noted in the previous chapter, rule and bauxite operations were largely looted and destroyed by 





risks, and more benefits, than the alluvial diamond sectors.  For example, the character of 
industrial minerals meant it was far easier for the government to control and tax, less 
amendable to any kind of rebel exploitation, and comparably larger in terms of both reserves 
and projected revenues.  The expectation of IBOs was that rutile production could begin in 
2003 with bauxite, Kimberlite diamonds, and other identified minerals (iron ore, ilmenite) 
following soon afterwards.273
 The World Bank (2002b, 5) defined the mineral sector as involving three aspects: (1) 
the large-scale production of non-precious minerals such as rutile and bauxite; (2) large scale 
production of precious minerals - diamonds; and (3) artisanal and small-scale production of 
precious minerals such as diamonds, and to lesser extent gold.  According to World Bank 
estimates by 2012 large-scale mining activities were projected to conservatively result in four 
new mine, in addition to the reactivation of three mines that could generate annual export 




                                                 
 
273 Resolutions from the National Consultative Conference on Just Mining in Sierra Leone in 2000 
offered key resolutions aimed at the mineral sector. Key issues included the formulation of pro-people 
mining policy, problems with generating and distributing revenue from mining, the impact of mining 
on the environment, the effects of mining on local communities and the consequences of mining on 
culture. 
 To achieve this, the World Bank focused on the need to attract foreign investment 
to increase output, provide employment, bring in state revenue and contribute to foreign 
exchange earnings. On the other hand, the Bank (2002b) proposed tightening control over 
alluvial diamond mining to limit their use as a source of potential rebel funding, and to 
improve the overall standard of living for communities.  According to the Bank, this could be 
achieved by (1) licensing mineral rights using a first-come-first serve approach with rapid and 
transparent processing, incorporating a cadastral system supported by satisfactory monitoring, 
administration and enforcement; (2) facilitation of mechanization and lending for the 
274 Including dependents and extended families it was projected that about 300,000 people would 





purchase of equipment that would reduce miner's dependence that fosters patronage and 
poverty; (3) extension of services to assist miners, identify license holders and address 
environmental conditions; and (4) provision of fair commercialization to improve trading 
prices for miners and diggers and ensure license holder sell only to authorized buyers.  The 
report argues revival of the mining industry would provide livelihoods, directly and indirectly 
for a large segment of the population, and support more stable and positive economic 
performance.275
 IBOs stressed the importance reconstructing government capacity and formulating a 
new national mineral policy to promote the sector as a "socially responsible, economically 
important engine of growth" (World Bank 2002b, 7). The new mineral policy encouraged by 
IBOs would emphasize "participatory" mining legislation and regulations that are realistic in 
the national and international economic context and are sensitive to social and environmental 
impacts of mining (World Bank 2002b, 7).  A revised policy would also restructure the links 
between government and local authorities, and enhance institutional capacity while 
establishing systems of governance to ensure transparency and effective decision making, 
accountability (World Bank 2002b, 8).  Because implementation of a comprehensive mineral 
policy would take several years to implement, IPOs emphasized that the rejuvenation of the 
sector cannot wait until an "ideal process" is in place and had confidence that the existing 
Mines and Minerals Act of 1996 (and subsequent amendments) serves as an adequate 
foundation for an investment friendly, socially responsible mineral reforms.   
  
 The "way forward" then was immediately revive large-scale mining activities that 
ended during the 1980s-1990s, in particular rutile.  Furthermore, large-scale operations in the 
bauxite and Kimberlite diamonds were to progress in a timely manner so that income, 
exchange and government revenue could be realized quickly.  The World Bank stressed the 
                                                 
 
275 The report does note that in the longer term, Sierra Leone will need to diversify the rural and urban 





importance of establishing an "internationally competitive mining environment" and a fiscal 
regime generally reasonable and flexible for large-scale operations" (World Bank 2002b, 58).   
The benefit of the resuming activity quickly would also send a signal to potential investors 
that after a long period of conflict, Sierra Leone is "open for business".  In the alluvial mining 
sector, the IBOs highlighted the need for the government to gain control over diamond 
mining areas to limit smuggling and illicit operations, and ensure "legitimate licensed miners" 
can continue to mine.  One particular note of caution--highlighted by the UN--was that many 
ex-combatants were coming back to mining communities and increasing the potential for 
instability.  With that in mind, the World Bank noted the importance of the diamond 
development fund to make sure the sale of diamonds benefits community welfare and the 
certificate of origin regime continues to operate effectively.    
 As the government of Sierra Leone and IBOs continued to discuss comprehensive 
recommendations for reforming the mineral sector there emerged international concern about 
a new "diamond rush" after the war. Estimates suggested that between 200,000 and 500,000 
people were mining alluvial diamonds (ICG 2003).  Significant numbers of these miners had 
no other livelihood option in the aftermath of the conflict and were attracted to the potential 
of mining to provide some immediate employment.  International peacebuilders cautioned 
that the rush to diamond mining areas was led and dominated by former combatants, which 
increased the potential for illegal mining and instability. The UN realized the need to gain 
control of diamond mining areas and identify illegal activity that could result in conflict 
diamonds.  The problem was that even if ex-combatants were involved little could be done 
since the mining activity did provide local livelihoods for miners and communities that would 
have proved harmful if disrupted.  Moreover, since the advent of the certificate of origin 
regime diamond exports had been increasing and contributing greater sums of revenue to the 





 In 2002, negotiations and preparations were underway to rebuild the industrial 
mining sector.   Sierra Rutile Limited signed a letter of intent with the US government's 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation for a$25 million loan to restart the now largely 
destroyed operation. Likewise, the British loaned £25 million to the government to begin the 
process of rehabilitating the mines and preparing for production.276  This was in addition to a 
reported $114 million loan from the World Bank's International Finance Corporation.  An 
agreement was negotiated resulting in the Sierra Rutile Agreement Act of 2002, which 
replaced a1989 agreement between the government and the company and established new 
financial terms and obligations.  The terms of the contract were generally in line with 
international standards by civil society groups (NACE 2009).  The royalty rate was 3.5 
percent of total sales and income taxes between 3.5 and 37.5 percent depending on turnover 
(GoSL 2002).   The Act contained a stability clause that allowed the company to continue 
paying the negotiated tax and royalty rates for the duration of the 25-year lease, even if the 
government decided to enact new legislation raising taxes or royalties.  The agreement set 
import duties at 5 percent for equipment and other plant infrastructure but did not make any 
provision with regard to the employment of expats or Sierra Leoneans. The most 
controversial provision in the agreement allowed the company to create and maintain and 
armed security force and import weaponry to deter "incidents".  This raised concern among 
local communities and civil society groups since it was the only company given permission 
for an armed and uniformed security force in the postconflict period.277
 Efforts by Koidu Holdings, S.A. began to resume Kimberlite diamond operations 
near the town of Koidu in eastern Sierra Leone. The original agreement to commence 
Kimberlite mining for 25years was originally signed between Branch Energy and the Kabbah 
   
                                                 
 
276 Sierra Rutile Limited was owned by Consolidated Rutile Ltd. of Australia and US-based Nord 
Resources Corp.  Nord sold its half to MIL in 1999 while Consolidated Rutile sold its share to UK-
based Titanium Resources.  





government in 1995 and subsequently approved in 1996 by the parliament as rebels were just 
on the outskirts of Freetown.278 Branch Energy's assets were completely destroyed by rebels.  
In June 2002, Branch Energy began to show interest in resuming operations but was bought 
by DiamondWorks and Magma Diamond Resources Limited both agreeing to form a joint 
venture called Koidu Holdings begin redeveloping the kimberlitic project.  Eventually Koidu 
Holdings was purchased outright by MDRL with the intention of starting production slated 
for 2004.279
 International efforts to govern alluvial diamonds continued apace.  Negotiations over 
the terms and conditions of the Kimberley Process moved forward aggressively, and in 
November 2002 representatives from 37 countries and the EU agreed to launch the 
certification scheme in January 2003.
   
280  Although there remained uncertainties in how 
exactly to monitor the trade in diamonds and establish independent control systems given 
sovereignty concerns, the process had widespread international support.281 This meant that 
only participant countries were allowed to trade rough diamonds with each other and 
countries that wished to participate were given more time to implement national 
legislation.282
                                                 
 
278 Branch Energy had links to the private security firm Executive Outcomes, which was discussed in 
the previous chapter. Branch Energy and all of its mineral rights were acquired by Canadian firm 
DiamondWorks in 1996. 
  At the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was announced by UK Prime Minister 
Tony Blair (EITI 2010).  Given international attention to the issue of conflict resources 
(including but not only diamonds and minerals) the goal of EITI was to increase the 
transparency of payments by companies to governments and revenue transparency by 
279 Magma Diamond Resources Limited is wholly owned by BSG Resources.  
280 Many participant countries, including the US and UK, were not prepared to implement the 
Kimberly Process in January 2003.  A grace period was put in place until May 2003.   
281 Because many participating countries, including the US and UK, were not ready to implement the 
agreement a grace period was extended until May 2003 at which time all participant countries 
implemented the Kimberly Process and it came into force 
282 The US passed HR 1584 the "Clean Diamonds Trade Act", which implemented regulations that 





governments themselves.  The impetus for such a system emerged European governments 
and NGOs concerned that revenues natural resources if not properly governed can create 
conditions for instability and conflict.  Specifically, the mismanagement and lack of 
accountability and transparency over natural resource revenues was viewed as exacerbating 
poor governance, corruption and economic decline when it should be an engine for economic 
growth and positive human development. The role of EITI was to increase transparency and 
openness by getting countries rich in resources to provide information to citizens and civil 
society organizations in order to hold governments accountable for the revenues they collect. 
The system was also advertised as potentially significant for attracting foreign direct 
investment given that responsible companies would benefit from such a plan while corrupt 
and nefarious ones would not.283
 It is also important to note that although the international spotlight remained  largely 
on the role of "conflict diamonds" in fueling the conflict and efforts to set up an international 
governance regime, Sierra Leone civil society was organizing with the help of international 
organizations to address "mining for the people" (Brima 2003).
   
284
                                                 
 
283 The subtext is that responsible companies are international ones while the corrupt ones are domestic 
companies.  The dominant view, a promulgated by the World Bank and IMF, was that international 
investment by larger firms was more stable and less inclined to corruption or abuse. 
  International attention to 
conflict diamonds, in fact, worked to open space for civil society in late 2000, organizing a 
coalition of human rights groups, environmental organizations, academic institutions, the Bar 
association, student and trade unions, community development organizations, theatre groups, 
youth, nurses and women's groups to promote "just mining" policies and practices.   Whereas 
mining was previously the "preserve of government and a few individuals" the Campaign for 
Just Mining demanded that the government and industry introduce a human rights framework 
that will "empower the people and make them owners and beneficiaries of their resources" 
284 International organizations actively involved included PAC, Global Witness, International Peace 





(Brima 2003).  The work of these NGOs led the government to establish the Diamond Area 
Community Development Fund (DACDF) in December to secure a portion of the export tax 
on the sale of diamonds for "chiefdoms where diamond mining is taking place and 
neighboring communities who utilize the social and economic services. The DACDF 
allocated 25 percent of revenue accrued form diamond export taxes and represented a first-
step in the emergence of Sierra Leone civil society to increase the opportunities for mining 
communities.   
 While the US Government began to pay attention to the diamond sector following the 
Lomé Agreement in 1999, technical assistance focused on  meeting with stakeholders to 
support the Kimberly Process and establishing a legalized channel for rough diamonds, 
providing equipment for the mines monitors and monitoring the DACDF fund and sensitizing 
communities to its existence.  However, the objectives of US assistance broadened with the 
goal of introducing "peace diamonds" from Sierra Leone to the rest of the world through a 
process that maximized benefits to communities and empowered local miners and diggers.285
                                                 
 
285 Diamond diggers are those who do a vast majority of manual labor in alluvial diamond mines. 
Diggers carry out various activities including carrying mud, washing gravel or doing other manual 
labor.   
 
This was deemed important vitally important since the "control and ownership of most 
production is in the hands of a small but powerful trading elite, depriving licensed miners and 
their diggers the opportunity to secure a fair return on their labor" (Even-Zohar, 2003, ii).  
What emerged was the Peace Diamond Alliance a cooperative effort to bring together civil 
society organizations, international non-governmental organizations and the MMR to help 
communities to demonstrate that "the alluvial diamond industry can maximize benefits to 
local miners/diggers and their communities, minimize corruption, mobilize local surveillance 
and mines monitoring and convert consumer awareness around conflict diamonds into 





"source of war and desperation to the foundation for peace and prosperity" (Tutusaus 2007, 
10).286
 There was a substantial increase in officially recorded rough diamond exports with 
250,000 carats exported in 2002 and 500,000 in 2003.  Although at least 55 percent of all 
mining operations in Sierra Leone were reported to be operating illegally and some 85-90 
percent of all rough diamonds were believed to be smuggled out of the country efforts to 
"regularize" artisanal mining was recognized as on the right track.  Tax receipts and exports 
of diamonds were increasing and Sierra Leone's certificate of origin regime and participation 
in the implementation of the Kimberly Process exhibited signs that the country was serious 
about reforms and laying the foundation for a more regulated, transparent and accountable 
diamond sector.  In light of these efforts by the Government of Sierra Leone to "strengthen 
and improve...management of the diamond industry", the UN Security Council agreed not to 
renew the embargo against the importation of rough diamonds, which was imposed by 
Resolution 1306 in 2000.
   
287
 While the lifting of the sanctions was newsworthy and important sign that things 
were heading in a positive direction, the international community remained wary of the 
potential for diamonds reignite conflict. According to USAID, only $41 million of the 
projected $300 million worth of diamonds mined in Sierra Leone was legally exported in 
2003 with little money returning to the communities for the benefit of postconflict 
reconstruction.  As US Ambassador Peter Chaveas (2003) noted although security was 
beginning to return to Sierra Leone and "blood diamonds" was in the global lexicon, the 
conditions on the ground in mining communities had changed little since the end of the 
  In essence, the UN and its members agreed that Sierra Leone 
was no longer a home for conflict diamonds.   
                                                 
 
286 Although the Peace Diamond Alliance was eventually transformed from a coalition of interest 
groups  





conflict.  In order to ensure the country did not return to "business as usual", the US 
Ambassador argued that wealth derived in diamond mining areas must stay in Kono and 
Sierra Leone if lasting peace is to be achieved (Chaveas 2003).  The position of the US 
Government was that with "relatively minor adjustments to credit, production and marketing 
systems, hundreds of millions  of dollars annually could be redirected to 300,000-400,000 
Sierra Leoneans engaged in the diamond industry" (Even-Zohar 2003, v).  This was not seen 
not only as an opportunity to ensure communities received a fair share of benefits but also to 
reduce the incentive to smuggle by ensuring that diamond revenue would return to producing 
communities and chiefdoms.   
 In 2003, the government signed a "special agreement" with Sierra Rutile in a 
'Memorandum of Understanding' that altered provisions in the 2002 Act.288
                                                 
 
288 This MOU would be agreed to in the so-called First Amendment Agreement of the 2002 Act in 
2004.   
  The new MOU 
lowered the company's royalty rate to 0.5 percent until 2014 (after which it world revert back 
to 3.5 percent) and ended the corporate income tax and other taxes for 10-years.  In return, 
the company offered the government the opportunity to purchase up to 30 percent stake in 
operations in lieu of the payments and taxes, which were valued at $37 million. The company 
maintained that it had drastically underestimated the scope of the investment needed to restart 
production and that the MOU was needed if Sierra Rutile was to swiftly resume rutile 
exports. The World Bank and IMF suggested that despite the trade-offs the government 
should concur with the special agreement even if the fiscal terms would impose a revenue 
burden on the government (World Bank 2006; IMF 2004).  There was substantial 
disagreement among the international stakeholders involved as to whether such concessions 
were the price of attracting foreign direct investment in a postconflict situation or simply a 
case of companies taking advantage of a fragile, postconflict situation. Many actors, 





that not agreeing to the MOU would send the wrong message to international investors 
(Interview 65).   They suggested that Sierra Leone should negotiate from a position of 
strength and dictate the terms and conditions (NACE).289
 Sierra Leonean civil society organizations, including the National Advocacy 
Coalition on Extractives suggested that the special agreement with Sierra Rutile should be 
reviewed for its apparent illegality.  It questioned whether the country could afford a 
reduction in projected revenues of $37 million.  Mboka (2003) also argued the agreement was 
signed by a seriously corrupt process carried out without the participation of landowners that 
were not properly compensated for the destruction of crops affected by mining operations. 
There was increasing criticism about the company's resettlement policy, in which 
approximately 5,400 residents were moved from areas zoned for mining even before 
activities commenced without the provision of adequate water supplies or fertile land.  The 
company was also condemned for its security forces holding farmers at gunpoint and 
arresting them for allegedly farming on company property.
   
290
 By late 2003, the government had passed several significant mining laws. The first 
was an amendment the Mines and Minerals Act of 1994, which set penalties for diamond 
smuggling.  Shortly after the Core Mineral Policy was passed that was "designed to create an 
  Mboka (2003) warned of 
future problems and tension over these and other issues since the history of rutile mining was 
one of "unmitigated exploitation" and a legacy of abject poverty and ecological disaster.  
Contrary to conventional wisdom, Mboka (2003) suggested that rutile mining has historically 
had negative not positive effects on the lives of neighboring communities and that efforts to 
fast-track rutile production  in the name of development was deeply troubling since it did not 
include local communities in the decision making process.   
                                                 
 
289 A report by NACE (2009) suggested that revenue losses to the government due to the Sierra Rutile 
revisions amounted to a loss of approximately $100 million over 10 years or $8 million annually.   





internationally competitive and investor friendly business environment in the mining 
sector...[and] assist in the mining industry in attracting foreign and local private sector funds 
and to provide benefits and protection for the  people and the environment of Sierra Leone" 
(GoSL 2004, 1).291
  The conventional wisdom among IBOs by mid-2004 was that Sierra Leone is making 
tremendous progress in terms of rehabilitating the large-scale diamond mining sector and 
regulating artisanal mining activity (IMF 2004).  Real and rapid GDP growth continued and 
exports from the alluvial diamonds had increased over 10-fold since 2000.   However, what 
looked like positive trends was combined with weak revenue projections in the sector that 
were largely overestimated due to constraints of getting the rutile and kimberlite sectors 
  One of the objectives of the policy was to provide an "enabling legal and 
fiscal regime for all mining operations from large-scale mines such as those of Sierra Rutile 
to the small artisanal gold and diamond mines in the provinces" (GoSL 2004, 1).  The 
policy's vision was to "facilitate a fair and transparent business environment to stimulate 
development of a successful minerals sector" via a "free-market approach and economic 
policies" (GoSL 2004, 2).  The government, which owns all rights in, and control of, minerals 
under or upon any land in Sierra Leone, stated in the policy that it will do everything in its 
power to make sure that the revenues from minerals including diamonds will be used for the 
benefit of the country and this will be achieved by ensuring that all licensing fees, royalties, 
taxes and any other forms of income from the exploitation of minerals are collected and 
properly recorded and that all mining, trading and exporting companies in the mineral sector 
operate within the laws that comply with international trading protocols (GoSL 2004).  The 
policy also committed t he government to reviewing and amending mining laws, regulation 
and associated laws to make them as attractive as possible for investment and improving the 
regulation and efficiency of artisanal and small -scale mines (GoSL 2004, 6-7).     
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producing and slow developments getting bauxite development underway.  The IMF (2004) 
stressed the importance of attracting investment in the large scale industrial production but 
highlighted that substantial investments required were substantial and may therefore require 
"fiscal incentives" by the government to facilitate investment.  Fiscal incentives refer to 
"special agreements" like the one granted to Sierra Rutile.  Although less revenue would 
accrue to the government over the short-term, the IMF called this "trade-off" important for 
investor confidence provided it was backed up by sound fiscal policy.  The IMF expressed 
concern that each time a company applied for a mining lease in post-war Sierra Leone that 
company explicitly sought out and received a special agreement incorporating beneficial 
fiscal terms.  For example, the original agreement with Sierra Rutile was changed; the 
agreement with Koidu Holdings was to leave existing 1995 agreement with lesser terms in 
place; and negotiations with African Minerals with respect to bauxite mining was thought to 
include substantial tax breaks.    
 Throughout 2004 there were reports of a "diamond rush" in the eastern part of Sierra 
Leone that raised security concerns among international donors.  One key concern was that 
the rush could lead to an increase in smuggling and a higher likelihood of diamond -related 
conflict.  A report by commissioned by USAID found that despite significant improvements 
the borders of Sierra Leone remain porous-particularly at points of entry like Lungi Airport- 
and the combination of corruption and the illicit trade made diamonds a continued security 
threat (Corkill 2004). While the "rush" exaggerated, it had the effect of directing attention to 
the lack of opportunities not only for ex-combatants that had been demobilized but also 
amount the general population of men with no work and no other livelihoods opportunities.292
                                                 
 
292 This rush could have also been caused in part to rumors of state consolidation over the sector.   
  
In fact, this led to an increase in illicit mining operations although by all accounts smuggling 





the artisanal mining sector so as to "eliminate the incentives for smuggling" (IMF 2004, 32).  
As the IMF (2004, 32) notes, artisanal mining is more open to smuggling (in comparison to 
kimberlite mining) because it takes place over vast," insecure regions that are difficult to 
control and is often associated with limited competition between buyers because of barriers to 
entry and implicit contracts, give rise to uncompetitive domestic prices", thus increasing 
incentives for smuggling.  
  These" implicit contracts", as the IMF termed them, contributed to smuggling and a 
lack of transparency because artisanal miners and diggers have irregular earnings and 
therefore need to borrow money in order to purchase equipment and guard against decreases 
in production (IMF 2004).  This financial backing typically comes from diamond dealers or 
"supporters" that manage specific operations and include an exclusive right to buy their 
diamonds.  Diamond dealers have similar contracts with exporters.  These implicit contracts 
limit competition and allow export companies to purchase diamonds at prices well below 
international markets, creating incentives to smuggle.  Partners tied to these implicit contracts 
therefore have the incentive to smuggle in order to get a higher price than what the exporter 
would pay.  At the same time, for the exporter it can be lucrative to bypass formal 
government channels so as to hide the true value of diamonds being exported, which allows 
the exporter to undervalue them and reduce the price paid to the dealer.  This is extremely 
common given that exporters are most able to assess the true value of a stone and smuggle in 
outside the country (IMF 2004).  
 The lack of transparency in the alluvial diamond sector caused by these implicit 
contracts was a source of concern for international donors.  This is because non-transparent 
pricing allows exporters to underpay dealers, and allows dealers to underpay miners and 
diggers.  A vast majority of the rents generated by the sector accrue to a small cadre of people 
with most of the value leaving the country. While estimates varied, local costs associated 





accruing to exporters and foreign traders.  In some cases, dealers, miners and diggers 
captured none of the diamond rents.   While there was surely concern that diamonds should 
pass through official channels so the government can acquire revenues, a particular concern is 
that these rents could be used to buy weapons or reignite conflict. Another worry was that 
diamond smuggling and associated money laundering could fund criminal enterprises or at 
worst global terrorism (Global Witness 2003).  
 According to the IMF (2004), the general fiscal regime for artisanal diamond mining 
was appropriate since reforms implemented in the early 1990s, including a low import tax of 
three percent to encourage the regularization of the diamond trade through official 
channels.293
 It became increasingly important in the eyes of international donors, particularly the 
US Government, to engage in projects to ensure local communities benefit and get 
proportionate share from mining operations and that miners and diggers are empowered to 
  Since no other taxes or fees are levied other than income taxes-and the cost of 
smuggling is estimated at 2-3 percent of revenues,-the taxes were deemed appropriate and not 
an impediment to legal exports. The view of the IMF was that the real impediment was the 
government's unwillingness to enforce its own policies and fiscal regimes, and the property 
rights and mining regulations that underpin it.  A survey by the UNIMSIL (2003) found that 
the government and in particular the Ministry of Mineral Resources was ill trained to address 
illicit mining and smuggling activities (UNIMSIL2004).  To address these needs, the World 
Bank provided technical assistance installing a cadastre system to help define property rights 
and thereby provide some basis for the enforcement of mineral rights.  As the IMF (2004, 35) 
states, "secure property rights and better prepared government agencies will go a long-way 
toward bringing the mining sector back under the government's control and restoring law and 
order."   
                                                 
 
293 The revenue situation in the early 1990s and concerns that diamond rents were not being captured 





gain a greater share of diamond revenues.  While USAID started out prioritizing the 
consolidation of state control over the industry and certificate regimes like the Kimberly 
Process, a USAID commissioned report by Even-Zohar (2003) made the case that such 
programs need to be integrated with "grassroots concerns and needs" (Tatusaus 2007, ix). The 
goal was to devise programs was to improve revenue to government and benefits to 
community so that "Sierra Leone's diamonds can never again be used to fund conflict" (MSI 
2004), and not coincidently reduce the potential that money from diamonds was not used to 
launder money by international crime syndicates and terrorists. The operating premise was 
that the security threats associated with illegal mining and smuggling could be constrained or 
prevented by ensuring that "local people benefit from legal mining and marketing so that they 
develop a commitment to transparent, legal diamond industry."  
 This programmatic area was driven by a perception that the conflict was caused in 
part by "idle" and uneducated youths that did not benefit from mining and had nothing better 
to do than loot the country.    Since alluvial diamond mining is overwhelmingly done by 
groups of "diggers"-predominantly young uneducated men -who work for licensed miners, 
ensuring more equal distribution of benefits was deemed a significant security and 
development priority by USAID and non-governmental organizations like Global Witness.294  
The problem, however, is that miners and diggers operate within an integrated system 
(implicit contracts) that requires them to sell their "winnings" to specific supporters or 
dealers.295
                                                 
 
294 Mining licenses can only be given to Sierra Leonean nationals.  
  While miners hold the actual mining license and can employ up to 100 diggers on 
a one acre site they are often not the driving force in artisanal mining.  Miners often deal with 
authorities, pay license fees, and collect a share of winnings.  Miners are intensely dependent 
on financial supporters, who are often dealers or agents or supporters with close ties to 
295 Miners are the individuals that hold the actual mining license, entitling them to the mine.  They are 
often the manager of the operation although when there is an external supporter from outside financing 





dealers.296 These dealers have access to capital and can advance miners the cost of the 
license, tools and food for the operation.297
 Studies estimated that the share of a digger's per capita share of industry revenues is 
at or below subsistence income levels (World Bank 2005).
   Dealers Although this relationship can be viewed 
as a "profit sharing arrangement" more often than not miners and diggers go into debt after all 
expenses are paid.  This debt and marginalization often increases poverty of miners, diggers 
and local communities while exporters with connections to paramount chiefs or other 
landowners get wind fall profits and the regions vast wealth is exported to Europe and Asia. 
In short, miners and diggers are enticed by the possibility of immediate wealth from finding a 
big diamond but often remain in deepening and worsening poverty.  The UN Commission on 
Human Rights has characterized these relations as "a system of debt bondage" and classified 
as contemporary variant of slavery (Moyers 2003).  
298
 Most of the local level reform, which has been described as an 'earth to export 
scheme' was funded by USAID, who focused attention on exploitative labor relationships 
  The only genuine opportunity 
for diggers and licensed miners to get a decent price for their winnings is to smuggle higher 
value diamonds. This smuggling is not done to avoid export taxes or a preoccupation with 
smuggling but to by-pass these "financial supporters" who "at best, offer minimal rewards-
and then only after deducting real or imagined costs and...debts" (Even-Zohar 2003, 7).  As 
one can imagine given the incentive to smuggle there is little trust between the miner and 
supporter.   However, as Levin and Gberie (2006, 10) suggest diggers and miners are unlikely 
to gain much more than what they would earn selling to a supporter since he is unlikely to 
realize "even marginally" the actual price of a stolen diamond due to a lack of knowledge and 
the" rush to sell the diamond so as to not get apprehended."     
                                                 
 
296 This is commonly referred to as a "tributor system" 
297 According to Even-Zohar (2003) at least 80 percent of licensed miners in Sierra Leone lack the 
means to finance operations, including buying the mining license or paying land rental fees.  





between supporters, miners and diggers noting that the continued lack of benefits for local 
communities is a substantial threat to security. 299 The major program was called the 
Integrated Diamond Management Program (IDMP), which was essentially tasked with 
developing pilot projects to integrate "finance and alluvial diamond mining tracking system 
grounded in providing better prices to miners and laborers" (Tatusaus 2007, 10).300    One 
such program was to promote diamond cooperatives designed to rationalize artisanal 
production by by-passing traditional "supporters", who coincidently are believed to be deeply 
involved in smuggling and inflating prices, and empowering diggers and miners to become 
independent of the exploitative system and bringing a greater proportion of diamond value to 
the producer level demonstrating the advantages of extending credit to miners was good for 
bankers and miners alike and encouraging self-policing. By 2004, 35 cooperative were 
formed although the scheme ended in 2005 unsuccessfully since "not one cooperative found 
enough diamonds to pay back their loans or turn a profit" (Levin and Turay 2008, 5).301
 To a large extent the concerns about miners, diggers and local communities emerged 
at the international level with the emergence of the Diamond Development Initiative (DDI).  
While donor governments were involved in initial discussions, the DDI is largely a 
collaborative effort between the World Bank, international NGOs Global Witness and PAC 
and business (De Beers and International Diamond Manufacturers Association) to address the 
"political, social and economic challenges facing the artisanal diamond mining sector in order 
to optimize the beneficial development impact of artisanal diamond mining to miners and 
their communities" (Levin and Gberie 2006).
  
302
                                                 
 
299 Through a contract with Management Systems International 
  The objectives of DDI were to gather and 
disseminate information on artisanal diamond mining and promote better understanding of, 
and possible solutions for: government and mining regulation; distribution and marketing and 
300 The IDMP also served as a technical capacity to formulate strategy. 
301 One cooperative reportedly produced no diamonds at all.   





organizational aspects of artisanal production (Levin and Gberie 2006).  DDI was formed in 
many ways as a companion to the Kimberly Process. For example, while the Kimberley 
Process addresses conflict diamonds it does little to target the underlying problems of the 
alluvial diamond sector that also have considerable security and development dimensions. As 
noted in a PAC report in 2007: 
 
 The Kimberly Process is strictly about controlling the trade in rough diamonds, in order to 
 ensure...[the] are not used to finance conflict. There is nothing in the KPCS requiring 
 governments to improve the lot of diamond miners, to distribute wealth from diamond 
 mining to local communities, or to  use revenues from diamond mining for anything at all 
 (PAC 2007).     
 
 The Kimberly Process and firmer government control over diamond mining areas 
began to transform the discussion of conflict diamonds into discussion about how the mineral 
sector as a whole could "contribute to peace and development" (World Bank 2005, iii).  The 
World Bank released a report titled "Tapping the Mineral Wealth for Human Progress-A 
Break with the Past", which was a reissued but updated version of a 2002 report.  The report 
stressed that the sector continued to not fully exploit the mineral potential available and thus 
needed to carry out additional geological investigation and revise mineral frameworks to 
attract potential investors in large scale mining create better living conditions for artisanal 
miners .  With a an reforms Mines and Mineral Act, sound trade policies and a fiscal 
framework designed to induce investment, the World Bank continued to report that annual 
mining potential of the industrial sector could amount to $370 million annually, including 
38,000 people directly and indirectly employed and another 300,000 or more deriving 





 By 2005 was a perceptible shift in emphasis with more attention focused on large-
scale industrial mining sector.   Many factors contributed to the push of fast-tracking 
industrial mining.  First, in the mid-2000s and ending in 2009 the world was in the midst of 
one of the largest commodity booms in history and the government and its international 
advisers wanted to take advantage of excess global capital.  According to a government 
adviser interviewed, in 2005 and up to late 2008, $50 billion in capital was floating around to 
invest in extractive industries world-wide and Sierra Leone was maneuvering to get in on the 
boom (Interview 43).   Second, although alluvial mining was contributing to growth, Sierra 
Leone faced substantial revenue deficits.  International advisers at the World Bank (2005) 
and IMF (2004) among others also did not view artisanal mining as efficient or economically 
viable in the long-term.  According to an IMF (2004, 8-10) report the positive impacts of 
large-scale mining grossly outweigh the positive impacts from smalls-scale mining.  For 
example, large-scale mining contributes to positive macro-economic, socio-economic, 
infrastructure, skills development, empowerment, social security and environmental impacts 
missing from small-scale mining.    
 In Sierra Leone, alluvial diamonds were long believed by experts to be in decline 
with alluvial mining was being done in areas previously mined.  The economic answer was to 
scale-up for better productively and revenue potential.  This included not only a shift to large-
scale industrial mining operations but also mechanized alluvial diamond operations overseen 
by companies. The alluvial sector, which is dependent on manual labor of hundreds of 
thousands of diggers and miners often engaged illegal operations, was increasing seen as 
backwards, inefficient and ungovernable (Le Billon and Levin 2009).  The growing 







 A primary focus now... is to attract bigger mining companies, which means foreign 
 investment....They are easier to monitor.  They keep a paper trail, and they are bringing in 
 a lot of revenue in the form of taxes and employment.  The alluvial mines are a problem.  
 They always have been, and will probably continue to be. Until we are able to attract 
 companies...to invest in the alluvial mines-which are overwhelmingly dominated by artisanal 
 miners-the problem of illicit mining, and therefore smuggling will continue (PAC and NACE 
 2005, 1) 
 
 International advisers and government realized that given the importance of alluvial 
mining to young males (15-30 years old), the demographic group most likely to be recruited 
into any future conflict and the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of others it would not be 
feasible to "crack down" on the sector.  It was not politically or socially feasible to "just get 
rid of it" (Interview 43).  International experts believed that even if sector was not productive 
economically, the security imperative was to ensure that youth are content and smuggling 
does not contribute to conflict.  There was a desire to keep a lid on the alluvial mining sector 
while moving forward rapidly to get industrial sector going.  The irony was that as the 
industrial mining sector started to gain momentum artisanal diamond mining continued to 
contribute to the country's economic growth with official exports increasing from $10 million 
in 2002 to over $125 million in 2005 due in part to the Kimberly Process scheme, it was 
largely thought of as a threat to security and development.  This was because since the end of 
the conflict the numbers of illegal diamond mines and smuggling remained high.  The Peace 
Diamond Alliance (2005) estimated illegal production at around $400 million and the UN 
(2005) suggesting that at least half of all diamond mining activities went unlicensed despite 
the considerable international attention to the issue.303
                                                 
 
303 In a Kimberly Scheme (2005) report response the government states that only 10-15 percent of 
exports are smuggled.    





was contributing to revenue it is was small since it is a share of the three percent tax and 
license fees.304
 However, there was no denying that the alluvial diamond sector was changing.  The 
number of mining licenses increased from 100 at the end of the war to well over 2,000 by 
2005. Reports also concluded that the government's Gold and Diamond Office, which values 
exports was contributing too much needed increases in government revenue.   However, the 
capacity of the Ministry of Mineral Resources was still weak at the field level.  Mines 
Monitoring Officials remained poorly paid, trained and equipped and thus unlikely to be 
efficient and fair regulators of such a lucrative industry.   Despite this it appears that by one 
measure governance reforms of the alluvial diamond sector have been successful.  Since the 
end of the war diamond exports and revenues have been consistently increasing.  For 
example, figures obtained from the GGDO, suggest that after the KPCS was implemented 
increases in exports of alluvial diamonds has risen sharply.  For example, between 2002 and 
2007, exports of alluvial diamonds increased by an estimated $80 million (calculated from 
GGDO figures) and this amounted to over 90 percent of imports.  
   
 The rise in diamond exports and revenues has been viewed by the government and 
donors as evidence of success in governing conflict diamonds.  Not only did the Kimberley 
Process have a role in ending the wholesale trafficking in conflict diamonds but also helped 
to control the trade in illegal trade and formalize the sector raising state revenues in the 
process.  However, while the certification scheme deserves credit, other factors have 
contributed to the rise in official exports (Cooper 2008, 108).  For example, increased control 
over diamond areas by UN peacekeepers, a substantial increase in mining and public 
attention that kept the diamond business engaged.  There is also evidence that the UN 
sanctions on Liberian diamonds as well as instability in neighboring Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea 
                                                 
 





provided an incentive to smuggle diamonds into Sierra Leone (Global Witness 2005; World 
Bank 2006).  While by most accounts a majority of diamonds are still exported illicit, what 
Cooper (2008, 108) calls the "security and policing framework" was relatively successful.  
Sierra Leone's Diamond and Mineral Reforms: A Period of 
Contention 
 
The "good news" about alluvial diamond exports, however, was increasingly tempered by 
other concerns.  First, it is not clear the degree to which alluvial diamonds actually 
contributed to state revenue.  Because of Sierra Leone's porous borders, and the impact on the 
price paid to miners, the amount of the export tax the government could impose on diamonds 
was set at three percent.  Including license fees only about $5.28 million was returned to the 
government from the alluvial diamond sector in 2006 (GoSL 2010). 305
                                                 
 
305 License fees on approximately 2,000 licenses. 
  Of this almost a 
million dollars were distributed to mining communities (GoSL 2010).  While this number 
does not take into consideration the direct role alluvial diamonds play in employing and 
providing revenue, it makes clear that state revenues from the sector are likely to be limited.  
This is due to the difficulty of taxing alluvial diamonds and the broad consensus among 
international peacebuilders that the alluvial diamond sector has peaked, and is currently in 
decline.  While little scientific analysis has been done, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
people are increasingly mining previously worked over areas (Interview 48).  The only way 
to increase production potential of the alluvial sector, then, is to mechanize and bring in 
small-scale companies.  Mechanization would help increase production compared to hand 
digging while small-scale companies, in theory at least, is believed would be easier to 
regulate and tax.   While it is necessary to continue to promote the alluvial sector for 





industrial mining or "modern-sector mining" holds the real promise for Sierra Leone in terms 
of economic growth, development and poverty reduction.  As one mining consultant 
described it, there had to be less an emphasis on "splitting up the mineral pie" (who gets what 
royalty, tax, etc) and not enough emphasis on "growing the [mineral] pie" (Interview 43). 
Community resentment and Sierra Rutile 
 The problem is that the rush to "jump-start" the industrial mineral sector has resulted 
in controversy, which has plagued the two large-scale mining operations--Sierra Rutile and 
Koidu Holdings.  Both of these operations were deemed critical to expanding state revenue 
and showcasing improvement for foreign investors.  Sierra Rutile restarted production in 
2006 investing over $200 million in facilities and infrastructure (NACE 2009, 24).  The 
company's resurrection was enabled by loans from international lenders and the government 
amounting to an estimated $50 million, and controversial financial terms negotiated with the 
government. In its first year of operation, the company reported that almost $30 million worth 
of rutile had been exported; second only to alluvial diamonds and that approximately 1,400 
were employed benefiting directly the surrounding community (NACE 2009, 24).306   The 
revenue numbers were hailed by the government and IBOs as a significant step in the 
development of Sierra Leone; it was the collapse of a dredge in 2008 that received most of 
the attention.  The dredge collapse, which killed several workers, led to a halt in production 
and layoffs of more than 25 percent of the workforce focused public attention on the Sierra 
Rutile and the industrial mineral sector more generally.307
 Although the company was back to work after an accident, the event raised several 
issues.  First, it provided a window of opportunity for civil society organizations to question 
   
                                                 
 
306 As NACE (2009) reports, Sierra Rutile is the only significant employer in the region and with 
average monthly salaries higher than people can expect to earn any other way.   
307 The company also asked for and received a two-year moratorium on interest payments to the 





the transparency of the sector and sound the alarm about the agreement that had been 
negotiated between the government and Sierra Rutile.  A government review found that 
losses to the government near $100 million between 2004 and 2016 due to the tax 
concessions and a diminished royalty payment granted to the company.  Civil society 
organizations maintained that the agreements were illegal and needed to be reviewed by the 
government. The company projected profits of over one billion dollars over 20 years, which 
would contribute some $25 million annually to state revenue.  However, civil society 
organizations as well as the IMF (2004) suggested that revenues will only amount to between 
$10 and 20 million in the next two decades under the current agreement.  In short, there is a 
question as to whether or not the state will acquire the much coveted revenue in the short to 
medium term from Sierra Rutile mine.  While the government promised to review the 
concessions in 2009 to ensure they benefit the people of Sierra Leone, the review has not 
been completed.  
 The dredge accident also raised the profile of working conditions, grievances and 
resentments in adjacent communities. A lack of clean water, high unemployment, a 
disproportionately high cost for basic commodities and a diminishing supply of agricultural 
land has been reported (Interview 80).  Conversations in the communities found that despite 
promises by the company to provide more wells few have been built.  And where wells have 
been built, it was done without the consultation with the community (Interview 80).  In 
addition, people complained of high prices for basic essentials (Interview 80).  As a Sierra 
Leone civil society group stated, the company is "sitting on top of so much money, but no 
one benefits" (Interview 81). In addition, as many as 15,000 youth are unemployed in the 
vicinity of the mine due to consistent rumors of employment that does not exist (Interview 
81).  
 Most contention is over the impacts of the Sierra Rutile mine on agricultural land and 





just compensation or surface rents.  Since the process of mining rutile involves removing, 
dredging, flooding and separating rutile from the topsoil the impact is tremendous.  While it 
remains unknown precisely how much land was impacted hundreds of households have 
apparently been affected and as the mining site expands this number is expected to increase 
substantially (NACE 2009).  Interviews in the area suggest that mining operations have 
reduced the available supply of land and this translates into diminished incomes and a lack of 
food for households (Interview 80).  This is significant because most of the available land is 
used for growing food and there exist few livelihoods alternatives to farming.  Making 
matters worse, many of the people currently losing agricultural land for mining were 
relocated by Sierra Rutile in the past (NACE 2009).  In a survey, NACE (2009, 25) found 
that approximately 84 percent of affected households are experiencing increasing land 
pressure that can lead to increased poverty near the mining site. 
 The make matters worse, the community reported that surface rents paid to the 
landowners as well as compensation for the loss of crops has been very low in comparison to 
what the land can produce in food can income over the life of a farmer (Interview 81; NACE 
2009).  In 2008, it was estimated that Sierra Rutile paid a little over $11 per acre annually in 
surface rents.308
                                                 
 
308 Surface rent rates are set in the agreement between Sierra Rutile and the government and were 
agreed to without any public consultation or participation. Surface rents are annual payments by the 
company.  The rates were set at $10 in 2003 with a 3 percent increase per year thereafter.  Only 45 
percent of the rents accrue to the landowner with 20 percent going to district councils, 20 percent to 
Chiefdom Development Fund and 15 percent to the Paramount Chief. 
   In addition, compensation for the loss of crops is not adequate primarily 
because it is based on one-year of production.  As a report by NACE (2009) suggests, a kola 
tree can produce over 200,000 Leones worth of product per year and can last 30 years, yet 
compensation is only a one-off payment of 40,000 Leones.  The same is true of a mango tree, 
which can produce up to 400,000 Leones of fruits per year although compensation is just a 





negotiations with the company when the mining agreement was finalized with the 
government.  At the same time, communities and land owners have seen little environmental 
remediation of disturbed mining sites, which are often left flooded and unusable. In the 
company's Environmental and Social Impact Assessment, it committed to reclaiming more 
land than it disturbed so the land can be used again for income generation.  However, to date 
of the 13,000 hectares impacted by rutile mining, past and present, perhaps 80 hectares have 
been rehabilitated (NACE 2009, 27).309
 Efforts to relocate communities due to mining operations have been met with 
resentment and anger.  According to NACE (2009) between 1985 and 1994 almost 6,000 
people--about 6 percent of the regional population-were relocated with mixed success.  While 
many reported better constructed homes and schools most people also saw a corresponding 
loss in agricultural land that made them less food secure while reducing incomes.  While 
Sierra Rutile has a policy that every household should be "at least as well off, if not better 
that it was" before any resettlement-the signs that it will be able to meet its obligations are not 
good.  One case in point is the small village of Foinda, which was scheduled to be moved in 
1994 and has been in a state of limbo ever since.  In fact, because resettlement has been 
proposed the company, it has instructed people to not plan cash crops and if they do they will 
not be compensated.  Interviews in the village highlighted a sincere lack of trust in Sierra 
Rutile particularly whether the company will be able to provide adequate land or 
development programs to help construct new livelihood opportunities to compensate for 
relocation.  Moreover, the resettlement location - adjacent to the town of Madina, which was 
relocated in 1994-is largely deemed wholly inadequate (NACE 2009). Not only are schools 
   
                                                 
 
309 The amount of land impacted by rutile mining in the area remains unknown. The company cites a 
figure of about over 3,500 hectares while the World Bank suggests that between 13,000 and 30,000 





and health clinics in disrepair but villagers report that since the relocation they have had to 
rent rather than own land (NACE 2009).310
 On top of that all this controversy, efforts by the communities to protest the company 
and raise awareness to their issues has been suppressed by police with some community 
leaders reportedly detained (Interview 81). The perception is that this heavy handed approach 
is the result of pressure to extract rutile at all costs given that Sierra Rutile has received 
generous backing by the government and international organizations, and therefore cannot 
afford "agitation" that could bring bad publicity or halt production.  In the end, what is 
particularly worrying is that the communities feel as if they are up against a wall, and as one 
member of civil society suggested, "people are willing to die for this area (Interview 57). 
While this may be hyperbole, it does not sound like a recipe for peace and development by 
any standards.  
  
Violence and Koidu Holdings 
 There appears to be a similar pattern of discontent in the communities surrounding 
the Koidu Holdings in Kono that began mining Kimberlite diamonds in 2004.311  Koidu 
Holdings exported approximately $28 million in diamonds in 2007, or roughly 20 percent of 
the Sierra Leone's overall diamond output (NACE 2009).  State revenue from these exports 
amounted to about $3.2 million of which just $1.7 million was from royalties.   According to 
the company, it employed about 600 Sierra Leoneans.  The revenue projections for the mine 
have been estimated at almost $400 million, which would amount to nearly $25 million in 
state revenues and an additional sum of several million to the Kono community through a 10 
percent profit share.312
                                                 
 
310 At the same time there existed only one well for over 600 people.  
  While increases in revenue and employment are certainly positive 
311 Koidu Holdings expanded in the Tongo diamond fields by getting a mining lease from the 
government in 2008.  





signs for the industry, mining operations in Koidu have been undermined by events.   In 
December 2007, violence erupted in Koidu that killed two protestors and brought a halt to 
operations for nearly two years.  While the event itself was significant, the lasting perception, 
especially among the community and portions of Sierra Leone civil society, is that the protest 
(and the resulting violence) was effective since it brought a halt to mining operations and got 
the attention of international actors, the government and Koidu Holdings itself.   
 The protest, involving an estimated 400 people, was organized by civil society 
organizations to bring attention to the grievances of the surrounding community's lack of 
sufficient compensation to landowners for land and crops "taken", problems with relocation 
of housing in the mining area and the lack of employment opportunities for local people 
(NACE 2009).   For example, like Sierra Rutile, communities were angered over what they 
saw as a lack of genuine compensation for the loss of land and crops due to mining activities.  
Like the case of Sierra Rutile, one time payments were offered to farmers that did not 
proximate the value to employment, livelihoods and household revenues over the long-term.  
Because the government negotiated the rates of land and crop compensation with the 
company, communities- some 5,000 households in all-perceive Koidu and the government 
working together to take and then profit from their land.   
 Another point of contention is over blasting without adequate notification and 
relocation.  In fact, it was unannounced blasting that led to anger and the subsequent protest 
in which two people were killed and 18 wounded by bullets fired by armed police forces. As 
one person who was there mentioned, the people did not think police would actually shoot 
(Interview 40; Interview 83).313 The blasting shakes the area, reportedly causes damage to 
property and is stressful to the population, who often gets no advanced warning.314
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 If they do 
get warning, which is supposed to be two-days in advance, people are often away from their 





homes at times for several hours, if not more.  Representatives of the company agree that the 
community should be evacuated but sometimes this is not possible and blasting is essential 
for mining and mining brings benefits.  There has also been considerable contention over the 
relocation of those near the mining site and susceptible to the affects of the blasting.  Much of 
the disagreement has been over the type of construction and the relocation site itself, with 
some people reportedly being bullied by the company and the consultant (CEMMAT) 
overseeing the Koidu Holdings maintains that it has consulted with those affected but after 
there is some agreement the community changes its mind and demands more and more.  
Regardless of who may be "right" in the debate over blasting and relocation little trust exists 
between communities and the company.     
 International outcry over the killing of the protesters lead to a halt of all mining 
operations and resulted in a government enquiry and report.315
 However, in mid-2009 tensions still run high.  Little had been done since the enquiry 
and report and the situation may be getting worse.  There is a general perception among the 
  International peacebuilders 
were well aware that the conflict started in this area and the stakes were high. The report 
documents the events of the day and accused the police acting in an "indiscriminate, 
disproportionate and reckless" manner and suggested that Koidu Holdings should had shown 
more restraint and  sensitivity toward the demonstrators.  The report also accused the 
company of not relocating people in the timeline originally agreed upon and suggested a 
larger radius from the blasting site be notified.  The report also found that the houses built for 
relocation are "not of a sufficient standard as would be expected of any building being 
constructed for human habitation in 2008" (Jenkins-Johnson Commission 2008).  In addition, 
the report found failures in basic sanitation and water supply at the resettlement village, 
without basic facilities (no school or market).   
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community that the government is corrupt and does not have an interest in protecting the 
citizenry but only in ensuring the company can operate to export diamonds.  Many in the 
community asserted that they don't mind mining but want the government to keep its 
promises.  As evidence the government's recommendations were not implemented, the police 
responsible for shooting the protesters were not prosecuted, and the growing perception that 
Koidu Holdings is bribing government officials and local chiefs to "look the other way" 
(Interview 83). The local community believes that even the contractor hired to settle the land, 
crop and resettlement issues-CEMMAT- lacks any credibility since its owner sits on the 
board of Koidu Holdings.  Only civil society organizations like National Movement for 
Justice and Democracy (NMJD) are the "only organizations that will tell [us]...what is going 
on (Interview 84)."  A local community organizer sums up the tension by suggesting that 
people are being "radicalized" and locals "are fed up, and enough is enough" (Interview 83). 
From the perspective of the company, they doing all they can under difficult economic 
conditions and that without Koidu Holdings, the employment and economic situation would 
be much worse for the local people.  The common perception among some is that civil 
society organizations like NMJD are only attempting to agitate the population and put a halt 
to mining without offering any alternative.  In short, these types of "activist" organizations 
are creating conflict by pitting people against the government and communities.  As one 
international consultant mentioned in passing, civil society was "stoking unrest" and using it 
as a "bargaining chip."  
 After almost five years of consultations with international advisors, the government 
passed the Mines and Minerals Act of 2009.316
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Diamond Trading Act of 2009 (GoSL 2009b).  The Act is intended to provide for the internal 
monitoring of the production and trade in rough diamonds, controls on the export, import and transit 
across Sierra Leon and an improved certification scheme under the Kimberly process.  
  The Act replaced the Act of 1994 and the 





standards.  The new Act was to make Sierra Leone the leader in West African mining 
legislation by balancing the interests of investors and communities and making oversight of 
the sector and its revenues more transparent in order to benefit the "economy, local 
communities and the country" (GoSL 2009a, 2).  The objective of the Act was to address 
"several issues not previously covered by the law including health and safety, environmental 
protection and community development" (GoSL 2009a).  The Act was also supposed to help 
tighten rules for administrators and mineral rights holders and investment and mineral sector 
development by ensuring security of tenure and rebalancing fiscal arrangements by raising 
royalty rates for precious stones and minerals.   
Controversy over new industrial mining contracts  
 Although the passing of the Mines and Mineral Act was celebrated as a milestone by 
the government and international donors, it has also been contentious.  Many international 
and Sierra Leone NGOs believed that the Act had not been  properly vetted or publicized, 
despite the fact that it was in the works for five years (Interview 72). The conventional 
wisdom was that the rush to pass the law was to "show it off" at a donor's conference in 
London to potential investors.  Others were critical of provisions of the Act that gave mining 
officials amnesty in dealing with mining companies as long as it could be proven that any 
improprieties were in "good faith."  This provision only serves to concentrate power in the 
Ministry of Mineral Resources, and can lead to a lack of accountability and corruption.  In 
short, it seemed to give excessive powers to the government, which mirrored pre-war 
arrangements. These same groups were also critical of the 0.1 percent of the gross revenue 
that the Act mandated be given to mining communities stating that this seemed low given that 
"the land belonged to the people, and they must benefit from the mines that destroyed their 
lands, and forced them out of traditional farming" (Fofana 2009).  As one NGO official put it 





pittance for the land; and agricultural activities that sustain communities are destroyed by big 
mining corporations in the name of development" (Interview 57).  The larger concern, or 
course, was the laws made in Freetown did not involve or include the input of local people or 
civil society organizations.  When asked about this an international consultant commented 
that consultations with communities would slow down the process, which needs to be fast-
tracked while dealing with international and local civil society groups was limited because 
they were not "constructive" (Interview 43).  
 By 2008, the Ministry of Mineral Resources had awarded 83 exclusive exploration or 
prospecting licenses, ten mining leases and over 20 small-scale mining leases for mechanized 
gold and diamond operations.   This highlights a growing mineral sector.  Although the 
problems with Sierra Rutile and Koidu Holdings received significant attention, more recently 
two large scale iron ore agreements, linked to British companies, have raised questions about 
Sierra Leone's reforms in the mining sector.  As the Economist (2010) put it Sierra Leone is 
"breaking its own rules on exploiting resources."   
 The first is London Mining, which signed an agreement and received a mining lease 
in 2006 to redevelop an abandoned iron ore mine in Marampa, north of the Freetown. 
According to London Mining the site consists of about 14 km² of brownfields formerly 
operated by the state-owned Sierra Leone Development Company. 317
                                                 
 
317 The Marampa mine was in operation from the mid-1930s until 1975, reaching peak production in 
the mid-1960s.   
  According to NACE 
(2010a), a Sierra Leonean NGO, the London Mining lease agreement is illegal, was 
negotiated in secret, goes against the spirit of reform and represents past practices (NMJD 
2010).   One of the main concerns, for example, is that agreement grants a tax concession that 
reduces future benefits to the state and communities substantially.  The "tax holiday" would 
reduce the tax rate from 37.5 percent to six percent for 10 years.  While the lease is for 25 





company suggests otherwise. There is no provision for this arrangement in Sierra Leonean 
law or internationally. As NACE pointed out that although Mines and Mineral Act of 2009 
had raised royalty rates on minerals, these were being subverted in favor of fiscal incentives 
that benefit the company (NACE 2010a).  According to the member of an NGO, this places 
the company above the "law, country and people" (Interview 40). While the company, 
government and IMF suggest that these "fiscal incentives" are necessary to attract investment 
and kick start the economy - NGOs such as NACE suggest it is a "bad precedent" for 
subsequent negotiations on other mining contracts.  In short, rather than bring development it 
will undermine the national development agenda.  Another point of contention is the 
agreement's reported contribution of 0.1 percent Community Development Fund, which is not 
only a tiny fraction of what was promised to local communities. 
 Critics have also raised concern about a so-called "confidentiality clause" in the 
agreement, which will be used to limit the release of public information that undermines 
Sierra Leone's commitment to transparency and the EITI (NACE 2010b).  The company 
suggests that such confidentially is needed to protect business interests, NGOs argue that 
such clauses only create opportunities for government corruption since it obfuscates 
revenues.  Another clause in the agreement that has raised alarm is that the company is not 
liable for any pollution, loss of land or environmental damage that occurred before the mining 
lease was signed (NACE 2010b). This has been difficult for the local community because the 
company was active for years in exploration but cannot be held responsible for damages.  In 
addition, while Sierra Leone's Environmental Protection Agency declared the mine 
suspended due to a failure to meet environmental requirements, this declaration was 
mysteriously reversed the same day, leading to perceptions of corruption.  As a director of a 
civil society organization remarked, "is the government in charge of the company or the 
company in charge of the government" (Interview 43)?  While these community-level 





attention of international actors.  According to Global Witness the agreement is a "bad deal" 
for all Sierra Leoneans and should be made public in the spirit of openness and transparency 
(NMJD 2010). As a member of an international NGO put it, "why spend vast sums of donor 
money on reforming the mineral sector and passing new laws, if they are only to be ignored" 
(Interview 43).  
 A much larger agreement, and to date a more controversial one, is with Africa 
Minerals, who has succeeded at getting a 25 year mining lease on arguably the largest deposit 
of magnetite in the world.  According to geologists almost 10 billion tons of iron ore may be 
contained in the area around Tonkolili.  According to the company's controversial chairman 
Frank Timmis, the mine will be Africa's largest and one of its lowest-cost producers (The 
Exclusive 2009).318  The mine is expected to begin exports at the end 2011 with total exports 
to reach $1 billion by 2018 and help the country bring about "financial independence" 
(Scanlon 2010).  Timmis claims that at its peak, the mine could generate revenue of $3 billion 
a year, which would be six times the annual revenue of the country (Reuters 2010).  To mine 
the ore the company is beginning to construct a 200 km railway line to the port at Targrin and 
update the port, which would handle the export of up to 45 million tons of ore annually.  The 
company also announced that it expects employ 10,000 Sierra Leoneans directly or indirectly 
at the mining site, which would make it the largest employer in the country. 319
                                                 
 
318 Frank Timmis, CEO of African Minerals has been controversial.  A Romanian, Timmis moved to 
Australia started a gold mining company and became successful. However, a mine he owned in 
Romania led to local tensions and environmental degradation. Another company he founded, Regal 
Petroleum was at the center of a scheme to sell off the company after claims that of a Greek Oilfield 
held the largest reserves in Europe were found to be false 
 President 
Koroma in a speech at the groundbreaking in Targrin stated that the partnerships with the 
private sector - like African Minerals- is vital for national development agenda and economic 
growth (The Exclusive 2009).  The President of Sierra Leone stated that "mining companies 
319  Not a small thing in a country where 800,000 youths are without full employment (out of a total 





are indispensible partners in development" and stressed the importance of transparency and  
creating a stable and conducive business climate in which mining companies can "operate 
freely and which guarantees fair returns on investments" (The Exclusive 2009).  Africa 
Minerals has been helped by a $1.5 billion dollar investment by Shandong Iron and Steel 
Group, one of China's largest state-owned steel mills.  At the same time, China Railway 
Materials Commercial Corporation purchased a 12.5 percent stake in Africa Minerals.   
 The problem, according to international and local NGOs is that the mining agreement 
fails to conform to the new mining act that Sierra Leone drew up in 2009 with substantial 
international support.  According to NACE the agreement contains at least 10 clauses that 
contradict existing Sierra Leonean law and proclaim that the country is on a "precipice" and 
needs a "agreed, transparent, legal regime to ensure that mining companies finally operate in 
ways that benefit Sierra Leoneans" (NACE 2010).  Not only has the agreement been viewed 
as illegal but was carried out in secrecy.  Like the other large mineral deal that was pushed 
through, it does not meet the tax rate of 37.5 percent, instead paying only six percent initially 
and exempt when in a tax loss position.320
                                                 
 
320 According to the Minister of the Mines and Mineral  Resources, after the initial period of a tax 
holiday and assuming the company is not in a tax loss position, the country would eventually get 41 
percent of revenue (including taxes, royalties, surface fees, etc). However, according to the President 
this will be 25 percent. The point is nobody really knows what is in the agreement.  
  Others are also skeptical about the sudden 
"spectacular discovery" of "high quality grade ore" especially given Timmis' history in the 
Regal Petroleum debacle (Interview 72).  The behavior of the government resembles that of 
diggers and miners motivated by the possibility of fast and easy "winnings" in the short term 
at the expense of long-term security and development.  There is no independent verification 
of the precise amounts of iron ore in African Minerals concession area nor the precise 
numbers that may be employed and it is not uncommon for prospectors to exaggerate a "find" 
so as to attract support from actors and weaken any proponents of the project.  For example, 





of the African Minerals (and London Mining) agreement have been accused of "not having 
the country's national interest in mind." 
 The dispute over African Minerals goes well beyond the mining lease and agreement 
due to recent tensions with local communities that have turned violent.  These problems are 
generally around the company not keeping promises to local communities.  The company has 
promised to provide training and new schools but have thus far failed to do so.  However, 
most disputes are over land in Kemedugu area.  In one case, young men became upset over 
the company destroying piece of farmland to construct a dam and barricaded a road and 
effectively took several members of the company hostage.  The farmland was deemed to be 
"sacred bush" for the community. Although the group wanted to negotiate with the company 
and be included in decisions that impact their land, local police used tear gas and live rounds 
to disperse a crowd of protestors.  New reports at the time suggested that several protestors 
were badly beaten and hospitalized and that fearing retribution from police young men fled 
the area. Tensions remain high with local groups damaging a drilling rig valued at over 
$400,000 in protest.   Others residents of the community have refused to abandon the land the 
company has been planning to excavate only increasing resentment. Although the company 
insists that it will relocate villages in the vicinity of mining operations, communities remain 
skeptical given the problems and controversies associated with resettlement at Sierra Rutile 
and Koidu Holdings.    The fact is that the mining operations at African Minerals (and 
London Mining) are only in the initial stages yes conflict over land and benefits is already 
boiling over.  The problem is that mines and the related infrastructure require land just as 
communities require land for livelihoods and farming, so there is bound to be contention and 
conflict. 
 The core argument for pursing industrial-scale mineral extraction was its ability to 
contribute large revenues to the state for the purpose of reconstruction and development.  By 





results.  While revenues have increased due in part to the Sierra Rutile and Koidu Holding 
starting production as well as companies like African Minerals and London Mining turning 
from exportation to mining, thus far at least revenues are far below projections.  This is due to 
a combination of factors that have been discussed above, not least of which may be 
overinflated and unrealistic projections. These projections of the productive potential of the 
sector not only work to drive the sector forward but it also creates unrealistic expectations.  
Postconflict countries tend to have higher expectations for "rapid, equitable and visible 
development progress" (UNEP 2009, 57).  However, these expectations can not only over 
estimate the amount of revenue available that might be available to the government but also 
have implications at the local level where the people expect to see immediate peace 
dividends.  When these dividends do not materialize--either in the form of jobs, health 
centers, education or development projects- then there is the potential for popular  resentment 
and grievance - although the consequences are far from clear. While potentially justified, the 
lack of immediate social services from companies has resulted in growing accusations over 
government corruption. In short, in a sector that incentivizes outlandish projections there is as 
need to manage expectations both in terms of what is realistic and  
 At the same time, however, overhauling mineral governance, including efforts at 
transparency and accountability were viewed as essential to ensuring revenues do not get 
absorbed into patronage networks or undermine security.  There have certainly been notable 
improvements but again the record is mixed at best.  The mining cadastral project is a case in 
point.  International donors and financial institutions funded the development of a cadastral 
system as a critical part of modernizing and bringing clarity to the sector by linking 
geographic locations to ownership, mining rights and payment of fees.  While the Ministry of 
Mineral Resources supported the project in theory, implementation has been slow.  
Government officials suggest this is due to a lack of knowledge and capacity since the system 





that the cadastre project would begin to chip away at the discretionary decisions that officials 
leverage for side benefits and therefore have been reluctant to move forward (Interview 41).  
More specifically, maintaining uncertainty and disorder about ownership, licensing, and 
prospecting, exploration and production activities benefits both companies and government 
officials.  Or put another way, lack of capacity or "incompetence" is orchestrated to create 
confusion, which ends up benefiting a "faceless" groups of politicians and other elites 
(Interview 43).  There is also concern that state revenues from the sector remain less than 
transparent.  Although the first EITI report found discrepancies over almost $1 million over a 
two year period this was deemed the result of government entities  failing to report or the 
inability to substantiate payments (EITI 2010).  Le Billon and Levin (2009, 709-710) suggest 
that these totals contrast sharply when land rental fees are added in, questioning the veracity 
of revenue transparency initiatives.321
 At the same time, the secrecy in which large industrial contracts, which involve large 
sums of money, is becoming an increasing concern of the international community.  While 
international and local NGOs have been vocal about the lack of transparency and 
accountability in the sector, international actors remain cautiously optimistic.  While 
international pressure led the government to form a task force to examine the mining 
contracts for Sierra Rutile and Koidu Holdings, there is growing apprehension about the 
African Minerals and London Mining contracts.  The UN's Executive Representative in 
Sierra Leone cautioned that while the country's mineral endowment may bring help 
"break...high donor dependency...[and] pursue development goals more aggressively" 
dependence on the export of raw materials can cause "social disruptions, huge income 
disparities and rampant corruption" that can result in conflicts (von der Schulenburg 2010).  
The UN representative suggested that the iron ore contacts could be a "game changer" that 
   
                                                 
 
321 Le Billon and Levin report that when a multilateral funding agency expressed concerns about 





alters the country's economic, political and social landscape in ways that may simply "dwarf 
the capacities of the government itself" (von der Schulenburg 2010).  Of particular concern 
was whether the mining agreements were done transparently and if they are in compliance 
with the new mining law.  A still larger concern was impact such "huge commercial interests 
could have on the integrity of an underpaid public service, the media and civil society" (von 
der Schulenburg 2010).   While interviews with British and US government officials in Sierra 
Leone turned up similar concerns, as one mentioned ironically, they are "reluctant to get 
involved in the internal decisions [of the Sierra Leonean government] (Interview 84).  
Contention in the small-scale mining sector  
 It should also be noted that although much attention has focused on these large-scale 
industrial operations there has also been increasing conflict around smaller companies that 
are exploring, prospecting or beginning to extract minerals.  A report by a group of civil 
society organizations, for example, argued that in Kono District the Sierra Leone Mining 
Company and Milestone Mining Company were not operating in accordance with national 
laws or international standards, keeping secret both the mining lease agreements and the 
required Environmental Impact Assessments.  Moreover, local chiefdom authorities have 
been accused of selling off lands to mining companies without consultation or consent of 
chiefdom people (NACE 2006).  Landowners reported being denied access to their farmland, 
which was described as "grabbed" by the mining companies without permission or 
compensation (CJM 2007).  According to community testimonies, the Sierra Leone Mining 
Company had taken hold of substantial land holdings with no regard for the need of local 





2007).322  While chiefdom officials announced that they gave permission for mining 
operations on approximately 130 acres it was done with the tacit agreement that the company 
would support community development projects although nothing had been done in this 
regard.  Furthermore, any effort to investigate the company's mining areas was either deterred 
by Sierra Leone police forces or young men wielding knives.323
 While problems in the large and smaller-scale industrial sector point not only to 
mixed results but increasing levels of conflict and contention that may be undermining the 
consolidation of peace, other related dynamics exists in the alluvial mining sector.  While 
revenues are increasing due in part to more government control of the sector and the 
Kimberly Process, significant challenges remain.  The foremost of these is that alluvial 
diamond mining is in decline in Sierra Leone and despite the best efforts of programs to 
improve the lot of diggers and communities; nothing will restore diamonds to the ground. 
Anybody that has spent time with diggers (and miners) in the pits of Sierra Leone 
understands that while many harbor dreams of "getting rich" by finding a particularly rare or 
large diamond, most are simply trying to earn a livelihood. The problem is that alluvial 
deposits in the both due to growing scarcity in combination with unequal power relations in 
the diamond mines will fail to meet livelihood needs and provide future opportunities for 
youth.   
 
 And two other factors will continue to diminish the ability of youth find even meager 
livelihoods.  First, international security imperatives to control illegal alluvial mining and 
government's pursuit of revenue from legal mining has lead to a crackdown that reducing 
even further the available opportunities while fostering resentment.  It is not uncommon for 
police to issue warnings that illegal mines will "face the full brunt of the country's law" 
                                                 
 
322 According to Ministry of Mineral Resource data (2008), the Sierra Leone Mining Company has 
exclusive prospecting licenses to almost 25,000 hectares, at least half of which is in Kono District.    
323 Reports suggest that the mining company hired young thugs to break up any meeting that was being 





(Yongai 2009).  While this hard-handed approach may work to discourage some illegal 
operations, often these operations reflect a sincere search for livelihoods by diggers and 
miners, and securitization by police forces is an unwarranted intrusion of state power, 
especially because these illegal mines are more often than no implicitly sanctioned by local 
chiefs and power brokers. In these cases, the security threat of illegal mining is exaggerated 
while the contribution to incomes, poverty alleviation and livelihoods goes underemphasized.  
Second, diminishing alluvial diamonds reserves that can be extracted by hand-and pressure to 
garner tax revenue-is increasing the pressure to mechanize and corporatize the sector.  This 
not only reduces the need for artisanal diggers and miners (and their dependents) that relies 
on alluvial mining for livelihoods but also can have environmental implications on streams 
that diminish neighboring diamond mining activities as well as  This has resulted in growing 
numbers of conflict, some turning violent (World Bank 2008b).    
 More importantly perhaps is a growing recognition that a majority of diggers want 
alternative livelihoods.  Specifically, a large majority of young men who toil in alluvial 
diamond pits want to be engaged in subsistence agriculture but have limited or no 
opportunities to do so.324
                                                 
 
324 Often these young men want to return to their home communities.  
 This is partially the result of land scarcity that is due almost 
exclusively to exclusive land ownership and tenure rights that make acquiring land for 
farming and agricultural production almost impossible for diggers (or unemployed youth, 
more broadly).  The fact is that alluvial miners have other possible livelihoods.  Interviews 
with diggers in Kono District find conclusively that young men go into diamond mining 
because there is no other means of making a living and once they are "hooked" on mining it 
is difficult to find other work.  Land in Sierra Leone is either owned by powerful elites who 
are provided access by the government through concessions to grow cash crops or 





political power.325  This dynamic of increasing elite control of agricultural land is only being 
exacerbated by efforts to both increase the role of small scale mining companies and divvy up 
the country to large international mining companies.326
 Finally, there is indeed a segment of civil society that question the long-term 
development prospects of mineral exploitation and whether the benefits from mineral 
resources can really be the key to postconflict peace and development.  From this perspective, 
minerals-whether alluvial diamonds or large-scale industrial operations-offer little hope to the 
population.  This perspective is derived from the undisputable fact that Sierra Leone has been 
mining diamonds for three-quarters of a century and still remains one of the most 
impoverished countries in the world.  What is most striking is that the regions with the 
highest levels of poverty have been those in districts and chiefdoms that rely on mining or are 
adjacent to large-scale mining operations (UNEP 2010).   As one person was quoted as 
saying-"we see diamonds carted away from here daily, but remain impoverished" (Fofana 
2009).  In addition, the country has a checkered history with the mining sector, including 
exploitation of workers, human rights abuses, environmental degradation and war and the 
notion that better governance and more efficient state control can transform decades of 
 As has been recounted above, this is 
already creating contention and conflict among landowners and communities more generally.  
Put simply, diggers, and to a lesser extent miners, are trapped between an occupation they did 
not choose (alluvial mining) and an occupation they cannot have (agriculture), and this is 
beginning to foster increasing resentment and contention as the youth population continues to 
grow and opportunities for sustainable livelihoods shrink. This is despite a wealth of good 
faith efforts to govern alluvial diamonds and increase the benefits to miners by international 
actors and the government.  
                                                 
 
325 Many Paramount Chiefs charge substantial "rents" for access and are therefore reluctant to 
relinquish any control of land in the chiefdom.   





mismanagement, patronage and corruption into prosperity in a matter of years is met with 
genuine cynicism.  
 An influential member of a civil society group working on mining matters suggests 
that it is important to understand that natural resource and environment issues and the 
struggles of communities are not only complex but have been going on forever. What is new 
is that the international community has been made more aware of them and civil society is 
more powerful in terms of its authority and legitimacy.  Sierra Leon developed and 
perpetuated an opportunistic system in which politicians that "think they own the country" 
use the business of resources to gain more control and power.  In short, many argue that at the 
heart of Sierra Leone's problem is elite struggle to extract resources as quick as possible-often 
with the same people in power-because they may be out of power next week.  Not only does 
this fail to lift up the population up and contribute to development and genuine poverty 
alleviation but leads to plunder of the country's resources.  What is ironic is that the policies 
of the international donors and the international financial institutions seem to be rebuilding if 
not intensifying pre-war mining arrangements and many in international and local groups are 
asking whether the industrial model is worth it.  And while it is often local elites that gain, 
some NGOs accuse the international community of promoting a development model 
grounded in the sense that if resources are governed well it will benefit the country and its 
people. However, this puts the people last and the "wealthy class" first.  As one member of a 
local NGO summed it up, "Sierra Leone has gone full circle, [we]...are in the same place as 
before the war" and that in many ways the only "counter-force" holding the country together 
is a shared "war-weariness" (Interview 57). 
 International donors and the government, on the other hand, counter with two 
arguments.  First, despite the problems in the mineral sector the country is on the right track.  
For a country that needed to basically start from scratch in terms of industrial scale mining 





reforms that have been implemented need time to work but have shown in other places that 
over long-term  extractive industries will add to state revenues, benefit local communities and 
support sustainable development (World Bank 2005).  The key to such reforms is to manage 
expectations, implement measures to increase transparency and decrease corruption, and 
provide regulatory clarity so reputable companies will want to invest in a risky postconflict 
setting in a risky industry.  Although the World Bank and IMF caution against continued 
"fiscal incentives" to mining companies such "easy deals" was deemed an imperfect necessity 
in order to raise state revenue and jump-start the sector World Bank 2005; IMF 2004).  
Second, there is the widespread view that Sierra Leone really has no choice but to fast-track 
the industrial mineral sector. As the director of an international organization explained the 
Minister of Finance cannot even import gas or pay government salaries without mineral 
revenues and if the country is going to alleviate poverty and improve economic growth a 
future of mineral exports are vital. Moreover, there is a growing acknowledgement that 
artisanal mining while politically significant is not efficient or productive in terms of long-
term economic productively. Calls by NGOs to close the sector or slow it down as to be more 
participatory are accused of ignorance of the realities and practicalities of Sierra Leone and 
the need to engage in international trade. These same NGOs are blamed for following their 
own narrow agenda and not being representative of the communities they claim to support. At 
least one Sierra Leonean NGOs has been called "treasonous".  In fact, interviews with civil 
society organizations routinely turned up the perception that the government and mining 
companies were trying to divide people by colluding with local leaders while the government 
and mining companies accused NGOs of exactly the same thing (Interview 83; Interview 40).  
Suffice to say, the mineral sector is divisive and becoming increasingly politicized.   
 In sum, mineral reform in Sierra Leone is arguably in a state of confusion.  While 
international actors and the government point to increasing state revenues and a new Mines 





increasing contention raises serious questions.  What is known, however, is that considerable 
human and financial capital has been spent on the premise that mineral wealth can be  
transformed into postconflict peace expectations of the population remain high.   
Conclusion 
International peacebuilding organizations by-and-large understand the relationship between 
diamonds and the Sierra Leonean conflict as characterized by "blood diamonds".  The 
problem was that rebels groups were able to trade diamonds in exchange for weapons, which 
destabilized West Africa and threatened international security.  The central peacebuilding 
challenge, then, was for IBOs was to consolidated state authority and control over diamonds 
and diamond producing areas, and improve governance to ensure diamond revenue funds 
economic recovery rather than conflict.  Due to an inherent distrust that diamonds could be 
readily controlled, IBOs have also stressed the importance of rebuilding Sierra Leone's 
mineral sector. The objective of IBOs was to transform problematic "conflict diamonds s" 
into "peace resources" for the purpose of establishing a stable and lasting peace. 
 This chapter has tracked the diamond and mineral reform process--including new 
policies, laws, regulations and practices.  I have argued that the reforms and policies are 
designed to "securitize" and "marketize" diamonds and minerals.  In the immediate aftermath 
of the conflict, IPOs were concerned with securing Sierra Leone's diamonds by promoting 
and supporting the establishment of reforms and policies to consolidate state control and 
authority over diamonds revenues.  These reforms and policies stressed the importance of 
"good governance", including the improvement of revenue transparency, government 
accountability and public participation.  The ultimate purpose was to ensure the dynamics of 
"blood diamonds" do not reoccur.  The reforms and policies promoted by international 
peacebuilders also stress what I refer to as "marketization", as exemplified by the emphasis 





overarching rationale among IPOs is that stagnant economic growth, poverty and a lack of 
state revenue threaten a sustainable and long-term peace.   
The reforms and policies appear to have influenced the consolidation of state 
authority over the alluvial diamond sector, which has helped to provide stability and raise 
considerable revenue.  At the same time, efforts to restart the industrial mining sector have 
resulted in several major concessionary agreements and new sources of state revenue.  All of 
this has led to a perceptible uptick in the country's GDP.  At the same time, however, 
everything is not alright with the diamond and mineral sectors.  There is substantial 
contention and resistance over the "rules of the game"--that define how people behave 
relative diamonds and minerals--and their consequences.  In the alluvial diamond sector a 
combination of the state "cracking down" on "illicit" operations, mechanization, and a lack of 
available land and alternative livelihoods is creating palpable resentment and potentially 
deepening poverty.  At the same time, efforts to "jump-start" industrial mining have resulted 
in not only resentment and anger over conditions in adjacent communities but also episodes 
of violence.  Central areas of contention and resistance revolve around the perception of too 
much state power, corruption, a lack of land and livelihoods, and exclusion.  After much 
optimism there is a sense that things are reverting back to past practices (Interview 57).  The 
larger issue, which I turn to in the next chapter, is to understand what the source of the 
underlying tensions might be, and determine the potential consequences might be for 






Chapter 8: Governing the Environment and Natural 
Resources: Pathologies and Consequences 
 
 
In Liberia and Sierra Leone civil conflict has not resumed and this is the result of a host of 
contingent factors, not least of which is sustained peace operations and intervention by 
international peacebuilding organizations.  Peace remains fragile in both countries but given 
the extent of the brutality and violence it is an impressive accomplishment.  Yet, the question 
I pose is not whether conflict resumes or not.  Instead, my objective is to examine how 
environmental and natural resource governance reforms help or hinder peacebuilding.  To be 
more precise if environmental and natural resource governance "helps" peacebuilding, we 
should be able to detect a related decrease in the propensity of violence  At the same time, if 
environmental and natural resource governance "hinders" peacebuilding, we should be able to 
identify a subsequent increase in propensity of violence.  As the cases show, international 
peacebuilders have been actively involved in promoting and supporting the establishment of 
reforms and policies aimed at "securitizing" and "marketizing" the environment and natural 
resources in an effort to transform "conflict resources" into "peace resources".  In short, 
international peacebuilders have been actively engaged in altering the "rules of the game" 
with the objective of turning "bad governance into good governance" and by extension 
conflict into peace (Chandler 2010, 6).   
 The purpose of this chapter is to compare IBO efforts to govern Liberia's forests and 
Sierra Leone's diamonds and minerals, respectively.  First, I explore the similarities and 
differences.  What I find--and what is nakedly evident from reading the case studies--is that 





to reforms and policies that are strikingly analogous, almost as if they were being written by 
the same "script".  I argue that this indicates the development of standardized set of 
peacebuilding practices--with regards to environmental and natural resource governance.  
While these have produced some positive benefits, a closer look at the cases reveals a mixed 
verdict.  Rather than serve as focal points for trust, confidence and cooperation, the reforms 
and policies are divisive and wrought with contention and resistance--some resulting in 
violence.  I suggest the reason is that "securitization" and "marketization" give rise to 
numerous linked pathologies that include: the danger of inattention to livelihoods and the 
environment, the problem of unrealistic expectations, the risk of recreating pre-war political 
arrangements; and the danger of provoking societal competition.  Given these inherent effects 
and pathologies, environmental and natural resource governance may be counterproductive 
for peacebuilding in Liberia and Sierra Leone because they increase the propensity for 
violence.   To reduce methodological uncertainties, I also briefly examine the relative lack of 
international attention to governing diamonds and minerals in Liberia and forests in Sierra 
Leone.    
The Development of Standardized Peacebuilding Practices 
The problem and solution: From "conflict resources" to "peace 
resources 
  
 Over the last decade, the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone have been the subject 
of a growing literature that has improved our understanding of complex, puzzling, and 
horrific civil wars. Despite this literature, however, there remains a general inability of 
analysts to fully comprehend the conflict, and instead focus on aspects that are easier for 
(Western) audiences and policy makers to digest.  Early explanations of the conflicts, for 





barbarism" in which irrational and uncivilized warlords and rebels--motivated by ethnic 
hatreds or primordial savagery--committed murder for no reason (Kaplan 1994; Richards 
1996).  Other explanations blamed the conflict on globalization and the end of the Cold War, 
which undermined state institutions and made countries ungovernable (Kaldor 1999).  As 
discussed in Chapter 4, explanations for the Liberian conflict center on the economic motives 
of combatants, and the responsibility valuable natural resources played in starting and fueling 
the 14-year civil war. Such narratives emphasize the role of "greedy" warlords and corrupt 
government officials, who traded in "blood timber"--among other resources--to amass wealth 
and buy weapons.  Liberia remains to this day the "poster child" of a greed-driven, natural 
resource conflict, and the prime example of a "new war" fought over forests and their 
revenues (de Jong, Donovan and Ken-Ichi 2007).   The conflict in Sierra Leone, likewise, 
conflict, is explained through the lens of "economic agendas" and "conflict resources".  Such 
explanations highlighted the role of "loot-seeking" rebels and "greedy" warlords--most 
prominently Liberia's Charles Taylor--that plundered Sierra Leone's vast diamond deposits to 
buy arms, get rich and sustain conflict. In fact, Sierra Leone will forever be synonymous with 
the term "blood diamonds (Campbell 2004). 
 It's worth repeating that the practice of controlling the environment and natural 
resources for power and patronage--at the expense of the population--has a long historical 
trajectory in both Liberia and Sierra Leone.  Until the late1990s--a full six or seven years 
after the conflicts began-- it caused little alarm among the international community.  
However, several issues intersected to construct the problem of "conflict resources".  First, a 
flurry of academic work linking the environment and natural resources to civil conflict 
emerged to influence how IPOs came to understand the problem.  In short, abundant natural 
resources were a cause for alarm since they could not only entice undermine government or 
even increase poverty but instigate rebellion.  Second, international non-governmental 





conflicts in Sierra Leone, Liberia and elsewhere.  Given public pressure to do something, and 
the emerging idea that peacebuilding needed to expand to address new challenges, the issue 
of "conflict resources" garnered tremendous attention among IPOs.  Because the UN had 
been unsuccessful to some degree ending wars through negotiation (the Liberian civil war 
had at least 14 separate peace agreements), mitigating conflict by controlling the trade in 
natural resources was appealing.  And finally, the international security implications of 
"conflict resources" increased dramatically after news reports surfaced that diamonds were 
indirectly funding al Qaeda operations after 9/11 (Farah 2001).  Almost overnight the issue 
of failed states and the global trade in natural resources merged with the "War on Terror" 
(Pugh, Cooper and Goodhand 2004). 
 As discussed in Chapter 3, the extensive literature linking the environment and 
natural resources to civil conflict remain tentative and controversial, at best.  Despite these 
ambiguities, the idea of "conflict resources" remains a central "problem" for in the world of 
peacebuilding and has come to define how IPOs understand the relationship between the 
environment, natural resources and conflict.  Because of this, it has also had a profound 
influence on the ways in which IPOs understand the linkages between the environment, 
natural resources and peace.  The dominant way the environment and natural resources are to 
help consolidate peace or improve international security involves using them as "peace 
resources".  "Peace resources" stresses the idea that financial flows from high-value natural 
resources can "fund" peace, particularly if the state has the capacity, authority and legitimacy 
to govern.  The general assumption, which emerges from the peacebuilding literature, is that 
rebuilding war-torn states, and providing for people in the aftermath of conflict, requires 
substantial state revenue to repair infrastructure, pay government officials and provide basic 
services.  In this way, the government can signal to potential combatants that the benefits of 
peace outweigh the costs.  A second key assumption is that establishing a sustainable and 





provide employment.  Recall, that in Liberia, the commercial timber sector is a critical part of 
the country's peacebuilding strategy based on its potential to trigger economic growth, 
alleviate poverty, and provide state revenue and employment opportunities.  A similar 
dynamic, of course, exists in Sierra Leone where formalizing the export of rough diamonds 
and resurrecting the industrial mining sector are deemed by IBOs to be key components in the 
transition from conflict to development.     
 While Liberia and Sierra Leone share a similar pattern with regards to how 
international peacebuilders understand the environment and natural resources, there are some 
distinctive features. In Liberia, "conflict timber" is associated to the corrupt government of 
Charles Taylor, more so than to rebel groups.  As discussed in Chapter 6, timber was of little 
concern to international peacebuilders in the years before Taylor became president despite 
evidence that rebels were using some timber exports to fund the conflict.   Conversely, in 
Sierra Leone "conflict diamonds" were linked to marauding rebels even though subsequent 
research suggests that rebel groups, government soldiers ("sol-bels"), political elites, and 
peacekeepers all colluded to main disorder so as to trade diamonds.  Despite this, the 
Government of Sierra Leone has largely been viewed as an important ally to ending the trade 
in "conflict diamonds".  Stated another way, "conflict resources" in Sierra Leone existed in 
"weak states" in which diamond- producing areas lacked state power and authority. The 
opposite was true in Liberia, which was in a sense considered an "strong state" because of its 
ability to keep the country "stable" and secure even though it was corrupt and suppressing 
any political opposition.    
 These differences may be because timber and diamonds have a different character, 
which creates differences in types of "conflict resources".  Diamonds are extraordinarily 
"lootable"-- meaning they are not costly to extract, do not require expertise and are widely 
accessible.  In addition, diamonds are derived from a "point source", dispersed over a broad 





case underscores, diamonds exporters could simply go to Guinea or Liberia to gain access.  
This dynamic produces resources that are more conducive to rebel or insurgent movements 
often thought to be associated with the trade in conflict resources.  Timber, on the other hand, 
is more diffuse although capturing extensive rents requires road building, sophisticated means 
of transportation and the control of ports. This explains --in part--Taylor's need to collude 
with timber companies, and control major transit points.  It should be noted, however, that 
although timber was used by Taylor and other rebel groups, it was always the "second 
choice."  Even as the president of a "strong state", Taylor preferred to trade diamonds from 
Sierra Leone to fund conflict because they were more valuable, required less infrastructure to 
exploit and could be easily transported.  Recall, that only after UN sanctions were imposed on 
diamonds transiting through Liberia did Taylor turn aggressively to timber exports.    
The peacebuilding strategy: Securitization and marketization 
 Despite differences, however, the framing of "conflict resources" and "peace 
resources" by international peacebuilding organizations in Liberia and Sierra Leone is 
analogous.  The irony, of course, is that in both cases the "conflict resources" are the "peace 
resources", and vice versa.  The central dilemma for peacebuilders is, then, to reduce the 
threat of "conflict resources" and subsequently leverage the benefits of "peace resources".  As 
noted throughout, international peacebuilders have been actively involved in promoting and 
supporting the establishment of reforms and policies aimed at a" securitizing" and 
"marketizing" the environment and natural resources in an effort to transform "conflict 
resources" into "peace resources".  What is striking is that despite differences in the cases, 
and differences in the character of the resources themselves, efforts to alter the "rules" that 
govern forests in Liberia and diamonds and minerals in Sierra Leone are strikingly similar.  
 Concern that "conflict resources" would continue to fuel conflict and threaten 





was that UN peacekeepers should deploy to resource-rich areas to disrupt the illicit trade in 
"conflict resource" at the source. However, in both cases, physically controlling territory was 
not feasible. First, the UN was sensitive to sovereignty claims.  In Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL's 
mandate did not address diamonds or seek to interfere with the country's economic activity.   
Even as evidence mounted that diamonds were fueling the conflict, the UN was reluctant to 
approve deployments that might result in fighting to control mining areas.  To complicate 
matters, UN peacekeepers in Sierra Leone were actively involved in illegal mining and 
colluding with rebel groups (UNSC 2000; Keen 2005).  It would be three years after the 
conflict officially ended, in fact, that peacebuilders received a mandate to assist Sierra 
Leone's security forces to secure "illegal" diamond mining areas.  Learning from Sierra 
Leone experience, the UNMIL mission in Liberia did allow peacekeepers to assist the 
government to "restore proper administration of natural resources", including timber-
producing areas (UNSC 2003c). The problem is that forest areas in Liberia are vast, dense, 
remote, and almost impossible to police.  The best UN peacebuilders could do was control 
points of entry so that timber could not be openly shipped out of the country illegally.   
 The deployment of UN peacekeepers aside, strategies to control "conflict resources" 
in both cases began with UN sanctions. The objective of the sanctions was to stem the flows 
of revenue from natural resources to combatants, and increase security by excluding timber or 
diamonds from international trade.  The fundamental problem the sanctions sought to address 
was the lack of state control and authority over contested, resource-rich areas.  This is 
particularly interesting because in Liberia the problem with conflict resources.  In addition, 
the sanctions provided early framework indicating the "rules of the game" should established 
to get UN sanctions lifted.  And third, the sanctions for carrying out international attention to 
conflict resources and as a tool to leverage action. In both cases, the sanctions were a starting 
point for subsequent actions and resolutions.  The sanctions also functioned as a critical focal 





laws and regulations.  In both cases, the trigger for lifting of the sanctions revolved around 
the degree to which state control over natural resources had to be subjectively achieved.  In 
Liberia, forest areas are difficult to "control" so passing reforms and policies provided 
enough evidence to peacebuilders that the state had consolidated authority over the sector.   
In Sierra Leone, the lifting of the sanctions occurred after official exports of rough diamonds 
had increased and Sierra Leone committed to the Kimberley Process.   
 There are some differences worth noting.  First, international peacebuilding 
organizations were reluctant to place sanctions on Liberian timber. This reluctance stemmed 
from the perception that sanctions would interfere with the country's sovereignty since Taylor 
had been "freely" elected.  Timber exports were also important to France, China and other 
importers, which slowed any attempts to implement sanctions.  Only after evidence emerged 
that Taylor was using timber revenue to support the RUF and destabilize Sierra Leone did the 
conflict resources narrative emerge and UN sanctions materialize. Another difference 
between the cases was that diamonds were viewed not only as a Sierra Leone specific issue 
but an international "problem" that needed an international solution.  This resulted in the 
Kimberley Process.  In contrast, "blood timber" in Liberia was not viewed in the same way, 
and did not result in a scheme equivalent to the Kimberley Process.  The reason for this 
difference has to do with the character of alluvial diamonds, which are easily smuggled and 
once removed from their country are difficult to track.  Moreover, since diamonds require 
extensive labor--mostly from young men --IPOs worry about the threat of renewed conflict.  
In addition, "conflict diamonds" not "conflict timber" was linked to the "War on Terror" with 
the US government support for Kimberly Process increased dramatically after 9/11 (Pugh, 
Cooper and Goodhand 2004).   
 Beyond UN sanctions there is also broad similarity in the host of international 
initiatives and programs that emerged in both countries. These initiatives and programs had 





begin to lay the groundwork for new reforms and policies to address the problem of conflict 
resources. In Sierra Leone, the most notable initiatives are the Kimberley Process and the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which were created to monitor the trade in 
rough diamonds and increase transparency of diamonds revenues.  The impetus for both 
initiatives, of course, was to help securitize the trade in conflict diamonds and ensure that 
associated revenues do not reignite conflict.  Likewise, in Liberia, the Liberia Forest Initiative 
and GEMAP were promoted by peacebuilders to deal with controlling the problem of 
"conflict timber".  Recall that LFI was tasked with helping the government establish its 
authority over forest resources and creating policies to allocate resources in an equitable and 
transparent manner.  GEMAP, on the other hand, was intended to improve transparency and 
financial management of the resources sector.    
 While UN sanctions and various initiatives are important ways in which 
peacebuilders shape reforms and policies, they are involved in promulgating and promoting 
particular reforms and policies.  While some differences emerge, the reforms and policies are 
closely matched in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In both cases, "securitizing" the environment 
and natural resources includes a focus on "good governance".  Specifically, reforms and 
policies emphasize revenue transparency, government accountability and public participation.  
This should not be surprising because" poor governance" and corruption of the natural 
resources sectors is what peacebuilders understand as a critical factor in  precipitating 
"conflict resources".  Good governance is also viewed by IPOs as vital to enhancing public 
trust that is necessary to gain state legitimacy and maintain order.    
 The reforms and policies promoted and supported by international peacebuilders 
followed a concerted strategy of securitization to help establish order and control "conflict 
resources". But securitization of the natural resources sectors had another purpose, to help 
establish the conditions to jump-starting economic recovery. Recall that efforts to resume the 





Liberia's forests was based on generous revenue projections and the perception that the 
timber sector could provide jobs and alleviate poverty. Despite stalling by the transitional 
government all forest concessions in the country were cancelled to make a clean break 
between the "old" and the "new".  Although the forest agenda appears broad and inclusive 
because it incorporates the "three C's"--conservation, commercial and community-- the 
reforms and policies prioritize commercial timber, and specifically, promote actions that need 
to be taken so that timber harvesting can commence.  The efforts to restart industrial mining 
in Sierra Leone closely resemble that of Liberia. The sector ceased to operate during the 
conflict but in the immediate aftermath became an international peacebuilding priority. 
Rebuilding the sector was triggered by sizeable revenue projections as well as the 
conventional wisdom that the mineral sector can provide employment and alleviate poverty.  
It was also seen as an alternative to the alluvial diamond sector since it is easier to tax and 
more secure because it cannot be exploited by rebel groups.  While there was language in the 
reforms and policies referring to "social and environmentally responsible development", the 
dominant agenda was to negotiate agreements with individual companies so that mining 
operations could resume production as quickly as possible.    
 The key reforms and policies in each sector also mirror each other quite closely.  The 
central elements of Liberia's forest reforms focus on new laws and regulations detailing the 
qualifications for conducting timber harvests, the issuing of concessions and contracts, 
managing forests and disbursing taxes, fees and royalty payments. Granted, reforms and 
policies do stress transparency accountability, participation and equitable benefit sharing but 
these exist only to govern commercial timber operations. The point is that the reforms and 
policies put a priority on marketizing Liberia's forests.  The commonalities are striking in 
comparison to Sierra Leone's mineral sectors, in which new laws and regulations discussed in 
Chapter 7 focus on the acquisition of mineral rights, issues of mineral licenses, mining 





policies that emphasize the transparency, local participation, accountability and community 
benefits but these are largely in relation to the larger marketization strategies.  In short, 
reforms and policies promote a strategy in which marketization represents a dominant 
element of both Liberia's and Sierra Leone's natural resource governance agenda. 
 The prominence of marketization is can be seen the poverty reduction strategy papers 
(PRSP) of both countries.  Liberia, for instance, focuses on reforms and policies that promote 
an open economy linked to international trade and amenable to foreign investment.  The 
private sector is the "main driver of growth" (IMF 2008, 21).  While the PRSP suggests 
Liberia's overall strategy includes references to infrastructure improvements, diversification, 
and the provision of basic services, the central priority is to revive traditional sources of 
economic growth, which includes most prominently timber.  The rationale:  
alleviate poverty, "create significant numbers of jobs, provide substantial budget revenues 
and initiate rapid growth" (IMF 2008, 36).  Sierra Leone's PRSP stressed in almost identical 
fashion the need to "open up of investment and trade to deliver economic growth" (IMF 
2005, 6). Despite calls to improve infrastructure, diversity the economy and promote human 
development, the PRSP argued for increased investment in the mining sector because it 
"directly impacts the economy as a whole" and the "ability of the government to generate 
resources" (IMF 2005, 93-95).  Again, the rationale is identical: to improve poverty 
outcomes, deepen economic growth, create jobs and produce revenue (IMF 2005).  In both 
cases, however, the focus on marketizing natural resources comes with the proviso-prominent 
and repeated in all reforms, policies and planning documents-- that economic growth, poverty 
alleviation, jobs, and revenue will not be possible without "good governance".  This should 
not be surprising because, as discussed in the preceding section, poor governance and 
corruption of the natural resources sectors was a precipitating factor in the emergence of 
conflict resources.  In short, good governance is viewed as vital not only to enhancing public 





maintain order. Good governance reforms in both countries include policies to overhaul 
procurement and concession process, install revenue and expenditure controls, strengthen 
financial management and investment protocols, and improve accountability and budgeting 
practices to ensure transparency.   
 It is important to note that in both cases there are alternative strategies being 
employed by international peacebuilders that do not appear to fit neatly into the categories of 
securitization and marketization.  In fact, international peacebuilders view the two strategies 
as compatible and mutually enforcing.  Securitization and marketization are two sides of the 
same coin.  The real question, however, is to ascertain what the effects of such strategies for 
transforming "conflict resources" into "peace resources" have been.  I turn to this below.  
Gauging the Effects: Contestation and Resistance 
I have argued that international peacebuilding organizations promote and establish 
governance reforms and policies aimed at "securitizing" and "marketizing" the environment 
and natural resources.  While this is a novel insight that adds to our understanding, I am 
concerned with how such reforms and policies might help or hinder peacebuilding.   Recall 
that the objective of peacebuilding is to establish the conditions for a long-term peace in 
countries emerging from civil conflict.  Peace, then, is largely understood by IBOs to be the 
absence of full-scale civil conflict.  However, this definition unduly renders invisible from 
any analysis numbers of fatalities below this arbitrary benchmark and particular forms of 
violence outside of the civil conflict, insurgency, rebellion typology that is all too common.  
Moreover, if peacebuilders are genuinely concerned with the underlying conditions that may 
engender further civil conflict, we should be concerned with violence broadly understood as 
"practices or acts that cause direct harm to humans" (Peluso and Watts 2001, 26).  To be 
more precise-- if environmental and natural resource governance "helps" peacebuilding, we 





environmental and natural resource governance "hinders" peacebuilding, we should be able to 
identify a subsequent increase in propensity of violence.    
Securitization and marketization: State stability and revenue 
 Efforts by international peacebuilding organizations to securitize Liberia's "blood 
timber" and Sierra Leone's "blood diamonds" has been relatively successful by some 
measures.  Action was slow to materialize but international intervention by peacebuilders 
brought some degree of order and stability to natural resource sectors that were in complete 
disarray and resembled a "free for all".  A range of factors conspired end the wars but UN 
sanctions, while an imperfect remedy, helped to bring order by regulating the trade in conflict 
resources.  Moreover, international initiatives, like the Kimberley Process in Sierra Leone, 
and GEMAP in Liberia, helped to prevent the trade in "conflict resources" through increased 
oversight and regulation of the diamond and timber sectors, respectively.  By promoting and 
supporting new policies, laws, regulations, institutions and practices--peacebuilders helped to 
shape the way people behave relative to the environment and placed restraint on action and 
interests, which brought order and stability to the natural resources sector.  International 
engagement in Liberia's forest sector or Sierra Leone's diamond sector in the immediate 
aftermath of the conflict worked to limit the rush to exploit or control forests and diamonds 
by rebel groups, opportunistic entrepreneurs or corrupt government officials.   In this respect, 
the likelihood of large-scale violence--related to the trade in "conflict resources" has been 
reduced.  
 International peacebuilding efforts to marketize Liberia's forests, and Sierra Leone's 
diamonds and minerals have also been fairly successful in increasing official exports.  In 
particular, there has been a significant jump in revenue from alluvial diamond mining in 
Sierra Leone since the end of the conflict. While extensive smuggling continues, a ten-fold 





origin regime, and the Kimberley Process--all of which have altered the risk and opportunity 
calculations of local diggers and miners as well as the diamond industry.  As a result 
increasing numbers of diamonds are passing through official state channels. Sierra Leone has 
also seen exports of industrial minerals start to increase over the last few years as 
international peacebuilding organizations have promoted the restoration and expansion of 
large-scale industrial mining.  Conversely, efforts to export Liberian timber have been less 
successful due to problems outlined in Chapter 5 but still represent a net increase since the 
end of the conflict.  Suffice to say, export and revenue projections advertised and promoted 
by international peacebuilders and the national government remain optimistic.   Sierra Leone 
is projected to triple diamond and mineral output within five years and Liberian timber 
exports are expected to increase at least as much.  According to the literature, at least, 
increased state revenues hint at reduced propensity for violence because  it suggests not only 
increasing GDP and incomes, which are deemed the "best protection against civil war" but 
also provides the government with the resources to provide basic services vital for "buying 
confidence" in peacebuilding (Bannon and Collier 2003, 8; Woodward 2002, 183).  
 In short, the strategies employed to" securitize" and "marketize" natural resources--
for the purpose of transforming "conflict resources" into "peace resources"-- have produced 
benefits.  They have helped to maintain order and stability--and may reduce the propensity 
for violence in both countries--by preventing the trade in conflict resources and delivering 
some revenue to the state.  A closer look at the case studies, however, reveals that the effects 
of the reforms and policies are not as straightforward as international peacebuilders assume.  
The cases also show that the process has been divisive and wrought with contention and 
resistance--some of it resulting in violence.  Not only is this counterproductive for 
peacebuilding, but Liberia and Sierra Leone are still vulnerable and fragile to disruption. The 






Securitization and marketization: Contention and resistance 
 The benefits of stability and new revenues notwithstanding, the case studies indicate 
that the governance reforms and policies aimed at securitization and marketization--and 
indeed the overlap between the two--is focal points for contention and resistance.  By this, I 
mean that actors or groups of actors do not accept the configuration of rules and institutions 
governing the environment and natural resources or do not consent to the desired social order 
(Migdal 1988).  Contestation and resistance come in two distinct forms.  First, the contention 
and resistance reflects action by people and groups of people to cope with the consequences 
or perceived consequences of new "rules of the game" and institutions promoted by 
peacebuilders to securitize and marketize natural resources.  Second, the contention and 
resistance reflects efforts to alter or change the rules and institutions promoted and 
established by international peacebuilding organizations. This process includes efforts to 
reframe narratives about the relationship between natural resources, conflict and 
peacebuilding.  While the contention and resistance does not suggest that civil conflict will 
resume, there is some evidence that in certain instances it is increasing the propensity for 
violence.   
 Governance reform the alluvial diamond sector in Sierra Leone was born out of 
international concern about "conflict diamonds". The is an array of  policies, initiatives, 
institutions and laws--including most prominently the Kimberley Process--to securitize the 
sector by reducing smuggling and policing illegal mining activities to capture a greater share 
of the tax revenue for the government. This securitization strategy has been successful in 
terms of controlling conflict diamonds and increasing state revenues.  What gets overlooked 
or dismissed are the increasing episodes of contention and resistance that continue to surface 
in reaction to securitization.  First, international imperatives securitize diamond mining areas 





(World Bank 2008b). Public pronouncements that illegal artisanal mining will "face the full 
brunt" of Sierra Leone's security forces is in some cases viewed as an unwarranted intrusion 
of the state that is undercutting local livelihoods (Independent Observer 2009).  As described 
in Chapter 6, this hard-handed approach has historically led to reductions in illegal mining 
and increasing state revenue but at the high cost of eliminating livelihoods and deepening 
poverty.  More concerning is that such strategies have historically resulted in instability, 
resentment and the formation of shadow states.  Recall that efforts by Siaka Stevens to fund 
networks of patronage in the 1980s led to a decline in state services and a withdrawal of 
support from rural areas that exacerbated tensions among disenfranchised young men that 
were later absorbed into the RUF.   
 Second, initiatives by international peacebuilders to promote mechanized alluvial 
diamond mining and large-scale industrial mines in the name of both improved security and 
productivity is fostering localized contention and resistance. Recall that industrial mining 
contracts currently cover approximately 90 percent of the country, which includes virtually 
all of alluvial mining areas.  In Sandoh Chiefdom, rioting has occurred numerous times in 
response to industrial concessions on land historically set aside for artisanal mining or 
agriculture. As noted in Chapter 7, landowners have been denied access to their own land 
because of new industrial concessions and threatened with violence or retribution by security 
forces.  While international peacebuilders view these skirmishes as relatively minor events--
and do not systematically document such events-- the local population tends to view it in the 
context of "land grabs" by an overzealous state and business interests without the 
participation of local or traditional authorities. Third, despite more diamonds passing through 
official government channels and increasing revenues, there is growing resentment that the 
securitization of the alluvial mining sector has not trickled down to adjacent communities or 
those toiling in the mines.  Diggers and miners are habitually pulled into diamond mining by 





International peacebuilders initially funded programs to increase the benefits to miners and 
diggers and redress the exploitative relations that exist in mining areas. People are becoming 
increasingly aware that diamonds fetch substantial sums outside of Sierra Leone but there 
have not been genuine improvements in mining conditions or financial returns.  The general 
perception is that this is the result of mismanaged state institutions and persistent corruption 
among national elites. In short, securitization is a strategy designed to enrich a small segment 
of Sierra Leone's elite and foreign investors.  
 While alluvial mining has historically been Sierra Leone's "powder keg", as Chapter 
7 highlights recent contention and resistance is in reaction to efforts to kick-start the 
industrial mining sector.  Recall that while industrial mining is certainly a marketization 
strategy, it has also been promoted as a more orderly and secure alternative to alluvial 
mining.  Over the last five years, there has been an almost continuous pattern of contention, 
resistance and even violence against industrial mining operations by adjacent communities 
concerned about a lack of sufficient benefits and environmental and social costs.  Time and 
time again, people have complained to the government about a lack compensation for land 
and crops, inadequate housing relocation and a lack of basic necessities such as clean water 
and schools from companies such as Koidu Holdings and Sierra Rutile. But time and time 
again, government officials have ignored the problems or side with the companies, which has 
led to protests and rioting.  Only after two people were shot to death in Koidu did the 
government--and international peacebuilding organizations--even acknowledge there were 
potential problems even though no police officers were ever prosecuted and the same issues 
remain largely unresolved.  Attempts by the communities to protest have also been 
suppressed by local police forces.  The dominant perception among adjacent communities is 
that the state cares more about getting mineral operations started and receiving revenue from 
companies than to the grievances and complaints of its own people. This can be summed up 





country" (Interview 3).  People in mining areas tend to see the government as captives of the 
international peacebuilders --and the economic system they perpetuate--who provide loans to 
mining companies and promote the industrial sector on security and economic grounds.  Most 
believe that rural areas will be plundered by mineral companies for the benefit of a few well-
connected Sierra Leoneans.  So while fast-tracking of the industrial mineral sector was 
rationalized by peacebuilders to provide a "rapid, equitable and visible development 
progress", at the moment resistance and contention is starting to boil over into violence.    
 Likewise, in Liberia efforts to securitize and marketize forests have resulted in 
contention and resistance albeit to a lesser extent than Sierra Leone.  As referred to in Chapter 
5, several forest communities have reacted to halt or at least postpone timber harvesting 
operations.  Recall that skirmishes and protests have occurred in several areas that the 
government had issued prospective timber contracts.  In these cases, securitization rather than 
simply marketization was the culprit because it was the government and FDA that was 
accused of ignoring local structures and "monopolizing the process" in a rush to begin timber 
harvesting (Interview 12). An illustrative example was the timber concessions awarded in 
Bokumu District that the local community stopped by refusing to participate in the harvesting 
of its own forests without permission.  And it was not marketization that was to blame per se 
but the fact that the land set aside for "commercial" uses by the government was done without 
any understanding of overlapping land claims or consultation with the community. As a 
member of an International NGOs stated, the local community viewed it as "my Father's 
land"--and "not the government's to give away" (Interview 12).  In addition at least two-thirds 
of all timber sale contracts were stopped by community opposition about overharvesting on 
tribal lands (Interview 15).  This should not be surprising given that over 60 percent of 
Liberians believe land ownership and distribution is the leading cause of violent conflict in 
areas where they live (Topka, Saryee and Asunka 2009).  An incident in 2008, in which 15 





communities compete for land with the government and timber companies.  The worry is, 
according to an influential international peacebuilder, that "bad forestry will only exacerbate 
conflict" (Interview 15).   
 A majority of the struggle and contention, in Liberia however, has been over the 
meanings, narratives and frames that end up shaping the character of the reforms and policies.  
Put another way, efforts to rapidly set in motion sets of reforms and policies aimed at 
consolidating state authority and marketizing forest resources shortened the shadow of the 
future and produced contention.  This is because   the reforms seek to impose a governing 
logic on a valuable national and societal asset over a short time horizon.  The overarching 
perception among all actors is that this is short "window of opportunity" and that "who is 
there first" will determine the future of Liberia's forests.   International peacebuilders, who 
have been focused on first securing and then marketizing the country's forests, have 
continuously stressed the importance of harnessing the revenues from timber in ways that do 
not ignite conflict but fund economic growth, development and poverty reduction, which is 
led by the government.  As long as the government trends closely to the forms, by being 
transparent, accountable and inclusive, the overwhelming assumption is that over the long-
term such a strategy will help sustain a long-term peace.    
 Although reforms and policies have dealt overwhelmingly with commercial-centric 
strategies to secure and market Liberia's forests, conservation has also emerged in the 
background as a significant issue that is sparking contention and resistance.  In the immediate 
aftermath of the conflict international peacebuilders stressed the importance of regaining 
control of national parks and reserves since they provided, at least theoretically, remote areas 
where rebels could regroup (Interview 50).  While some of the activity in parks was a 
consequence of a displaced population, international actors and the government worried that 
illegal mining, hunting and timber extraction could undermine state security and impact 





been made to evict the illegal "squatters" from Sapo National Park but it remains a Liberian 
national security issue. Another problem related to conservation is that communities have 
begun to question the demarcation of protected areas, particularly when they intersected with 
communal lands. Recall in Chapter 5 that 30 percent of Liberia's forests were to be preserved 
as a Protected Forest Area Network and the integrity of existing reserves and parks protected.  
But efforts to demarcate borders have been challenged by local communities who have 
clashed with government officials (UN Panel of Experts 2008). This should not be surprising 
since the border regions of most of Liberia's most established parks and reserves remain 
contested by local communities who were never included in the decision making process 
(Interview 50).  
 The consequences--or perceived future consequences of securitization and 
marketization--have been a focal for contention and resistance in Liberia and Sierra Leone--
and at times reaching the level of violence.  However, as mentioned above, there is also 
contention and resistance associated with efforts to change or alter the prevailing "rules of the 
game".  This is important because rules--including institutions, laws, regulations, practices--
fundamentally pattern what is socially and politically acceptable; what is deemed possible 
and what is even deemed possible to discuss relative to governing the environment and 
natural resources (Lipschutz 2004).  Moreover, these rules and institutions often persist and 
pattern the future.  Given that a "window of opportunity" exist in the aftermath of conflict is 
should not be surprising that the battle over rules--and in fact ideas about how the 
environment and natural resources are governed and in whose interest--is ongoing and 
contentious.        
 In Liberia, international and civil society groups have used the space opened up to by 
international peacebuilders to address the future of forests in ways that veer from the 
securitization and marketization strategies promoted by peacebuilders.  This is based on a 





producing priorities. Based on historical experience these groups have little confidence that 
communities will benefit from commercial forestry activities or that a development model 
based on timber exploitation will genuinely lead to poverty alleviation or genuine 
development.  In addition, despite rhetoric of public participation and inclusiveness, these 
groups argue that strategies based on reestablishing state authority left little room for 
meaningful dialogue with forest communities on key matters, including land tenure, 
ownership and community rights--even while discussions to grant timber concession was 
almost continuous.  And without meaningful dialogue with communities, the reforms and 
polices are "fatally flawed" and commercial timber operations should be halted and 
renegotiate.  As a member of a prominent Liberian NGO stated, "how can timber harvesting 
support peace when contentious and violent episodes over land tenure are still going on" 
(Interview 26 ).  These groups point to problems finding respectable timber companies and 
improprieties with handling contracts, concessions and bidding as evidence that the nexus of 
securitization and marketization was marking the return of the "old way of doing business" 
that existed before and during the conflict.   
 Another point of contention concerns the extent to which the state has the right and 
ability to construct and enforce "rules of the game" that govern Liberia's forests. The 
contention revolves around the fundamental questions of who owns the forests and what is 
the primary entity to manage them on behalf of the country. While international 
peacebuilders rushed to reestablish state authority over forest resources, these groups note 
that traditionally the state has been deeply corrupt and used its authority to exploit forests for 
personal enrichment.  Moreover, an identical arrangement, which put the state in charge of 
forests, was thought responsible for enabling and perpetuating the conflict. The reforms and 
policies, then, have been increasingly viewed as an internationally sanctioned land grab by 
the state to benefit political elites and foreign business interests. As an alternative, a handful 





Liberia’s forests.  By endowing communities with authority and diminishing that of the state, 
it then might be possible to realize the benefits.  
 To a lesser extent, reforms and policies associated with diamond and mineral 
resources have led to contention in Sierra Leone over the "rules of the game".  Civil society 
groups argue that securitization and marketization rather than a recipe for peace may be 
recreating the violent struggles and contention that has been going on "forever" in Sierra 
Leone (Interview 3).  The argument is that international peacebuilders and the government 
ignore issues like land ownership and public participation while promoting marketization.  In 
short, international peacebuilders ignore the grievances and abuses of mining communities 
and support the state in negotiating mining agreements behind closed doors for the fear that 
addressing these issues will slow down economic growth and reduce state revenue.  While 
there have been modest attempts at improving the conditions of diggers and miners, the 
priority have been on securitizing and increasing exports. The problem, of course, is that a 
reduction in available diamonds, combined with increasing population, an emphasis on 
mechanization and a serious lack of alternative livelihoods will only exacerbate previous 
problems.  
 Contention and resistance to the rules of the game can be an important process in 
determining how the environment and natural resources are governed.  What determines the 
prevailing rules and institutions is often a push and pull of different factors from a variety of 
groups. What sets Liberia and Sierra Leone apart is that environmental and natural resources 
are high stakes issues in fragile war-torn states.  In fact, the rhetoric has heated up to 
concerning levels.  In Liberia, actors are accusing other actors of pitting the “state against 
society”, “communities against the government” or “communities against communities”.  
And in Sierra Leone, there is a perception that marketization and securitization are actually 





question the importance of such contention and resistance to the rules of the game, in both 
cases it is fostering cycles of suspicion and creating competition and deep division.   
 The reforms and policies are working to reconstruct and lock-in historical sources of 
conflict and violence.   I find that the reforms and policies are also creating new conditions 
that may endanger peace through several mechanisms. First, while fostering economic 
growth, providing employment and generating state revenue is important, it tends to dominate 
discussions and crowd out other factors vital for the consolidation of peace.  Governing high-
value natural resources is a high stakes issue that needs attention from peacebuilders but 
putting diamonds and timber into the international spotlight can lead to tunnel vision that risk 
overlooking the sustainable livelihoods of communities.  A comprehensive focus on 
sustainable livelihoods related to agricultural production or the use of forest resources by 
rural communities, are viewed as part of the “informal” economy and do not receive attention 
in peacebuilding efforts.  The factors that habitually impede communities to meet their 
livelihoods, including perverse land ownership and tenure rights and unfair systems of 
hierarchy or patronage, which fosters a majority of grievances and resentments, is rarely, if 
ever, addressed.  Aside from some tokenistic efforts, there is little in the way of genuine 
reform to address these issues. Indeed, interviews in both countries turn up a widely held 
perception that livelihoods and communities are being left behind in the peacebuilding 
process at the expense of marketizing forests, minerals and agricultural products.  Liberia's 
focus on commercial timber is not matched by comparable efforts to rebuild communities and 
ensure food security with input from communities themselves.  In Sierra Leone, reforms 
continue to stress the "formalization" of the alluvial diamond mining sector and "jump-
starting" industrial mining rather than addressing alternative livelihoods for a growing 





Linked Pathologies of Securitization and Marketization 
The observations above suggest that governance reforms in Liberia and Sierra Leone based 
on a strategy of securitization and marketization, which are largely sponsored and promoted 
by international peacebuilding organizations, offers mixed results.  On the one hand, 
securitization has helped to stop the flow of conflict resources, reestablish state authority and 
enable marketization reforms and policies move forward.  The result has been improved 
stability and increases in state revenue.  On the other hand, however, the securitization and 
marketization have been a focal point for contention and resistance--some of it resulting in 
violence.  This leads to an important question: Why exactly do reforms and policies aimed at 
securitizing and marketizing the environment and natural resources generate these side-
effects? Why, contrary to the "environmental peacebuilding" discourse that environmental 
and natural resource governance can establish trust and foster cooperative relations is it 
seemingly having the opposite effect?  I argue that four linked pathologies of securitization 
and marketization actually increase the propensity for violence and, thus, are working to 
hinder peacebuilding.     
Risk of recreating pre-war political arrangements 
 Efforts to securitize and marketize Liberia and Sierra Leone's environment and 
natural resources runs the risk of  recreating and potentially "locking-in" political 
arrangements that have historically been sources of civil strife and violence.  Recall, the 
conventional wisdom is to lay the blame for both conflicts on the greedy and self-serving 
warlords and combatants that used the control, exploitation and trade in natural resources to 
fuel conflict and amass wealth.  The problem is these explanations are an oversimplification, 
as Chapters 4 and 6 make clear. The conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone are deeply rooted 
in a history of resentment and hostility toward a long line of oligarchic, dysfunctional and 





thrust upon the population by elites.  These dynamics opened up its forests and minerals to 
international exploitation with the benefits accumulating to a small group elites and foreign 
investors but left the rest of the country underdeveloped, with few opportunities and little 
access to land.  This trend only intensified in political systems that centralized control of 
natural resources and left the population few opportunities to own land or adequately meet 
their livelihood needs. Grievances over land and underdevelopment in both countries stem 
from a historically unjust and corrupt political systems that are based on systems of patronage 
dedicated to exploiting the country's resource base.  Both the Sierra Leone and Liberian 
conflicts were the result of political struggles with a long history, and are best understood 
through the lens of patronage, which involves consolidating power over economic resources 
as a means of gaining and keeping power.  Patronage tends to flourish in places like Liberia 
and Sierra Leone where a substantial rents come from  the exploitation of natural resources, 
and agreements and concessions are arranged with little transparency or accountability (Reno 
1998; Richards 1996).  Systems of patronage are political practices that can undermine the 
state by diverting revenues to key groups or supporters instead of provisioning basic service 
to the population.  A characteristic of patronage is the marginalization of particular groups 
and fostering conditions that give rise to shadow states--both of which are known to increase 
the propensity for violence.     
  In Liberia, the underlying structure of forest governance is largely being recreated by 
the reforms and policies.  First, the reforms and policies carry-over the idea that the state is 
endowed with the power to oversee all matters on land and unilaterally divide forest lands 
irrespective of land ownership or tenure rights. Second, the reforms are both "state-centric" 
and commercial centric, which defines the government and commercial interests as the 
"principal actors" while communities where forests are located are at a minimum 
beneficiaries of commercial forestry.  The NFRL and Community Rights Law do make 





resources, equitable benefits, and participation in forest management.  However, because the 
reforms and policies are "commercial-centric", there is a feeling that communities are being 
excluded from decisions that have a bearing on the future of forests and livelihoods. In 
addition, there is a perception that factors that have long led to violence and conflict 
including issues over land ownership, access and user rights, benefit sharing and genuine 
inclusion are being pushed aside in a rush to export timber that will only benefit political and 
economic elites.  As a consultant for an international organization stressed, "we may be 
repeating the same mistakes of export" in which the "money accrues to a few" (Interview 35).  
Like in the past, there is a sense that Liberian's do not control [their] destiny" and this time 
"the people may rise up" (Interview 9).  Recall that where timber operations have 
commenced, communities have resisted citing a lack of trust with timber officials or disputes 
over land ownership.   In the forest sector, in particular, there is the perception, that "peace 
my fall apart because tensions and contradictions that led to conflict have not been addressed" 
(Interview 15).  
 Likewise, in Sierra Leone, international peacebuilders assumed the major problem 
was conflict diamonds and the unregulated revenues in the hands of rebels and corrupt 
officials that fueled conflict. The solution was to first have international peacebuilders 
intervene through UN sanctions and oversight through the Kimberley Process while at the 
same time reestablishing state control over diamond mining areas and by establishing reforms 
and policies.  The problem is that in Sierra Leone diamonds and minerals have long been the 
target of colonial and state authorities.  As Chapter 6 notes, from the beginning of diamond 
and mineral mining accusations of too much state power were commonplace. The period 
between 1950 and 1980 led to resentment and violence as the government used force to 
increase state control of diamonds and "crackdown" on smuggling, which led to repression 
and marginalization of rural populations.  Current reforms and policies run the risk of 





on the state consolidation of power over diamond areas to control smuggling and procure 
revenues for the state development is congruent to past practices. International peacebuilders 
find such policies necessary to control conflict diamonds and help contribute to economic 
recovery.  The problem is that while such reforms and policies may increase state revenue, 
they do little to improve the conditions and circumstances of diggers, miners and 
communities or alter what is for many a source of desperation. International peacebuilders 
tend to view diggers and miners involved in alluvial mining as a problem since smuggling of 
diamonds is difficult to stop.  The solution is to police "illegal" mining and establish reforms 
and policies that require mining licenses. The problem is that diggers and miner cannot afford 
licenses and because mining is an important livelihood for hundreds of thousands of people 
restricting access can create a serious backlash.     
  Political arrangements in Liberia and Sierra Leone have historically required the 
leveraging of the economic benefits of natural resources, which often presages agreements 
and concessions that are arranged with business interests with no genuine inclusiveness, 
transparency or accountability. This not only fosters resentment and grievance but can lead to 
shadow states that can undermine conventional statebuilding by diverting revenues into 
patronage networks, marginalizing certain populations and undermining the provision of 
basic services.  International peacebuilders have emphasized the importance transparency and 
accountability on the premise that if corruption continued and the people failed to benefit 
peace would be difficult to sustain.  In Liberia, problems finding respectable timber 
companies and improprieties in handling contracts and bidding have raised questions about 
transparency and accountability. While these improprieties may be simply poor judgment or a 
lack of capacity, it also might be evidence of parallel systems of “doing business”.  
Conversely, in Sierra Leone, reports that mineral agreements and concessions are negotiated 
behind closed doors and to the benefit of Koidu Holdings, Sierra Rutile, African Minerals or 





previous patronage-resource structures without the necessary oversight, it can legitimize and 
deepen systems of patronage and work to weaken government and divert revenues away from 
peacebuilding priorities, which only increases the propensity for violence.   
Danger of provoking societal competition 
 The reforms and policies are working to reconstruct and lock-in historical sources of 
conflict and violence.   I find that the reforms and policies are also provoking societal 
competition that may increase the likelihood for violence. Reforms that stress marketization 
of valuable natural resources are often "fast-tracked" on the premise that peacebuilding 
objectives of poverty alleviation, economic growth and the provision of basic services will be 
realized faster if the process of natural resource extraction and export is started as quickly as 
possible after the conflict ends.  However, this works to shorten the "shadow of the future" 
and produce conflict since the reforms seek to impose a governing logic on a valuable 
national and societal asset over a short time horizon. The overarching perception is that "who 
is there first" will determine the future of natural resources and the environment and this 
increases episodes of conflict and resistance. Second, despite the inclusion of transparency, 
accountability and benefit sharing in the governance reforms, marketization fosters deep-
seated grievances, resentments and hostility. For example, policies aimed at attracting foreign 
direct investment for the extraction of raw natural resources has led to violence and conflict 
associated with the perception of too much state power and too little community 
participation, struggles over property and land ownership issues that undermine the provision 
of sustainable livelihoods, and antagonism pertaining to community access and access to 
local or rural "environments".    
 An emphasis on economic growth, foreign direct investment and fast-tracking the 
export of exploiting valuable natural resources has resulted contentious political struggle over 





from a perception that community objectives are subordinate to the governments and 
international timber producing priorities while failing to address historical grievances over 
land ownership, tenure and community rights. In fact, there is both little confidence based on 
historical experience that communities will benefit directly through the government's 
commercial forestry activities or that a development model based on timber exports will 
genuinely help communities.  At the same time, Sierra Leone's diggers and miners as well as 
communities adjacent to industrial mining areas continue to feel exploited by much powerful 
actors and under threat from security forces.  In addition, there remain few other 
opportunities to mining since land is difficult, if not impossible, to attain.  At the moment, is 
appears that tension and mistrust will likely sow discontent, particularly as long as 
community concerns are perceived as a low priority.     
 And finally, the focus on economic potential of natural resources as the predominant 
peacebuilding mantra generate a cycle of unrealistic export and revenue projections creates 
dangerously high expectations among the population.   In Liberia, for instance, timber 
projections have been widely off the mark in recent years to the tune of $25 million given that 
no timber has been exported. In Sierra Leone, revenues from diamonds and minerals have 
increased since the end of the conflict, although it remains to be seen whether the sector can 
triple is output as projected over the next five years.  What is obvious is that the government 
and international actors have a certain incentive to calculate unrealistic projections since it 
highlights a sector's "potential" under optimal market conditions.   However, such predictions 
can have perverse effects on a population by raising expectations for development.  In both 
Liberia and Sierra Leone there needs to be a more concerted effort to manage expectations 





Inattention to the environment and sustainable livelihoods 
 With the international peacebuilding spotlight focused brightly on the transforming 
"conflict resources" into "peace resources" it is not surprising that reforms and policies 
overwhelmingly targeted high-value natural resources in both Liberia and Sierra Leone.  
Despite being a focal point for contention and resistance, the attention to securing "conflict 
resources" has been important in terms of helping to forge order and stability--particularly in 
the immediate aftermath of the conflict in both cases.  Furthermore, efforts by peacebuilders 
to marketize natural resources have led to increases in state revenue, particularly in Sierra 
Leone. But the cases also highlight different problem. Chiefly, international peacebuilders 
have "pathology of inattention".  Specifically, attention to high-value natural resources had 
resulted in a lack of attention to other important factors associated with the environment and 
natural resources.  
 First, the framing of environmental and natural resource governance challenges 
almost solely in terms of "conflict resources" and "peace resources" has all but rendered 
invisible the "environment".  It takes attention away from the environmental--as opposed to 
natural resources--needs of the population.  While natural resources refer to potential sources 
of wealth from raw materials, the environment is the physical condition s that affects natural 
resources and the ecosystem services that sustain life.  What goes unnoticed is that conflict 
directly and indirectly damages ecosystems and natural assets that are essential for well-being 
of the population.  Vital environmental issues related to water, sanitation, shelter, food, and 
energy supplies are almost overwhelmingly overlooked.  For instance, reforms and policies 
designed to restart Liberia's timber sector have not been matched by comparable efforts to 
rebuild communities and ensure food security. In Sierra Leone, reforms continue to stress the 
alluvial diamond mining sector and focus on industrial mining rather than creating new 





A failure to respond to these environmental problems--and putting all the attention to conflict 
resources may actually deepen poverty, make development more challenging and exacerbate 
environmental problems. The focus on securing and marketizing natural resource also renders 
invisible the ways in which natural resource exploitation can lead to poor environmental 
outcomes.  Alluvial and industrial mining, and timber harvesting, are not environmentally 
benign.  Recall that even after the substantial environmental devastation wrought by timber 
companies during the conflict; international peacebuilders were not particularly concerned 
about the environmental toll. In Sierra Leone, mining and industrial mining has huge 
environmental implications, which has been a point of contention for adjacent communities.  
 Second, efforts to securitize and marketize natural resources shifts attention toward a 
global commodity view of the environment and natural resources--and to a lesser extent a 
"global" ecosystem view.  From this perspective it is the economic lives of the environment 
and natural resources that matter most. In Liberia, forests are significant as a cultural and 
livelihood resource for a majority of the population. A key point of contention and struggle 
revolves around the extent to which commercial timber may impede on the ability of rural 
communities to meet their day-to-day existence.  Factors that habitually impede the ability of 
these people to meet their livelihood needs such as perverse land ownership and tenure rights, 
environmental degradation, and unfair systems of patronage have not been addressed in the 
forest reforms and policies.  While not normally considered a culturally significant activity, 
there is no doubt that Sierra Leone's alluvial diamonds constitute a vital sustainable 
livelihood for hundreds of thousands of people. One problem is that attempts to crack down 
on illegal mining is reducing livelihood opportunities and created newfound resentment.  The 
other problem is that while there is a growing scarcity of alluvial diamonds there is also a 
lack of alternative livelihoods due to land scarcity as a result of exclusive ownership and 
increasing efforts to commercialize agricultural land.  In areas adjacent to large-scale 





people rely on for livelihoods. Put another way, local populations are viewed chiefly as 
beneficiaries of high-value natural resources that "trickle down" either in the form of land 
fees or as part of national development program. There is of risk of overlooking or 
underemphasizing the sustainable livelihoods that are intimately tied to the land and a 
fundamental component of local economies. More importantly perhaps, strategies that 
emphasize securitization and marketization of the environment and natural resources can 
serve to aggravate these factors and generate tension and conflict that can undermine 
peacebuilding.  Indeed, interviews in both countries turn up a widely held perception that 
livelihoods and communities are being left behind in the peacebuilding process.   
 Third, aggressively pursuing reforms to address conflict timber and conflict 
diamonds that fit particular economic narratives has led international peacebuilders to neglect 
other sectors that may deserve international attention.  An estimated 70 percent of Sierra 
Leone's population lives in rural areas that rely on the interaction between agricultural 
production and forest resources for their livelihoods. In addition forests provide most 
construction materials and 95 percent of the country's firewood.  Combine that with concerns 
that Sierra Leone's remaining forests are under pressure, from agriculture, mining, hunting, 
urban development and timber harvesting.  Despite the significance of forests to Sierra 
Leone's population, forest governance has not been an international peacebuilding priority 
(Beevers 2011).  Likewise, in Liberia the mining sector has remained largely ignored in the 
peacebuilding process (Brownell 2009). Although this has recently begun to change largely in 
response to international peacebuilders concerned with the security implications of a revived 
mineral sector.    
The problem of unrealistic expectations 
 Sierra Leone and Liberia remain in fragile but the prospects for a sustainable and 





expectations. The end of conflict and international intervention represents a new starting 
point for the country, government and people despite the fragility of the peace and the desire 
of spoilers to undermine it. International peacebuilding moved relatively quickly to establish 
a wide range of policies, strategies, programs, regulations, laws and practices that are 
intended to bring stability and consolidate peace.  At the same time, elections are usually 
organized to provide a venue for public discussion that is accompanied by an array of 
political promises.  The danger, of course, is that once the population moves beyond the 
initial peace dividends and the expectations cannot be met that this will undermine the 
legitimacy of the state and open up new opportunities for instability.   
 The reforms and policies promoted by international peacebuilders in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone play a substantial role creating an "expectation gap" among the population and 
government. First, the emphasis on marketization places unrealistically high expectations on 
the natural resources sector.  Recall that timber projections in Liberia have consistently been 
off the mark to tune of tens of millions of dollars.  A majority of years, no timber was even 
exported from the country.  In Sierra Leone, revenues from diamonds and minerals have 
increased substantially since the end of the conflict but have yet to fully meet projections.  
Experience suggests that the triple output for minerals and diamonds currently projected for 
Sierra Leone over the next five years is over optimistic. The source of these export and 
revenue projections remains a matter of controversy.  Civil society organizations in both 
countries accuse the government and international peacebuilders of inflating revenue 
projections based on unrealistic scenarios in order to rationalize reforms and policies of 
marketization (Shearman 2009; UNEP 2010).  A report commissioned in Liberia, for 
example, found that timber volumes were routinely overestimated by at least half.  In Sierra 
Leone calculating diamond and mineral reserves is largely guesswork with the government 
and international peacebuilders relying on industry data, which may be severely inflated.  





resources--and other primary commodities--are also susceptible to significant "price shocks" 
due to global economic conditions.  As an IFI economist mentioned, all the reforms and 
policies in the world could not help the fact that "Sierra Leone missed the largest commodity 
boom in history" after mineral demand contracted in late 2008 (Interview 43).                 
 It is normal for countries to have high expectations for equitable and visible 
development progress in the aftermath of conflict. The presence of international 
peacebuilders and the rebuilding of state institutions and governance lend itself to optimism--
for the state, peacebuilders and the population. In countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone, in 
which exploitable natural resources can serve to kick-start economic recovery expectations 
are even greater in terms of state revenue, economic growth and job opportunities. Poverty 
reduction strategies, which in war-torn states are the blueprint for peacebuilding, track very 
close to projections of natural resource derived revenue.   Better development outcomes 
based on these projections are often the most prominent illustration to the population as to 
whether corruption and malfeasance is being curtailed and the benefits of peace and natural 
resources are being shared.  Recall that forest communities in Liberia expected immense 
benefits that have not been forthcoming.  Likewise, the expectations of benefits from a 
reformed artisanal and industrial mining in Sierra Leone has failed to materialize in adjacent 
communities.  When ordinary citizens do not see perceptible changes-due in part to 
unrealistic expectations- on the level of those that were anticipated increased tension and a 
lack of confidence in state institutions can prevail.  This only reinforces perceptions that the 
benefits of natural resources either accrue to elites or are absorbed by foreign investors.  Not 
only are expectations dashed but if the benefits are perceived to go disproportionately to 
those outside of communities that "own" such resources- social unrest and hostility may 
result.  Rather than increase trust and confidence in the state--inflated and unrealistic 





 While unrealistic expectations can create anxiety and resentment among local 
communities and the population, it can also provide ammunition for spoilers trying to 
undermine peace. First, overconfidence by international peacebuilders in the ability of natural 
resources to quickly produce development outcomes and ultimately sow together a stable and 
lasting peace by way of increased transparency and accountability can provide for potential 
spoilers when expectations do not match reality.  A lack of tangible benefits along with 
accusations of corruption and state mismanagement can aggravate already existing 
grievances.  When reforms come under criticism or expectations go unfulfilled there is bound 
to be rigorous discussions as why "progress" has stalled, particularly in given the significance 
of the environment and natural resources. The result can be a process of casting blame that 
can be politicized as the fault of government or the failure of a certain segment society that 
can serve to divide society along political, ethnic or social lines and have lasting ramifications 
for peace.  Moreover, the ways in which marketization and securitization can trigger the 
violence alluded to above can be used by opportunistic entrepreneurs to press claims or 
interests that can amplify localized issues in ways that can create instability for the country as 
a whole.   
A Look at Sierra Leone's Forests and Liberia's Minerals and 
Diamonds 
 
Claims that certain reforms and policies promoted and supported by international 
peacebuilding organizations had "positive" or "negative" outcomes raises the question: 
"compared to what"?  More specifically, due to the absence of adequate "control" cases in 
which the independent variable (e.g., environmental and natural resource governance) is 
absent, how can we know what would have happened in the absence of international 
peacebuilders?  This methodological challenge should not be dismissed in attempting to 





caution.  With that in mind, however, I have employed two analytic strategies to address this 
point.  First, as discussed in Chapter 1, I have employed process tracing to do the hard work 
of narrowing the list of potential causal pathways and illuminating the conditions in which 
they occur.  As the cases highlight, international peacebuilding organizations have--largely to 
maintain regional stability and minimize the threats posed by "failed states"--supported and 
established the reforms and policies that are deeply contested in Liberia and Sierra Leone.  
Second, I examine briefly the closest thing we have to control cases--Liberia's mineral and 
diamond sector and Sierra Leone's forest sector.  What distinguishes the cases is that they 
have until very recently been devoid of significant intervention by international peacebuilding 
organizations.  While only preliminary, these observations help us to understand the extent to 
which reforms and policies promoted by peacebuilders were determinative in the outcome 
Sierra Leone's Forests  
 Approximately 18 percent of Sierra Leone is forested (Baker et al. 2003).  
Rainforests historically comprised approximately 60 percent of the total land area but was 
reduced by the early 20th century from a combination of shifting cultivation and timber 
extraction by colonial authorities (Richards 1996). As Richards (1996, 117) notes, if Liberia 
was the last country in West Africa to have its forests exported, Sierra Leone was the first.  
Forests did not contribute significantly to conflict or its outbreak, and “conflict timber” was 
not implicated in funding or sustaining the hostilities (Baker et al. 2003).  Part of this is 
probably the result of limited commercial timber and the inability of rebels or the government 
to access and root forest areas. Where forests are linked to the conflict, it is largely in the 
context of small-scale resource use.  An estimated 70 percent of the population lives in rural 
areas and rely on agricultural production and forest resources for sustainable livelihoods and 
as a cultural asset.  Not only are forests and wooded areas important in the evolving process 





materials and are used by 95 percent of the population for fuel in the form of firewood and 
charcoal (Baker et al. 2003).   
 Despite the significance of Sierra Leone’s forests to the people, reforming the forest 
sector has not been a peacebuilding priority for IBOs.  As discussed in Chapter 4, Sierra 
Leone’s peacebuilding strategy emphasizes the importance of economic growth and poverty 
alleviation--and in particular rebuilding the country’s mining sector.  Forests are rarely 
discussed as an important component of sustainable livelihoods for the population by 
international peacebuilders.  Instead, forests are discussed only in relation to on-going 
deforestation, poor land use, and biodiversity loss that are believed to "deepen poverty" 
(World Bank 2005, 105).  Current forestry and wildlife regulations -– are 37 and 21 years old, 
although the forestry act was revised before the war in 1990.327
 Only recently have concerns about the management of Sierra Leone’s forests 
increased among a small group of IBOs that have discussed comprehensive forest and trade 
reforms (Howard 2009).
  While new wildlife 
regulations and forest policy were drafted in 1997 and 2003, they were not passed, and no 
comprehensive attempt to address forests has occurred since.   
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327 The Wildlife Act of 1972 and the Forestry Act of 1988, respectively.  
  The concerns stem in part from a perception the government 
lacks control over its remaining forests areas and reports of illicit timber harvesting in 
reserves and parks (Ford 2008).  Second, there is concern about conserving Sierra Leone’s 
remaining forests, which are deemed by conservation groups as under pressure from 
agriculture, mining, hunting, urban development and timber harvesting.  To regain control, 
the government placed a temporary ban on all timber exports until forest reforms can be 
introduced (Ford 2008).  Ironically, there are conflicting views of where the “threats” to 
Sierra Leone’s forests come from and whether such threats can undermine peace. Information 
328 In early 2009, forest management was restructured by the Ministry of Agriculture to mirror that of 






from civil society and activists suggests that illicit timber harvesting occurs with sanctioning 
from local chiefs and government officials who profit from the revenue and dispense 
patronage to subjects (Interview 67).  The worry is that even small-scale trade in forest 
products may sustain “shadow states” that can lead to conflict or deprive local communities 
of needed resources that can exacerbate forest and land-based grievances.  Others however, 
mostly in government and international organizations, lay blame for deforestation and 
biodiversity loss on “slash and burn” agricultural practices and hunting, which are thought to 
rise in tandem with future population growth and diminished opportunities to “get rich” in 
diamond mines (Interview 62).   This view suggests that one threat to peace is increasing 
forest scarcity that can foster competition over remaining stands and provide little 
opportunity for youth looking for alternative livelihoods tied to forest resources.  Still others 
suggest that deforestation in Sierra Leone is “overplayed” by conservation organizations and 
converting forests to agricultural land and using forest products sustainably is necessary for 
meeting livelihood needs of forest communities (Interview 51).   The concern here is that 
government attempts to control forests may diminish livelihood opportunities and hence, 
increase tension between local communities, customary chiefs and the government.   
Liberia's Diamonds and Minerals 
 Liberia is endowed with substantial mineral resources, including most prominently 
diamonds, gold and iron ore (GoL 2010).  Since the 1950s--and the country's "Open Door 
Policy" these resources made a significant contribution to the country's economy, although 
the benefits were not widely distributed among the population (Soto-Viruet 2010).  Before 
the war, minerals --mostly iron ore--composed approximately 65 percent of the country's 
export earnings and a quarter of GDP, although all major mining operations were 
subsequently looted and closed in the early 1990s.  While small-scale alluvial mining is 





Regardless, tens of thousands of Liberian's depend on diamonds (and gold) for their 
livelihoods even though most live in impoverished conditions and are susceptible to 
exploitation (Brownell 2009).    
 Despite the significance of Liberia's mineral sector--and to a lesser extent diamonds-- 
to the economy and population, reforming the sector has not been a peacebuilding priority for 
IBOs until recently.   As discussed in Chapter 4, Liberia's peacebuilding strategy emphasized 
the importance of addressing "conflict timber" and jump-starting country’s commercial forest 
sector.  Minerals and diamonds are generally not perceived by IBOs as complicit in the 
conflict--despite evidence that Taylor and the NPFL exported stockpiled materials and were 
actively involved in alluvial mining in Liberia (Brownell 2009).   Regardless, restarting the 
mineral sector is rarely discussed in early peacebuilding documents as an important 
component of peace consolidation (GoL 2006a; IMF 2004).  However, in early 2007, efforts 
by peacebuilders to address restarting the industrial mineral sector increased.  In 2010, the 
"Mineral Policy of Liberia" passed with the help of IBOs and its vision was the: "equitable 
and optimal exploitation of Liberia's mineral resources to underpin broad-based sustainable 
growth and socio-economic development." With that in mind, the Liberian government only 
recently began issuing mineral agreements to foreign companies to extract iron and 
Kimberlite diamonds (Soto-Viruet 2010).  The biggest agreement was negotiated with global 
giant Arcelor-Mittal to redevelop the massive iron ore deposits in Nimba County, which was 
to be accompanied by rehabilitating over 200 km of railroad and the Buchanan Port.    
 While attention has begun to turn to industrial minerals production due to its potential 
to spur economic benefits, the alluvial diamond sector is still largely ignored by IBOs.  In 
fact, the first documented participatory appraisal to assess problems with alluvial diamond 
sector occurred in 2008, a full five years after the conflict came to an end (Brownell 2009). 
Although Liberia's new mineral policy does address the importance of alluvial mining in 





forthcoming.  As Brownell (2009) suggests, the sector is hobbled by "poor regulations, lack 
of investment, disorganization, ignorance, abused labor and resources" (Brownell 2009, 1).  
More than any other natural resource sector, Liberia's alluvial mining "present challenges for 
health, environment, gender, education, child labor and poverty alleviation" (Blundell 2009, 
2).   Despite this, IBOs have failed to recognize the sector as important for peacebuilding and 
thus have not channeled the resources.   
 After examining Sierra Leone's forests and Liberia's minerals and diamonds several 
things are worth noting.  First, it appears that because forests in Sierra Leone and minerals 
and diamonds in Liberia were not perceived as "conflict resources" by the IBOs they were not 
important in the first five or so years after the conflicts ended.  In fact, only recently has the 
Liberian mineral sector received attention largely because of the substantial economic 
potential that it represents.  Meanwhile, alluvial diamonds and Sierra Leone's forests have 
been largely ignored despite the fact that large swaths of the population depend on them for 
their livelihoods and well-being.  Second, the lack of international attention appears not only 
to have reduced the potential positive benefits related to revenue but has ensured that the 
contention, resistance and violence associated with rapid peacebuilding reforms and policies 
has also been reduced.  The violence that has emerged around Sierra Leone's industrial 
mineral sector has thus far at least not occurred in Liberia. Third, while further research needs 
to be conducted, it appears that several of the pathologies linked to securitization and 
marketization reforms and policies have been moderated.  For example, societal competition 
spawned by "fast-tracking" and the expectations that accompany the reforms and polices do 
not exist.  While these findings are certainly preliminary, the fact that IBOs place certain 
environments and natural resources into the international spotlight may have ramifications for 





The Consequences of Securitization and Marketization for 
Peacebuilding 
 
The first litmus test for any peacebuilding strategy or agenda is whether it can be linked 
directly or indirectly to the resumption of civil conflict.  The good news is that in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone conflict has not resumed.  The question that surfaces, then, is to what extent did 
the strategy of securitization and marketization described in this study contribute to this 
successful outcome?  I argue this is a difficult question on two fronts.  First, whether a war-
torn state sustains peace after civil conflict ends cannot be boiled down to a particular factor 
but depends on a range of variables that make the propensity for violence more or less likely.  
These factors include, but are not limited to, the conditions that led to the onset of the war, 
the characteristics of the previous conflict, the nature of the peace settlement, and the scope 
and timing of UN peacekeeping operations.  Sustaining peace also depends on the mix of 
strategies, reforms and policies promoted by international peacebuilders.  Second, even if we 
could identify one single factor, or even set of factors responsible for the current period of 
peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone, peacebuilding is not defined by the absence of conflict.   
As noted in Chapter 2, the fundamental purpose of peacebuilding is to establish the 
conditions for a sustainable and long-term peace.  
 Based on these provisos two things become clear.  First, it is too early to tell whether 
peacebuilding has been successful in either Liberia or Sierra Leone.  Simply put, a host of 
important factors and conditions are still playing out and it will be decades before any 
retrospective analysis of success or failure can be rendered.  Second, because of this 
limitation, we require a framework to be able to evaluate how specific strategies, reforms and 
policies influence and shape peacebuilding at a particular points in time.  One framework, 





This framework suggests that at a minimum, environmental and natural resource governance 
should: (1) not recreate or "lock-in" conditions that increase the propensity for violence and; 
(2) "do not harm"--that is not create new conditions that increase the propensity for violence.  
Any of these outcomes would appear to contradict or at the very least challenge the notion 
that environmental and natural resource governance helps peacebuilding.  As I suggest above 
in the section on linked pathologies marketization and securitization as governance reforms 
appear to do both.   
 But another way to analyze the potential consequences of governance reforms in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone is from what might be termed a "peacebuilding" framework. This 
approach suggests that peacebuilding requires multiple interventions and is premised on the 
notion that "peace revolves around the reform of governance" (Richmond 2009, 23).  From 
this perspective, international peacebuilding interventions--if deployed properly--can reduce 
the propensity for violence (Call and Wyeth 2008).  
 While the list of possible interventions is virtually endless when it comes to war-torn 
states, I examine four specific outcomes that are thought by international peacebuilding 
organizations --and largely substantiated in the scholarly literature--to decrease the propensity 
for violence.  These outcomes are: (1) security improvements; (2) increased economic 
development; (3) enhanced social cohesion and trust; and (4) strengthen state institutions.  
These conditions are important to consider in dealing with environmental and natural 
resource governance because they can potentially provide insight into historical conditions 
responsible for violent conflict but also provide peacebuilders--to the extent possible--with 
levers that can be used to improve outcomes.  More specifically, by considering the 
"upstream" factors it may allow IBOs not just to "do not harm" but, in fact, improve 
peacebuilding practices in ways that decrease the propensity for violence and help the 
peacebuilding project.  Below, I evaluate efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone see whether 





in Chapters 5 and 7, respectively.   I suggest that negative outcomes, at the very least, 
challenge the assumption that securitizing and marketizing the environment and natural 
resources in war-torn states in reality helps peacebuilding.     
Security improvements 
 The core objective of international intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone boils 
down to security or order.  The conflicts inflicted death, destruction and displacement on the 
civilian population and had regional implications.  At the same time, the international 
community increasingly viewed the conflicts as a threat to international security and stability.  
Peacebuilding emerged as a response to these security challenges and was an effort to 
consolidate peace over the long-term.  By definition, without security, peacebuilding is 
impossible.   In Liberia and Sierra Leone, the state's monopoly on violence--a key 
characteristic of "stateness"--has been reclaimed with the international assistance of 
peacebuilders.  Although security is virtually guaranteed by15, 000 peacekeepers in Liberia 
and a British security force in Sierra Leone, substantial reform of the security sector has 
rebuilt the army and police forces.  The situation in both countries is fragile and characterized 
by episodic violence but has been secure enough for relatively peaceful national elections, 
activities of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, the reintegration of former combatants 
and the return of refugees and displaced peoples.  In short, if we compare Liberia and Sierra 
Leone to how they looked in the mid-1990s when the civil wars were raging, the security 
situation has vastly improved.  
 In one sense, security and order now characterizes the environment and natural 
resource sectors in which the problem of conflict resources garnered the most attention from 
international peacebuilders as the threat.  In Sierra Leone, international peacebuilding efforts 
to reduce the threat of conflict diamonds have been successful--even though smuggling 





areas and reforms and policies, such as the Kimberley Process, to control the rough diamond 
trade.  There is a similar dynamic in Liberia as efforts to end the trade in "conflict timber" 
have been successful.  The Liberian government has an increased its presence in forest areas 
and the smuggling of timber has been significantly reduced.  When compared to the threat 
posed by conflict resources, the security situation appears much better.   
 In another sense, if we unpack security to focus on people and communities--
specifically a human-centered framework that prioritizes livelihoods, justice and rights--
security looks different.  In Sierra Leone, despite almost a decade of new reforms and policies 
to better govern the mineral sector, mining community's in particular remains areas of broad 
insecurity.  Despite a few attempts by international peacebuilders to improve the conditions 
of miners and diggers, poverty in diamond mining communities remains pervasive and higher 
than anywhere else in the country (UNEP 2010).  Moreover, efforts by the government to 
securitize alluvial mining reduce the ability of people to earn a livelihood since few 
alternatives exist due to a lack of available agricultural land.  This lack of land results from 
land that is controlled by an entrenched elite and being eaten up by new mining and industrial 
agriculture concessions. The story is the same in communities adjacent to large-scale 
industrial operations where communities are impoverished, feel exploited as land is taken 
away by mining companies with little compensation, and revenues do not benefit the people.  
This has resulted in episodes of violence and instability. In Liberia, there is a sense that in 
spite of the reforms and policies communities are being excluded from decisions that have a 
bearing on the future of forests and livelihoods. This is viewed as the state making a "grab" 
for what is rightfully a community resource. There is an emerging perception factors that 
undermine the security of the rural population, including land ownership, access and user 
rights, benefit sharing and genuine participation are being pushed aside in a rush to export 
timber that will only profit political and economic elites. Where timber operations have 





have resulted in stoppages and local resistance. As a UN adviser commented, the trouble will 
begin "when large-scale timber exploration conflicts with community land...since land is the 
basis of the Liberian livelihood" (Interview 14).    
 I draw a distinction, then, by questioning the "target" of the security improvements.  
An emphasis on conflict diamonds places the security of the state at the center of any 
analysis.  The state is deemed the "protector and regulator of society, and its economic 
development" and therefore must be rescued (Pugh, Cooper and Turner 2008, 2).  But it is 
also because international peacebuilders assume that states--particularly those that are market 
democracies--are the best guarantor of international security.  Security can be heralded as an 
achievement if elections are held, security forces are reorganized and there is an absence of 
war.  The problem is that while an emphasis on rapidly securitizing and marketizing the 
environment and natural resources in an effort to address the state's security may undermine 
the security of people and communities.  This is because the state does not always have 
society's best intentions at heart--a fact that the people of Liberia and Sierra Leone know all 
too well--and also because state-centric security priorities can unintentionally or not conflict 
with local political and economic priorities.   
Increased economic development 
 It is orthodoxy to view poverty as the handmaiden to conflict. This logic rests on the 
widely-held assumption that peace between and within states rests on increased economic 
development that helps to initiate political transformation.  A related finding is that the 
likelihood of conflict is increases in tandem with levels of poverty and negative economic 
growth (Collier et al. 2003).  Because civil conflict destroys formal economies, intensifies 
poverty, increases unemployment and reduces economic growth, the prevailing peacebuilding 
wisdom is that reforming the economic sector is absolutely essential for peacebuilding.   





investment to stimulate economic growth, produce jobs and procure state revenue.   It should 
not be surprising; then, that international peacebuilding organizations promote and help 
establish reforms that emphasize the marketization of the environment and natural resources.  
As the Liberia and Sierra Leone cases show there is an assumption that timber, diamonds and 
minerals can be quickly leveraged in name of economic development.    
 On a range of measures, Liberia and Sierra Leone's economic development appears to 
be increasing.  Sierra Leone has recovered strongly with real GDP growth hovering at seven 
percent annually (IMF 2008).  Revenue generation has also increased substantially due in 
large part to the mineral and diamond reforms that places a priority raising diamond revenue 
and reviving the industrial mineral sector.  Not only did GDP and revenue increase at least 
ten-fold since early-2000s but projections are expected to swell dramatically in the future 
with continued private investment (IMF 2008).  Likewise, Liberia has seen a relatively strong 
GDP growth averaging about eight percent per annum.  Revenues in Liberia have been 
increasing steadily even though commercial timber extraction has been well below 
projections.  While there has been uneven progress and even some problems, international 
peacebuilding organizations believe things are on the right track and over the long-term 
economic development will help consolidate peace (IMF 2008).   Despite some progress, 
however, the reforms and policies have not led to the levels of development anticipated.  At 
$200 and $190 GDP per capita, respectively, Sierra Leone and Liberia remain the poorest and 
most unequal countries in the world (IMF 2008).  Although life expectancy and child 
mortality in both countries have rebounded since the end of the conflict, they are some of the 
worst in the world (World Bank 2008b).  Formal employment in both countries also hovers 
around 70 percent.    
 The development figures above are ambiguous but there remains a question as to 
whether the reforms and policies discussed will amount to genuine development outcomes in 





increasing steadily in Sierra Leone due to increased state control over the mining sector and 
efforts to prioritize commercial exports. The problem is that currently most of the revenues 
accumulate outside the country's borders limiting the ability of the government to acquire 
revenue to fund basic services.  At the same time, poverty levels remain higher in mining 
areas with very few benefits trickling down to the workers and communities, who are largely 
exploited and in a state of debt bondage. Efforts to crack down on "illegal" diamond mining, 
along with declining amounts of available land for farming, has also pushed people to the 
margins and left many without sustainable livelihoods.  Efforts to jump-start the industrial 
mining sector have also been extremely problematic as mining agreements have been 
negotiated behind closed doors, with little public accountability and often at odds with the 
law.  Violence and grievance have also been increasing as communities adjacent to large-
scale operations complain strenuously about police abuse, a lack of compensation for land 
and crop, environmental issues related to water pollution and an inability to participate 
actively in decision making.  All this is compounded by restrictions on land tenure and 
ownership that restricts people's ability to improve well-bring and foster sustainable 
livelihoods. Revenue projections for Liberia's forest sector have been routinely 
overestimated, perhaps on purpose, but efforts to sell off huge chunks of commercial forest 
lands to concessionaires continues apace.  While some timber harvesting has commenced 
there has been community opposition to timber contracts and social agreements. Because 
what constitutes timber-producing areas has been decided a priori and forest communities 
have been excluded from decision making there is a perception that communities will be 
"pushed aside in the name of economic development" (Interview 32).  Given the importance 
of forests to the day to day existence of Liberia's people, communities want some control 
over forests and a right to "develop in accordance with their own needs and interests" (Binda 





     Again, it is important to draw a distinction that might be important for peacebuilding.  
First, development is predominantly used to refer to higher incomes and poverty alleviation 
so as to reduce the likelihood of future conflict.  But development has a human side that 
expands the meaning of development beyond income to "enlarge people's choices", and to 
encompasses things like equity, sustainability, livelihoods and empowerment (UNDP 2009).   
While over the long-term the reforms and policies may be able to increase incomes, efforts to 
securitize and marketize timber, diamonds and minerals may be impeding human 
development over the short-medium term.        
Enhanced social cohesion and trust 
 The conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone tore society apart leaving them divided by 
hostility, anger and insecurity. This had substantial influence on peacebuilding because if 
societal dynamics remain contentious and divisive it can perpetuate negative attitudes and 
fears about other groups, and also lead to resumption of conflict if violent behaviors continue 
to leave people vulnerable and in despair (Colletta, Lim, and Kelles-Viitanen 2002). 
Therefore, peacebuilding requires efforts to understand and make sense of the conflicts as 
well as its consequences. To this end, Liberia and Sierra Leone held Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions that investigated the cause, gave voice to victims, and prosecuted those that 
were responsible in the name of reconciliation and forgiveness.  At the same time however, 
peacebuilding requires that reforms and policies established in the aftermath of conflict help 
to foster social cohesion and build trust in order to transform divided societies and help 
people heal.  Reducing social cohesion and trust arises by reducing disparities and feelings of 
exclusion while also strengthening social bonds (Colletta, Lim and Kelles-Viitanen 2002).  It 
is assumed that the environment and natural resource governance may be particularly helpful 
in efforts to deepen social cohesion and build trust (Conca and Dabelko 2002; UNEP 2009).   





resources may promote communication and interaction--between adversarial social groupings 
or between civil society and the state--that crate shared identities and trust.  In short, the 
interdependent nature of the environment and natural resources may be able to transcend the 
political boundaries and social cleavages in the name of social cohesion and peacebuilding.    
 In Liberia, forest reforms and policies have created opportunities for engagement and 
dialogue. Though the contours of the reforms and policies were largely predetermined by the 
demands of international peacebuilders, the reform process encouraged interaction between 
stakeholders. This was particularly the case in discussions over forest concessions and in the 
crafting of the forest reform laws, when cooperation was at an all-time high due to 
international pressure. While this dialogue was confined to a hand-selected group of 
individuals, it did help to build trust and confidence because all actors "at-the-table" got 
something in return. Once implementation of the forest reforms and policies got underway, 
however, the process began to fracture under the weight of contention and expectation.  
Increasing resentment has emerged over the lack of community participation, the intrusion of 
the state, the commercial-centric agenda and a lack of attention to land ownership issues and 
community rights.  In addition, the promised benefits of a functioning and efficient timber 
sector have not materialized as promised in communities or trickled down to the population. 
This has resulted in increasing distrust and a lack of confidence. The government and FDA 
have recently accused international peacebuilders and Liberian civil society of thwarting 
economic development by publicly questioning the motives of officials and bringing up 
allegations of corruption.  The FDA continues to assert that holding the forest sector to strict 
and complex international standards and holding up errors as examples of corruption has 
slowed down the awarding of timber contracts: each time a new allegation arise, commercial 
timber activities that could contribute to economic growth, state revenue an poverty 
alleviation are put on hold because of public and international pressure.  At the same, 





policies and undermining the country's fragile peace by fast-tracking commercial forestry 
without genuine systems of transparency and accountability, and first addressing the needs of 
forest communities.  These groups suggest that despite the reforms and policies, the 
government is resorting to the "old ways of doing business" and not adequately addressing 
issues that have long been catalysts for conflict.  For the communities and the population, 
there is also a palpable lack of confidence and trust in the government's ability to leverage 
forest resources for development. This "lack of progress" leads to perceptions that the 
government is corrupt, incompetent or both.  
 In Sierra Leone, diamond and mineral reforms and policies have largely been done 
by a select group of international peacebuilders, business interests and government officials.  
Unlike the forest reforms in Liberia, which took several years and included a variety of 
stakeholders, efforts to quickly reduce the influence of conflict diamonds led to a less 
inclusive process.  There have been some disjointed programs designed to make the lives of 
miners and diggers better but the reforms and policies did little unite groups or initiate a 
dialogue about the future diamond or mineral sectors outside of international peacebuilding 
channels where there was an urgency to stem the flow of conflict resources and rapidly 
rebuild the economy.  The overriding perception was that a combination of security and 
economic recovery would in and of itself build trust and social cohesion, and that too much 
consultation would "slow [the] process down" (Interview 44).  In fact, it appears that an 
emphasis on state revenue or more control over diamond mining (e.g., Kimberley Process) 
has undermined trust between mining communities and the state.  This is because the focus 
on revenue and control of diamonds has done little to improve conditions for diggers, miners 
and local communities or provide new opportunities for land ownership and alterative 
livelihoods in agriculture. At the same time, efforts to jump-start the industrial mining sector 
has led to disputes over mining leases, concessions and agreements that put adjacent 





mining sector. International peacebuilding organizations are critical of the government but 
suggest the reforms and policies need time to work.  Communities and civil society groups, 
on the other hand, have suggested that the reforms and policies enable the kind of state 
control that leads to economic mismanagement and corruption.   
 In Liberia and Sierra Leone, the reforms and policies have served a very useful 
purpose of bringing to the surface historical grievances and exposing the corruption and 
patronage that has traditionally been associated with forests, diamonds and minerals. The 
importance of this cannot be overstated since these debates and discussions have historically 
been off-limits in public discourse.  In Liberia, reforms and policies were first largely 
hammered out among a small group of stakeholders in a climate of trust and cooperation but 
over time this process has fractured over increasingly contentious issues.  In Sierra Leone, 
confidence and trust in the reforms and policies continues to decline even as the government 
has successfully been able to implement the Kimberley Process and raise government 
revenue.  This is largely due to a lack of attention to the plight of diggers and miners and 
increasing evidence of corruption by the government in negotiating contracts with mineral 
companies.  In both cases, then, the reforms and policies are not at the moment helping to 
build social cohesion and trust but may be having the opposite effect. Since the reforms and 
policies may ultimately alter people's relationship to the environment and natural resources, 
they can inherently bring people together or divide them over time.  The lesson here is that 
governance reforms, particularly in war-torn states like Liberia and Sierra Leone is a slow 
and contentious process that may succeed in building trust and cohesion among the 
population and government--it is far from certain.    
Strengthened state institutions  
 Recently, there has emerged a focus on  legitimate state institutions as an essential 





and Sisk 2009).   According to Paris (2004, 173-174), state institutions are critical for 
peacebuilding since the conditions above--security, economic development and social 
cohesion and trust--take place within institutional constraints that can resolve competing 
societal disputes, openly debate and create policy, and enforce a system of rules and 
regulations that govern the polity.  Fractured, ineffective or illegitimate state institutions that 
cannot balance societal demands or protect certain groups may be susceptible to contestation 
or violence (Paris 2004, 173). State institutions should be legitimate in the eyes of the 
population and international community.  Legitimacy, then, refers the consent of the 
population to accept certain "rules of the game" and the capacity to exercise a monopoly on 
the use of force, the ability to collect revenues and govern expenditures (Call and Wyeth 
2008).   
 From the view of international peacebuilders in Sierra Leone, state institutions 
dealing with the environment and natural resources--specifically diamonds and minerals--
have been strengthened since the end of the conflict.  Before the intervention of international 
peacebuilders, the diamond sector was not only an unmanaged free-for-all but helping to fuel 
the conflict.  At the same time, the industrial mineral sector was in ruins and not contributing 
to the economy.  Not only has Sierra Leone restored its monopoly on the use of force but has 
been successful at gaining control of diamond mining areas. By establishing new reforms and 
policies, it has successfully been able to reestablish its authority to collect revenues as can be 
seen by the upswing in diamond and mineral receipts.  While international peacebuilders 
remain vigilant to counteract corruption, the general consensus is that the mineral sector is on 
the right track.  Security has been restored, economic development is increasing and social 
cohesion has been enhanced all because of strengthened and increasingly legitimate states 
institutions. However, whether the state institutions are legitimate in the eyes of certain 
portions of the population remains uncertain.  While the more legally mined diamonds are 





only way diggers and miners can capture a decent price.  In addition, despite continued 
attempts to crack-down on illegal mining operations they continue to be widespread because 
such operations, although illegal, offer livelihoods.  In this sense, the people that rely on 
small-scale alluvial diamond mining elude the state's grasp and apparently do not consent to 
the rules and institutions.  If the violence and conflict is any guide, there is also evidence that 
communities adjacent to industrial mining operations are unwilling to consent to policies they 
view as unjust.  Finally, public attention to corruption in negotiating large-scale mineral 
contracts has raised suspicion as to whether the state is willing or able to leverage the 
environment and natural resources for the benefit of the population.     
 In Liberia, there is a sense among international peacebuilders that the reforms and 
policies in the forest sector is evidence of strengthened state institutions.  Certainly during the 
conflict the forest sector had been unmanaged, overharvested and hijacked by rebels and 
corrupt government officials to sustain a brutal conflict.  The government has reestablished 
its monopoly on violence and regained control of forests areas.  Although the government has 
not been able to meet revenue projections and despite a host of problems, international 
peacebuilders highlight that state institutions have contributed to peacebuilding.  But just like 
Sierra Leone, there is reason to believe that state institutions do not enjoy popular legitimacy 
and support, particularly among forest communities.  This is largely based on two 
observations.  First, because the forest reforms and policies are essentially dictating how 
people should behave relative to forests, which to reiterate have always supplied the 
resources needed for survival and sustainable livelihoods, it was expected that community 
rights would be part of a national dialogue.  Although reforms and policies do stress the 
importance of active public participation in forest management there is little genuine 
inclusion in the decision making process.  Timber contracts have been contentious based on a 
lack of community input, and government's allocation of 800,000 hectares of land for timber 





fundamental question about "who owns the forests?"  This is a long-standing struggle that has 
played out over the Community Rights Law and concerns whether forests are a state asset or 
an endowment of rural communities.  Because of a long history of powerful local and 
national elites and business interest controlling Liberia's forests at the expense of 
communities and the environment, the reforms and policies that place the state once again at 
the center of decisions is illegitimate.   
Conclusion 
Despite differences in the cases, I found that the reforms and policies pursued by international 
peacebuilders follow a broadly common strategy aimed at "securitizing" and "marketizing" 
the environment and natural resources.  While there are peace-enhancing benefits to these 
policies and reforms, I found that they come with four linked pathologies that can give rise to 
contention and resistance, which appears to be increasing the propensity for violence.  In 
terms of peacebuilding outcomes, it appears that by prioritizing primarily economic outcomes 
like GDP and state revenue and state authority, other factors are being either ignored that can 
play a significant role in how the environment and natural resources can help reduce the 
likelihood of violence.  It appears that IBOs ignore the lack of inclusiveness and 
participation, a deficiency of sustainable livelihoods, inequitable or disputed land ownership 
and tenure rights, and equitable benefit sharing at their peril. .  While environmental and 
natural resource governance may be counterproductive at the moment, our reaction should 
not be to discard our efforts. Nor do I suggest that "securitization" or "marketization" should 
be abandoned outright since state control and economic growth are clearly part of the 
solution.  Indeed, peacebuilders need chart a new way forward by taking stock in the current 
strategies and priorities while also being aware of faulty assumptions and the deep 










The peacebuilding literature has expanded considerably in recent years but few studies have 
scrutinized in any detail environmental and natural resource governance. This is surprising 
because peace operations have integrated environmental and natural resource governance 
reforms into war-torn states for over a decade.  Perhaps the reason is that scholars deem the 
subject matter "low politics" or focus on other facets of areas perceived to be more 
consequential for establishing a sustainable and long-term peace.  Either way, the 
peacebuilding agenda and policy are out in front of the scholarship, and there is a lot we do 
not know about the role of environmental and natural resource governance in war-torn states.  
The objective of this research is to fill this gap in the literature, and examine the extent to 
which environmental and natural resources governance helps or hinders peacebuilding.    
 This chapter proceeds as follows.  First, I review the significance of this research for 
Liberia and Sierra Leone; for peacebuilding operations; and for scholarship, more generally.  
Second, because this work is a preliminary step in a longer project I describe three areas for 
future research.  And finally, I chart a new way forward for environmental and natural 
resource governance by briefly elucidating the challenges IBOs  inherently face and new 
strategies that may be helpful for peace operations now and in the years to come.    
Significance of this Work 
Given the importance of peacebuilding as a means of addressing civil conflict and the threats 
they pose to international security and human welfare any opportunity to improve the 





been a decrease in the number and intensity of civil wars but a growing supply of war-torn 
states (Mack 2007).  According to Call and Wyeth (2008, 1) “peacebuilding may be as – if 
not more – important than conflict prevention in reducing the fact and toll of civil war.”  As 
such, the stakes of peacebuilding failure and the prospects for success underscore the 
fundamental importance in understanding and establishing the conditions for achieving a 
sustainable and lasting peace. Although this dissertation focuses on only two cases, the last 
several years we have witnessed not only new peacebuilding operations but several that have 
significant environment and natural resource dimensions. For instance, as of this writing, 
Cote d'Ivoire, and Libya are on the threshold of civil conflict and both have significant 
natural resources.  
 Because peacebuilding operations are likely to increase in the coming decades, my 
work endeavors to bridge the world of theory and policy.  The findings that emerge from this 
research--that current strategy aimed at reforming environmental and natural resource 
governance may undermine positive peacebuilding trajectories--have almost immediate 
significance for those involved in peace operations on-the-ground.  International 
peacebuilders and analysts concerned with reforming environmental and natural resource 
sectors should be interested in this work.  If anything, it should raise the specter that 
strategies, agendas and policies employed by IBOs may lead to sub-optimal outcomes. 
Beyond that, however, this research presents challenges for those designing plans for 
economic recovery, which are inherently based on assumptions about the ability of the 
environment and natural resources to provide goods and services at a variety of levels.  While 
it is important not to over-generalize the findings, we can make contingent generalizations 
that suggest with a high degree of confidence that in volatile and fragile in war-torn states 
efforts to establish, maintain or alter the "rules of the game" for governing the environment 
and natural resources can have palpable consequences for a sustainable and lasting peace 





 This work is also important for scholars of international relations and comparative 
politics. It raises questions about the role of the environment and natural resource governance 
that have not been addressed with any detail.  Broad claims regarding the way the 
environment and natural resources can "concretely" contribute to peacebuilding may need to 
be reexamined in light of this information (UNEP 2009).  The premise, for example, that 
interaction and communication around the shared environments and resources can promote 
cooperation and peace is by no means easy or assured.  Furthermore, this work adds 
substantial detail to arguments in the peacebuilding literature that market-oriented reforms 
undermine peacebuilding outcomes but never clearly delineates any specific mechanisms by 
which tension, contention and conflict may development (Paris 2004).  Moreover, if Doyle 
and Sambanis (2006, 47) are correct that rebuilding war-torn states is determined by the 
rebuilding of social trust this research provides another set of factors beyond political 
institutions, power sharing arrangements and the like that need to be considered.  Lastly, I 
should mention that this research also contributes to the scholarship on the Liberia and Sierra 
Leone cases, respectively.  In fact, it represents the first detailed account of Liberia's 
significant and well-publicized attempts to govern forests for peace as well as the first to 
address Sierra Leone's efforts to govern both the mineral and diamond sectors.   But further 
research is needed.  I have examined only two cases so similar studies in other countries and 
sub-regions are certainly desirable.  Further research should be conducted on the dynamics of 
different resources, including those that sit outside of the international "spotlight".  More 
research is also required on the precise actor's efforts to govern the environment and natural 
resources.  For example, can we unpack the role of civil society? And finally, are there new 





Challenges and a Way Forward 
International peacebuilding organizations have placed a great deal of faith in the reforms and 
policies responses promoted and established in Liberia and Sierra Leone.  As it turns out, 
however, any the peace-enhancing traits are threatened because the reforms and policies can 
trigger pathologies that can undermine the conditions they were intended to strengthen.  
However, our reaction should not be to discard efforts to govern the environment and natural 
resources.  Nor do I suggest that "securitization" or "marketization" should be abandoned 
outright since state control and economic growth are clearly part of the solution.  Indeed, I 
argue the peacebuilders need to do three things: (1) rethink strategies and priorities; (2) 
beware of assumptions and; (3) address embedded tensions.    
Rethink peacebuilding reforms, policies and priorities 
 To establish a sustainable and long-term peace, strategies and policies need to be 
devised that can foster trust, build confidence and engender cooperation, particularly in the 
decade or so after a conflict ends.  As this research points out, this is no easy task when the 
political, economic and social dynamics are deeply intertwined with the environment and 
natural resources.  But there needs to be some way to remedy the pathologies identified.  If 
we look closely, we find that the most common grievances concern land ownership and 
tenure, corruption, exclusion and a lack of sustainable livelihoods. I suggest that slowing 
down efforts to "marketize" the environment and natural resources while speeding up efforts 
to provide sustainable livelihoods to the population may be helpful.  Reorienting such 
priorities, I believe, would help ensure that issues that have historically aggrieved populations 
get resolved early on, the "expectation gap" gets reduced, and potential windows of 
opportunity in which spoilers can emerge are minimized.  At the same time, peacebuilders 
need to make sure that reforms do not simply rebuild or reassemble pre-war arrangements 





time not only to rebuild state institutions--and begin the long-process of institutionalizing 
norms of transparency and accountability that brings patronage out into the open. 
 "Slow tracking" would also allow for a comprehensive focus on sustainable 
livelihoods related to agricultural production and the use of forest products that are often 
labeled as part of the “informal” economy or as so-called "low stakes" issues related to water, 
sanitation, shelter, food, and energy supplies Indeed, interviews in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
turn up a widely held perception that livelihoods and the well-being of communities are being 
left behind in the peacebuilding process.  Liberia's focus on commercial forestry has not been 
matched by comparable efforts to rebuild communities and ensure food security with input 
from communities themselves.  And in Sierra Leone, reforms continue to emphasize an 
alluvial diamond mining sector and industrial mining rather than creating new livelihood 
opportunities for a growing population of youth that want to return to subsistence agriculture. 
  I certainly envision this "way forward" to be criticized on two grounds.  The first is 
that "slow-tracking" rather than "fast-tracking" environmental and natural resource 
governance will not only increase the cost and duration of international peacebuilding but 
deprive war-torn states of revenue that can fund peacebuilding activities shortly after conflict 
ends.  This may appear to be a solid critique but as the Liberia and Sierra Leone cases 
highlight the promise of such revenue is far from clear. It is hard to tell in the abstract but 
perhaps commercial forestry in Liberia would be further along and industrial mining less 
violent if only the process was "people-centered" rather than "state-centered".  The second 
potential critique is that a reorienting peacebuilding so that it focuses more on the local 
livelihoods and ownership needs of the population can undermine peace since it would 
slowdown peacebuilding.  The real fear, I suspect, among IPOs and governments is that too 
much public participation, decentralization or local control is deemed a threat. In addition, the 
notion that development is state-led rather than part of local-level dynamic goes against the 





govern, is a lack of legitimacy of an overzealous central authority that could be enhanced by 
placing an emphasis on local dynamics of peacebuilding as well as the national.     
Beware of faulty assumptions and constructs 
One must be keenly aware that the ways in which conflicts are constructed by actors 
reflects sets of assumptions about the character and extent of problems, which justify certain 
actions.  The ways problems are constructed also determines the character any reforms or 
policy responses.  While the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts were fuelled in part by 
greedy warlords and combatants that controlled valuable natural resources this is an 
oversimplification.  The country has a long-history of corruption and networked patronage 
that is intertwined the environment and natural resources to create "shadow states".  The 
environment and natural resources were used as levers to buy the loyalty of local actors.  
Such relationships were shaped by a combination of endemic underdevelopment and unfair 
land practices, and exploited by ethnic groupings and political allegiances.   Representing the 
conflict in the terms described above had tremendous implications for the scope and extent of 
reforms and policies in two ways.  First, it lends itself to understanding the relationship 
between the environment, natural resources and conflict in terms of "conflict resources".  
This leads to reforms and policies bent on securing and controlling the environment and 
natural resources at all cost. A focus on economic motives of combatants renders invisible the 
ways in which the political and economic dimensions are linked via corruption and systems 
of patronage.  It also ensures that historically relevant points of contention, which are linked 
to the consolidation of state power, are ignored or minimized.  Finally, suggesting that new 
wars are a novel phenomenon deflects attention from the destabilizing effects of market 
economic systems or the behavior of international actors.   
 The emphasis on marketization emphasizes the security enhancing traits of the 





held assumptions that poverty and a lack of economic growth is the most significant risk 
factor for war-torn states.  In addition, since state authority and power is essential for 
security, revenues key preoccupation of peacebuilders.  Moreover, integrating countries into 
the global economic order is presumed to help guarantee peace and security. The recipe, then, 
is to rapidly exploit and export available natural resources. Construction the relationship 
between the environment, natural resources and peace in terms of marketization has impacts 
the reforms and policies in several ways.  First, it decreases the likelihood that factors which 
habitually foster grievance and resentment--including perverse land ownership and tenure 
rights, and unfair systems of patronage--will be addressed.  A focus on marketization tends to 
dominate discussions and crowd out other factors vital for the consolidation of peace. Vital 
environmental issues related to water, sanitation, shelter, food, and energy supplies are almost 
overwhelmingly overlooked.   Moreover, while valuable natural resources are high stakes 
issues, putting diamonds and timber into the international spotlight can lead to tunnel vision 
that risk overlooking the sustainable livelihoods of communities, more broadly. A 
comprehensive focus on sustainable livelihoods related to agricultural production and the use 
of forest products are often labeled as part of the “informal” economy or as low stakes issues, 
and does not receive comparable attention in peacebuilding efforts. 
 Reforms and policies are based on faulty or at least uncertain assumptions and 
constructs that help create pathologies of marketization and securitization. The reason for this 
may be an unwillingness to question underlying assumptions that link state authority and 
market oriented policies to peace in war-torn states (Paris 2004).  It might also be due to an 
inherent inability of international peacebuilder to "see" how politics and economics are linked 
in resource-dependent states.  For a variety of reasons international peacebuilders are both 
discouraged from digging deep into national politics or historical analyses.  Finally, 
peacebuilders have been unable to deal with a lag time between academic research and policy 





civil war, take exception to a description of the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia as 
caused "new barbarism" and question the accuracy of the "Liberal Peace Thesis" of war-torn 
states, the reforms and polices still reflect these dubious ideas.     
Address embedded tensions 
 What emerges with striking clarity is that environmental and natural resource 
governance is fraught with contradiction.  As we have seen consolidating state authority has 
received pushback from local communities concerned about the historical conditions by 
which economic and political elites have captured the environment and natural resources and 
used it as an instrument of private gain and tool of patronage rather than to improve public 
well-being.  Bypassing or reducing state authority and control on the other hand is 
problematic as well because it undermines the effectiveness of the state and reduces its 
legitimacy in the eyes of peacebuilders.  A lack of state capacity state control opens up 
opportunities as had to effect of fostering a tradition of contention, competition and violence.  
At the same time, a lack of state authority can empower local warlords, who likewise can 
capture and control environment and natural resources for personal gain--also part of 
patronage networks. There is an embedded tension --securitizing the peace is needed and 
particularly the assistance of international peacebuilders in doing so--but sustaining it needs 
local ownership of the processes.  While international peacebuilders talk about--and reforms 
and polices reflect--decentralization and local participation and control it is largely not felt in 
practice.  This is largely because such local options represent a threat to state power and open 
up the potential for security threats in the future.   
 We have also seen how marketization has been contested by communities and NGOs 
who argue that in the past such prescriptions have not only been counterproductive but have 
sown the seeds of conflict.  Historically such efforts have only resulted in corruption and 





the state.  These policies have also served to undermine the legitimacy of the state with the 
local population that can leave the country vulnerable to popular discontent and armed 
insurgency.  At the same time, a reluctance to aggressively marketize resources can leave the 
state drastically dependent on international peacebuilders for cash and may leave the state 
unable to cash in the peace dividend and fund a return to basic services, pay government 
officials, and rebuild state institutions.  This can not only create discontent but leave 
institutions in a state of fragility that can only increase vulnerabilities for conflict.  This point 
to another embedded tension-- marketizing the environment and natural resources may be 
needed to some extent--and international peacebuilders are likely necessary to ensure 
transparency and accountability are improved.   
 This idea of embedded tensions highlights two things. First, analysts that advocate a 
wholehearted endorsement of the current peacebuilding agendas or suggest a need to abandon 
peacebuilding altogether are off-the-mark.  In fact, neither option is possible at the moment.  
What is needed is a better understanding of the trade-offs and innovative ways of negotiating 
and legitimizing reforms and policies that are clearly contentious and tension filled.  Second, 
international peacebuilders face tough choices because an emphasis on state authority and 
neoliberal prescriptions for peace has implications for local well-being and development.  In 
short, IPOs need to be attentive to the fact that dealing with the environment and natural 
resources in war-torn states is intrinsically difficult.  As guideposts, peacebuilders should ask 
precisely "whose peace" they are trying to secure and what kind of development genuinely 
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